The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests

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2013
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Zusammenfassung

The heterogeneous effort supply in intergroup contests explains why groups have a manager. However, the objectives of group managers and members often differ. Using data from an experiment this paper studies whether this conflict of interests affects leadership effectiveness. The managers have an advisory role only and cannot change the monetary incentives of the group members in any context. Depending on the treatment some managers prefer more competition than the group members, some less, and some do not have any incentive at all. The results show that managers can coordinate their groups rather effectively. Their incentives shape the competitive behavior of the 'subordinates'. However group members follow the non-binding investment recommendations of their group manager more closely if management compensation is not incentivized.

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330 Wirtschaft
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Communication, Experiment, Rent-seeking, Management compensation, Group decision making
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ISO 690EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2013. The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests
BibTex
@techreport{Eisenkopf2013Impac-29929,
  year={2013},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests},
  number={2013‐06},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald}
}
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