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After Widening: Preference Constellations, Voting Power, and Institutional Change

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Summary: In recent years, the study of European decision making processes and the institutional structures they are governed by has found its place in mainstream political science. An array of publications deals with the modified decision making rules in the EU and its effects on the course of integration. Concerning enlargement, many academics describe the advantages and disadvantages of the accession of up to 15 new states and concentrate on the political and economic obstacles in this matter. In this analysis, however, the main focus will be put on the development of legislative decision making processes in the EU in the future as well as the course of integration in certain policy areas such as agricultural policy, external trade and consumer interests.
It is frequently assumed that intergovernmental negotiations will become more tedious and complex in light of the growing number of states and interests. The goal of this study is to measure the preferences of the candidate states along several individual political dimensions in the EU and to compare these preferences with those of the current members. On the basis of the data gathered through interviews and structural statistics concrete prognoses will be made on the further course of integration along several important conflict dimensions in EU decision making. This analysis serves to establish whether such conflict lines will be intensified and whether the current voting coalitions in the Council of Ministers will modified in the course of enlargement. The ulitimate aim is then to present different decision making scenarios for individual policy areas so that future developments in the EU can be anticipated and modelled.

Zusammenfassung: In den letzten Jahren rücken europäische Entscheidungsprozesse und die dahinterstehenen institutionellen Strukturen verstärkt ins Blickfeld der politikwissenschaftlichen Forschung. Eine Vielzahl von Publikationen beschäftigt sich mit den modifizierten Entscheidungsregeln in der EU und deren Auswirklungen auf den Integrationsprozeß. Was die bevorstehende Osterweiterung anbelangt, beschreiben viele Akademiker die Vorteile und Nachteile der Aufnahme von bis zu fünfzehn neuen Staaten und die damit verbundenen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Hindernisse. In dieser Studie richtet sich dagegen der Fokus auf die Entwicklung von legislativen Entscheidungsprozessen in der EU der Zukunft und auf den Verlauf der Integration in einzelnen Politikbereichen, z.B. Agrarpolitik, Handelspolitik, Verbraucherinteresssen.
Es wird in der Politikwissenschaft davon ausgegangen, daß intergouvernmentale Verhandlungen angesichts der wachsenden Zahl von Staaten und Interessen langwieriger und komplexer werden. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit besteht darin, die Präferenzen der Beitrittskandidaten entlang einzelner wichtiger Politikdimensionen systematisch zu messen und diese mit denen der jetztigen Mitglieder zu vergleichen. Anhand der durch Experteninterviews und Strukturstatistiken erhobenen Daten werden konkrete Prognosen über den weiteren Verlauf der Integration entlang mehrerer Konfliktdimensionen gemacht. Es gilt dabei festzustellen, inwiefern bestimmte Konfliktlinien im Zuge der Osterweiterung verschärft und die gegenwärtigen Stimmkoalitionen im Ministerrat verändert werden. Es werden zum Schluß anhand der Präferenzen der Beitrittskandidaten verschiedene Entscheidungsszenarien für einzelne Politikbereiche vorgestellt, damit künftige Entwicklungen in der EU antizipiert und modelliert werden können.

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Vorwort

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1. Introduction

Imminent eastern enlargement poses daunting challenges to the European Union (EU). By nearly doubling the number of members in the near future, the EU is confronted with the task of accommodating more diverse political interests and preferences, while generating an efficient mode of governance among actors with enormous political and economic disparities. On the one hand, the accession of primarily post-communist candidate states is viewed as a unique historical chance at ultimately overcoming the enduring ideological and political division of Europe. Many observers allude to past successes of the EU in terms of integrating less wealthy states whose political and economic institutions have been distorted by legacies of dictatorship and economic backwardness. Furthermore, the acquisition is seen as a means of expanding the world's largest common market and for the EU to become a heavyweight in international affairs. On the other hand, there is a legitimate fear that the integration of the central and eastern European countries (CEECs) into the EU will not only bring on immeasurable financial burdens, but also eventually lead to instability in decision-making processes. Due to the relatively low level of economic development of most accession candidates, many fear that enlargement will reinforce or aggravate the existing political cleavages, while disrupting the precarious decision-making inertia. In the past, though, after being written off by skeptic academics as status-quo biased (see Scharpf 1985), the EU has shown a resilient ability to regenerate itself and overcome even the most enduring periods of stagnation. These breakthroughs were frequently attained by seizing the opportunity of preference conversion (see Moravcsik 1998), with the most prominent examples being the Single European Act (SEA) (1987) and the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) (1992).

In the context of imminent enlargement though, pessimists see the politics of vote trading, side-payments and issue-linkage as doomed, because - in light of the assumed further heterogenization of the EU - the prospects for outcomes that improve the standing of both the present and future members will likely diminish (Schneider 2002: 186). In contrast to past enlargements, many scholars view the upcoming expansion to eastern and southern Europe as a *sui generis* enlargement (see Bomberg and Peterson 1998) because it encompasses states not only with relatively weak economic outputs, but also severe structural problems and a legacy of political and economic hardships. From a statistical perspective, the accession of all 12 candidate states would lead to a population increase of 30%, but to an aggregated increase in GDP of merely 4%.

Figure 1-1. GDP of the CEECs compared to EU-15



(Eurostat 2002)

In the eyes of the candidates, membership in the world's largest common market is regarded as the most attractive means of accelerating the ongoing transformation process and achieving a higher level of modernization (Balázs 1998: 68; Plümper and Mattli 2002). Despite widespread fears over various political issues and loss of national sovereignty, EU membership remains the supreme foreign policy goal of some 15 central, eastern and southern European states. In their view, acquisition shall serve to alleviate socioeconomic disparities, while providing an impetus to upgrade and democratize national political institutions.

Interestingly enough, the EU has equally set its hopes on enlargement as a motive to reform, revise and recreate its own forms of governance. For this reason, the future design of European institutions has come to dominate the recent political agenda. Like the upcoming members, the Union itself seeks to link enlargement to internal reforms aimed at optimizing its governance capacity, increasing institutional flexibility, while remaining a source of innovation and progress. This entails an extremely delicate and intricate process ultimately geared at minimizing the institutional damage expected to be brought on by the acquisition of nearly a dozen ex-communist states (exceptions: Cyprus and Malta). Despite high levels of economic growth a vast majority of these states are continuously plagued by deeply ridden economic distortions as well as extreme social inequalities and political uncertainty (see Nørgaard 2000a, 2000b). Thus, the EU is confronted with the crucial tasks of maintaining internal cohesion, promoting an environment of sustainable growth, while coming to terms with the expected distributive and legislative conflicts expected to emerge after enlargement.

1.1 Innovation on the research front

Rethinking and reconstructing the EU demands progress and innovation on the research front as well. The present paper attempts to move beyond the existing studies on enlargement and

apply a unique scientific approach ultimately geared at simulating future decision-making procedures in the EU. Instead of dwelling on the advantages and disadvantages of enlarging (see Baldwin, François and Portes 1997) and the obstacles in the accession process, the focus will be placed on the impact of the further heterogenization of preferences and interests on the decision-making process. Observers are well aware of the enormous income gap between the present member states (EU-15) and the future members, but few scholars have aimed to synthesize CEEC policy positions with the EU's decision making framework and scrutinize enlargement from the context of institutional reform. By overcoming the analytical deficits of previous research, this project shall tackle matters of CEEC political preferences and their repercussions on European governance. Its ultimate goal then lies in generating plausible prognoses on patterns of behavior to be expected in future EU legislative procedures.

Even the most motivated accounts of accession have yet to deliver concrete forecasts on the nature of EU legislative governance after enlargement.[1] The current debate on expansion has indicated that the expected applicants have divergent political preferences which may endanger the fragile equilibrium in particular between wealthy and poorer member states (see König and Bräuninger 2000). However, it would be negligent to reflect on these economic disparities from the macro-level alone. Instead, this analysis proposes a technique of dissecting EU decision making into its fundamental parts on an issue and conflict-specific basis. Considering past and current voting behavior of the present member states as well as the anticipated preferences of future members, the legislative game of the EU will be analyzed along an array of poignant political dimensions with their inherent conflict lines. Unlike other scholars, who have theorized enlargement from the viewpoint of the Council voting power of the current and member states (see Steunenberg 2002; Lane and Mæland 2002), the central focus of this approach will be placed on the impact of enlargement on different policy domains and in particular the existing political cleavages.

2. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Enlargement

The theoretical literature on the EU is characterized by widely divergent opinions on the phenomenon of regional integration and the role that enlargement plays within its context.

[1] One exception is the work of König and Bräuninger (2000), who have pointed out that distributive conflicts will be at the heart of EU politics, in particular in matters of agriculture and cohesion.

The following section will establish a theoretical framework for the description of European Union politics while briefly applying various perspectives to the context of enlargement. An overview of the state-of-the-art literature on both the accession process as well as the legislative game in an enlarged Union will be offered. I will then present several research questions and working hypotheses derived from the discussed theoretical literature and devise a research design to tackle the analytical complexities at hand.

The concept of integration essentially comprises two separate, but perhaps related (see Schneider 2002) phenomena: the *dynamics of deepening* and the *dynamics of widening*. Deepening can be understood as a vertical process in which the forms and patterns of cooperation are solidified and expanded. Widening, on the other hand, is a "horizontal" phenomenon by which the existing cooperative framework is transferred to new geographical entities. Enlargement is thus a formal process of horizontal institutionalization, in which institutions spread beyond the incumbent actors and encompass new members (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002: 503).

Despite its political salience in the present and past, enlargement and its underlying dynamics have yet become a focal point of *regional integration theory*. Nevertheless, the grand integration theories do offer limited insights on the phenomenon of territorial expansion. *(Neo)Functionalism* advocates the view that the expansion of cooperation to other policy areas and territorial units is not problematic because integration is an unrestricted *public good*. The theory is constructed on the principle that successful integration in one policy-area will create the necessity for and facilitate similar successful collaboration in others. Integration is governed by so-called *spillovers*, i.e. the pooling of responsibilities in one policy domain leads to the necessity for pooling elsewhere. Functionalism assumes that the fruits of integration will eventually equally spill over to other regions (Haas 1968: 313-317; Deutsch 1970: 43-44). Thus, integration is driven by an internal mechanism: states reaping the benefits of integration can and will expand in political and territorial terms because of the non-exclusivity of integration.

The credibility of functionalism, in particular in terms of imminent enlargement, is impeded by its theoretical shortcomings. Innovative applications of this paradigm have been paralyzed by the fact that it blends out strategic considerations of actors, self-seeking opportunism and coalitions, while understating the role that institutions play in the integration process. Particularly damaging for the credibility of the neo-functionalist school is the fact that it

predicts only more integration and is geared to explain neither periods of stagnation nor the *stop-and-go* pattern by which European integration has evolved (see Schneider and Cederman 1994). By exaggerating the benefits of expanding cooperation, it overtly neglects the most significant factors that govern enlargement - disparities in economic development, political structures and in turn diverging policy positions – and is thus inadequate in grasping the phenomenon of widening in analytical terms.

Intergovernmentalism has been successful at pinpointing the shortcomings of the neo-functionalist paradigm. In particular Moravcsik's (1998) liberal intergovernmentalism views integration as a process molded by self-seeking states and their efforts to transmit their economic and political preferences into community policy. Advancements in integration are regarded as the outcome of bargaining between states who - with knowledge of the preferences of their counterparts - strive for policies that appease the main national economic groups. If the policy positions of the most influential states converge, *pareto-optimal* integration steps become feasible. Unlike functionalism, intergovernmentalism delves to the micro-level roots of policy-making by examining how national preferences are channeled into supranational policy. Strategic governments opt for further integration as a means of extracting credible commitments (e.g. on the opening of markets, fighting inflation) from other actors (Moravcsik 1998: 73-77). European integration is essentially conceived as a treaty bargaining process in which each actor possess the right to veto unfavorable policies.

For this paradigm, the acquisition of new members doubtlessly poses great difficulties as all (larger) members are assumed to insist on pareto-optimal outcomes. The only possibility for the EU to advance from the status quo (SQ) to more integrationist policies in the face of widely divergent interests is through issue-linkage and side-payments (see Moravcsik 1998: 65-67). Overcoming such hurdles through package deals or side-payments alone, however, would bring about such enormous costs after enlargement that it is questionable how community projects could be financed in the future.

The predictions of liberal intergovernmentalist theory demonstrate a significant shortcoming by downplaying the impact of supranational institutions as strategic actors in their own right. Tsebelis and Garrett (1996; 2000) and others have formally illustrated how the European Parliament (EP) is able to pull outcomes towards its optimal position through the usage of its conditional agenda setting/veto power. Moravcsik's version of intergovernmentalism also goes too far in narrowing the integration process to treaty bargaining between large states.

Applied to enlargement, intergovernmentalist theory suffers from the analytical weakness that it is constructed to assume that the current members have no incentive to change the institutional status quo. By presuming that the SQ lies within the pareto area of all member states, this paradigm neglects the process of institutional reform that geographical widening may entail. It cannot be ruled out that some or many actors anticipate positive externalities through accession and the institutional reforms linked to it (Steunenberg 2000: 97). Thus, the process of enlargement and its underlying *institutional revision* provide the basis for member states to alter the EU's policy agenda, while reconstructing existing institutions to their advantage (see section 3.2).

2.1 Enlargement literature – The Institutionalist Turn

The majority of studies focus primarily on enlargement from the macro-level, addressing questions of why and under what conditions the EU opts to expand. Detailed descriptive accounts deal with the efforts made to prepare the CEECs for enlargement and the obstacles involved with the adaptation of the *acquis communautaire* as well as the vigorous attempts to modernize post-communist societies (Dauderstädt, M. 2000; Hartwig and Soveroski 2000). Scholars have taken on the task of describing how the accession process has been managed and realized in the CEECs (see Àgh 1999; Stawarska 1999; Bungs 2000; Fink Hafner 1999). Other academics and practitioners have offered valuable advice on the preparation of *status quo* Europe for the entry of the future members (Balász 1998; Lippert 1998, 2000), while thorough attention has also been dedicated to relations between the EU and various candidate states (see Preston 2000; (Brinar and Svetlićić 1998). Despite their empirical richness, a majority of such studies lack a robust theoretical framework and tend to cling to the descriptive level. With the exception of a growing branch of research on CEEC public opinion[2], the vast majority of research restricts itself to the internal reform process and the obstacles of accession, while lacking a solid scientific foundation.

In order to overcome the analytical deficits of the existing literature and the classical theories discussed above, scholars of both enlargement and EU politics in general are increasingly turning to *institutionalist theory*. We have recently witnessed a renaissance of institutional accounts of EU politics focussing on the relative power of actors, the complexities of multi-level bargaining and the impact of socialized norms on the tempo of European integration

[2] see Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Hughes et. al. 2002

(Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 2). This section will briefly outline the three variants of institutionalist theory and argue for a rational choice institutionalist approach to the study of enlargement and EU decision making.

2.2 Historical and Sociological Institutionalism

The principal claim of the institutionalist approach is that institutions structure political and social behavior, restrain and empower actors and thereby have a direct effect on political outcomes. Sociological Institutionalism (SI) has generated meaningful insights on European integration and the enlargement process. By elevating culture, norms, and ideas to the status of an independent variable it has enhanced our understanding of how social constellations leave their mark on the course of integration. This perspective has emphasized that the political game entails not merely self-seeking, mean-end efficiency, but is also driven by deeply anchored norms and socially appropriate behavior patterns (see Hall and Taylor 1996: 946-947; Checkel and Moravcsik 2001). Diverse applications have indicated that the course of integration depends on more than just the pursuit of exogenously given interests, but also on the cultural disposition of the relevant actors and in turn "the impact of values, beliefs, and identities on actor's responses to integrative challenges" (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 21). The underlying assumption is that integration and enlargement are driven by the existence or creation of a common identity, while - in a comparative sense - the diverse reactions to integration are sought after in the cultural backgrounds of the individual member states.

