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Integrity Endangered by Hypocrisy

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1 Introduction

At a time when pluralistic value systems present alternating, precluding perspectives, I take up the challenge of presenting arguments to shed light on the dynamics of the interaction between integrity and hypocrisy.

There is a long history of discussion of whether integrity is about a formal relation to the self or how relevant integrity is to acting morally, including discussion of whether and how both aspects can be reconciled. Hypocrisy as a philosophical term can be understood as a special form of dishonest or deceitful behavior towards others. Nevertheless, the effects of hypocrisy become noticeable: first, whenever ethical issues of reliability or accountability are compromised and, second, in the process of domination and exclusion as exercised by any given power system.

This paper has two aims. The first is to show the relational aspect in various concepts of integrity and hypocrisy. I will introduce integrity within Kant's concept of duties. For relational emphasis, I will refer to the contemporary philosopher Margret Urban Walker, who has contributed greatly on feminist ethics and lately worked on trust and repair in moral relationships. Although there are relevant and perpetuating differences in the conception of morality held by these two philosophers (Kant and Walker), my intention is to show how integrity as moral accountability, as argued by Walker, can be read complementarily to my reading of Kant and with arguments by Christine Korsgaard. Central thereby is a comparison of the seemingly diverging concepts of Kantian and non Kantian philosophers: becoming morally reliable and understanding one's self, as well as a non relativistic notion of integrity as moral accountability.

The second aim is to inquire to what extent and under which circumstances a person is in danger of displaying hypocritical behavior and also to show the political

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consequences thereof. Hilde Lindemann's analysis gives orientation for monitoring individual stories of identity for detection of the pitfalls of hypocrisy within a context sensitive environment.

I argue that this understanding of integrity as moral reliability is valid from a first person perspective. Moral reliability cannot, however, become a permanent attribute someone can lay claim to, but remains an ongoing process throughout life. I will also address several problems arising with questions of integrity and the claim by groups to have the attribution of moral reliability. As social contexts are heterogeneous and thus constituted by a plurality of narratives, some persons may find that their preferred self-constituting narratives are opposed by different, perhaps even more powerful yet discriminating narratives. We can imagine a group like the Romani, where stories about this group – told from the outside – could have this effect. Despite the often asserted socially integrative function of these master narratives within the social group, these stories, when told by persons outside the group, then prove to be harmful to persons within the group, diminishing their chances for equal social and political recognition and thereby threatening their possibilities to develop into members of a community recognized as morally reliable.

Therefore, I argue that persons and also groups of persons claiming integrity as an attribute are in danger of becoming hypocritical themselves if, in particular, they use this attribute to dominate others or to keep them outside their dominant group by withholding recognition of them.

2 Kant's Foundation of Integrity and Hypocrisy in the Metaphysics of Morals

This understanding of integrity and hypocrisy is derived from the second part of *The Metaphysics of Morals*, entitled *Metaphysical first principles of the doctrine of virtue*.[1] One aspect of integrity in Kant's understanding is the clearing away of obstacles that hinder a person from acting ethically. This is one way integrity can be understood as moral reliability: "[…] the preservation of my moral integrity […] is my end and also my duty."[2] In the original German quotation: "[Die Integrität] meiner Sittlichkeit[3] zu erhalten [ist] mein Zweck und zugleich meine Pflicht,"[4] the emphasis is on the integrity of one's morality having to be preserved through one's goals while, at the same time, being one's duty. In this paper, I will argue that Kant aims at preserving integrity through strengthening transcendental freedom.

[1] Kant (1797), VI, 373–493. Translations of Kant quotes derive from: (Gregor 2008).

[2] Kant (1797), VI, 388. See also 408f.

[3] When "morals" translates into "Sittlichkeit" according to Kant, there is only one moral law and therefore one morality. "Sittlichkeit", in a different understanding, can mean how things are done within a historically contingent context; this, however, is not what Kant has in mind.

[4] Kant (1797), VI, 388.

Being at ease, in terms of being content with one's own personality, means contentment with one's deeds in accordance with the accepted value system and its principles. The role played by integrity within this system is that of enabling a subject to confront and challenge obstacles which keep him or her from acting according to what is understood to be morally permitted.[5] While the concept of moral integrity excludes any and all such courses of action that are morally forbidden, it, nevertheless, does not interfere or banish any permissible, non immoral intentions, actions, and ends. "[…] happiness is merely a means for removing obstacles to his morality – a *permitted* means, since no one else has a right to require of me that I sacrifice my ends if these are not immoral."[6]

However, in his *Doctrines of Virtue*, Kant does not strive for laws to regulate actions; his virtue ethics focus on putting forth the inherent principle underlying one's course of action or conduct.[7] For any action to qualify as ethical practice, it must, at the very least, be in accordance with treating people with due respect and equal dignity. A person willing to act as morally permitted should scrutinize her subjective motives and her conduct according to the categorical imperative. From Kant's various formulations, I refer to the second formulation from *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, which is derived from the first one.[8]

The second formulation of the categorical imperative (also referred to as the Formula of Humanity) is: "Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being *exists* as an end in itself, *not merely as a means* to be used by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational beings, always be regarded *at the same time as an end*."[9]

This formulation of the moral law can be read, firstly, as a prohibition and, secondly, as an imperative. Firstly, it prohibits functionalization of others, i.e. viewing them as the mere means to an end since, rationally, this course of action would violate their dignity, which is rooted in their conscience in respect to transcendental freedom. Secondly, it implies reciprocal respect of one another's competence to choose one's own ends.[10] This implicates that the effects of my decisions on others must be considered in such a way that those suffering the consequences be respected as ends in themselves. Interestingly, little attention has been paid to the fact that there is yet another formulation of the categorical imperative presented in the *Doctrines of Virtue* which is based on an alteration of the Formula of Humanity.[11] It turns the

[5] Cf. Kant (1785), IV, 439.

[6] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 388.

[7] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 389.

[8] Cf. Kant (1785), IV, 421. "There is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative and it is this: *act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law*."

[9] Kant (1785), IV, 428. "Nun sage ich: der Mensch und überhaupt jedes vernünftige Wesen *existiert* als Zweck an sich selbst, *nicht bloß als Mittel* zum beliebigen gebrauche für diesen oder jenen Willen, sondern muss in allen seinen, sowohl auf sich selbst, als auch auf andere vernünftige Wesen gerichteten Handlungen, jederzeit *zugleich als Zweck* betrachtet werden."

