The Determinants of Salary and Bonus for Rank and File Employees

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dc.contributor.authorDemougin, Dominiquedeu
dc.contributor.authorFabel, Oliverdeu
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:40:34Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:40:34Zdeu
dc.date.issued2004deu
dc.description.abstractThe current study integrates the repeated game approach to implicit contracts and the analysis of explicit bonus rules based on subjective performance evaluation to determine the optimal structure of the compensation scheme for the average white-collar employee. In contrast to previous contributions we assume that the agent is risk-neutral but liquidity constrained. The salary reflects the maximum reward associated with contractual compliance which can be implicitly agreed. If the probability that the employee remains within the firm increases, the principal can reduce the rent captured by the agent. Hence, the optimal salary increases and the explicit bonus decreases. Nevertheless, the optimal effort supply unambiguously increases.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfdeu
dc.identifier.ppn112932568deu
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11835
dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2004deu
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiskussionsbeiträge ("Grüne Reihe") / FB Wirtschaftswissenschaften
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subjectWhite-Collar Employeesdeu
dc.subjectImplicit Contractdeu
dc.subjectExplicit Bonusdeu
dc.subjectReputational Equilibriumdeu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.subject.jelM52deu
dc.titleThe Determinants of Salary and Bonus for Rank and File Employeeseng
dc.typeWORKINGPAPERdeu
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.bibliographicInfo.seriesNumber327
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  series={Diskussionsbeiträge ("Grüne Reihe") / FB Wirtschaftswissenschaften},
  title={The Determinants of Salary and Bonus for Rank and File Employees},
  number={327},
  author={Demougin, Dominique and Fabel, Oliver}
}
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