Publikation: Campaign finance legislation and the supply-side of the revolving door
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Existing research on the revolving door examines why employers hire former politicians. I complement this demand-side approach by demonstrating the importance of the supply-side. In particular, I argue that one important institutional factor that shapes politicians' willingness to leave office for a private sector job is campaign finance legislation. Less restrictive rules increase campaign spending for incumbents, which makes revolving door employment less attractive. Empirically, I use novel data from the US states and a difference-in-differences design to show that the exogenous removal of campaign finance legislation through Citizens United reduced the probability that incumbents left office to work as lobbyists. The supply-side approach provides insights into comparative differences in the prevalence of the revolving door.
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WESCHLE, Simon, 2021. Campaign finance legislation and the supply-side of the revolving door. In: Political Science Research and Methods. Cambridge University Press. 2021, 9(2), pp. 365-379. ISSN 2049-8470. eISSN 2049-8489. Available under: doi: 10.1017/psrm.2019.46BibTex
@article{Weschle2021Campa-54605, year={2021}, doi={10.1017/psrm.2019.46}, title={Campaign finance legislation and the supply-side of the revolving door}, number={2}, volume={9}, issn={2049-8470}, journal={Political Science Research and Methods}, pages={365--379}, author={Weschle, Simon} }
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