Les effets de confiance et de désaveu sur les acteurs politiques

Abstract

This chapter introduces two concepts – brinkmanship and backsliding – to explain why integration referendums are frequently successful and why the unsuccessful ones have seldom had consequences for the incumbent leader. We argue that governments typically engage strongly in referendum campaigns, profiting from institutional advantages and the possibility to link their political fate to the outcome of the vote (brinkmanship). What is more, a bad economic situation seems to lower the chances of a positive vote, that is a vote in favor of the government stance or further integration steps. The EU’s growing influence over economic policy could account for this relationship. If the responsibility for the economic distress was attributed to the EU, this shift in responsibility from the national to the supranational level would also explain why governments who lose referendums do not systematically resign or perform badly at the next election. Finally, those governments who are defeated at the ballot box, often engage into diversionary strategy by distancing themselves from their campaign (backsliding). The chapter offers some anecdotal and statistical evidence in support of these behavioral patterns