Group Dynamics in Experimental Studies - The Bertrand Paradox Revisited

Kurzanzeige
dc.contributor.authorBruttel, Lisa
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-23T09:36:14Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-23T09:36:14Zdeu
dc.date.issued2009deu
dc.description.abstractDifferent information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects' behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects' own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to Nash equilibrium. Limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject's own opponent, in contrast, leads to competitive behavior. When we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices. We can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization ; 69 (2009), 1. - S. 51-63deu
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002
dc.identifier.urihttp://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/1872
dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2009deu
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subjectBertrand duopolydeu
dc.subjectTacit collusioneng
dc.subjectLearningeng
dc.subjectLeadership by exampleeng
dc.subjectExperimenteng
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.subject.jelD83deu
dc.subject.jelD43deu
dc.subject.jelC92deu
dc.subject.jelC72deu
dc.titleGroup Dynamics in Experimental Studies - The Bertrand Paradox Revisitedeng
dc.typeJOURNAL_ARTICLEdeu
dspace.entity.typePublication
kops.citation.bibtex
@article{Bruttel2009Group-1872,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002},
  title={Group Dynamics in Experimental Studies - The Bertrand Paradox Revisited},
  number={1},
  volume={69},
  journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  pages={51--63},
  author={Bruttel, Lisa}
}
kops.citation.iso690BRUTTEL, Lisa, 2009. Group Dynamics in Experimental Studies - The Bertrand Paradox Revisited. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2009, 69(1), pp. 51-63. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002deu
kops.citation.iso690BRUTTEL, Lisa, 2009. Group Dynamics in Experimental Studies - The Bertrand Paradox Revisited. In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2009, 69(1), pp. 51-63. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002eng
kops.citation.rdf
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/1872">
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ; 69 (2009), 1. - S. 51-63</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <dcterms:issued>2009</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:creator>Bruttel, Lisa</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:title>Group Dynamics in Experimental Studies - The Bertrand Paradox Revisited</dcterms:title>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:36:14Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/1872"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-23T09:36:14Z</dc:date>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:contributor>Bruttel, Lisa</dc:contributor>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Different information provision in experimental markets can drastically change subjects' behavior. Considering the repeated Bertrand duopoly game of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), we find that population feedback about the prices in other markets outside a subjects' own current market causes group dynamics that prevent prices from convergence to Nash equilibrium. Limited information comprising only the decisions of a subject's own opponent, in contrast, leads to competitive behavior. When we extend the number of periods from 10 to 25 in the full information treatment we observe a very robust cyclical up and down movement of prices. We can explain tacit coordination in our experiment with an extended learning direction model and leadership by example.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
kops.flag.knbibliographytrue
kops.identifier.nbnurn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-84260deu
kops.opus.id8426deu
kops.sourcefieldJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2009, <b>69</b>(1), pp. 51-63. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002deu
kops.sourcefield.plainJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2009, 69(1), pp. 51-63. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002deu
kops.sourcefield.plainJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 2009, 69(1), pp. 51-63. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2008.10.002eng
relation.isAuthorOfPublication7d582a9f-19df-4c4d-a917-a57be05d4fbb
relation.isAuthorOfPublication.latestForDiscovery7d582a9f-19df-4c4d-a917-a57be05d4fbb
source.bibliographicInfo.fromPage51
source.bibliographicInfo.issue1
source.bibliographicInfo.toPage63
source.bibliographicInfo.volume69
source.periodicalTitleJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Dateien

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen