The quality of government conditions political disagreement over redistributive policies

Abstract

This study argues that the quality of government structures the divide of public opinion on redistribution within countries. Countries with higher government quality have both the capacity and impartiality required to implement effective and fair redistribution. In effect, material self-interest and fairness-based evaluations should become better predictors of policy preferences in countries with higher government quality. An empirical analysis of survey data from 40 institutionally diverse countries supports this theory. Interaction regression models show that the government quality moderates the effects of income and unfairness perceptions on redistribution preferences. Both preference drivers are more strongly associated with redistribution support in countries with higher government quality. Preferences thereby become more heterogeneous in higher-quality settings. The results offer micro-level support for the theory that government quality structures politics and policies via the public opinion channel. To the extent that public opinion influences political behavior and policymaking, higher government quality should induce a stronger economic left-right divide over these political phenomena.