Experimental evidence on the appropriateness of non-monotone incentive contracts
| dc.contributor.author | Brosig, Jeannette | deu |
| dc.contributor.author | Lukas, Christian | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-03-25T09:40:55Z | deu |
| dc.date.available | 2011-03-25T09:40:55Z | deu |
| dc.date.issued | 2006 | deu |
| dc.description.abstract | Non-monotone contracts, which can well represent the theoretically optimal choice of a contracting problem, are often deemed as non-plausible labor contracts and attention is (therefore) confined to monotone if not linear contracts. In this paper we test the incentive effects of non-monotone contracts in a simple principal-agent setting. Principals select either a monotone or a non-monotone contract, both are incentive compatible, and agents then decide which effort level to choose. The results show that principals do select the non-monotone contract, agents virtually never reject the non-monotone contract and they expend that effort level which is desired by principals. | eng |
| dc.description.version | published | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | deu |
| dc.identifier.ppn | 277902223 | deu |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/11891 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | deu |
| dc.legacy.dateIssued | 2008 | deu |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut | |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0 Generic | |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/ | |
| dc.subject | experimental agency | deu |
| dc.subject | non-monotone contracts | deu |
| dc.subject | epeated decision making | deu |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | deu |
| dc.title | Experimental evidence on the appropriateness of non-monotone incentive contracts | eng |
| dc.type | WORKINGPAPER | deu |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| kops.bibliographicInfo.seriesNumber | 15 | deu |
| kops.citation.bibtex | @techreport{Brosig2006Exper-11891,
year={2006},
series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
title={Experimental evidence on the appropriateness of non-monotone incentive contracts},
number={15},
author={Brosig, Jeannette and Lukas, Christian}
} | |
| kops.citation.iso690 | BROSIG, Jeannette, Christian LUKAS, 2006. Experimental evidence on the appropriateness of non-monotone incentive contracts | deu |
| kops.citation.iso690 | BROSIG, Jeannette, Christian LUKAS, 2006. Experimental evidence on the appropriateness of non-monotone incentive contracts | eng |
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