A new model of equilibrium involuntary unemployment

Kurzanzeige
dc.contributor.authorKaas, Leo
dc.contributor.authorMadden, Pauldeu
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:40:28Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:40:28Zdeu
dc.date.issued2004deu
dc.description.abstractWe show that equilibrium involuntary unemployment emerges in a multi-stage game model where all market power resides with firms, on both the labour and the output market. Firms decide wages, employment, output and prices, and under constant returns there exists a continuum of subgame perfect Nash equilibria involving unemployment and positive profits. A firm does not undercut the equilibrium wage since then high wage firms would attract its workers, thus forcing the undercutting firm out of both markets. Full employment equilibria are payoff dominated by unemployment equilibria, and the arguments are robust to decreasing returns.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfdeu
dc.identifier.citationFirst publ. in: Economic Theory 23 (2004), 3, pp. 507-527deu
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00199-003-0391-2
dc.identifier.ppn31288852Xdeu
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11822
dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2009deu
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subjectInvoluntary unemploymentdeu
dc.subjectMulti-stage gamedeu
dc.subjectImperfect competitiondeu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.subject.jelD43deu
dc.subject.jelE24deu
dc.titleA new model of equilibrium involuntary unemploymenteng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEdeu
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
@article{Kaas2004model-11822,
  year={2004},
  doi={10.1007/s00199-003-0391-2},
  title={A new model of equilibrium involuntary unemployment},
  number={3},
  volume={23},
  journal={Economic Theory},
  pages={507--527},
  author={Kaas, Leo and Madden, Paul}
}
kops.citation.iso690KAAS, Leo, Paul MADDEN, 2004. A new model of equilibrium involuntary unemployment. In: Economic Theory. 2004, 23(3), pp. 507-527. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-003-0391-2deu
kops.citation.iso690KAAS, Leo, Paul MADDEN, 2004. A new model of equilibrium involuntary unemployment. In: Economic Theory. 2004, 23(3), pp. 507-527. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-003-0391-2eng
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kops.sourcefieldEconomic Theory. 2004, <b>23</b>(3), pp. 507-527. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-003-0391-2deu
kops.sourcefield.plainEconomic Theory. 2004, 23(3), pp. 507-527. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-003-0391-2deu
kops.sourcefield.plainEconomic Theory. 2004, 23(3), pp. 507-527. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-003-0391-2eng
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