Intellectual Property Rights, Global Competition and Transfer of Technology: Prospects for a Global System of Innovation Rights based on the Quasi-Contract of Unjust Enrichment

dc.contributor.authorSuárez Baltodano, Pedrodeu
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-23T13:44:32Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-23T13:44:32Zdeu
dc.date.issued1999deu
dc.description.abstractThe definition of the legal nature of intellectual property rights is crucial for their interpretation and enforcement. A reconsideration of this legal foundation may significantly increase the efficiency of intellectual property rights in promoting both the creation and difusion of technology. Traditionally the exclusion right of patents has been explained as based on monopoly or property rights. As a result, the exclusion right has been interpreted as absolute (per se). The possibility of framing patent exclusion rights as based on the quasi-contract of unjust enrichment has been overlook. In this case, the exclusion right is not absolute, per se, but based on a rule of reason. The new economy has increased the possibilities of global networking, whereby profit is generated by licensing. This joined with the creation of national systems of innovation, such as the Japanese one, makes a system of protection for innovators based on quasi-contracts feasible. In this context, patentees are no longer encouraged to frame their rights as absolute monopoly rights to exclude others arbitrarily, but as instruments to profit from the transfer and difusion of technology. Compulsory licensing is no longer framed as an expropriation, but as a measurement that may be necessary to balance legitimate interests of technology users. Infringement of patents constitutes an act of unjust enrichment, whereby negligent or intentional infringers should make additionally restitution of damages. In this case, patent rights are constructed on general principles of law and equity globally recognized. Thus, this framework offers a proper background for interpreting and applying the TRIPs Agreement. It allows for the creation of a win/win bargaining scenario, whereby all parties are interested in sharing their resources as long as they can obtain fair participation in the enrichment generated by their contributions. As a result, all agents may profit from the systemic nature of innovation.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfdeu
dc.identifier.ppn088851656deu
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/3336
dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2000deu
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subjectInnovationssytemedeu
dc.subjectJapanese Patentpolitikdeu
dc.subjectUruguay Rounddeu
dc.subjectTRIPsdeu
dc.subjectGeistiges Eigentumdeu
dc.subjectInternational Patent Lawdeu
dc.subjectInnovation Systemsdeu
dc.subjectTransfer of Technologydeu
dc.subjectTRIPsdeu
dc.subjectDevelopment Policydeu
dc.subject.ddc340deu
dc.subject.gndInternationales Patentrechtdeu
dc.subject.gndPatentpolitikdeu
dc.subject.gndTechnologietransferdeu
dc.subject.gndInnovationsförderungdeu
dc.subject.gndEntwicklungspolitikdeu
dc.subject.jelO31deu
dc.subject.jelO33deu
dc.subject.jelO34deu
dc.titleIntellectual Property Rights, Global Competition and Transfer of Technology: Prospects for a Global System of Innovation Rights based on the Quasi-Contract of Unjust Enrichmenteng
dc.title.alternativeGeistiges Eigentum, Globaler Wettbewerb und Technologietransfer. Möglichkeiten eines in dem vertragsähnlichen Verhältnis ungerechtfertigter Bereicherung begründeten Systems der Innovationsrechtedeu
dc.typeDOCTORAL_THESISdeu
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
@phdthesis{SuarezBaltodano1999Intel-3336,
  year={1999},
  title={Intellectual Property Rights, Global Competition and Transfer of Technology: Prospects for a Global System of Innovation Rights based on the Quasi-Contract of Unjust Enrichment},
  author={Suárez Baltodano, Pedro},
  address={Konstanz},
  school={Universität Konstanz}
}
kops.citation.iso690SUÁREZ BALTODANO, Pedro, 1999. Intellectual Property Rights, Global Competition and Transfer of Technology: Prospects for a Global System of Innovation Rights based on the Quasi-Contract of Unjust Enrichment [Dissertation]. Konstanz: University of Konstanzdeu
kops.citation.iso690SUÁREZ BALTODANO, Pedro, 1999. Intellectual Property Rights, Global Competition and Transfer of Technology: Prospects for a Global System of Innovation Rights based on the Quasi-Contract of Unjust Enrichment [Dissertation]. Konstanz: University of Konstanzeng
kops.citation.rdf
