Perceptual justification and assertively representing the world

dc.contributor.authorBriesen, Jochen
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-23T12:35:36Z
dc.date.available2015-02-23T12:35:36Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.description.abstractThis paper argues that there is a problem for the justificatory significance of perceptions that has been overlooked thus far. Assuming that perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes and that only propositional attitudes which assertively represent the world can function as justifiers, the problem consists in specifying what it means for a propositional attitude to assertively represent the world without losing the justificatory significance of perceptions - a challenge that is harder to meet than might first be thought. That there is such a problem can be seen by reconsidering and modifying a well-known argument to the conclusion that beliefs cannot be justified by perceptions but only by other beliefs. Nevertheless, the aim of the paper is not to conclude that perceptions are actually incapable of justifying our beliefs but rather to highlight an overlooked problem that needs to be solved in order to properly understand the justificatory relationship between perceptions and beliefs.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11098-014-0407-8eng
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29955
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.subjectPerception, Evidence, Justification, Propositional Attitude, Assertivityeng
dc.subject.ddc100eng
dc.titlePerceptual justification and assertively representing the worldeng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEeng
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
@article{Briesen2015Perce-29955,
  year={2015},
  doi={10.1007/s11098-014-0407-8},
  title={Perceptual justification and assertively representing the world},
  number={8},
  volume={172},
  issn={0031-8116},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  pages={2239--2259},
  author={Briesen, Jochen}
}
kops.citation.iso690BRIESEN, Jochen, 2015. Perceptual justification and assertively representing the world. In: Philosophical Studies. 2015, 172(8), pp. 2239-2259. ISSN 0031-8116. eISSN 1573-0883. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0407-8deu
kops.citation.iso690BRIESEN, Jochen, 2015. Perceptual justification and assertively representing the world. In: Philosophical Studies. 2015, 172(8), pp. 2239-2259. ISSN 0031-8116. eISSN 1573-0883. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0407-8eng
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kops.sourcefieldPhilosophical Studies. 2015, <b>172</b>(8), pp. 2239-2259. ISSN 0031-8116. eISSN 1573-0883. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0407-8deu
kops.sourcefield.plainPhilosophical Studies. 2015, 172(8), pp. 2239-2259. ISSN 0031-8116. eISSN 1573-0883. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0407-8deu
kops.sourcefield.plainPhilosophical Studies. 2015, 172(8), pp. 2239-2259. ISSN 0031-8116. eISSN 1573-0883. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0407-8eng
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source.periodicalTitlePhilosophical Studieseng
temp.internal.duplicates<p>Keine Dubletten gefunden. Letzte Überprüfung: 18.02.2015 12:45:54</p>deu

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