Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design

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dc.contributor.authorKragl, Jenny
dc.contributor.authorSchöttner, Anja
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-24T08:54:10Z
dc.date.available2014-11-24T08:54:10Z
dc.date.issued2014eng
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the effects of wage floors on optimal job design in a moral-hazard model with asymmetric tasks and imperfect aggregate performance measurement. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. A sufficiently high wage floor, however, induces the principal to dismiss one agent or to even exclude tasks from the production process. Imperfect performance measurement always lowers profit under multitasking, but may increase profit under specialization. We further show that variations in the wage floor and the agents' reservation utility have significantly different effects on welfare and optimal job design.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/iere.12060eng
dc.identifier.ppn420005234
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/29279
dc.language.isoengeng
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dc.subject.ddc330eng
dc.titleWage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Designeng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEeng
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  pages={525--550},
  author={Kragl, Jenny and Schöttner, Anja}
}
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kops.citation.iso690KRAGL, Jenny, Anja SCHÖTTNER, 2014. Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design. In: International Economic Review. 2014, 55(2), pp. 525-550. ISSN 0020-6598. eISSN 1468-2354. Available under: doi: 10.1111/iere.12060eng
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kops.sourcefieldInternational Economic Review. 2014, <b>55</b>(2), pp. 525-550. ISSN 0020-6598. eISSN 1468-2354. Available under: doi: 10.1111/iere.12060deu
kops.sourcefield.plainInternational Economic Review. 2014, 55(2), pp. 525-550. ISSN 0020-6598. eISSN 1468-2354. Available under: doi: 10.1111/iere.12060deu
kops.sourcefield.plainInternational Economic Review. 2014, 55(2), pp. 525-550. ISSN 0020-6598. eISSN 1468-2354. Available under: doi: 10.1111/iere.12060eng
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source.periodicalTitleInternational Economic Revieweng
temp.internal.duplicates<p>Keine Dubletten gefunden. Letzte Überprüfung: 13.11.2014 12:43:24</p>deu

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