Publikation:

Simulation, imagination and justification

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2025

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Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG): RO 1063/3-1

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Analysis. Oxford University Press. 2025, 85(1), S. 159-169. ISSN 0003-2638. eISSN 1467-8284. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1093/analys/anae075

Zusammenfassung

According to an epistemically optimistic view of empathy – understood as the simulation of another person’s state – agents learn (1) in which state the target is and (2) what it is like for her to be in this state. Assuming the necessity of justification for knowledge, this view faces the challenge of how imagination can justify beliefs. Constraining simulation to match the target’s state seems to be a solution. Because of the abundance of plausible psychological reactions towards a specific situation, however, we need to know how the target reacts in order to simulate the correct mental state. According to narrativists, we gain this knowledge by means of testimony, which makes simulation superfluous. For those who accept that (2) has epistemic value, the paper presents a solution to the problem of justification that assigns a central role to both testimony and imagination.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
100 Philosophie

Schlagwörter

empathy, imagination, justification, testimony, phenomenal knowledge, simulation

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ISO 690WERNER, Christiana, 2025. Simulation, imagination and justification. In: Analysis. Oxford University Press. 2025, 85(1), S. 159-169. ISSN 0003-2638. eISSN 1467-8284. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1093/analys/anae075
BibTex
@article{Werner2025-09-04Simul-75761,
  title={Simulation, imagination and justification},
  year={2025},
  doi={10.1093/analys/anae075},
  number={1},
  volume={85},
  issn={0003-2638},
  journal={Analysis},
  pages={159--169},
  author={Werner, Christiana}
}
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