[10] Cf. Nagl-Docekal (1998a), 67.

[11] Cf. Forkl (2001), 77ff.

prohibition of functionalization into what will be significant for the second end, which is also a duty.[12] "The supreme principle of the Doctrine of Virtue is: act in accordance with a maxim of *ends* that it can be a universal law for everyone to have. – In accordance with this principle a human being is an end for himself as well as for others, and it is not enough that he is not authorized to use either himself or others merely as means (since he could then still be indifferent to them); it is in itself his duty to make the human being as such his end."[13] This new formulation is not reduced to prohibiting the treatment of humans as mere means to an end. "To make the human being as such his end"[14] excludes indifferent behavior towards the ends and needs of others or, positively spoken, includes attention to the ends and needs of others.

The new formulation is significant in yet another perspective, for it finally connects the formal duty with the material end (materialer Zweck) within the principle of duty. Even the heading of this passage supports this hypothesis, for it is the first time Kant uses the term "Tugendpflicht", but, since there is no corresponding term in English, this remains "a duty of virtue". This duty of virtue is combined with the moral end, which at the same time is both a duty and end in itself.[15] If we ask about the material ends, i.e. what should be done if we want to act morally, we are confronted with two duties of virtue as two ends that are, at the same time, our duty.[16] People are, furthermore, encouraged to develop their individual personality and their ends with regard to respect for the equal dignity of others.[17]

The two obligations derived from the *end in itself* in the humanity formula of the categorical imperative are: developing one's own perfectibility and promoting the well-being of others. Enhancing the well-being of others also advances one's own perfectibility. This means that the relational aspect can be interpreted as inherent and intrinsic to equal dignity put forth through advancement of the well-being of others as well as of one's own perfectibility. I will argue that, in respect to our faculty of morality, this means that we have to develop our moral reliability. To make this more easily understandable, we have to consider differences on the formal and on the material level.

Striving to act with respect towards oneself and others is never accomplished once and for all with a claim to be in possession of righteousness. As long as we act, we are constantly called upon to consider ourselves and others as part of humanity

[12] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 387; 393f.

[13] Kant (1797), VI, 395. "Das oberste Prinzip der Tugendlehre ist: Handle nach einer Maxime der *Zwecke*, die zu haben für jedermann ein allgemeines Gesetz sein kann. – Nach diesem Prinzip ist der Mensch sowohl sich selbst als Anderen Zweck, und es ist nicht genug, daß er weder sich selbst noch andere bloß als Mittel zu brauchen befugt ist (dabei er doch gegen sie auch indifferent sein kann), sondern den Menschen überhaupt sich zum Zwecke zu machen, ist an sich selbst des Menschen Pflicht."

[14] Kant (1797), VI, 395.

[15] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 394; cf. Forkl (2001), 78.

[16] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 386.

[17] Nagl-Docekal (1998b), 151.

and thus to treat them and ourselves with dignity. Acting with respect for oneself and others is a lifelong process of self-examination, since righteousness as an attribute is a goal never able to be fully attained: we are constantly called on to view ourselves and others as members of a common humanity and to treat each other and ourselves with dignity and respect.[18]

With regard to the first duty of every person to strive for perfectibility, Kant argues that this is to be understood in a formal way, meaning that he is well aware that we can never achieve formal perfectibility, since 'to err is human'. However, if we follow Kant's analysis leading to the partial aspects of acting merely on rational grounds versus acting with the faculty of reason, we come to the distinction between *noumenon* and *phaenomenon, animal rationale* in relation to reasoning. In the latter, formal perfectibility is understood in a way that we should be able to want to do what we are morally required to do. Thus, from the perspective of transcendental freedom which supports our volition, the duty of perfectibility can be understood as a duty to develop moral reliability by removing obstacles against it.[19] If our wills are internally motivated by respect for the equal dignity of others in all our actions, intentions, and aims, we are following this claim freely.[20]

The second duty of humanity, promoting the well-being of others, has to be performed through reciprocal respect and meritorious love for others.[21] This duty implies respecting others as ends in themselves who take on their first duty of moral reliability. Having to respect others reciprocally is due to the fact of the dignity of our personality, with its capacity for transcendental freedom. "[…] neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary self-esteem of others, as human beings, that is he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a practical way the dignity of humanity in every other human being."[22] Therefore, the second duty of humanity is relational in the regard that it applies to all humans reciprocally when the first duty introduces a reflexive relation to the self expressing accountability for one's personality.

However, this does not level out the plurality and diversity found in individuals because treating others with equal respect as a duty toward humanity leaves open all the other aspects of individual design. The formal level refers to conformity with the moral law. It expresses our ability to choose our course of action but, at the same time, this freedom is presented in two perspectives – as positive (transcendental) and as negative freedom. The formal level is distinguished from the material level, which refers to conformity of ends.[23] It is only by emphasizing the duties which are, at the same time, ends that Kant can answer the question of how principles of morality can be applied in the empirical world. This evidently means that neither are there formal persons nor does humanity cross our respective paths. These two aspects,

[18] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 383; 385.

[19] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 441.

[20] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 387.

[21] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 448.

[22] Kant (1797), VI, 462.

[23] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 410, Gesetzmäßigkeit und Zweckmäßigkeit.

formal and material, can be separated only for analytical reasons; nevertheless, they converge in every living person.

