The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests

Eisenkopf, Gerald

The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests

Dateien

Eisenkopf_0-274768.pdfGröße: 728.99 KBDownloads: 150

Datum

2013

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

The heterogeneous effort supply in intergroup contests explains why groups have a manager. However, the objectives of group managers and members often differ. Using data from an experiment this paper studies whether this conflict of interests affects leadership effectiveness. The managers have an advisory role only and cannot change the monetary incentives of the group members in any context. Depending on the treatment some managers prefer more competition than the group members, some less, and some do not have any incentive at all. The results show that managers can coordinate their groups rather effectively. Their incentives shape the competitive behavior of the 'subordinates'. However group members follow the non-binding investment recommendations of their group manager more closely if management compensation is not incentivized.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Communication, Experiment, Rent-seeking, Management compensation, Group decision making

Zitieren

ISO 690

EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2013. The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests

BibTex

@techreport{Eisenkopf2013Impac-29929,
  year={2013},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests},
  number={2013‐06},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald}
}

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