Regardless of its clear shortcomings - e.g. non-falsibility, methodological dubiousness – the sociological paradigm has enriched our comprehension of enlargement. There have been intensive, and often exaggerated efforts to reconstruct eastern European national identities and implant them into the circle of western European culture (see Davies 1997: 25-31). Thus, the enlargement process is accompanied by the construction of norms which in turn manifest themselves in formal and informal interactions between current and future member states (see Wiener and Fierke 1999). Schimmelfennig (2000) depicts how prospect members mimic the values and rhetoric of the EU to give to believe that they are equally indoctrinated in western values as the present members. Their overt allegiance to the EU's principles has made it increasingly difficult refuse them speedy membership.

However, such cultural or ideological interpretations erroneously lead us to believe that the behavior of the CEECs will only be integrationist. Furthermore, they leave us to wonder

whether the existing institutions of governance will have the capacity to absorb new members. Mere enthusiasm for the EU does not reveal any insights on the policy positions of the future members and their impact on the pace of integration. The analytical plausibility of SI is limited, as it strips actors of their rationality and restricts policy preferences to culture, norms, and values alone.

Historical Institutionalism (HI) subscribes to the public choice credo that struggles between rival groups lie at the heart of politics, but strives for a more adequate explanation for the distinctiveness of national political outcomes. By scrutinizing the institutional fabric of public policy and the economy, it searches for reasons why certain preferences are more easily transmitted into policy than others (see Hall and Taylor 1996: 937). Regarding institutions as procedures, routines, and norms embedded in the organizational structure of political economy, historical institutionalists emphasize that the asymmetrical institutional configuration of society is a driving force for the operation of a system as a whole. HI also demonstrates how past decision-making patterns are continuously reiterated in present-day situations. Thus, not only the content of an issue and the self-seeking motives of the participating actors, but also the framework and nature of policy making have implications for the output. HI analyses of the EU have focussed on the temporal aspect of politics, the restricted time horizons of political decision makers and in particular how prior institutional commitments structure the future behavior of actors. The term "path dependent" is applied to various EU policy domains, in which an institutional momentum laid out by past decisions undermines member state control (see Pierson 1996: 157-158).

HI has yet to tackle the politics and effects of enlargement. However, transition theorists (Lijphart 1992; Johannsen and Nørgaard 2001) have succeeded in delivering explicit accounts of the self-reinforcing impact of both communist and newly created post-communist institutions.[3] Both before and during democratization, an institutional momentum has been created in the candidate states which has empowered certain actors while shutting others out. The ever recurring example is that of the Polish agricultural sector (see section 7.1) which has gained privileged access to national policy making, while other (civic interest) groups remain at a particular disadvantage. Thus, in the future, we may expect an upsurge of literature

[3] In analyses by scholars of diverse backgrounds the notion is reiterated that once virgin political and economic institutions have been established in the transition phase they are extremely difficult to uproot or undo (see Lijphart 1992; Johannsen and Nørgaard 2001; Schneider and Bodenstein 2001)

focussing on the de-institutionalization of inherited post-communist structural distortions and their effects on the integration process.

Despite offering insights on how the institutions structure politics, HI neglects the *genesis* of political institutions and does not deliver adequate explanations, for example, for the current struggle over the nature of EU governance institutions. Enlargement and its underlying institutional reforms have endowed actors with a unique opportunity to alter institutional arrangements to better suit their needs (see Aspinwall and Schneider 2000). The accession process is accompanied by a *rush* to reshape legislative and bureaucratic institutions to improve one's position in the post-enlargement phase (see Steunenberg 2002: 97).

2.3 Rational Choice Institutionalism

By overcoming the shortcomings of its institutionalist counterparts, Rational Choice (RC) institutionalism has rapidly found its way into the mainstream of political science and inspired sophisticated work on the European legislative process (see Tsebelis and Garrett 1996, 2001; Schneider 1995; Crombez 2001). This brand of institutionalism is characterized by the underlying assumption that actors have relatively fixed sets of preferences and behave strategically to see these preferences channeled into policy. To a greater extent than the paradigms above, RC institutionalists view politics as a struggle for power and a myriad of collective action dilemmas, but simultaneously as a process of social learning (Hall and Taylor 1996: 945). They lean towards the notion that one's behavior is bound to be driven by the strategic environment and expectations of the behavior of others. Institutions are exogenous rules according to which actors define their strategies. One particular *forte* of the RC paradigm over the historical variant is that it offers an explanation for the emergence of political, social, and economic institutions: Actors create institutions and rules as instruments to attain their preference in the most efficient and economic fashion.

Several related, but distinctly different strands of rationalist work enrich our understanding of EU politics. Working within the two-level framework, Schneider and Cederman (1994) refute the plausibility of the classical integration theories by illustrating how states can strategically refer to their domestic restrictions to bolster their bargaining position in EU negotiations. The *stop-and-go* pattern of the integration process is explained by veto or exit threats perceived by the other states as credible or a bluff. Credible threats may trigger the ratification of a less integrationist treaty (see Schneider and Cederman 1994).

Recent other work on the EU and enlargement usually follows two lines of attack, with some scholars adhering to the *power index approach* (Hosli 2001; Widgrén and Holler 1999) while others advocate a *spatial approach* that emphasizes institutional rules. We find a wide gap between these two approaches not only in terms of their techniques, but also in terms of their conclusions. Starting with the (Council) voting power of the legislative actors, the power index strategy is interested in determining to what extent the actors' power is actually manifested in decisional outcomes. Thus, they examine the influence of voting power on how often an actor actually gets what it wants (Dowding 2002: 26).

The spatial approach has picked up on the main weakness of the power index strategy, namely that it neglects preferences, or more precisely the "connectedness" of preferences. Thus, this analytical approach draws on *coalition theory*, which assumes that coalition formation depends on the ability of parties to reach agreements on transferable payoffs, such as portfolios, and nontransferable payoffs, i.e. policy positions in the ideological space (Sened 1995: 283). Riker (1962: 32-33) goes further by claiming that agents will form coalitions just as large as the strict minimum necessary to obtain control over the divisible prize. The upcoming analysis will shed light on the plausibility of such minimum coalitions in Council voting and in turn assess the impact of enlargement in this practice. Starting with the theoretical assumption that only actors with similar policy preferences will form coalitions, the spatial approach enhances our understanding of the interrelations between different EU institutions within the context of their relative power. Several studies (Tsebelis 1994; Tsebelis and Garrett 1996, 2001) have focussed on how the introduction of new decision-making procedures has altered the strategic position of the EP, who is labeled a conditional agenda-setter under the cooperation procedure and co-equal legislator under co-decision (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001).[4] The spotlight is focussed on how actors exert influence on the course of integration and strategically exploit their agenda or veto-power to extract favorable political outcomes within the framework of political alliances. Therefore, spatial analysis is instrumental in illustrating how legislative actors collectively generate beneficial outcomes through coalition formation with like-minded actors (Dowding 2002: 27).

[4] In an other interpretation, Crombez (2001) comes to the conclusion that the EP fulfills the function of a conditional veto player with "conditional" referring to such situations in which it cannot be overruled by a unanimous Council.

3. Enlargement and Institutional Change: Finding a framework

Political science investigations of the institutional configurations and rules of EU decision are, for the most part, highly advanced and continually growing. However, the current scientific research possess a *status quo bias* of its own restricting itself to the EU-15. It is safe to say the bulk of social science literature has failed to adequately theorize enlargement and thereby neglected its significance for legislative politics. Presently, though, more advanced analyses are beginning to examine the relationship between internal reform and enlargement. Schneider (2002) tackles the question whether the EU can simultaneously prevail on both fronts. On the basis of a model that synthesizes pessimistic and optimistic views on enlargement, he concludes that the danger of institutional failure after enlargement may well be overstated. The model indicates that the detrimental impact of enlargement on the efficiency of the organization much too frequently overshadows the positive effects of system change. With an emphasis on the temporal perspective of EU politics, this approach illustrates that states negotiate more intensely in the context of successful organizations because of the assumed longevity of the negotiation outcome (Schneider 2002: 197). The longer shadow of the future involved in such intergovernmental interactions has the further negative consequence of aggravating enforcement problems. This implies that the essence of future EU politics may lie in the implementation of negotiated common policies (Schneider 2002: 197; see section 9).