Yet alone our ability to reason is not sufficient for being held accountable for our actions. What is significant is that through our conscience of being capable of morality, we have the ability to engage in a reflexive dialogue in order to reflect upon who we want to be as personalities. We can reflect on the ability to advance with our will, which aims to choose – as well as to decide – how and which means to select in order to put these aims into action. Furthermore, we can reason about our course of action and about our character. Kant calls this partial aspect of our personality intelligible, "endowed with *inner freedom* [as] (*homo noumenon*)".[24] Every person "possesses dignity (an absolute inner worth)"[25] as basis for reciprocally owed respect. This implies that, due to our capability for being part of the noumenal world, it would be an incomplete characterization of personality to describe humans as rational egoists for we are capable of giving in to egoistic premises and of cultivating our will in order to develop the ability to decide which means to choose so as not to harm the dignity of others.[26] Kant suggests that one means of becoming morally reliable is to shed light on and study our internal motivations. For this, we need to open up a realm of personal introspection and reflection to examine and validate our intentions in order to understand and know ourselves, the first commandment of empirical obligation.[27] Slackness in regard to examining one's conduct or finding excuses for specific behavior while accusing others of the same misdoings is hypocritical.[28]

There are three attacks on transcendental freedom: first, lying, which includes the inner lie, second, submission to servility, and, third, avarice, which damages the faculty of morality. Although these three vices are formulated within the duties to oneself through the relational aspect of moral reliability rooted in humanity, they achieve political relevance as they constitute attacks on transcendental freedom: submitting to others with hidden expectations of favors without regard of one's own dignity or belittling one's moral worth with false humility is to disregard humanity within ourselves.[29] "Be no man's lackey. – Do not let others tread with impunity on your rights."[30] and: "But one who makes himself a worm cannot complain afterwards if people step on him"[31] show the share one's own responsibility has in taking care to maintain one's dignity, as well as the capability for transcendental freedom and standing up against any violation thereof.

[24] Kant (1797), VI, 418.

[25] Kant (1797), VI, 434.

[26] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 387.

[27] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 441.

[28] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 430f.

[29] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 435.

[30] Kant (1797), VI, 436

[31] Kant (1797), VI, 436; 437. "Werdet nicht der Menschen Knechte. – Lasst euer Recht nicht ungeahndet von Anderen mit Füßen treten" and "Wer sich aber zum Wurm macht, kann nachher nicht klagen, daß er mit Füßen getreten wird."

If integrity were to be understood as expressing the coherence between a person's words and deeds, it would also have to include the responsibility for one's beliefs in order to act according to these values, even at personal cost. In certain situations, we will be interested in transparency in regard to those values or curious about the principles underlying the intended conduct. Nevertheless, we can imagine a scenario where a villain feels very secure in regard to the methods of his actions and is completely transparent about the fact that his aim will be accomplished reliably, yet with unacceptable means. This form of transparency and reliability has nothing to do with morality although we might call his acting reliable within the group, e.g. the mafia, whose aims he promotes. Thus, although reliability and transparency as well as coherence between words and deeds can be sufficient for integrity, they are, nevertheless, not sufficient for moral reliability.

For Kant, the most serious attack on transcendental freedom is hypocrisy, explained as an 'inner lie'.[32] Analogous to the obligation to oneself to preserve integrity as moral reliability, the inner lie is the "rotten spot […] that the ill of untruthfulness spreads onto his relations with other human beings as well […]."[33] As there is no moral leeway between truthfulness and lying[34] in terms of transcendental freedom, truthfulness is the "first command of all duties to oneself."[35] Within the reflexive dialogue of scrutiny about the determining grounds for our actions, the inner lie is the enemy of moral conduct. I will come back to this point later in the paper.

After unfolding the difficulties of the problem, Margret Urban Walker's thoughts on relational interdependencies will help to clarify the complexity involved with integrity, which is understood as moral accountability from yet another perspective. Upon contrasting this analysis with my understanding of Kant's duties in the third part, I will show in the fourth and last section how Hilde Lindemann's concept of counterstories contributes to an operative understanding of integrity.

3 Margret Urban Walker's Relational Understanding of Integrity in Contemporary Philosophy

Both the concepts of hypocrisy and those of moral integrity address the acting subject in the first person perspective. We can plumb our own implicit and explicit aims, reasons, and justification through enquiry and examination of our consciences. Although even Kant acknowledges that "the depths of the human heart are unfathomable,"[36] Walker's approach to matters of moral reliability is through narratives told by

[32] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 430f.

[33] Kant (1797), VI, 431.

[34] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 433*.

[35] Kant (1797), VI, 441.

[36] Kant (1797), VI, 447. Cf. 441.

the person herself and by others. The question is now: How can we monitor our own stories of identity for the pitfalls of hypocrisy?

The struggle for moral reliability within a constantly changing context shows what we have to take into account in being and becoming morally reliable. This process is relational, in the sense that it influences the way a person develops, how she becomes the person she wants to be if she is able to find the scope for it, and how she remembers her stories and those told by others. In her article *Picking up Pieces: Lives, Stories, and Integrity*,[37] Walker describes integrity as a relational phenomenon and an ongoing process. Our integrity and the way in which we are irreplaceable individuals develop within an ethics of responsibility composed of narratives of identity, relationships, and values. Walker "defends a view of integrity as *reliable accountability.* Its point is not for us to will one thing nor to be it, but to maintain – or re-establish – our reliability in matters involving important commitments and goods" and "this view takes utterly seriously to what and to whom a person is true, but looks with suspicion upon true selves."[38] Morality becomes a practice which needs to be acted out. The consequences this has on the stories and the making of stories (because the making of these shows how discursiveness and social context are linked) display an additional implication. Who tells whose story in what way makes a difference which has to be taken into account.[39] Walker's ethics of responsibility observes "an extended family of moral views."[40] If we are obliged to respond to requests, then the question becomes: How does this obligation come about? First, there is the presupposition of acknowledgement for claims upon us by others. If we do not accept that we are the addressees of these claims, the obligation to respond is difficult to enforce. Second, if the claim is established within a non-reciprocal relationship, such as one in which others are "vulnerable to or dependent on our actions and choices",[41] the assumption of responsibility has to be acknowledged and accepted. The mere fact that some dependencies are caused biologically is not a sufficient explanation for non-essentialists. This is a political question because all individuals are "dependent on others feeling obligated to our moral claims"[42] in order to live our lives responsibly.

To inquire about the notion of integrity, three additional notions are introduced: identity, responsibility, and value (the latter being constitutive to morality). Walker introduces these as three kinds of narratives. She puts forward that responsibilities

[37] Walker (1979).

[38] Walker (1979), 64. As argued in this paper, Kant's understanding displays an ongoing process of developing one's personality. Neither is there a static self, nor can a person claim moral reliability as a personal attribute without the person becoming hypocritical herself.

[39] Cf. Walker (1979), 64.

[40] Walker (1979), 64.

