Hermeneutic Ambiguities : Language, Historicality, and Truth

Abstract

A highly sophisticated conception of language constitutes the core of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. On the one hand, Gadamer’s focus on the humanities and historical knowledge is intimately connected with theories and traditions of interpretation. Interpretation is tacitly present in everyday communication and becomes explicit in the philological and historical disciplines where epistemological and methodological questions of validity and justification are discussed. On the other hand, Gadamer’s thinking turns away from such systematically oriented approaches and advocates a contrasting and encompassing view. This orientation takes refuge in Heidegger’s thinking and puts language and understanding on a completely different level in comparison to the cognitive conceptions of truth, meaning and interpretation. Why does Gadamer distance himself from the cognitive conceptions of understanding and interpretation?—Gadamer’s move seems to be largely motivated by the insight, that linguistics and orthodox philosophies of language are not capable to tackle the philosophically basic question What is language? in its sober generality, because they are always already using and presupposing language, at least in the form of a metalanguage. Of course, every language can be described by a metalanguage. This is the basis of linguistic and philosophical theories of language. But in this framework, there is no possibility to give a non-circular account of language. Therefore, Gadamer dismisses the project of a systematically constructed theory of language altogether and acknowledges the necessity of the hermeneutical circle. The relation of language and history in Gadamer highlights the fact that human languages are not stable and invariant systems, but dynamic and fluid media of conceptualization and communication. The processes of modification, transformation and development of languages are intrinsically tied to the cultural, social and political dimensions of human live. Therefore, historicality is an integral dimension of language. Language gives us the resources for forming beliefs, desires and intentions. It would be a rather dangerous understatement to say that language and life-world are intimately related. There is no life-world, there is no experience independent from language and its reservoir of concepts. Conversely, there is no pure language, immune from human experience and contact with the life-world. Whereas it seems easy to follow Gadamer’s lead with respect to the conceptions of language and historicality, the relation of language, historicality, and truth is a riddle. Current philosophical notions of truth may be compatible with Gadamer’s thinking, but for Gadamer truth is not primarily operative on a logical or epistemological level. He thereby obliterates the distinction of sense, meaning and truth.