Publikation: The electoral consequences of taxation in OECD countries
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Researchers, politicians, and pundits commonly expect that voters retrospectively punish and reward government parties for tax policies, but there is surprisingly little cross-country evidence that backs this claim. This study provides comprehensive evidence from 30 OECD countries, 1970–2020. It analyzes the electoral fates of government parties that increased or cut taxes on personal incomes and consumption. Our findings confirm the prevalence of electoral consequences, but these depend on the type and direction of tax change. Government parties lose votes when they increase personal income taxes while there is only marginal evidence suggesting electoral reward for income tax increases and electoral consequences after value-added tax changes. The findings also indicate the distributive effects of reforms to matter. The most pronounced consequences arise when governments raise income taxes on the poor. The moderating role of conditional factors such as government partisanship and fiscal pressure are explored, but no consensus emerges from the findings.
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AHRENS, Leo, Frank BANDAU, 2024. The electoral consequences of taxation in OECD countries. In: Electoral Studies. Elsevier. 2024, 88, 102774. ISSN 0261-3794. eISSN 1873-6890. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102774BibTex
@article{Ahrens2024-04elect-69705, title={The electoral consequences of taxation in OECD countries}, year={2024}, doi={10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102774}, volume={88}, issn={0261-3794}, journal={Electoral Studies}, author={Ahrens, Leo and Bandau, Frank}, note={Article Number: 102774} }
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