[41] Walker (1979), 64.

[42] Walker (1979), 64.

are narrative constructions of morality. Given that context is constitutive to the growth of moral responsibility and given that this context develops over time, we will be able to understand how lives are interwoven only by means of interpretation of the history of action and responses.[43]

The "three kinds of stories central to living responsibly a life of one's own"[44] start with the narrative of relationship because this is what presupposes identity. "We need to keep on keeping straight who we are, and who we have given others to understand we are, in moral terms; and we need to sustain and sometimes refurbish our understanding of moral terms themselves […]."[45] Stories about oneself are narratives about identity, about how we become what we understand ourselves to be. Making sense of who we are is the equivalent of constructing an identity. This is, of course, never possible without relationships around us, constituting the realm in which we individuate and where others help us develop our personality. Allowing others to understand who we are implies different aspects because, through the way others perceive us, a picture is formed which might differ from the one we try to transmit deliberately. Through the way we act, i.e. how we assume or avoid responsibilities, we are constantly displaying who we are.

There are different reasons why we commit to relationships and engage in doing things for others: either these 'others' have a claim on us which is represented in our commitment – acting to create a relationship we bring about through acting for another – or it is a way of "honoring a history of a past relationship."[46] However, as we cannot respond to all claims, we have to prioritize them by judging and "weighing different continuations against each other"[47] and that is where Walker sees our integrity becoming strained.[48] When she refers to relationships where we are motivated to act because either "the need is so extreme," "it's easy for us to respond," or "there's no one else to help,"[49] the reasons given seem to be motivated consequentialistically, however the underlying reference to integrity can also be seen deontologically. The mere fact that I perceive that I can help, that I can take charge because I am the only person present, or that I can be moved by a desperate situation is not in contradiction with deontological argumentation: that I *will* what I should, motivated through the moral law. The narrative of responsibility and the

[43] Cf. Walker (1979), 66f.

[44] Walker (1979), 67.

[45] Walker (1979), 67. This presupposes truthfulness to the self and others in order to preserve transcendental freedom to act in a morally reliable way.

[46] Walker (1979), 68.

[47] Walker (1979), 68.

[48] Cf. Kant (1797), 224. To evaluate the seemingly conflicting duties, Kant argues for the stronger ground of obligation instead of the stronger obligation.

[49] Cf. Walker (1979), 68.

one of moral identity are not only closely linked, they are also interwoven. This fact becomes visible in "what a person cares for, responds to, and takes care of."[50] "The significance of the ongoing narrative of moral identity is that we [*should*][51] have characteristic patterns of valuation […]".[52] The history of the traces we make both shapes and tells the story or stories of our lives, for no one has only one linear story – there are always several strands that together form a life narrative.[53]

There is still another narrative, a third one, which "spans and supports"[54] the antecedents of both identity and relationship, that is to say: the narrative of moral values. Values, insofar as they are relational, call for application.

It is the *characteristic pattern of valuation* that emphasizes where to turn, what to look at, and how to evaluate. Such a pattern is understood in Walker's work as a 'knot' – a point of reference – for which we can offer explanations. "It shapes and controls our history of responses to others in ways we can account for. The narratives of relationship I sustain, the ways I combine and order them, the continuations I find more valuable than others, and the losses I am willing to accept or impose are controlling structures of the moral life that is specifically mine." […] Although "we *will* be selective, whether in individual or collective contributions, these selections reflect and refine a moral identity that gives our deliberations greater focus and refinement. Equally important, they let others know where we stand and what we stand for."[55]

This statement expresses the significance of the realm of judgment and the scope in which we express our personality or our personal integrity. The idea of autobiographical stories is introduced as a way of arguing for reasoned ethical principles. Walker argues that there is no set of universal moral principles and values, and we can agree with Kant, for there is only one universal moral principle, namely the categorical imperative expressing one initial value, the equal dignity of humans through their moral capacity. Walker wants to introduce her "ethics of responsibility through the narrative based account of moral deliberation and justification", yet this is not possible, as Walker agrees, without the obligation to respond. That is exactly where she meets Kant in the obligation to care for the well-being of others. Kant calls it our duty not to stand aside indifferently if others need our help.[56] For Walker, moral demands on individuals are set forth through the three narratives of relationship, moral identity, and value.

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[50] Walker (1979), 68.

[51] Italics by Nora Hangel.

[52] Walker (1979), 69.

[53] Cf. Walker (1979), 69.

[54] Walker (1979), 69.

[55] Walker (1979), 69. The use of "moral life" here indicates a sociological understanding which could easily lead to an understanding of private morals. Kant delimits this usage of moral.

[56] Kant (1797), VI, 452–454 and 456.

4 To What Extent Are the Two Concepts Presented Compatible, and How and Where Do They Display Incompatibility?

I want to show that Walker's *narrative of relationship* resembles Kant's second duty of contributing to the well-being of others, whereas "*individual moral identity*" seems like a contradiction in terms. Starting with an individual ongoing identity through your own narrative, the self is not completed as long as you live.

Earlier, I argued that moral reliability implicates two relational aspects. It is, first, the reflexive relation to the self, how a person deals with her own stories, her decisions, how she argues her actions and, second, the relation involved to others that yield information about who a person is. If we say that moral reliability needs to be acted out, then the relationality is always within a socio-cultural context and therefore of political relevance. Walker states that moral guidelines cannot be merely mechanical, but rather that the application of moral guidelines reflects the relations it affects. The construction of an impartial bystander is not the standard for evaluation, but plays only *one* role as a basis for assessment. Moral guidelines aim at things between us, "which depend on people's care and responsibility for their maintenance […] they are not mechanical because things of importance are multiple, often multiply relative."[57] "Moral justification […] is from the first and at the last *interpersonal*."[58] Even if individual stories and individuating narratives are designed for particular lives, they lay out a structure which responsibility ethics can clarify.[59] So it is, on the one side, interpersonal, multiple, relative, and changing values and, on the other side, a structure of responsibility that is coming through.

