Publikation:

Delegation and stewardship in international organizations

Lade...
Vorschaubild

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2022

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

URI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Journal of European Public Policy. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2022, 29(4), pp. 568-588. ISSN 1350-1763. eISSN 1466-4429. Available under: doi: 10.1080/13501763.2021.1883721

Zusammenfassung

International organizations (IOs) are driven by political-administrative interactions between member states and IO administrations. To model these interactions and understand their outcomes, scholars have predominantly, and almost exclusively, relied on agency theory. Yet, as this paper argues, delegation can also take a form of stewardship, where goal conflict and information asymmetries are low. In stewardship relationships, member states trust the IO administration, which enables softer, more informal exercise of control. Both agency and stewardship relationships are illustrated in a comparative case study of FAO and WFP. As interview data and document analysis show, while FAO exhibits agency, WFP provides an example for stewardship. The findings imply that conventional Principal-Agent assumptions should not be taken as given. Not all IO administrations are self-serving agents. The findings also provide implications on IO control and performance and call for scholarship to redirect its focus on de facto rather than de jure IO characteristics.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
320 Politik

Schlagwörter

Agency, control, delegation, international organization, stewardship, trust

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690JANKAUSKAS, Vytautas, 2022. Delegation and stewardship in international organizations. In: Journal of European Public Policy. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2022, 29(4), pp. 568-588. ISSN 1350-1763. eISSN 1466-4429. Available under: doi: 10.1080/13501763.2021.1883721
BibTex
@article{Jankauskas2022Deleg-53158,
  year={2022},
  doi={10.1080/13501763.2021.1883721},
  title={Delegation and stewardship in international organizations},
  number={4},
  volume={29},
  issn={1350-1763},
  journal={Journal of European Public Policy},
  pages={568--588},
  author={Jankauskas, Vytautas}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/53158">
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2021-03-17T09:38:44Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">International organizations (IOs) are driven by political-administrative interactions between member states and IO administrations. To model these interactions and understand their outcomes, scholars have predominantly, and almost exclusively, relied on agency theory. Yet, as this paper argues, delegation can also take a form of stewardship, where goal conflict and information asymmetries are low. In stewardship relationships, member states trust the IO administration, which enables softer, more informal exercise of control. Both agency and stewardship relationships are illustrated in a comparative case study of FAO and WFP. As interview data and document analysis show, while FAO exhibits agency, WFP provides an example for stewardship. The findings imply that conventional Principal-Agent assumptions should not be taken as given. Not all IO administrations are self-serving agents. The findings also provide implications on IO control and performance and call for scholarship to redirect its focus on de facto rather than de jure IO characteristics.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/53158"/>
    <dcterms:title>Delegation and stewardship in international organizations</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:issued>2022</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:creator>Jankauskas, Vytautas</dc:creator>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dc:contributor>Jankauskas, Vytautas</dc:contributor>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2021-03-17T09:38:44Z</dc:date>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Ja
Diese Publikation teilen