In line with the RC Institutionalist approach, the shadow of enlargement has triggered an academic debate on questions of governance. Having originally been designed to accommodate six member states, the institutional rules surrounding EU-policy making have undergone a sluggish reform process over the past decades. However, there is reason to doubt that the current decisional framework will be able to cope with up to 27 members. Kerremans (1998) seeks a correlation between the number of states, the diversity of their preferences, and the governance capacity of the EU. Enlarging the organization has inevitable repercussions on two core concepts of governance: *capacity* and *control*. Capacity is understood as the capability of a given political system to generate effective political decisions, while translating the interests of highly diverse participants into policy. Control refers to the extent to which the involved political actors can exert influence on the context or outcome of collective decisions. From this standpoint, enlargement widens the cleavage between capacity and control (Kerremans 1998: 87-88). This poses a *fundamental trade-off* to larger member

states in particular, who must choose between exerting as much control as possible - thereby endangering the political capacity of the EU - or sacrificing political control and enhancing supranational governance capacity (Kerremanns 1998: 95). In these terms, the process and outcome of enlargement are directly linked to the heterogenization of political preferences. As for the existing political divisions in Europe, Kerremans (1998: 100) jumps to the conclusion that any further enlargement will transform the predominant north-south division (see Mattila and Lane 2001) into a north-south-east division. This in turn is assumed to have a detrimental impact on the decision making capacity of the EU, who must translate the preferences of three opposed blocks into efficient political equilibria. Despite its apparent plausibilty at first sight, this assumption is not supported by empirically testable data. Furthermore, it is premature and perhaps faulty to assume that CEECs will bear identical policy preferences.

3.1. A rational approach to enlargement

By synthesizing formal rules and institutions with individual rationality and producing testable predictions, RC institutionalism fares very well in comparison to its theoretical counterparts (Braun 1999: 271). Its systematic and graphic depictions of the means by which actors exploit different institutional arrangements have served as a useful tool for understanding the mindset and institutional *Spielraum* of EU decision makers. With this in mind, I propose an approach to enlargement and its repercussions on decision making embedded in RC institutionalism. Analyzing given preference profiles and the institutions by which they are mediated allow us to make concrete predictions on future legislative games. In line with the RC paradigm, a strong emphasis in this analysis shall be placed on formal decision rules and the strategic conduct of actors aiming to extract favorable outcomes in harmony with a fixed set of preferences. This approach enables us to interpret the process and outcome of decision-making as a product of the interactions between state and supranational actors within a given institutional framework (Steunenberg 2002: 9). The challenge ahead lies thus in assessing the impact of enlargement on future decision making procedures and the ability of the existing institutions to conduce inertia in an enlarged Union. With this in mind, a brief overview of the reforms negotiated at Nice (December 2001) will be given, as they are crucial for understanding both the linkage between enlargement and institutional reform as well as recent enlargement research.

3.2. The Reforms of Nice

The deliberations at the Nice Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 2001 and after have helped to revitalize the *power index approach* Today's member states are presently debating over procedural settings to maintain both the proper functioning of the EU as well as uphold their individual control on policy making (see also König and Bräuninger 2002a: 93). The Nice Treaty was aimed to fulfil the function of making the EU *de jure* capable of granting additional states membership status. Besides expanding qualified majority voting (QMV) to other policy areas and mapping out the future seat distribution in the Parliament (EP), the current scheme of Council voting weights (dating back to the 1973 enlargement) was heavily modified by allocating a number of votes to all present and candidate states. The new weighting of the votes also created the necessity to determine how many votes constitute a qualified majority (QM) or blocking minority. As for the EU-15, the required majority was fixed at 170 of 237 total votes, signifying an increase of the majority threshold from 71.3 to 71.7. As for the EU-27, the voting weights agreed on clearly indicate that the concept of "*control*" emerged victorious over that of "*capacity*" because the threshold QMV was initially pegged at 74.8%. This required at least 258 of 345 votes, whereas in a later protocol the highest possible threshold was fixed at 73.4% (Giering 2001: 80).

Besides the allocation of new vote shares to current and potential members (see table 3-1), another significant consequence of Nice are two additional majority requirements aimed to enhance policy legitimacy.[5] Council decision making will require that at least 14 (of 27) states approve the proposal and that these 14 states account for 62% of the EU population. Thus, although existing members will be forced to share power with new members, they have succeeded retaining control over policies through the increased inclusiveness of the rules, i.e. higher approval threshold (Giering 2001: 83; König 2001).[6]

Table 3-1. The Nice Modifications: Strategic power index for state players in an EU-27

Member State	*Vote Share*	*Percentage of Votes*	*Current Version of QMV*	*Nice Version of QMV*
Germany	29	8.41%	0.052	0.053
France, UK, Italy	29	8.41%	0.052	0.052
Spain	27	7.83%	0.042	0.049
Netherlands	13	3.77%	0.026	0.023
Belgium, Greece, Portugal	12	3.48%	0.026	0.021

[5] The stipulations of the Nice Treaty apply to the EU with 27 members, even though only 10 states are likely to enter the organization in 2004. "The QMV threshold will move, according to the pace of accessions, from a percentage below the current one to a maximum of 73.4%" (Nice Treaty)

[6] see results and data analysis for more in-depth analysis

Austria, Sweden	10	2.90%	0.026	0.017
Denmark, Finland, Ireland	7	2.03%	0.015	0.012
Luxembourg	4	1.16%	0.010	0.007
- Extended Council				
Poland	27	7.83%	0.042	0.049
Romania	14	4.06%	0.031	0.025
Czech Republic, Hungary	12	3.48%	0.026	0.021
Bulgaria	10	2.90%	0.021	0.017
Lithuania, Slovakia	7	2.03%	0.015	0.012
Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia	4	1.16%	0.015	0.007
Cyprus	4	1.16%	0.010	0.007
Malta	3	0.08%	0.010	0.005
Total (with RO+BG)	**345**			
Total (without RO+BG)	**321**			

(Steunenberg 2002: 108)

Although moving away from unanimity towards QMV brings about substantial improvements in terms of policy efficiency, the Nice framework has increased the danger of legislative stagnation thanks to rigid majority stipulations (Steunenberg 2002: 104).

Table 3-2. Comparing Council Voting Rules: probabilities and inertia index for the EU-legislative game under a uniform distribution

Voting Rule	***Unanimity***		***QMV***	
Size of the EU	***EU-15***	***EU-27***	***EU-15***	***EU-27***
Expected policy choice:				
• current policy (SQ)	90%	95%	51%	52%
• new policy	10%	5%	49%	48%
Inertia index	0.97	0.99	0.54	0.57

(Source: Steunenberg 2002: 104)

However, power index applications are limited in their ability to predict future trends because they fail to integrate preferences into their calculations. Voting power is not automatically equivalent to the capacity to build coalitions and win other actors for a preferred policy (Tsebelis and Garrett 1996: 272). For this reason, spatially oriented studies on the EU have gained recognition for their ability to simultaneously depict preferences constellations and forecast future developments on the basis of the decisional rules and preferences structures. In one of the most sophisticated analyses of enlargement, König and Bräuninger (2000) steer the scientific research on enlargement in the right direction by evaluating the socioeconomic background of the applicant states on the basis of structural statistics. This spatial strategy illustrates several possible decisional constellations after enlargement and sheds light on the necessity of institutional reform to overcome the expected friction after accession. By sketching out future decisional constellations on the basis of statistical data, the most probable spatial location of policy outcomes is outlined with particular consideration to the risk of

decisional deadlock, i.e. the inability to alter the SQ because of the high degree of preference diversity and rigid voting rules. Therefore, linking enlargement with internal reforms is the most promising strategy to increase the governance capacity of the EU.