When Walker denies that coherence, consistency, and continuity constitute integrity, she speaks against a formal construction of moral reliability. Integrity cannot be accomplished by merely merging these three nouns together formally.[60] However, integrity cannot be understood without these notions. Integrity bridges these notions by telling the story of how coherence, consistency, and continuity are applied to the narratives of our life. The quantity of these notions does not make a person morally reliable. It is only if they are woven into stories in our lives that they can contribute to moral reliability. They do not contribute as separate qualities, and no one can claim to have them without acting them out. Integrity, understood as moral reliability, focuses on how a person presents herself through her actions. In Walker's insight, integrity has to be understood relationally because the consequences of the actions a person accounts for are always related to circumstances or persons not completely under our control. Therefore, integrity is understood as something steadfast standing against pressure without being static or inflexible. "Integrity as a kind of reliability"

[57] Walker (1979), 70.

[58] Walker (1979), 70.

[59] Cf. Walker (1979), 63.

[60] Cf. Walker (1979), 71.

is a "morally admirable quality."[61] It is an "indispensable responsiveness to the ongoing fit among our accounts"; it is reliable and responsive to the "consequences and costs our actions have in fact incurred"; it is the responsiveness to being able to say 'sorry' and making up for something that did not turn out as we had planned it.[62]

Neither in Walker's nor in Kant's concept is integrity a virtue one can claim to have, like a predicative attribute. Integrity can only be understood as a practice, as something which can in itself never be formal, but has to be performed in every decision made, as well as in every action carried out.

As described in this paper, however, integrity negotiates different views prior to applying them reasonably in regard to the situation, one's own history, and the values one can affirm. Acting out is often preceded by an ongoing struggle within an inner dialogue. The question now is: How can an inner dialogue find a relational representative in Walker's understanding of integrity as moral reliability performed through contextualized actions?

In a first step, we have to understand how Kant constructs this inner dialogue within the conscience. Secondly, we take a closer look at the reflexive inner dialogue for which Kant invents the concept of the "inner judge" who cannot be equated with an external impartial bystander, for it is the internal *homo noumenon*.[63] In a third step, with arguments by Christine Korsgaard, I am going to show how reliability within relationships can be understood within this concept.

According to Kant, positive or transcendental freedom can only be defended if we learn to control the inclinations and impulses that hinder us to take into account the equal dignity of others and learn to educate our will to strive for truthfulness rather than for lies, even if the latter seem convenient for our ends. Only if we are not mastered by external impulses in our internal decisions can we call our decisions free. Powerful emotions and biases, inclinations which have become settled habits can control our actions and decisions and constitute an attack on transcendental freedom. Kant also clearly states that there is no such thing as moral routine, for this contradicts his understanding of inner freedom. "[…] for if it is a *habit* […], that is a uniformity in action that has become a necessity through frequent repetition, it is not one that proceeds from freedom, and therefore not a moral aptitude"[64] Mere repetition of actions, even if they may qualify as morally desirable, is not sufficient to qualify as deriving out of inner freedom. What Kant has in mind is that one should strive to gain a reflexive distance from those powerful emotions in order to be able to act internally in a free manner according to the moral law.

One issue often confused here is that striving not to be at the mercy of one's emotions, including impulses or affects, does not mean that emotions do not play an important role in acting morally. On the contrary, the duties of virtue to others in need call for empathy, not for emotional indifference towards those who need our help.[65] Kant's

[61] Walker (1979), 72.

[62] Cf. Walker (1979), 72.

[63] Kant (1797), VI, 438ff.

[64] Kant (1797), VI, 407.

[65] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 456ff.

aim is to address only those who are able to act sensitively and responsively to the needs of others, those who are not overwhelmed and determined by their own needs and inclinations. In this understanding, his interpretation of inner freedom is the prerequisite for acting in a morally accountable way.[66]

In my view, Walker shares some interests with Kant's ethics. Both emphasize that ethical behavior needs to be sensitive to multifarious social practices, but Walker rejects the possibility that a formal principle can be of any use in practice. Walker questions if what we should strive for is an improvement of judgment and if, in practice, the best judgment available to us is sufficient for moral reliability. Kant would add that, if we want to reduce errors in our judgment, we have to develop our capacity for reasoning as well as our personalities. Walker concentrates on responsibility and the consequences of collaboration in a context sensitive environment. Kant's attention is centered on the development of the faculties that presuppose moral reliability. Kant's formal approach to ethics put forth through the idea of the categorical imperative has invited numerous misinterpretations. However, to avoid a double bind argumentation, it must be made clear that Kant's formula of the categorical imperative is formal insofar as it provides a procedure of scrutiny in the first person perspective. This process of scrutiny can only take place in an inner dialogue between the partial aspects of the reasoning self. Since this procedure is internal, there is no possibility that others can patronize us in the name of the categorical imperative. The chink in the armor is that, by leaving the responsibility to act according to the categorical imperative to the individual in question – and it is vital to do so to keep up the right understanding of inner freedom, the decisions made and acted upon represent the capability of the individual to judge reflectively. This, of course, mirrors the best judgment a person can come up with according to her reasoning and estimation of the situation. Needless to say, this process itself is always situated and never happens outside a particular social and cultural context.

Although Kant, too, is painfully aware of this, he does not argue for a strict system of material values to guide our actions in every situation of life. The duties he formulates are linked to the two duties that are, at the same time, ends. The first is to take on personal responsibility in order to develop one's capability to judge reflectively according to the categorical imperative, and the second is to "promote the well-being of others".[67] The material duties of virtue ensuing from these two duties are of wide implementation.

A misleading interpretation would claim that Kant's system of duties tries to assume complete control, leaving no freedom of self constitution for the individual, which, by the way, contradicts the other reproach that Kant's formal law has no effect at all on the acting individual. We cannot have it both ways. First comes first: Kant himself points out the nonsense of over-regulation, which, for him, has nothing to do with morality; he calls it the tyranny of virtue. Regulation for decisions and actions

[66] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 408f.

[67] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 388.

irrelevant to morality – and that is true for everything including self constitutional matters – is not what Kant has in mind.[68]

The greater problem for moral reliability is, as stated above, that the capability to decide and act on reflective judgments demands education, for, although humans are distinguished by the basic capability to develop their reasoning and take on responsibility, no one is born performing in this way. Walker, too, stresses the importance of justification based on reason for moral reliability. For, where reasonable justification is lacking, power systems are likely to be enforced and supported by arbitrariness. How should a universal and formal principle then unfold within a person?

