The Logic of Conditional Belief
| dc.contributor.author | Eva, Benjamin | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-12-07T12:45:33Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-12-07T12:45:33Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | eng |
| dc.description.abstract | The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is a real sense in which Stalnaker’s semantics for the indicative did succeed in capturing the logic of the Ramseyan indicative conditional. | eng |
| dc.description.version | published | eng |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/pq/pqaa008 | eng |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/52029 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | eng |
| dc.rights | terms-of-use | |
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| dc.subject.ddc | 100 | eng |
| dc.title | The Logic of Conditional Belief | eng |
| dc.type | JOURNAL_ARTICLE | eng |
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| kops.citation.bibtex | @article{Eva2020Logic-52029,
year={2020},
doi={10.1093/pq/pqaa008},
title={The Logic of Conditional Belief},
number={281},
volume={70},
issn={0031-8094},
journal={The Philosophical Quarterly},
pages={759--779},
author={Eva, Benjamin}
} | |
| kops.citation.iso690 | EVA, Benjamin, 2020. The Logic of Conditional Belief. In: The Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford University Press. 2020, 70(281), pp. 759-779. ISSN 0031-8094. eISSN 1467-9213. Available under: doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa008 | deu |
| kops.citation.iso690 | EVA, Benjamin, 2020. The Logic of Conditional Belief. In: The Philosophical Quarterly. Oxford University Press. 2020, 70(281), pp. 759-779. ISSN 0031-8094. eISSN 1467-9213. Available under: doi: 10.1093/pq/pqaa008 | eng |
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