Delegation and Value Creation

Kurzanzeige
dc.contributor.authorEisenkopf, Gerald
dc.contributor.authorNüesch, Stephan
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-03T14:25:02Z
dc.date.available2015-02-03T14:25:02Z
dc.date.issued2013eng
dc.description.abstractMany scholars argue that the delegation of decision rights to independent institutions promotes trust and specific investments. We test this conjecture with variations of the trust game in which the back transfer decision is delegated to a third party. A randomly chosen third party with a fixed payment induces larger investments over time although the experimental design rules out reputation building. Changes in the third party’s selection procedure eliminate this benefit. If the third party gets a reward for the appointment, delegation actually destroys trust. Investors (unwarrantedly) fear a diffusion of responsibility and lower back transfers in this case.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.identifier.ppn425733165
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29729
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper Series / Department of Economics
dc.rightsterms-of-use
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc330eng
dc.subject.jelD33
dc.subject.jelJ33
dc.subject.jelJ41
dc.titleDelegation and Value Creationeng
dc.typeWORKINGPAPEReng
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.bibliographicInfo.seriesNumber2013-13eng
kops.citation.bibtex
@techreport{Eisenkopf2013Deleg-29729,
  year={2013},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Delegation and Value Creation},
  number={2013-13},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Nüesch, Stephan}
}
kops.citation.iso690EISENKOPF, Gerald, Stephan NÜESCH, 2013. Delegation and Value Creationdeu
kops.citation.iso690EISENKOPF, Gerald, Stephan NÜESCH, 2013. Delegation and Value Creationeng
kops.citation.rdf
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/29729">
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:creator>Nüesch, Stephan</dc:creator>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29729"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/29729/3/Eisenkopf_0-275434.pdf"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:contributor>Nüesch, Stephan</dc:contributor>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-03T14:25:02Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Eisenkopf, Gerald</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:title>Delegation and Value Creation</dcterms:title>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/29729/3/Eisenkopf_0-275434.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2013</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-03T14:25:02Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:contributor>Eisenkopf, Gerald</dc:contributor>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Many scholars argue that the delegation of decision rights to independent institutions promotes trust and specific investments. We test this conjecture with variations of the trust game in which the back transfer decision is delegated to a third party. A randomly chosen third party with a fixed payment induces larger investments over time although the experimental design rules out reputation building. Changes in the third party’s selection procedure eliminate this benefit. If the third party gets a reward for the appointment, delegation actually destroys trust. Investors (unwarrantedly) fear a diffusion of responsibility and lower back transfers in this case.</dcterms:abstract>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
kops.description.openAccessopenaccessgreen
kops.flag.knbibliographytrue
kops.identifier.nbnurn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-275434
kops.relation.seriesofconstanceWorking Paper Series / Department of Economics
relation.isAuthorOfPublicationc77433c1-5ab4-4ad5-b6d7-88fccba4301d
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscoveryc77433c1-5ab4-4ad5-b6d7-88fccba4301d
relation.isSeriesOfPublication5a966192-6992-4bea-95cc-530b7a478a86
relation.isSeriesOfPublication.latestForDiscovery5a966192-6992-4bea-95cc-530b7a478a86
temp.internal.duplicates<p>Keine Dubletten gefunden. Letzte Überprüfung: 03.02.2015 11:23:02</p>deu

Dateien

Originalbündel

Gerade angezeigt 1 - 1 von 1
Vorschaubild nicht verfügbar
Name:
Eisenkopf_0-275434.pdf
Größe:
831.18 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Eisenkopf_0-275434.pdf
Eisenkopf_0-275434.pdfGröße: 831.18 KBDownloads: 747

Lizenzbündel

Gerade angezeigt 1 - 1 von 1
Vorschaubild nicht verfügbar
Name:
license.txt
Größe:
3.88 KB
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Beschreibung:
license.txt
license.txtGröße: 3.88 KBDownloads: 0

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen