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The asymmetric long-term electoral consequences of unpopular reforms : why retrenchment really is a losing game for left parties

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2021

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Journal of European Public Policy. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2021, 28(9), pp. 1494-1517. ISSN 1350-1763. eISSN 1466-4429. Available under: doi: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1773904

Zusammenfassung

Debates about the electoral malaise of the Left, punishment for cutbacks, and left parties as credible protectors of the welfare state have neglected the long-term consequences of retrenchment. To find out how reforms affect parties’ popularity beyond individual government periods, we track the electoral performance of government parties over five elections and assess the interplay of unpopular reforms, partisanship, and the economic legacy. Based on well-known asymmetries in the conditionality of welfare support among parties’ core groups, we hypothesize that right parties reap the economic fruits of their reform labour, whereas left parties struggle to claim credit even if the promised positive economic legacy materializes. Our analyses of the consequences of retrenchment for 196 cabinets in 18 countries confirm that losses of left parties after reforms – in contrast to losses of right parties – are permanent and independent of the economic legacy; creating a tragedy of social-democratic responsibility.

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320 Politik

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Crisis of social democracy; electoral punishment; unpopular reform; welfare state reform

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ISO 690HORN, Alexander, 2021. The asymmetric long-term electoral consequences of unpopular reforms : why retrenchment really is a losing game for left parties. In: Journal of European Public Policy. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2021, 28(9), pp. 1494-1517. ISSN 1350-1763. eISSN 1466-4429. Available under: doi: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1773904
BibTex
@article{Horn2021asymm-54701,
  year={2021},
  doi={10.1080/13501763.2020.1773904},
  title={The asymmetric long-term electoral consequences of unpopular reforms : why retrenchment really is a losing game for left parties},
  number={9},
  volume={28},
  issn={1350-1763},
  journal={Journal of European Public Policy},
  pages={1494--1517},
  author={Horn, Alexander}
}
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