Debt Relief for Poor Countries : Conditionality and Effectiveness

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Dateien
Scholl_2-iwpns1nrgr244.PDF
Scholl_2-iwpns1nrgr244.PDFGröße: 222.58 KBDownloads: 1
Datum
2018
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
Kontakt
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID
Internationale Patentnummer
Link zur Lizenz
Urheberrechtlich geschützt
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Gesperrt bis
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Forschungsvorhaben
Organisationseinheiten
Zeitschriftenheft
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Economica. 2018, 85(339), pp. 626-648. ISSN 0013-0427. eISSN 1468-0335. Available under: doi: 10.1111/ecca.12216
Zusammenfassung

This paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries. We develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government, and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract. In contrast to the recent practice of fully cancelling debt, optimal incentive‐compatible conditionality is accompanied by a concessionality level that implies a combination of subsidized loans and outright grants. The optimal concessionality level depends on the recipient's access to international financial markets and on the strength of the conflict of interest. Incentive‐compatible transfers with optimal concessionality levels generate substantial welfare gains. If the donor does not implement the optimal concessionality level and provides subsidized loans only, then the effectiveness of transfers decreases in the long run with severe welfare implications. In contrast, transfers are less effective in the short run if the donor offers outright grants only.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690SCHOLL, Almuth, 2018. Debt Relief for Poor Countries : Conditionality and Effectiveness. In: Economica. 2018, 85(339), pp. 626-648. ISSN 0013-0427. eISSN 1468-0335. Available under: doi: 10.1111/ecca.12216
BibTex
@article{Scholl2018Relie-26640.2,
  year={2018},
  doi={10.1111/ecca.12216},
  title={Debt Relief for Poor Countries : Conditionality and Effectiveness},
  number={339},
  volume={85},
  issn={0013-0427},
  journal={Economica},
  pages={626--648},
  author={Scholl, Almuth}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/26640.2">
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2018-06-29T09:24:43Z</dc:date>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/26640.2"/>
    <dcterms:title>Debt Relief for Poor Countries : Conditionality and Effectiveness</dcterms:title>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper studies the effectiveness of debt relief to stimulate economic growth in the most heavily indebted poor countries. We develop a neoclassical framework with a conflict of interest between the altruistic donor and the recipient government, and model conditionality as an imperfectly enforceable dynamic contract. In contrast to the recent practice of fully cancelling debt, optimal incentive‐compatible conditionality is accompanied by a concessionality level that implies a combination of subsidized loans and outright grants. The optimal concessionality level depends on the recipient's access to international financial markets and on the strength of the conflict of interest. Incentive‐compatible transfers with optimal concessionality levels generate substantial welfare gains. If the donor does not implement the optimal concessionality level and provides subsidized loans only, then the effectiveness of transfers decreases in the long run with severe welfare implications. In contrast, transfers are less effective in the short run if the donor offers outright grants only.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/26640.2/1/Scholl_2-iwpns1nrgr244.PDF"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2018</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2018-06-29T09:24:43Z</dcterms:available>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/26640.2/1/Scholl_2-iwpns1nrgr244.PDF"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:contributor>Scholl, Almuth</dc:contributor>
    <dc:creator>Scholl, Almuth</dc:creator>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Ja
Diese Publikation teilen

Versionsgeschichte

Gerade angezeigt 1 - 2 von 2
VersionDatumZusammenfassung
2*
2018-06-29 09:22:50
2014-02-27 07:34:43
* Ausgewählte Version