Mediation and Conflict Management

Kurzanzeige
dc.contributor.authorEisenkopf, Gerald
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:43:46Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:43:46Zdeu
dc.date.issued2009deu
dc.description.abstractMediation is a popular process to manage conflicts, but there is little systematic insight into its mechanisms. This paper discusses the results from an experiment in which a mediator can induce two conflict parties to behave cooperatively. If the mediator recommends cooperative behavior and threatens to punish deviations, she achieves the efficient solution. Similar results even obtain if the mediator is biased towards one party or has no incentive to prevent the conflict. Communication between the mediator and the conflict parties increases cooperation, even if punishment is impossible. However, when cooperation fails, communication without punishment leads to particularly low payouts for the 'losing' party.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
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dc.identifier.ppn311032338deu
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dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2009deu
dc.relation.ispartofseriesResearch paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subjectMediationdeu
dc.subjectConflict Preventiondeu
dc.subjectExperimentdeu
dc.subjectCommunicationdeu
dc.subjectPunishmentdeu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.subject.jelC90deu
dc.subject.jelD62deu
dc.subject.jelD74deu
dc.titleMediation and Conflict Managementeng
dc.typeWORKINGPAPERdeu
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kops.bibliographicInfo.seriesNumber45deu
kops.citation.bibtex
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  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Mediation and Conflict Management},
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  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald}
}
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kops.citation.iso690EISENKOPF, Gerald, 2009. Mediation and Conflict Managementeng
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