Self-referential Gettier Sentences

dc.contributor.authorHalbach, Volker
dc.contributor.authorHorsten, Leon
dc.date.accessioned2026-01-13T07:01:43Z
dc.date.available2026-01-13T07:01:43Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractWe construct new examples of justified true belief that do not constitute knowledge. In contrast to normal Gettier examples, if our counterexamples are used, the demonstration that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge requires only that belief and knowledge are both conceived as predicates and that basic syntactic reasoning is available.
dc.description.versionpublisheddeu
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-031-74527-0_11
dc.identifier.urihttps://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/75648
dc.language.isoeng
dc.subject.ddc100
dc.titleSelf-referential Gettier Sentenceseng
dc.typeINCOLLECTION
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  title={Self-referential Gettier Sentences},
  year={2024},
  doi={10.1007/978-3-031-74527-0_11},
  number={494},
  isbn={978-3-031-74526-3},
  address={Cham},
  publisher={Springer},
  series={Synthese Library (Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science)},
  booktitle={Paradoxes Between Truth and Proof},
  pages={237--245},
  editor={Petrolo, Mattia and Venturi, Giorgio},
  author={Halbach, Volker and Horsten, Leon}
}
kops.citation.iso690HALBACH, Volker, Leon HORSTEN, 2024. Self-referential Gettier Sentences. In: PETROLO, Mattia, Hrsg., Giorgio VENTURI, Hrsg.. Paradoxes Between Truth and Proof. Cham: Springer, 2024, S. 237-245. Synthese Library (Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science). 494. ISBN 978-3-031-74526-3. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-74527-0_11deu
kops.citation.iso690HALBACH, Volker, Leon HORSTEN, 2024. Self-referential Gettier Sentences. In: PETROLO, Mattia, ed., Giorgio VENTURI, ed.. Paradoxes Between Truth and Proof. Cham: Springer, 2024, pp. 237-245. Synthese Library (Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science). 494. ISBN 978-3-031-74526-3. Available under: doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-74527-0_11eng
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kops.sourcefieldPETROLO, Mattia, Hrsg., Giorgio VENTURI, Hrsg.. <i>Paradoxes Between Truth and Proof</i>. Cham: Springer, 2024, S. 237-245. Synthese Library (Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science). 494. ISBN 978-3-031-74526-3. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-74527-0_11deu
kops.sourcefield.plainPETROLO, Mattia, Hrsg., Giorgio VENTURI, Hrsg.. Paradoxes Between Truth and Proof. Cham: Springer, 2024, S. 237-245. Synthese Library (Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science). 494. ISBN 978-3-031-74526-3. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-74527-0_11deu
kops.sourcefield.plainPETROLO, Mattia, ed., Giorgio VENTURI, ed.. Paradoxes Between Truth and Proof. Cham: Springer, 2024, pp. 237-245. Synthese Library (Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science). 494. ISBN 978-3-031-74526-3. Available under: doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-74527-0_11eng
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source.contributor.editorPetrolo, Mattia
source.contributor.editorVenturi, Giorgio
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source.publisherSpringer
source.publisher.locationCham
source.relation.ispartofseriesSynthese Library (Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science)
source.titleParadoxes Between Truth and Proof

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