When Kant unpacks his story, he tells us about voices within. His CI scrutiny[69] takes place within the conscience, as a natural predisposition of the mind which every person has, but which must, nevertheless, be cultivated.[70] The moral reliability of a person, her personality, develops within her conscience, where conflicting motives and determining grounds enter into a dialogue within an internal court. The objective determining grounds of the moral law are advocated by the inner judge, who represents the partial aspect of the *homo noumenon*. The subjective motives and subjective determining grounds are vindicated by the homo *phaenomenon, animal rationale*.[71]

The inner judge presents the stronger determining ground of the moral law, inquiring if we are taking on a course of action that complies with the humanity within. As every single person is a part of humanity, we can therefore rightly ask others not to wrong us, as we, in turn, are asked not to wrong others. In this dialogue, the inner judge embodies scrutiny with the categorical imperative, whereas the dialogue is the reasoning of the reflexive power of judgment and, therefore, to be developed within through education and practice. In this sense, the dialogue becomes the story of integrity. Just as we are free to ignore the verdict of reflexive scrutiny, we are also to be held accountable from within for having ignored it or for having acted against our better knowledge.

The process of understanding values by asking for justification or normative reasons is crucial and constitutive for our identity and for how we act responsibly. Giving reasons can be meaningful in different perspectives, for us subjectively, as part of our individual narrative, and for fitting into our narrative of our personality or character. It can be a means to make our actions traceable for others. These reasons add to and are part of our narrative.

Since everything that can be developed is susceptible to errors and conscience needs to be developed, flaws can occur. However, Kant states "an erring conscience is an absurdity"[72] and means that it is not possible to err about whether we have

[68] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 388.

[69] The process when the categorical imperative is applied within an inner dialogue.

[70] Cf, Kant (1797), VI, 399.

[71] Kant (1797), VI, §13, 438–440.

[72] Kant (1797), VI, 401.

submitted our subjective motives to CI scrutiny or not. "[…] I can indeed be mistaken at times in my objective judgment as to whether something is a duty or not […]"[73] That is why it is important to educate our judgment to learn how to apply the moral law to the particular historically and socially contingent contexts we find ourselves in. Neither can morality, understood in this first person perspective, be imposed upon others without putting them in danger of becoming hypocritical themselves, nor can there be a custom of morality, for morality necessarily calls for contextualized decisions, so that even stagnation of reason would be counterproductive.[74]

From an adult perspective, as experience shows us, we should care for the well-being of others because, without this commitment to making others a matter of one's own purpose, no one can develop into a person capable of reciprocal responsibility. On this material level, there is no possibility to develop either a sense of one's self or a concept of duties, let alone the duty to act in a morally reliable manner. Whereas, formally, in the sense of Kant's system of duties, caring for one's perfectibility antecedes care for the well-being of others, empirically, it is *vice versa*. In terms of one's own perfectibility, others are included relationally since the prerequisite of being able to take care for oneself as an adult is that others have assumed the initial responsibility. At first, a person (e.g. a parent) is held legally accountable for another person (an infant) until that infant is mature and responsible enough to take on legal responsibility for herself. Practicing personal responsibility without the danger of legal consequence is the prerequisite of legal accountability.[75] In a relational perspective, care about one's own perfectibility is possible only if the individual in question has experienced the care of others who have promoted her well-being.

The reflexivity in this process is visible as one becomes morally reliable for others insofar as one assumes the responsibility of caring for oneself in order to promote one's own perfectibility, which again includes caring about the well-being of others. Relationally, both duties mutually refer to each other. Through distinction on the material and the formal level, circularity of the argument can be avoided.

The question now is why we should submit our subjective motives to an objective determining ground if our volition leads in another direction and no negative consequences can be expected upon disobedience of the moral law. If the person in question accepts the moral law as an intrinsically worthy principle, she wants what is morally asked, but, if it is inconvenient for a person to give in to a moral claim, we need an additional reason. Kant cannot give an additional reason because this would mean submission to a moral claim, i.e. to another end, which would lead to heteronomy. However, Kant turns our attention to the self-respect we experience in respecting the moral law. "It cannot be said that he has a duty of respect toward himself, for he must have respect for the law within himself in order even to think

[73] Kant (1797), VI, 401.

[74] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 409.

[75] Cf. Korsgaard (1992), 313.

of any duty whatsoever."[76] Kant relies on the freedom of every person to agree that the categorical imperative can serve as a guiding principle. It is only after a person has, in principle, agreed that the categorical imperative is worth considering that this principle can develop and unfold internally within the person, and that, as an effect of our capacity for morality, we are aware of our self-respect.[77] After freely acknowledging that a principle or value is worth considering, reasoning capacities can be affected. The prerequisite for this is the competence and the ability to reason.

In her paper on Reciprocity,[78] Korsgaard distinguishes the theoretical concept of responsibility from the practical one. Voluntariness is the core concept of the theoretical concept, for freedom of action lies in the possibility to decide how we act, in the awareness that we do have choices. The practical conception of responsibility, on the other hand, emphasizes the context, the relations from which our decisions are derived. The way one takes responsibility or accounts for responsibility within a relationship mirrors the relationship itself. One person may have reason to trust a person while a different one has lost faith in this specific person as a consequence of their joint relationship. We are, firstly, responsible for which relationships we maintain and, secondly, for answering to expectations of trust on the basis of their relationality. "Holding someone responsible can be insensitive or merciless; failing to hold someone responsible can be disrespectful or patronizing. Moral requirements will apply to our attributions of responsibility just as Kant believes they do"[79] in his *Doctrines of Virtue*. Kant claims that there is neither a duty to love someone nor one for personal friendship if we understand this as a sensual feeling.[80] However, there is a duty for moral friendship between reciprocal adults in the sense of reciprocal moral accountability.[81] Kant uses the term "duties of love" in a meritorious sense, meaning beneficence, gratitude, and sympathy.[82] As a moral requirement, love can only be practical, not sensual or, as he calls it, pathological.[83]

However, Korsgaard does not believe that "there is a stable relationship between the voluntariness of an action or attitude and the appropriateness of holding someone responsible for it."[84] Although we recognize mitigating circumstances for persons making decisions under pressure or severe stress, it does not follow "that people under severe stress *cannot* control themselves."[85] Nevertheless, we blame people for not controlling themselves and for acting inappropriately.[86]

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[76] Kant (1797), VI, 403.