4. The Research Design

The present paper seeks to improve on previous enlargement research in several important ways. Using previous RC institutionalist work as a springboard, I will strive to fortify the analytical linkage between enlargement and institutional reform by proposing a domain-specific analysis that maps out the policy positions of the present (EU-15) and future (EU-25) members along diverse conflict lines. With a rigid application of social science methods and techniques, this analysis aims to disassemble the politics of the European Union into its building blocks, i.e. central dimensions, pertinent decision rules, as well as relevant actors and coalitions. This provides the foundation to survey the coalitional and legislative repercussions of enlargement along the most significant issue-specific conflict lines (e.g. producers vs. consumers, industry vs. agriculture). In the course of territorial expansion, the existing divergent preference configurations and their inherent voting cleavages may be reinforced, intensified or perhaps even alleviated by the accession of the CEECs. On the basis qualitative and quantitative data on the CEECs, the analysis will take on a more institutional character by assessing the capability of the EU to sustain a tolerable level of political inertia in the midst of interest heterogeneity.

One common element of the previous enlargement research is the recurring assumption that the spectrum of preferences will become more heterogeneous in the course of accession (see Kerremans 1998; Mattila and Lane 2001). However, it is surprising that existing research has failed to elaborate more extensively on this presumption, leaving many questions unanswered as to what exactly is meant by increased heterogeneity. For example, in which policy domains is it most likely to manifest itself and what are its implications for the institutional framework of the EU? Does the concept of heterogeneity imply that the CEECs will be preference outliers with more extreme preferences than current members? Or does this suggest that the constellation of interests will merely be enlarged and altered? Thus, will this expected preference heterogeneity simply overlap or reinforce the existing preference diversity, implying that the future members will resign themselves to the given structure of constraints?

Past research has endowed us with a wide understanding of accession strategies from both sides of the negotiation table and depicted the coordination difficulties involved. Scholars have attempted to promote best solution strategies for alleviating the political, economic and institutional strain that enlargement is expected to lead to (see Gower and Redmond 2000). To overcome the analytical and methodological weaknesses the past literature, I instead propose a research strategy that consciously sketches out and reflects upon possible behavior and decisional scenarios in various facets of the political space[7]. This approach goes hand in hand with the straightforward assumption that enlargement will have a different impact on different policy areas and conflict lines. Thus, any attempt to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of expanding must have a domain-specific component.

This study aims to deliver answers to array of unsolved questions on European policy making and enlargement within a two-tiered explorative research framework. Firstly, quantitative research on the basis of a *factor analysis* will be conducted to sketch out the predominant and recurrent conflict dimensions and voting coalitions in EU decision making. Drawing on the data set "Decision Making in the European Union", I will seek to pinpoint the major sources of preference variation on issues involving agriculture, the internal market, consumers and fisheries. Additional policy dimensions not documented in the data set (e.g. trade policy, environmental protection) will also be given consideration in the empirical section.

Unlike past studies that emphasize the financial burdens of enlargement (see Kawecka-Wyrzykowska 1996), the factor analysis applied here will serve to lay out the current dimensions and preference constellations in supranational policy formulation. This shall provide a framework for incorporating the accession candidates into coherent one-dimensional models of legislative scenarios. Quantitative and qualitative techniques will then be applied to determine the policy positions of the candidate states along the most pertinent conflict dimensions in EU politics. This involves, first and foremost, a series of structured interviews with high ranking experts on the candidates and enlargement, but also an overview of statistical data on the socioeconomic fabric of the CEECs. After mapping out underlying policy positions, the discussion will shift towards matters of future coalitions and the impact of enlargement on legislative inertia. This entails their simulation in spatial form as well as a descriptive analysis of the socioeconomic and political characteristics of the CEECs which

[7] see Wessels (2000: 352) "Aufgabe der wissenschaftlichen Diskussion kann es in dieser Situation nicht sein, den einzigen sinnvollen und/oder realistischen Lösungsansatz vorzugeben, sondern sie muss bewusst mögliche Szenarien und Handlungsoptionen skizzieren und reflektieren."

may intrude on the current decision-making equilibrium. Predictions will be offered on whether the current (Council) voting coalitions will persist, or whether enlargement will generate new constellations.

Measuring the political alignment of the candidates along various conflict dimensions shall bring clarity as to whether they will have similar preferences and how well these will correlate with those manifested in the existing EU-15 coalitions. Most importantly, I will then seek to assess the impact of enlargement on the predominant conflict lines in European Union politics such as consumers vs. producers, regulation vs. deregulation as well as disagreements over the nature of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This strategy has the advantage of opening the *veil of ignorance* by which enlargement is plagued (Wessels 2000: 352) and delivering concrete answers on how decisional procedures will evolve. The final *étappe* of the research challenge will focus on how the diversification of the preference ensemble may increase danger of Council stalemate and organizational stagnation. The gathered data provide the foundation for the assessment of the overall feasibility of enlargement from an institutional perspective, i.e. to what extent will the institutional design of Nice be able to mitigate collective dilemmas and sustain political inertia.

4.1 Variables and Operationalization

Up to now, very few scholars have attempted to pinpoint the policy preferences of the CEECs and assess their compatibility with those of the EU-15. Starting with the assumption that more diverse and diverging preferences will complicate integovernmental negotiations, I strive to elevate the *heterogeneity of policy positions* to the status of an dependent variable. Essentially, this preference diversity can be understood as an indicator of the level of disagreement over the political character of various policy domains. There are two ways of operationalizing the heterogeneity of policy positions on the basis of data gathered for individual policy areas. Firstly, one can view this as the distance in positions between the most extreme actors, which is commonly realized in a one-dimensional space from 0 to 100. Another means of operationalizing the level of disagreement is calculating the distance between the positions of the member states and that of the European Commission (Com). In this paper, I will evaluate preference heterogeneity, i.e. the level of disagreement from the angle of state positions – thus the distance between the two most extreme states. Firstly, more data has become available on the positions of member states, in particular in the areas not

documented by the data set. A further reason for this operationalization is the fact that recent institutional modifications have reverted a significant amount of bargaining power back to the member states under the co-decision procedure, while reducing the role of the Com as an agenda-setter (Tsebelis and Garrett 2001). Moreover, enlargement will have major implications on *state alliance building* in the Council.

The increased coalition possibilities will cause the existing political clumpings to grow, shrink or shift in the course of enlargement, as many states have set their hopes on the political support of the CEECs to bolster their policy positions. For example, France is likely to find a stable ally in Poland on matters of agricultural funding, while Denmark and the Netherlands are bound to align themselves with the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary, who boast open and competitive economies. Furthermore, the Nice stipulations and their system of multiple thresholds (see section 3.2) have endowed state actors greater opportunities to control and manipulate the course of integration. It will be argued, however, that the rigidity of decisional rules designed for the benefit of state control may have the counterintuitive effect of strengthening the discretionary authority of supranational actors (section 9.1).

Granting preference heterogeneity the status of a dependent variable goes hand in hand with the claim that the higher the level of heterogeneity is, the more difficult it is for the EU institutions to synthesize conflicting interests and maintain an equilibrium between capacity and control. Thus, more specifically, this research seeks concrete answers as to the policy domains in which enlargement may produce an elevated, perhaps unsustainable level of preference heterogeneity and thus decrease decisional stability.

4.2 Hypothesizing enlargement

On the basis of the discussed literature I have derived a set of working hypotheses as a framework for an explorative examination of enlargement. As the research challenge lies foremost in gathering and interpreting data on the CEECs, the hypotheses remain particularly cautious and refrain from making any specific predictions on the preferences of the CEECs.

