Working Effort and Endogenous Job Separations in Search Equilibrium

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dc.contributor.authorZaharieva, Anna
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-21T10:34:12Z
dc.date.available2015-01-21T10:34:12Z
dc.date.issued2010eng
dc.description.abstractThis paper considers job separations in a search model with labour market matching and moral hazard. Both workers and firms value productive matches and take actions to increase match stability: firms offer a share of match surplus to provide workers with correct incentives and workers take hidden actions (effort) negatively affecting the match separation rate. Heterogeneous productivity draws combined with the moral hazard problem give rise to match-specific endogenous separation rates. Additionally a counteraction of two effects - match stability and match scarcity - explains an observed asymmetric shape of a wage probability density function with a unique interior mode on the support.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.identifier.ppn425006492
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29574
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper Series / Department of Economics
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dc.subjectMatching, separation rate, job stability, effort, wage densityeng
dc.subject.ddc330eng
dc.subject.jelJ31
dc.subject.jelJ63
dc.subject.jelJ64
dc.subject.jelM52
dc.titleWorking Effort and Endogenous Job Separations in Search Equilibriumeng
dc.typeWORKINGPAPEReng
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kops.bibliographicInfo.seriesNumber2010-6eng
kops.citation.bibtex
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  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Working Effort and Endogenous Job Separations in Search Equilibrium},
  number={2010-6},
  author={Zaharieva, Anna}
}
kops.citation.iso690ZAHARIEVA, Anna, 2010. Working Effort and Endogenous Job Separations in Search Equilibriumdeu
kops.citation.iso690ZAHARIEVA, Anna, 2010. Working Effort and Endogenous Job Separations in Search Equilibriumeng
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temp.internal.duplicates<p>Keine Dubletten gefunden. Letzte Überprüfung: 15.01.2015 12:54:49</p>deu

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