[77] Cf. Kant (1788), V, 73.

[78] Korsgaard (1992).

[79] Korsgaard (1992), 314.

[80] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 401. As love is an overwhelming impulse and sentiment, it cannot be a duty.

[81] Kant (1797), VI, 466–467 and 471–473.

[82] Cf. Kant (1797), VI, 448; 452.

[83] Kant (1797), VI, 452.

[84] Korsgaard (1992), 313.

[85] Korsgaard (1992), 313.

[86] Cf. Korsgaard (1992), 313.

From this point of view, I suggest the explanation that the difference between lying to a person on pretence and more explicitly deluding or misleading a person lies in the relational aspect. Lying implies use of the other person Q as a mere means to an end, i.e. in order to achieve a goal by motivating that person (P) into cooperation and participation to that end. On the other hand, a display of reliable, credible, or responsible behavior by another person R may also be seen as R's need for recognition by the person in question (P). If no deeds follow R's promises, R is in danger of being accused of hypocritical behavior in her relation to P. In a relational sense, P was used in order to reinforce R's insufficient belief in her own reliability. Perhaps R even used P's belief in her reliability to believe it herself.

If we want to be taken seriously and perceived as reliable, it is through reasoned acting and decision making that we form our own personalities in order to grow into the persons we want to be.

As moral integrity is based on inner freedom to choose this inner law freely, it is also possible to remain indifferent to moral integrity, as many people do. What we cannot reject, however, is the responsibility for having maintained our indifference because, due to the conscience of being capable of morality, we are human beings with dignity, and therefore united under this moral law, independently of whether we open up our reasoning to it or not. Nevertheless, this does not mean that this moral law is forced upon us from the outside, but the conscience of being capable of morality is the fact of reason given within.[87] Formally, neither throughout the world nor within the person herself does a sphere free of morals exist. If we state that the moral law has to be accepted freely, this means we have to give way in our subjective motives if scrutiny of our practical reasoning has judged that we are putting forth a subjective exception and thereby not treating others with due respect. Kant tells us that, if we want to act with moral integrity, there is no way around submitting to this moral law and administering it in our daily decisions and practice.

5 Integrity in Danger of Hypocrisy; the Political Relevance of Assignment and Withdrawal

Having inquired into the implications of integrity as relational, I want to examine the relational implications of hypocrisy. Walker explains hypocrisy in terms of someone misleading a person about what she is going to do or what the other person can count on in a relationship.[88] From the consequentialist view, I can agree with this explanation. However, I am curious about the structure of a person who would deliberately mislead or confuse others in order to achieve a common purpose.

[87] Cf. Kant (1788), V, 30f.

[88] Cf. Walker (1979), 72.

Let us start with this case. For Walker, integrity is moral reliability to the extent that a person can be or can become reliable no matter how diverse and changing a social context may be. Walker acknowledges that social practices form identities, but adds that, within those social intersections, integrity is possible by telling, retelling, and refining one's story. If hypocrisy is also to be considered relational, does this mean that another person is required who believes what is told?

I think hypocrisy is often used to make people cooperate in a certain way which is of greater advantage to others, but is communicated by these as if they want the consequences without profiting from them. A patriarchal situation or society, for example, will work with such stories, telling one section of that society how happy it is to be permitted to do more work for lesser acknowledgement.

So what is the structure of a person or groups of persons who mislead others about what they are interested in accomplishing? When can this deceptions be called deliberate and when not? In the case of a person being clearly aware that she will not fulfil her relational responsibility in terms of an action, I agree that this can be called deliberate. Nevertheless, this seems to me to be very close to lying, which has to be distinguished from hypocrisy, because, if I know at the very moment I commit myself that I will not take on the commitment, this means I am lying about my commitment. The difference from hypocrisy is, in my view, in the fact that, at the moment of agreement to the commitment, a person in danger of acting hypocritically agrees to the prospects others have set for her. She agrees to relational responsibility because she cannot take responsibility by herself due to lack of belief that she can accomplish the action by herself. So she really depends on the relationality of the other person who believes in her reliability. When she is left to herself, the relationality drifts off, and disbelief in what she can accomplish drifts in, along with the hypocritical action for which she does not take responsibility. Her untruthfulness consists in her inability to face and accept the fact that she does not believe herself capable of taking on her part of the promise. Instead of admitting her inability, she builds up a new story to make others believe in her ability. It is the belief others have in her that motivates her to engage in relational actions at all. Leaving these inquiries about the first person perspective, I finally want to come back to implications for the group before giving an example to illustrate the complexity of the problem.

If we understand moral accountability – as Walker does – to be acting according to a transparent system of values, transparent to all those involved, it is, however, plain to see that its realization can be very challenging. Within changing contexts, depending on where the acting person is positioned, depending on that person's capability of judging or deciding what to do, acting according to moral values may even reach life-threatening proportions.

Oppressed groups, for example, encounter the entire struggle of building meaningful lives within the context of social exclusion from within their own group and from the outside. An ideal environment, first, entails loving and respectful relationships which offer feedback on perceived incongruities, and, second, a position within a social group which is neither over-privileged nor marginalized. In contrast thereto, the worst possible environment would be a deceitful or even threatening atmosphere set within an oppressed group, i.e. one which is ignored, or even worse, despised by

other dominant social groups. Within the social context described, it is possible to understand that becoming a perceived hypocrite is hard to avoid if one strives to live up to the demands of the dominant group and, at the same time, tries to stay loyal to a context deprived of equal opportunities. These two constructed boundaries build the framework for the argument within which combinations of the set parameters will help to find the clarity necessary for moral integrity and hypocrisy.

6 The Two Dimensions of Integrity Illustrated by an Example

Let us assume the case that a person P grows up within a certain social context, for example, the ethnic group of the Romani.

P identifies herself with the acknowledged values of this particular context and becomes a well-regarded member of that society. People around her rely on her. The way she defines herself matches the picture that others have of her within her relationships. P is a committed member of the Romani and is nevertheless aware of the stories about her social group which show disregard for its social mores.

