Publikation: Competition within firms
Lade...
Dateien
Datum
2012
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Link zur Lizenz
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Sammlungen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Journal of Competition Law and Economics. Oxford. 2012, 8(1), pp. 167-185. ISSN 1744-6414. eISSN 1744-6422. Available under: doi: 10.1093/joclec/nhs004
Zusammenfassung
We investigate the role of incentives set by a parent firm for competition among its subsidiaries. In a Cournot experiment, four subsidiaries of the same parent operate in the same market. Parents earn a specific share of the joint profit, and can choose how to distribute the remaining surplus (or loss). Results show that parents allocating profits equally among their subsidiaries reach outcomes close to collusion. However, almost half of the parent firms employ a proportional sharing rule instead. These groups end up with profits around the Cournot level.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690
BRUTTEL, Lisa, Simeon SCHUDY, 2012. Competition within firms. In: Journal of Competition Law and Economics. Oxford. 2012, 8(1), pp. 167-185. ISSN 1744-6414. eISSN 1744-6422. Available under: doi: 10.1093/joclec/nhs004BibTex
@article{Bruttel2012-03-01Compe-49178, year={2012}, doi={10.1093/joclec/nhs004}, title={Competition within firms}, number={1}, volume={8}, issn={1744-6414}, journal={Journal of Competition Law and Economics}, pages={167--185}, author={Bruttel, Lisa and Schudy, Simeon} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/49178"> <dc:contributor>Bruttel, Lisa</dc:contributor> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-03-31T09:37:24Z</dcterms:available> <dc:contributor>Schudy, Simeon</dc:contributor> <dcterms:title>Competition within firms</dcterms:title> <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/49178/1/Bruttel_2-ymt7yjafqblv9.pdf"/> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We investigate the role of incentives set by a parent firm for competition among its subsidiaries. In a Cournot experiment, four subsidiaries of the same parent operate in the same market. Parents earn a specific share of the joint profit, and can choose how to distribute the remaining surplus (or loss). Results show that parents allocating profits equally among their subsidiaries reach outcomes close to collusion. However, almost half of the parent firms employ a proportional sharing rule instead. These groups end up with profits around the Cournot level.</dcterms:abstract> <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/49178/1/Bruttel_2-ymt7yjafqblv9.pdf"/> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/49178"/> <dcterms:issued>2012-03-01</dcterms:issued> <dc:creator>Bruttel, Lisa</dc:creator> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:creator>Schudy, Simeon</dc:creator> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-03-31T09:37:24Z</dc:date> <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Unbekannt