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The Institutional Design of Referendums : Bottom-Up and Binding

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2018

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Cheneval, Francis

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Swiss Political Science Review. Wiley. 2018, 24(3), pp. 294-304. ISSN 1424-7755. eISSN 1662-6370. Available under: doi: 10.1111/spsr.12319

Zusammenfassung

Democratic theorists generally ignore that the institutional design of popular vote processes varies in important ways. However, these differences in design influence the kind of role that these processes play in and their impact on democratic systems. We intend to remedy this situation by launching a normative discussion about the institutional design of popular vote processes in the Debate “Do Referendums Enhance or Threaten Democracy?” In this introductory essay, we first insist on the necessity to adopt a differentiated conception of popular vote processes. We then highlight some aspects of our normative approach to the institutional design of popular vote processes. We finally argue that referendum processes can positively contribute to democratic systems when they are 1) launched bottom-up and 2) legally binding.

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320 Politik

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ISO 690CHENEVAL, Francis, Alice EL-WAKIL, 2018. The Institutional Design of Referendums : Bottom-Up and Binding. In: Swiss Political Science Review. Wiley. 2018, 24(3), pp. 294-304. ISSN 1424-7755. eISSN 1662-6370. Available under: doi: 10.1111/spsr.12319
BibTex
@article{Cheneval2018Insti-55917,
  year={2018},
  doi={10.1111/spsr.12319},
  title={The Institutional Design of Referendums : Bottom-Up and Binding},
  number={3},
  volume={24},
  issn={1424-7755},
  journal={Swiss Political Science Review},
  pages={294--304},
  author={Cheneval, Francis and el-Wakil, Alice}
}
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