Audit Market Regulation around the World : Descriptive Evidence, Market Structure, and Audit Quality

Abstract

The main objectives of recent audit market regulations are to (1) increase audit quality, (2) decrease audit market concentration, and (3) foster competition between audit firms. However, the empirical evidence on whether such regulations fulfill these goals is limited. We construct a unique database of the regulations in effect in the audit markets of 29 countries to explore the link between audit market regulation and the abovementioned objectives. The staggered implementation between 2002 and 2014 across the sample countries allows better identification of the role of audit market regulation than in single-country studies. We find that only one of the analyzed regulations, the restriction of auditor liability, is positively associated with all three goals. Mandatory auditor rotation, fee disclosures, and fee caps appear to be detrimental: The associations with two of the objectives are in the wrong direction, with no positive counterbalancing effect with regard to the third goal. Restricting non-audit services is associated with a lower degree of concentration within the group of market leaders and higher audit quality, but is negatively related to competition. The role of audit partner rotation and that of joint audits remain ambiguous. Our findings are helpful for regulators and academics and represent a necessary first step for a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of audit market regulations.