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Campaign finance legislation and the supply-side of the revolving door

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2021

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Weschle, Simon

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Political Science Research and Methods. Cambridge University Press. 2021, 9(2), pp. 365-379. ISSN 2049-8470. eISSN 2049-8489. Available under: doi: 10.1017/psrm.2019.46

Zusammenfassung

Existing research on the revolving door examines why employers hire former politicians. I complement this demand-side approach by demonstrating the importance of the supply-side. In particular, I argue that one important institutional factor that shapes politicians' willingness to leave office for a private sector job is campaign finance legislation. Less restrictive rules increase campaign spending for incumbents, which makes revolving door employment less attractive. Empirically, I use novel data from the US states and a difference-in-differences design to show that the exogenous removal of campaign finance legislation through Citizens United reduced the probability that incumbents left office to work as lobbyists. The supply-side approach provides insights into comparative differences in the prevalence of the revolving door.

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320 Politik

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American politics, comparative politics: political institutions, legislative politics

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ISO 690WESCHLE, Simon, 2021. Campaign finance legislation and the supply-side of the revolving door. In: Political Science Research and Methods. Cambridge University Press. 2021, 9(2), pp. 365-379. ISSN 2049-8470. eISSN 2049-8489. Available under: doi: 10.1017/psrm.2019.46
BibTex
@article{Weschle2021Campa-54605,
  year={2021},
  doi={10.1017/psrm.2019.46},
  title={Campaign finance legislation and the supply-side of the revolving door},
  number={2},
  volume={9},
  issn={2049-8470},
  journal={Political Science Research and Methods},
  pages={365--379},
  author={Weschle, Simon}
}
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