Publikation: A Note on the Deterrence Effects of the Forfeiture of Illegal Gains
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2011
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Review of Law & Economics. 2011, 7(1). ISSN 1555-5879. Available under: doi: 10.2202/1555-5879.1500
Zusammenfassung
This paper analyzes how the forfeiture of illegal gains impacts the deterrence of illegal acts. We show that when public authorities introduce a claim on illegal gains as part of a sanction it may, counter-intuitively, increase crime in a setting in which criminals may invest in avoidance activities to lower the probability of detection.
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FRIEHE, Tim, 2011. A Note on the Deterrence Effects of the Forfeiture of Illegal Gains. In: Review of Law & Economics. 2011, 7(1). ISSN 1555-5879. Available under: doi: 10.2202/1555-5879.1500BibTex
@article{Friehe2011Deter-17781,
year={2011},
doi={10.2202/1555-5879.1500},
title={A Note on the Deterrence Effects of the Forfeiture of Illegal Gains},
number={1},
volume={7},
issn={1555-5879},
journal={Review of Law & Economics},
author={Friehe, Tim}
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