Beyond minimalism : why objectivity matters for metaethical moral realism

Abstract

This paper argues that moral realism must commit to objectivity as a core feature. According to an influential view, a theory qualifies as moral realism if moral claims are literally construed as straightforwardly true, requiring only cognitivism and success theory without objectivity. However, some forms of relativism accept truth-aptness and success theory while rejecting objective truth values, allowing moral propositions to have different truth values in different contexts of assessment. This creates a dilemma: either the notion of “straightforward truth” implicitly requires objectivity – making moral realism robust rather than minimal – or minimal realism cannot properly classify these relativist views as realist or antirealist. Further emphasizing this issue, research on folk metaethics suggests that people may comprehend moral claims in an assessment-sensitive manner. Future research could contribute significantly by arbitrating between competing interpretations of the current data: indexical moral relativism (moral claims express different propositions in different contexts) versus assessment sensitivity (the same proposition can have different truth values in different contexts of assessment). The paper concludes that moral realism must require objectivity not because relativism must reject it, but because some forms can coherently do so – a conclusion that could be strengthened by empirical studies examining how people judge moral disagreement across contexts.