Strategic Errors and Audit Quality - An Experimental Investigation

dc.contributor.authorFischbacher, Urs
dc.contributor.authorStefani, Ulrike
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-23T09:35:56Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-23T09:35:56Zdeu
dc.date.issued2007deu
dc.description.abstractWe report experimental results for a simple bimatrix game between a manager and an auditor. We investigate whether the quality of audited financial statements improves if the relative proportion of perfectly honest auditors increases. We find that the quality of audited reports is higher if computerized auditors who always perform a high audit effort are present. This result is in direct contrast to the Nash prediction for our game. The Quantal Response Equilibrium, which explicitly takes into account boundedly rational behavior, supports our experimental data. Our main findings depend neither on framing nor the payoff matrix we use.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.identifier.citationPubl. in: The Accounting Review 82 (2007), 3, pp. 679-704deu
dc.identifier.doi10.2308/accr.2007.82.3.679
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/1786
dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2009deu
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.titleStrategic Errors and Audit Quality - An Experimental Investigationeng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEdeu
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@article{Fischbacher2007Strat-1786,
  year={2007},
  doi={10.2308/accr.2007.82.3.679},
  title={Strategic Errors and Audit Quality - An Experimental Investigation},
  number={3},
  volume={82},
  journal={The Accounting Review},
  pages={679--704},
  author={Fischbacher, Urs and Stefani, Ulrike}
}
kops.citation.iso690FISCHBACHER, Urs, Ulrike STEFANI, 2007. Strategic Errors and Audit Quality - An Experimental Investigation. In: The Accounting Review. 2007, 82(3), pp. 679-704. Available under: doi: 10.2308/accr.2007.82.3.679deu
kops.citation.iso690FISCHBACHER, Urs, Ulrike STEFANI, 2007. Strategic Errors and Audit Quality - An Experimental Investigation. In: The Accounting Review. 2007, 82(3), pp. 679-704. Available under: doi: 10.2308/accr.2007.82.3.679eng
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kops.sourcefieldThe Accounting Review. 2007, <b>82</b>(3), pp. 679-704. Available under: doi: 10.2308/accr.2007.82.3.679deu
kops.sourcefield.plainThe Accounting Review. 2007, 82(3), pp. 679-704. Available under: doi: 10.2308/accr.2007.82.3.679deu
kops.sourcefield.plainThe Accounting Review. 2007, 82(3), pp. 679-704. Available under: doi: 10.2308/accr.2007.82.3.679eng
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