Reciprocity
| dc.contributor.author | Fischbacher, Urs | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-03-05T14:29:06Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-03-05T14:29:06Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2025-02-20 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Even though there is agreement on the general principle of reciprocity, the term includes several facets that often require qualification. Reciprocity means responding in kind, but the target of reciprocation determines whether reciprocity is direct, indirect, or generalised. Research on reciprocity has demonstrated its empirical relevance in controlled lab experiments. Further, several descriptive models of reciprocity have been developed, covering outcome-orientated models that mimic reciprocity and models of direct and type-based reciprocity. Finally, reciprocity is also highly relevant in the understanding of the evolution of human cooperation. The existence of strong reciprocity, the willingness to incur costs to reward good and punish bad behaviour, is an important puzzle for evolutionary models. | |
| dc.description.version | published | deu |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.4337/9781802207736.000108 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/72584 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | |
| dc.title | Reciprocity | eng |
| dc.type | INCOLLECTION | |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| kops.citation.bibtex | @incollection{Fischbacher2025-02-20Recip-72584,
title={Reciprocity},
year={2025},
doi={10.4337/9781802207736.000108},
isbn={978-1-80220-772-9},
address={Cheltenham},
publisher={Edward Elgar Publishing},
booktitle={Elgar Encyclopedia of Behavioural and Experimental Economics},
pages={347--349},
editor={Chuah, Swee-Hoon and Hoffmann, Robert and Neelim, Ananta},
author={Fischbacher, Urs}
} | |
| kops.citation.iso690 | FISCHBACHER, Urs, 2025. Reciprocity. In: CHUAH, Swee-Hoon, Hrsg., Robert HOFFMANN, Hrsg., Ananta NEELIM, Hrsg.. Elgar Encyclopedia of Behavioural and Experimental Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2025, S. 347-349. ISBN 978-1-80220-772-9. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.4337/9781802207736.000108 | deu |
| kops.citation.iso690 | FISCHBACHER, Urs, 2025. Reciprocity. In: CHUAH, Swee-Hoon, ed., Robert HOFFMANN, ed., Ananta NEELIM, ed.. Elgar Encyclopedia of Behavioural and Experimental Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2025, pp. 347-349. ISBN 978-1-80220-772-9. Available under: doi: 10.4337/9781802207736.000108 | eng |
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| kops.sourcefield | CHUAH, Swee-Hoon, Hrsg., Robert HOFFMANN, Hrsg., Ananta NEELIM, Hrsg.. <i>Elgar Encyclopedia of Behavioural and Experimental Economics</i>. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2025, S. 347-349. ISBN 978-1-80220-772-9. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.4337/9781802207736.000108 | deu |
| kops.sourcefield.plain | CHUAH, Swee-Hoon, Hrsg., Robert HOFFMANN, Hrsg., Ananta NEELIM, Hrsg.. Elgar Encyclopedia of Behavioural and Experimental Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2025, S. 347-349. ISBN 978-1-80220-772-9. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.4337/9781802207736.000108 | deu |
| kops.sourcefield.plain | CHUAH, Swee-Hoon, ed., Robert HOFFMANN, ed., Ananta NEELIM, ed.. Elgar Encyclopedia of Behavioural and Experimental Economics. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2025, pp. 347-349. ISBN 978-1-80220-772-9. Available under: doi: 10.4337/9781802207736.000108 | eng |
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| source.bibliographicInfo.fromPage | 347 | |
| source.bibliographicInfo.toPage | 349 | |
| source.contributor.editor | Chuah, Swee-Hoon | |
| source.contributor.editor | Hoffmann, Robert | |
| source.contributor.editor | Neelim, Ananta | |
| source.identifier.isbn | 978-1-80220-772-9 | |
| source.publisher | Edward Elgar Publishing | |
| source.publisher.location | Cheltenham | |
| source.title | Elgar Encyclopedia of Behavioural and Experimental Economics | |
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