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A comparison of professional traders and psychopaths in a simulated non-zero sum game

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Datum

2012

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Noll, Thomas
Scherrer, Pascal
Mokros, Andreas

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Open Access-Veröffentlichung
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Erschienen in

Catalyst: A Social Justice Forum. 2012, 2(2). eISSN 2160-1844

Zusammenfassung

In a prior study psychopathic individuals showed a diminished level of cooperativeness but realized higher individual rewards in a prisoner’s dilemma game, compared with community controls. The present study replicated this finding with professional bank traders, who exhibited less cooperative behavior than both of the aforermentioned groups (community controls and psychopathic patients). While the bank traders did not obtain a higher gain than the psychopathic individuals at an absolute level, they maximized the discrepancy between their own profit and the yield of their anonymous computerized gaming partner. The bank traders were more prone than psychopathic patients to rely on strategies that considerably harmed the profit of their gaming partners without necessarily optimizing their own total profit. The community controls achieved the same overall gain as traders and psychopaths. Unlike traders and psychopathic patients, the normal controls balanced overall gains of themselves and their game opponent, which led to the highest overall profit, whereas the traders achieved the lowest overall profit.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
150 Psychologie

Schlagwörter

psychopathy, non-zero sum game, professional trader, cooperativeness

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ISO 690NOLL, Thomas, Jérôme ENDRASS, Pascal SCHERRER, Astrid ROSSEGGER, Frank URBANIOK, Andreas MOKROS, 2012. A comparison of professional traders and psychopaths in a simulated non-zero sum game. In: Catalyst: A Social Justice Forum. 2012, 2(2). eISSN 2160-1844
BibTex
@article{Noll2012compa-68271,
  year={2012},
  title={A comparison of professional traders and psychopaths in a simulated non-zero sum game},
  url={https://trace.tennessee.edu/catalyst/vol2/iss2/1/},
  number={2},
  volume={2},
  journal={Catalyst: A Social Justice Forum},
  author={Noll, Thomas and Endrass, Jérôme and Scherrer, Pascal and Rossegger, Astrid and Urbaniok, Frank and Mokros, Andreas}
}
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2023-11-20

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