My first general claim is that the accession of new member states only has consequences for decision making and, in turn, the course of integration if their preference alignments differ from those of the existing members. This places the northern enlargement of 1995 in sharp contrast to immanent eastern enlargement. There is a general consensus that northern enlargement did not disrupt the relative calm of the post-Maastricht period because political

standpoints of the new members did not differ greatly from those of the previous members. In their advocacy of social rights, environmental conservation as well as QMV and political transparency, the new members reinforced the integrative direction and supranationalist momentum of EU policies. In fact one of the most substantial effects of the past enlargement was that it stirred anxieties that any further expansion will infringe upon the precarious institutional stability (Bomberg and Peterson 1998: 59).

The central argument in the following is that the present ensemble of political preferences will become more heterogeneous in the course of EU-enlargement. This will most probably have the immanent consequence of reinforcing or reshaping the present cleavages in supranational governance. To bolster this argument, it is worthwhile to first draw some of the classical work on democratic political systems in Europe. For decades, democracy theorists have offered interesting insights on the predominant cleavages in western societies. As illustrated below, there is a wide spectrum of potential political divisions:

Table 4-1. Social Cleavages

Economic cleavages	Political cleavages	Cultural cleavages
rich vs. poor	large vs. small populations	Latin vs. Germanic
urban/industrial vs. rural/agricultural	long vs. short democratic traditions	Catholic vs. Protestant
center vs. periphery	social democratic vs. conservative governing traditions	North vs. South
high vs. low unemployment	majoritarian vs. consensual	high trust vs. low trust societies
large vs. small income inequalities	corporatist vs. pluralist	homogenous vs. multi-ethnic societies
	Anglo-Saxon vs. Socialist/ Christian Dem. welfare states	

See Rokkan (1973), Gourevitch (1989), Lijphart (1984), Hix (1999b)

An array of these divisions continue to manifest themselves in contemporary EU politics, with many of them being directly reflected in the formulation of Union policies. While certainly not complete, this classification is a valuable starting point for understanding the impact of enlargement on the cleavages and divisions that guide European politics. In the case of enlargement, a vast number of these conflicts are highly salient within post-communist societies and will thus continue to make their mark on European policy making, e.g. agriculture vs. industry, large vs. small income inequalities. The reason for this postulated preference heterogenization also lies within the socioeconomic and historical context of the candidate states and the particular disparities existing both between old and new members as

well as among the new members. Going beyond the well-documented cleavages in economic growth and social development, I postulate that the CEECs will have different expectations from various policy domains. As the candidates widely view enlargement as a means of accelerating and enhancing the process of democratization, it is plausible to assume that they will pose different demands to EU policy areas. On these grounds I hypothesize:

H1 *The acquisition of new states only has consequences for integration when their political preferences differ from those of the existing core members*

These preferences are in turn not merely a function of the social, economic and perhaps cultural background of the concerned states, but also a manifestation of the expectations that the candidate states have towards certain EU policy areas.

H2 *The upcoming enlargement will lead to more heterogeneity in the preference configurations of the member states by bringing divergent standpoints and expectations into the playing field.*

On the basis of this hypothesis, the present analysis intends to deliver valid estimates on the extent to which the preferences of the future member states will coincide with those of the present members. One cannot rule out the possibility that the CEECs will defend even more extreme standpoints on certain issues than those of the present members. The accession of - for the most part- socially and economically distorted ex-communist states is assumed tip the political balance in the course of enlargement, making it increasingly difficult to generate pareto-optimal outcomes in the midst of political division.

H3 *The increased preference heterogeneity will aggravate tensions between member states and complicate the intergovernmental bargaining process.*

This indicates that enlargement will raise the danger of legislative stagnation and political gridlock, in particular if the current decision making rules proceed to exist and the member states differ considerable in their policy positions. Thus we can expect intergovernmental bargaining to become a more complex process, hampering the governance capacity of the EU. Additionally, one process by which the integration process has been driven, but often remains outside the scope of spatial RC research, must be a subject of debate in the following analysis. Mattila and Lane (2001) pinpoint significant discrepancies between the predictions of legislative decision-making models and empirical observations. On the basis of roll call data, they conclude that unanimity is the norm in Council voting, even when the legislation at hand

only requires a qualified majority. This finding does not necessarily falsify the RC assumption that actors struggle for favorable outcomes, rather emphasizes the importance of taking other decision making modes into account. It is misleading to presume that voting in the Council is a one-shot game in which all actors insist on voting sincerely in accordance to their true preferences (Mattila and Lane 2001). Instead, one can conceptualize this process as several simultaneous decisions that facilitate as 'log-rolling' or vote trading. In other words, states may vote against their personal preference on less salient issues in exchange for a favorable vote from other actors on other issues.[8]

Table 4-2. Unanimity in Council voting

Policy Sector	Number of decisions	Negative Votes	Abstentions	Unanimous decisions (%)
Agriculture	304	28	4	67
Internal markets	132	21	9	70
Transport	44	18	9	73
Public Health	13	8	15	77
Fisheries	181	12	4	84
Social Policy	29	10	7	83
Environment	33	12	3	85
Research	10	10	0	90
Commercial pol.	181	1	0	99
Others	219	14	6	81

(Source: Mattila and Lane 2001: 42)

Despite differentiated policy positions, unanimity is the norm in an overwhelming majority of Council decisions. This finding (Mattila and Lane 2001) must be reassessed in the context of enlargement. The acquisition of new elements with highly divergent socioeconomic backgrounds will overstrain the governance capacity of the EU if unanimity (constitutional or *de facto*) were to remain the general decision making practice. Thus, I postulate that the tendency towards oversized coalition will no longer be the prevalent in the Council.

H4 *Unanimity in the European Council will no longer be the norm in legislative decision making processes*

The increased spectrum of policy positions, expectations and interests will overload the existing institutional constellations if the legislative actors were to continue their quest to generate unanimous and by and large pareto-optimal outcomes. Thus, enlargement is likely to instigate a trend towards smaller or perhaps such *minimum winning coalitions* as postulated

[8] Mattila and Lane also demonstrate Certain states are also assumed to promote a "culture of compromise", by insisting that differences be worked out in the preliminary stages, so that a proposal can be voted on unanimously; see also van Schendelen (1996)

by Riker (1965), because oversized coalitions will become increasingly unlikely in the midst of political diversification.

4.3 Level of analysis and case selection

Although previous research has endowed us with a broader understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of enlargement, scholars have restricted themselves to the macro-dimension of accession – the overall dynamics that have shaped the EU's enlargement policy (Sedelmeier 2002: 626). However, enlargement entails a substantial meso-political level, thus policy outcomes in distinct sectors and along pronounced conflict lines which are no less significant for analysis. Past accession scenarios have demonstrated that a lack of flexibility on the part of EU regulations can easily cause irritations with new members who are dissatisfied with the EU's capacity to integrate, i.e. accommodate their political preferences. Thus, the present paper sets out to descend from the macro-level towards a more domain and actor-specific level of analysis, seeking answers on how the particular positions of new and old state actors may encroach on the policy dynamics of various sectors. The main focus will be placed on the European Council and its decisional structures. The Council remains the central lawmaking body of the EU, as all proposals must be adopted by at least a qualified majority of the state votes as well as 62% of the represented states.

Regarding the concrete subject of analysis, five necessary criteria that each candidate must fulfil before enlargement may proceed were presented at the 1993 Copenhagen IGC. They must establish a stable political system and a functioning market economy as well as adopt the bulk of EU-legislation known as the *acquis communautaire.* As for the EU itself, it is required to map out a community finance policy in conformity with the so-called Agenda 2000, for which internal reforms were agreed on in March 1999 (Giering 2001: 54). These institutional reforms also entailed the preparation of decision-making mechanisms for a nearly doubled number of member states.

