Monstrous A Priori

Abstract

This paper is devoted to the search for an argument for the existence of a posteriori identities. I will try to improve on existing predecessors and defend the result against Scott Soames' critique in his recent book "Beyond Rigidity". First I will inspect Kripke's original argument as well as Soames' reconstruction. This reconstruction, while closely related, is shown to differ from Kripke's original in important respects. I will then ask whether either the original or Soames reconstruction may be considered as satisfactory arguments for the existence of aposteriori identities. I will show that this is not the case. These arguments use objectionable notions of apriority, but this problem can be remedied. The result will still be open to Soames main criticism against Kripkean arguments, namely that they are committed to principles of disquotation, principles of a kind that Kripke himself has later shown to be objectionable. Therefore, I will also sketch a defense of principles of disquotation.