Public Debt and Total Factor Productivity
| dc.contributor.author | Kaas, Leo | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-02-19T10:21:32Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-02-19T10:21:32Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | eng |
| dc.description.abstract | This paper explores the role of public debt and fiscal deficits on factor productivity in an economy with credit market frictions and heterogeneous firms. When credit market conditions are sufficiently weak, low interest rates permit the government to run Ponzi schemes so that permanent primary deficits can be sustained. For small enough deficit ratios, the model has two steady states of which one is an unstable bubble and the other one is stable. The stable equilibrium features higher levels of credit and capital, but also a lower interest rate, lower total factor productivity and output. The model is calibrated to the US economy to derive the maximum sustain- able deficit ratio and to examine the dynamic responses to changes in debt policy. A reduction of the primary deficit triggers an expansion of credit and capital, but it also leads to a deterioration of total factor productivity since more low-productivity firms prefer to remain active at the lower equilibrium interest rate. | eng |
| dc.description.version | published | |
| dc.identifier.ppn | 426515587 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29886 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | eng |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Working Paper Series / Department of Economics | |
| dc.rights | terms-of-use | |
| dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/ | |
| dc.subject | Credit constraints; Unbacked public debt; Dynamic inefficiency; Sustainable deficits | eng |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | eng |
| dc.subject.jel | D92 | |
| dc.subject.jel | E62 | |
| dc.subject.jel | H62 | |
| dc.title | Public Debt and Total Factor Productivity | eng |
| dc.type | WORKINGPAPER | eng |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| kops.bibliographicInfo.seriesNumber | 2014-22 | eng |
| kops.citation.bibtex | @techreport{Kaas2014Publi-29886,
year={2014},
series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
title={Public Debt and Total Factor Productivity},
number={2014-22},
author={Kaas, Leo}
} | |
| kops.citation.iso690 | KAAS, Leo, 2014. Public Debt and Total Factor Productivity | deu |
| kops.citation.iso690 | KAAS, Leo, 2014. Public Debt and Total Factor Productivity | eng |
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| kops.identifier.nbn | urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-276501 | |
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| temp.internal.duplicates | <p>Keine Dubletten gefunden. Letzte Überprüfung: 10.02.2015 09:39:41</p> | deu |
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