Is tax harmonization useful?

Eggert, Wolfgang; Genser, Bernd

Is tax harmonization useful?

Dateien

dp00_23.pdfGröße: 191.87 KBDownloads: 133

Datum

2000

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

It is a widely acknowledged result of the literature on capital tax competition that underprovision of public goods can only be avoided if tax coordination between governments is intensive and residence-based capital taxation can be enforced. In this paper we use a model where commodity and factor taxes are available and we show that governments competing for tax bases will choose a globally efficient tax structure. In contrast to previous conclusions, we also show that the availability of a destination-based commodity tax or a labor tax is necessary to mitigate the problem of inefficient Nash equilibria and thus reduces the necessity of supranational tax harmonization or coordination.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

EGGERT, Wolfgang, Bernd GENSER, 2000. Is tax harmonization useful?

BibTex

@techreport{Eggert2000harmo-12004,
  year={2000},
  series={CoFE-Diskussionspapiere / Zentrum für Finanzen und Ökonometrie},
  title={Is tax harmonization useful?},
  number={2000/23},
  author={Eggert, Wolfgang and Genser, Bernd}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

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