Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fair Behaviour? : Evidence from Russia

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2014
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Fehr, Ernst
Tougareva, Elena
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This paper reports the results of a series of competitive labour market experiments in which subjects have the possibility to reciprocate favours. In the high stake condition subjects earned between two and three times their monthly income during the experiment. In the normal stake condition the stake level was reduced by a factor of ten. We observe that both in the high and the normal stake condition fairness concerns are strong enough to outweigh competitive forces and give rise to non-competitive wages. There is also no evidence that effort behaviour becomes generally more selfish at higher stake levels. Therefore, our results suggest that fairness concerns may play an important role even at relatively high stake levels.

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ISO 690FEHR, Ernst, Elena TOUGAREVA, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2014. Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fair Behaviour? : Evidence from Russia. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2014, 108, pp. 354-363. ISSN 0167-2681. eISSN 1879-1751. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.09.005
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@article{Fehr2014Stake-30383,
  year={2014},
  doi={10.1016/j.jebo.2013.09.005},
  title={Do High Stakes and Competition Undermine Fair Behaviour? : Evidence from Russia},
  volume={108},
  issn={0167-2681},
  journal={Journal of  Economic Behavior and Organization},
  pages={354--363},
  author={Fehr, Ernst and Tougareva, Elena and Fischbacher, Urs}
}
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