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/3336">
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/3336/1/baltodano.pdf"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/44"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dc:creator>Suárez Baltodano, Pedro</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T13:44:32Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:title>Intellectual Property Rights, Global Competition and Transfer of Technology: Prospects for a Global System of Innovation Rights based on the Quasi-Contract of Unjust Enrichment</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The definition of the legal nature of intellectual property rights is crucial for their interpretation and enforcement. A reconsideration of this legal foundation may significantly increase the efficiency of intellectual property rights in promoting both the creation and difusion of technology. Traditionally the exclusion right of patents has been explained as based on monopoly or property rights. As a result, the exclusion right has been interpreted as absolute (per se). The possibility of framing patent exclusion rights as based on the quasi-contract of unjust enrichment has been overlook. In this case, the exclusion right is not absolute, per se, but based on a rule of reason.  The new economy has increased the possibilities of global networking, whereby profit is generated by licensing. This joined with the creation of national systems of innovation, such as the Japanese one, makes a system of protection for innovators based on quasi-contracts feasible. In this context, patentees are no longer encouraged to frame their rights as absolute monopoly rights to exclude others arbitrarily, but as instruments to profit from the transfer and difusion of technology. Compulsory licensing is no longer framed as an expropriation, but as a measurement that may be necessary  to balance legitimate interests of technology users. Infringement of patents constitutes an act of unjust enrichment, whereby negligent or intentional infringers should make additionally restitution of damages. In this case, patent rights are constructed on general principles of law and equity globally recognized. Thus, this framework offers a proper background for interpreting and applying the TRIPs Agreement. It allows for the creation of a win/win bargaining scenario, whereby all parties are interested in sharing their resources as long as they can obtain fair participation in the enrichment generated by their contributions. As a result, all agents may profit from the systemic nature of innovation.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:issued>1999</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/3336/1/baltodano.pdf"/>
    <dc:contributor>Suárez Baltodano, Pedro</dc:contributor>
    <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
    <dcterms:alternative>Geistiges Eigentum, Globaler Wettbewerb und Technologietransfer. Möglichkeiten eines in dem vertragsähnlichen Verhältnis ungerechtfertigter Bereicherung begründeten Systems der Innovationsrechte</dcterms:alternative>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T13:44:32Z</dc:date>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/44"/>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/3336"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
kops.date.examination2000-10-17deu
kops.description.abstractDas Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, zu erforschen, welche Möglichkeiten es gibt, um einen gegenseitigen gewinnbringenden Technologietransfer zu verwirklichen. Es ist eine Arbeit, die sich insbesondere auf den Bedarf der lateinamerikanischen Entwicklungsländer bezieht. Deshalb werden die Gründe des relativen Mißerfolges dieser Länder bei ihrer Industriepolitik und der einschlägige Erfolg ostasiatischer Länder, insbesondere Japans, dargestellt. Aus einer globalen Perspektive werden die volkswirtschaftlichen, verwaltungswissenschaftlichen und juristischen Aspekte betrachtet, um die Zusammenhänge darzustellen. Dadurch sollen neue Auslegungen und Ausgangspunkte beleuchtet werden, welche geeignet sind, die traditionellen Widersprüche und Konflikte zwischen der Förderung der Technologieentwicklung und der Technologiediffusion zu lösen.deu
kops.description.openAccessopenaccessgreen
kops.identifier.nbnurn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-5898deu
kops.opus.id589deu

Dateien

Originalbündel

Gerade angezeigt 1 - 1 von 1
Vorschaubild nicht verfügbar
Name:
baltodano.pdf
Größe:
1.73 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
baltodano.pdf
baltodano.pdfGröße: 1.73 MBDownloads: 895