The Commission has recently set the year 2004 as the date of accession of 10 new members who have made significant progress in adopting the *acquis*, constructing democratic institutions, and generating economic growth. This analysis will thus deal with those states who have a very realistic chance of becoming a member of the EU within the next two years on the basis of their process and cooperation in negotiations. The selection comprises:

Table 4-3. Enlargement- The First Wave

Country	Abbrev.	Population	% of EU-25 population	Application Date	GDP per capita
Cyprus	CY	671,000	0.14%	July 1990	18,500
Malta	M	390,000	0.08%	July 1990	11,900
Hungary	H	10, 024,000	2.3%	April 1994	11,700
Poland	PL	38,649,000	8.53%	April 1994	8,700
Slovakia	SK	5,401,000	1.19%	June 1995	10,700
Latvia	LV	2,417,000	0.53%	October 1995	6,600
Estonia	EST	1,436,000	0.31%	November 1995	8,500
Lithuania	LT	3,696,000	0.81%	December 1995	6,600
Czech Republic	CZ	10,272,000	2.26%	January 1996	13,500
Slovenia	SLO	1,989,000	0.4%	June 1996	16,100

(source: Eurostat: Handbook on Candidate States)

As membership possibilities for Romania and Bulgaria have been postponed to 2007 and currently no negotiations are being carried out with Turkey, these countries will not be given any specific attention. Thus, the case selection is restricted to those states who are assumed to enter the organization in 2004 after the completion of negotiations in December 2002. Another significant choice to restrict the study to ten nations is that in each of them a lively debate over EU-membership can be observed both among political parties and in a public forum (see Kopecký and Mudde 2002; Stawarska 1999; Ágh 1999). Thus, the selection is based on the premise that these states demonstrate indeed a relatively fixed set of preferences and expectations from various EU policy domains. In harmony with rationalist theory, expected benefits and costs determine the applicants' and the member states' policy positions. On these grounds, it is assumed that the CEECs hold fixed preferences in various conflict dimensions.[9]

5. Methodology and analytical approach

Every researcher is faced with the task of securing the *validity* and *reliability* of the gathered data. Validity refers to the extent to which an instrument is actually measuring what it is supposed to measure (Wagschal: 1999: 39). This crucial research criteria concerns the degree to which an instrument is appropriate to capture what it intends to measure. Reliability, on the other hand, refers to the level of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same

[9] This does not go to say that the support of CEEC electorates for membership is a *fait accompli* (see Hughes, Sasse, Gordon 2002), as the accession date has been a sort of "moving target" without concrete guarantees. In light of wide-spread frustration and élite fragmentation, it is expected that referendums will be highly contested .

category by different observers or by the same observer at different occasions (Silverman 2001: 33). Thus, reliability is extent to which repeated measurements with an instrument deliver the same values (see section 6.2).

The research questions at hand present a dual methodological challenge. Before gathering data on the political alignment of the future member states, critical matters of validity must be elaborated on. This entails the establishment of a coherent framework of EU-decision making which the candidate states can be integrated into. With this in mind, the initial goal is to determine what the central conflict lines in various EU-policy areas are and gain an image of the existing preference configurations and coalitional trends.

5.1 Securing Validity: A factor analysis

A statistical analysis has been conducted to determine the main conflict dimensions in EU policy making as well as their underlying preference structures. The starting point is the data set "Decision Making in the European Union" (DEU), consisting of 69 legislative procedures between 1995 and 2000 and their respective sub-issues, which together total to 174 issues. For each independent variable, thus the legislative proposals at hand, the policy scales are standardized so that all actors, i.e. 15 member states as well as the EP and Com, have been given values on a scale between 0 and 100 corresponding with their optimal preference point during negotiations. In the majority of the cases, 0 is considered to be the reference point (RP) with 100 representing the most extreme position on matters of integration, regulation, agricultural reform, etc.

The data set possess an advantage over other sources of information in that it is more comprehensive and issue-specific. Thus, it does not just give nonchalant information on the preferences of states (e.g. that DK and UK are Eurosceptics), but instead breaks down policy making into its basic components: actors, preferences, and institutions. As meetings of the European Council are secret, the policy positions measured in the data set are a means of overcoming this information blockade. However, DEU possesses some slight disadvantages for my purposes as many of the decisions represented in the data set fall into miniscule details, e.g. visas for citizens of Macao, fats in chocolates. These are often not representative of the positions of the member states in a broader dimensional context (e.g. left-right, pro- vs. anti-integration). This is, however, not the fault of the data set, but rather due to the miniscule technicalities which the decision-making process is often characterized by. As the following

analysis demonstrates, though, the statistical data will offer an accurate image of the actors' preferences on an aggregate level.

For a better understanding of the interactions within the political space in the EU and the behavior of political actors, we first must ask the following questions:

1) What is the dimensionality of the EU political space?
2) What is the location of social interests in this space?
3) What is the starting position of the key actors in this political space?
4) How can we expect newcomers to behave within this structure of constraints?

(Hix 1999b: 72)

In a recent article, Hix (1999b) has pinpointed the most striking cleavages in the transnational policy-making forum of the EU. By coding major policy statements adopted by EU parties from 1974-1994, it is determined that a wide majority of decisions involve either an integration-independence or a left-right dimension in particular in policy areas involving redistribution, employment, public ownership and economic regulation (see Hix 1999b: 73).[10] Here I have opted instead for a statistically-oriented analysis to lay out the dimensional framework for gathering of data on the CEECs. As a prerequisite for collecting and evaluating such information, valid constructs must be developed. In the case of the data set DEU, we are dealing with a large bulk of information which at first sight lacks any dimensional coherence. To establish a consistent research framework a *factor analysis* comprising the Com proposals and preferences represented in the data set was carried out with STATA (for detailed calculations see appendix). This statistical technique starts with a set of observations obtained from a given sample by means of *a priori* measures, thus in this case the preferences represented in the data set. The objective of the strategy is to analyze these observations in terms of their inter-correlations to determine whether the variations represented can be accounted for adequately by a number of basis categories smaller than that with which the investigation was started (Bortz 1985: 616), i.e. the conflict dimensions inherent to EU politics. This technique then serves to reduce the bulk of data to the basic sources of variation in the field of investigation - Council decision making. In this context, the factor analysis serves three main purposes:

1. *determining the number of conflict dimensions involved in EU decision making in the various policy domains*
2. *extracting those issues in the data set which correlate well with the*

[10] Hooghe and Marks (1997) are quick to point out that EU decisions increasingly involve debates over the centrality or the degree of "majoritarianism" of supranational institutions, e.g. the EP, executive power.

inherent dimension (factor-loadings)

3. *delivering factor "scores" for each actor along the dimensions emerging from the factor analysis*

The analysis was carried out for the policy areas best represented by the data set: agriculture, consumer matters, internal market and fisheries. Matters of health and foreign policy were not included in this study as the latter should be the subject of a separate analysis, and data on the other topics are too scarce.[11] To avoid statistical distortions, *missing data* were considered to symbolize the indifference of the actors towards the pertinent legislative proposal. Thus, all missing data were replaced with mean value of the position of the Com and the RP.

5.1.1. Agriculture: The conflict structure

A factor analysis was conducted to extract the principal components reflecting the main patters of variance in 14 legislative proposals on agriculture. To secure the coherence of the given data, agricultural issues of low salience with no preference variation were filtered out.[12] Those issues involving trade with third countries have also been omitted as external trade will be treated as a separate dimension later. The issues reveal that there are three *grandes lignes* at the heart of the CAP, with subsidies being the supreme conflict:

Figure 5-1. Principle Components of Agricultural Policy Making

(principal component factors; 4 factors retained)

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
1	9.60968	5.30784	0.3559	0.3559
2	4.30184	0.95530	0.1593	0.5152
3	3.34654	1.10935	0.1239	0.6392
4	2.23720	0.80281	0.0829	0.7220

(*here only most significant factors; see appendix for complete calculations)

As nearly 40% of the Community budget is allocated to agricultural production, questions of subsidies are a highly sensitive and controversial matter. The factor analysis has extracted a factor explaining over 35% of the variance in agricultural voting patterns. Factor 1 gave high correlations (+ 0.50) for the following issues, most of which correspond nicely with the conflict line surrounding agricultural subsidies:

[11] The decisions in the area of ECOFIN also had to be left out because of the lack of variation in the preference scorings. However, it will be interesting to observe how the CEECs react to any attempts at harmonizing taxes.

