Credit And Growth Under Limited Commitment

Kurzanzeige
dc.contributor.authorAzariadis, Costasdeu
dc.contributor.authorKaas, Leo
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:40:35Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:40:35Zdeu
dc.date.issued2008deu
dc.description.abstractWe consider a linear growth model with idiosyncratic productivity shocks in which producers cannot commit to repay their loans. Borrowing constraints are determined endogenously by the borrowers incentives to repay, assuming that defaulters lose a share of output and are excluded from future trade in the credit market. We characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for the enforceability of a first-best equilibrium growth path. Weak property rights, impatient producers, and small productivity differentials can make the efficient growth path nonenforceable and lead to an inefficient equilibrium with binding borrowing constraints. For some economies, multiple balanced growth paths coexist.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfdeu
dc.identifier.citationFirst publ. in: Macroeconomic Dynamics 12 (2008), Supplement S1, pp. 20-30deu
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S136510050707006X
dc.identifier.ppn312566409deu
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11838
dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2009deu
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subjectEndogenous Growthdeu
dc.subjectLimited Enforcementdeu
dc.subjectBorrowing Constraintsdeu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.titleCredit And Growth Under Limited Commitmenteng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEdeu
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
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  year={2008},
  doi={10.1017/S136510050707006X},
  title={Credit And Growth Under Limited Commitment},
  number={Supplement S1},
  volume={12},
  journal={Macroeconomic Dynamics},
  pages={20--30},
  author={Azariadis, Costas and Kaas, Leo}
}
kops.citation.iso690AZARIADIS, Costas, Leo KAAS, 2008. Credit And Growth Under Limited Commitment. In: Macroeconomic Dynamics. 2008, 12(Supplement S1), pp. 20-30. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S136510050707006Xdeu
kops.citation.iso690AZARIADIS, Costas, Leo KAAS, 2008. Credit And Growth Under Limited Commitment. In: Macroeconomic Dynamics. 2008, 12(Supplement S1), pp. 20-30. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S136510050707006Xeng
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kops.sourcefieldMacroeconomic Dynamics. 2008, <b>12</b>(Supplement S1), pp. 20-30. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S136510050707006Xdeu
kops.sourcefield.plainMacroeconomic Dynamics. 2008, 12(Supplement S1), pp. 20-30. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S136510050707006Xdeu
kops.sourcefield.plainMacroeconomic Dynamics. 2008, 12(Supplement S1), pp. 20-30. Available under: doi: 10.1017/S136510050707006Xeng
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source.periodicalTitleMacroeconomic Dynamics

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