Publikation: Lobbying as a collective enterprise : Winners and losers of policy formulation in the European Union
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Why does lobbying success in the European Union (EU) vary across interest groups? Even though this question is central to the study of EU policy-making, only few have dealt with it. The small number of existing studies is moreover characterized by a multitude of hypotheses and contradictory findings. This article aims to overcome these shortcomings by presenting a theoretical exchange model that identifies information supply, citizen support and economic power of entire lobbying camps as the major determinants of lobbying success. The hypotheses are empirically evaluated based on a large new dataset. By combining a quantitative text analysis of interest group submissions to Commission consultations with an online survey among interest groups, the theoretical expectations are tested across a large number of policy issues and interest groups while controlling for individual interest group and issue characteristics. The empirical analysis confirms the theoretical expectations indicating that lobbying is a collective enterprise.
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KLÜVER, Heike, 2013. Lobbying as a collective enterprise : Winners and losers of policy formulation in the European Union. In: Journal of European Public Policy. 2013, 20(1), pp. 59-76. ISSN 1350-1763. eISSN 1466-4429. Available under: doi: 10.1080/13501763.2012.699661BibTex
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author={Klüver, Heike}
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