A note on selection effects of the hand rule

Baumann, Florian; Friehe, Tim

A note on selection effects of the hand rule

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2013

Autor:innen

Baumann, Florian

Friehe, Tim

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00402.x

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Bulletin of Economic Research. 2013, 65(4), pp. 343-353. ISSN 0307-3378. eISSN 1467-8586. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00402.x

Zusammenfassung

The famous Hand rule weighs the burden of precaution against the reduction in expected harm. The burden may be type‐specific, implying different standards of care for different injurer types. We show that this fact may be exploited by principals in their search for minimized individual costs. Principals may hire agents with high cost of care‐taking although other agents are available. This is shown in a unilateral‐care setting either with perfect or with asymmetric information. We therefore highlight a neglected downside of the negligence rule.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

BAUMANN, Florian, Tim FRIEHE, 2013. A note on selection effects of the hand rule. In: Bulletin of Economic Research. 2013, 65(4), pp. 343-353. ISSN 0307-3378. eISSN 1467-8586. Available under: doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00402.x

BibTex

@article{Baumann2013-10selec-41915,
  year={2013},
  doi={10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00402.x},
  title={A note on selection effects of the hand rule},
  number={4},
  volume={65},
  issn={0307-3378},
  journal={Bulletin of Economic Research},
  pages={343--353},
  author={Baumann, Florian and Friehe, Tim}
}

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