Deterring gaming with imperfect evaluation methods

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dc.contributor.authorEisenkopf, Gerald
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:41:33Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:41:33Zdeu
dc.date.issued2006deu
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces and discusses an idea which minimizes gaming or manipulation activities, if payments are linked to results from manipulative methods. The idea is to add nonmanipulable information to manipulable information to improve the evaluation of a given output. A score declining in increasing evaluation quality indicates gaming and allows to estimate the true result. A simple linear incentive scheme is introduced in which a high evaluation score is rewarded. The introduced mechanism dominates any single evaluation method. However, limited liability restricts its applicability. If agents are risk-averse, the principal should let each agent decide, which evaluation method he prefers.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfdeu
dc.identifier.ppn253046211deu
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11985
dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2006deu
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionspapiere der DFG-Forschergruppe Heterogene Arbeit
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subjectForschungsmanagementdeu
dc.subjectAgency-Theoriedeu
dc.subjectGamingdeu
dc.subjectManipulationdeu
dc.subjectEvaluationdeu
dc.subjectRisk Aversiondeu
dc.subjectResearch Managementdeu
dc.subjectAgency Theorydeu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.subject.gndManipulationdeu
dc.subject.gndGamingdeu
dc.subject.gndEvaluationdeu
dc.subject.gndRisikoaversiondeu
dc.subject.jelM52deu
dc.subject.jelM40deu
dc.subject.jelD80deu
dc.titleDeterring gaming with imperfect evaluation methodseng
dc.typeWORKINGPAPERdeu
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@techreport{Eisenkopf2006Deter-11985,
  year={2006},
  series={Diskussionspapiere der DFG-Forschergruppe Heterogene Arbeit},
  title={Deterring gaming with imperfect evaluation methods},
  number={06/04},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald}
}
kops.citation.iso690EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2006. Deterring gaming with imperfect evaluation methodsdeu
kops.citation.iso690EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2006. Deterring gaming with imperfect evaluation methodseng
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