Her social context is one of a deprived group, so, if P tries to gain recognition outside this group, she is very likely to face dominant narratives about the group through which she is identified by others. These narratives are designed to keep her within the realm accepted by the master-narrative of the dominant group. As an acknowledged representative of a deprived group, she might be confronted with questions about her own integrity, her reliability as a person, and her values if she tries to gain social/political recognition outside her group. As a member of a deprived group, she is not questioned about values and responsibilities constitutive to her personality; rather, her personality is judged by her membership in a deprived group from outside of this group.

So, in my model picture, person P faces a dilemma: through the imposed master-narrative, she identifies herself as a representative of a deprived group and is thus forced to view herself from a yet again different perspective. In addition, she faces the danger of becoming hypocritical by giving up her original self-definition, thereby becoming a hypocrite to her own people due to her efforts to fit into the realm which the dominant value system is providing. Does she now have a choice between staying within her community with full moral respect or leaving her initial context of being viewed as a person deprived of equal opportunity and recognition? In the eyes of the dominant group, P, as a member of the deprived group, has thus far failed to acquire a self of full integrity.

In her book *Damaged Identities*, Hilde Lindemann presents two descriptions which define "damaged identities" as: (A) "*Deprivation of opportunity*," when an entire social group is denied full moral respect, with the consequences of withholding "valuable social roles" or "desirable relationships that are themselves constitutive of identity."[89]

[89] Lindemann Nelson (2001), xii.

(B) "*Infiltrated consciousness*," which is as if discrimination against the social group *deprived of opportunities* could enter the sense of self, so that she "fails to acquire a sense of herself as worthy of full moral respect." As both injuries harm a "person's ability to exercise her moral agency," Lindemann develops the method of the *counter-story* as an "analytical and practical tool, to repair the damage done to the identity."[90]

It is *infiltrated consciousness* which could show behavior analogous to persons who act hypocritically when the damage done means that no one expects her to be reliable because of her deprivation and membership in an oppressed group. She fulfils the expectation others have of her as a significant member of a social group and not as an individual. As Scheman[91] points out, this would mean twice-done wrong to an individual: firstly, by labeling her as member of a damaged group and thus withholding her full moral value, as also presented in Lindemann's analysis of deprivation of opportunities; secondly, by victimizing her again as an individual because she has not been able to establish full integrity (moral reliability) due to the lack of opportunities in her social group from the outset.

Thus, by putting both aspects together, one can answer that integrity is moral reliability to the extent that a person can act or answer reliably no matter how diverse and changing a social context may be, but only if the damage done through deprivation of opportunity and infiltrated consciousness is not able to effect her ability to exercise moral agency to develop methods to repair the harm. Calling a person with damaged identity hypocritical would wrong her once more if identities are constituted in narratives. It is a question of the supposition for the realm and the conditions for development of a counterstory if the damage is done to the identity itself.

The implication is that we have to be attentive while telling counterstories which refer to the author's role. "Who gets to *tell* the story?"[92] A valuable counterstory requires more than one person because "full repair of an identity damaged by oppression requires the cooperation of quite a number of people."[93] A counterstory aims "to identify people as fully developed moral agents."[94] However, counterstories can take on many diverse forms "and still qualify as the stories that constitute the person's identity."[95] As counterstories function against master narratives that "edge you out or force you in", identities that deprive you of moral value can be seen as "identity-constituting stories that loosen the constraints on a person's moral agency."[96] When the master narrative is replaced by a counterstory, the damage caused by "deprivation of opportunity and infiltrated consciousness can be repaired."[97]

Nevertheless, master-narratives and their counterstories originate out of the same communities. Both sorts are fashioned by people, show a social structure, and can

[90] Lindemann Nelson (2001), xii.

[91] Scheman (1997), 124–162.

[92] Lindemann Nelson (2001), 186.

[93] Lindemann Nelson (2001), 186.

[94] Lindemann Nelson (2001), 186.

[95] Lindemann Nelson (2001), 186.

[96] Lindemann Nelson (2001), 186.

[97] Lindemann Nelson (2001), 186f.

be formed by this social framework, as well as contribute to its establishment. A story is positively constructed if it does not justify the inequality of moral value, but rather ensures that the goods of a society are available to the plurality of their members. Positively constructed stories bring "greater confidence in [the] worthiness to be the authors of their own action" as "expressions of morally developed persons", and, in the best case, they "remove some of the weight" dominant identities have taken on through master-narratives justifying the oppression of others.[98]

The political implication of integrity in terms of moral reliability is an orientation to remain sensitive to an egalitarian value which observes and closely monitors the distribution of privilege.. Or put more forcefully, it is the moral responsibility of the privileged to distribute privilege because they can afford to. The freedom to say no to privilege is the very freedom that tells us in enlightenment to think critically for ourselves.

If the danger of imposing master narratives socially is deliberately ignored by the more powerful members of society, the integrating function of master narratives becomes compromised, and these will ultimately become a kind of hypocrisy. Master narratives about who can claim integrity and, therefore, decide who is morally fit for equal political participation are in danger of becoming hypocritical themselves by generating power structures and thus depriving others of their chances for political recognition and social acknowledgement.

I have argued that, in terms of individual reliability, there is a need for an additional criterion if we do not accept that reliability, in any form, cannot, at the same time, be considered moral reliability, as discussed in my example with the villain. Kant offers a criterion for every individual to examine if she is potentially acting hypocritically. I have argued that developing one's moral reliability involves caring not only for the development of reasoning, but also for the conditions of moral accountability. Within our conscience, we are commanded to strive for truthfulness about the shape of our personality, which is displayed by the ongoing process of our decisions and actions. Maintaining truthfulness means maintaining transcendental freedom and fighting against attacks from within and from outside. Submission to the determining ground of other persons is equally as damaging to moral reliability as hypocrisy. I have tried to show some relational aspects of hypocrisy and integrity and argued that truthfulness is a matter of the first person perspective. Only if we develop moral reliability through a reflexive relationship within are we fit to withdraw from exceptions that wrong others in their dignity as part of humanity. Since morally reliable behavior has to be examined in the first person perspective as well as in that of the third person, contemporary feminist thinkers provide valuable insights through a shift from the individual perspective to the relational and on to the political one.[99]

[98] Lindemann Nelson (2001), 188.

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