The Principal–Agent Model, Accountability and Democratic Legitimacy

Brandsma, Gijs Jan; Adriaensen, Johan

The Principal–Agent Model, Accountability and Democratic Legitimacy

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Datum

2017

Autor:innen

Brandsma, Gijs Jan

Adriaensen, Johan

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_2

Sammlungen

Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft

Publikationstyp

Beitrag zu einem Sammelband

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

DELREUX, Tom, ed., Johan ADRIAENSEN, ed.. The Principal Agent Model and the European Union. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 35-54. ISBN 978-3-319-55136-4. Available under: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_2

Zusammenfassung

This chapter explores the normative underpinnings of the principal–agent model. These are situated in Rousseau’s analysis of the representative democracy and Weber’s study of the bureaucracy. Whereas many of their arguments still maintain their value in present-day politics, the empirical reality in which these ideas developed has changed drastically. The rise of alternative forms of public contestation, and above all, the multi-level decision-making setting of the EU, begs the question for which contemporary debates the principal–agent model still holds moral sway. We argue that—while principal–agent analyses can benefit from an explicit normative debate—the model is too reductionist to provide conclusive answers to such debates.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

320 Politik

Zitieren

ISO 690

BRANDSMA, Gijs Jan, Johan ADRIAENSEN, 2017. The Principal–Agent Model, Accountability and Democratic Legitimacy. In: DELREUX, Tom, ed., Johan ADRIAENSEN, ed.. The Principal Agent Model and the European Union. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 35-54. ISBN 978-3-319-55136-4. Available under: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_2

BibTex

@incollection{Brandsma2017-10-18Princ-41818,
  year={2017},
  doi={10.1007/978-3-319-55137-1_2},
  title={The Principal–Agent Model, Accountability and Democratic Legitimacy},
  isbn={978-3-319-55136-4},
  publisher={Palgrave Macmillan},
  address={Cham},
  booktitle={The Principal Agent Model and the European Union},
  pages={35--54},
  editor={Delreux, Tom and Adriaensen, Johan},
  author={Brandsma, Gijs Jan and Adriaensen, Johan}
}

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