[12] The subsidies issues demonstrate contradictory measures in the data set, with the coalition of reformers (DK, S, D, GB) sometimes receiving high values and at other times low values for the same measurement dimension. The values were inverted so that those states in favor of upholding support schemes received high values.

Table 5-1. Loadings and Scores for Factor 1: Subsidies Issues
Eigenvalue 4,13, explaining 31.80 % of variation

Issue number	Issue at hand	factor loading
pn0250i1	CMO Sugar: Extension of present CMO payments regime	0.72939
pn9202i1	Production aid for cotton: the level of the penalty rate	0.79794
pn0358i1	olive oil: Extension of present aid scheme	0.81756
pn0358i2	olive oil: Use and labeling of mixtures	0.70964
pn8109i1	CMO beef: reduction of the support price for beef and veal	0.85960
pn8109i2	CMO beef: compensation for the support price cut	0.84658
pn9072i2	procedure for est max residu medicinal p: extension of application of medicals for bovine and swine on horses	0.62658
pn9072i3	procedure for est max residu medicinal p: extension of application of medicals for bovine and swine on minor species	0.62658
pn9236i2	flax and hemp: long flax fibre – restriction of support scheme	0.63975

The legislative actors received the following values for this first and most significant factor[13]:

Table 5-2. Preferences on Subsidies Issues

Actor	Score	Pref. 0-100	Pref. 20-80	State	Score	Pref. 0-100	Pref. 20-80
A	-.5064449	32	39.2	L	-.0358064	0.47	48.2
B	.4190395	62	57.2	NL	-.8391158	0.21	32.6
DK	-1.419995	2	21.2	P	1.36845	0.93	75.8
FIN	-.5347269	31	38.6	E	1.435168	0.96	77
F	.8128515	75	65	S	-1.483791	0	20
D	-.4876923	32	39.5	GB	-1.194651	0.09	26
GR	1.570661	1	80	C	-.3233859	0.38	42.8
IRL	.6695893	70	62	EP	-.4067525	0.35	41
I	.956597	80	68				

For all variables - the member states as well as the Com and EP - I have standardized the factor scores into one-dimensional scales from 0 to 100.[14] Those states in favor of maintaining the present system of direct payments in f1 demonstrate the highest values.

Figure 5-2. Voting Behavior on Subsidies Issues



[13] Automobile initials are used as abbreviations for each country, thus E=Spain, D=Germany, GR=Greece, etc.
[14] **An important note on the scales**. The scales resulting from the factor analysis were later presented in modified form to the interviewed experts, with the most extreme values of the EU-15 being 20 and 80, leaving open space on both ends of the spectrum. In light of the socioeconomic and political background of the CEECs, they may manifest more extreme preferences than those of the existing members on either side of the scales.

Here we find a distinct north-south divide, with the supranational actors and B and L taking a moderate position. As the scale demonstrates, the EP and Com are gradually pulling the non-reformers towards their ideal point. The reform of the CAP is marked by a pronounced conflict over subsidies, which has incited fears over enlargement because the number of people employed in the agricultural sector is much higher in the CEECs than the EU-average (König and Bräuninger 2000: 52, EU Commission 2002). The data gathered in the following section will allow us to localize the standpoints of the CEECs as an indicator of the future evolution of this conflict line.

The factor analysis has also pinpointed a further conflict surrounding consumer protection.[15] This second principle component (eigenvalue 4.30, explaining 15.93 % of variation) extracted high rankings for the following issues:

Table 5-3. Loadings and Scores for Factor 2: Consumer Protection
Eigenvalue 4.30, explaining 15.93% of variation

Issue number	Issue at hand	factor loading
pd9204i1	Beef Labeling: timing of first stage	0.78436
pd9204i2	Beef Labeling: Timing of second stage	0.78392
pd9204i3	Beef Labeling: detail in first stage	0.68333
pd9204i4	Beef Labeling: detail in second stage	0.63547
pn8110i1	CMO in milk: extent and timing of cut in intervention price	0.76448

The actors obtained the following scores on f2 reflecting their attitude on consumer safety:

Figure 5-3. Preferences on Consumer Safety (with beef)



The results of f2 are troublesome for the present research challenge. Although the data do indicate that the producer-consumer divide resurfaces in legislative procedures, the cases are restricted to the highly politicized decisions on BSE. This has the negative effect that they may not reflect the deep-ridden producer-consumer conflict *per se*, but perhaps but only the actors' standpoints on this highly controversial issue. For example, the core of traditionally

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Simple calculations were made on the factor scores of the legislative actors to localize their position on one-dimensional scales between 20 and 80 (see Appendix)

consumer-friendly countries (DK, S, FIN, D) is spread across the scale. To overcome this assumed distortion, an additional factor analysis was carried out starting with the issue content instead of relying on the statistical analysis to extract all issues involving consumers. All issues involving consumer safety and production conditions presided over by the Internal Market, Energy and Transportation Councils were factored together with consumer related agricultural issues. In light of their similar content, these data will reveal a more credible image of voting patterns along this dimension than the beef issues alone.[16]

Table 5-4. Producers vs. Consumers: The issues

Issue number	Issue at hand	factor loading
n98092i1	Protection of laying hens: Prohibition of the use of cages	0.85039
n98092i2	Laying hens: Timing for the improvement of the general conditions of the cages	0.87497
n98092i3	Modification of the minimum of cm sq of cage area for each hen	0.87531
n98092i4	Timing for the introduction of a compulsory system of cm sq of cage area for each hen	0.84250
n98092i5	Timing for prohibiting the cages after the first of January of 2009	0.88180
d99158i1	food additives: decision on whether or not to allow the use of propellant gases for water-based emulsion	0.12476
n96115i1	designations on the label of fruit juices	-0.74372
d99083i1	establishing bodies to monitor safety of gas bottles	-0.26425
d99127i1	energy efficiency requirements for ballasts for fluorescent lighting : time frame for phasing out these types of ballasts	0.48225

The factor analysis nicely generated one main factor explaining over 50% of the variation which serves as an indicator of the actors' preferences on consumer issues.

Figure 5-4. Producers vs. Consumers: The main factor

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(principal component factors; 1 factor retained)
Factor   Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative

1        5.39726         4.01437      0.5397         0.5397
2        1.38289         0.21589      0.1383         0.6780
3        1.16701         0.39433      0.1167         0.7947
```

[15] This conflict between producers and consumers is not restricted to agriculture, but is also at the heart of environmental policy and internal market decision making.

[16] Consumer-related issues at hand are admittedly not entirely representative, as several of them have to do with animal transport conditions. However, these issues also put a strain on (agricultural) production and are thus in line with other consumer issues not documented by the data set.

State	Score	Pref. 0-100	Pref. 20-80	State	Score	Pref. 0-100	Pref. 20-80
A	.5383892	67	60.2	L	.1473483	53	51.8
B	-.6783423	24	34.4	NL	1.453787	100	80
DK	1.000232	84	70.4	P	-1.031703	11	26.6
FIN	.7424848	75	65	E	-1.344185	0	20
F	-1.231716	4	22.4	S	.9258057	81	68.6
D	.5596523	68	60.8	GB	1.278489	94	75.8
GR	-1.335696	0.1	20.1	C	.1876378	55	53
IRL	-.6237165	26	35.6	EP	.702848	73	63.8
I	-1.291316	2	21.2				

Figure 5-5. Defending Consumer Interests: The Conflict Structure



Once again, we find a north-south cleavage – a division between those states (DK, NL, S, etc.)[17] who actively advocate consumer interests and product safety (labeling, ingredients, production conditions for man and animal, etc.) and those prefer the maintenance of the current SQ for the sake of producers.

A third dimension documented by three issues in the data set involves questions of agricultural regulation, which is closely intertwined with the producer-consumer dilemma. The conflict between European and national regulation of agricultural production is a highly salient issue in the accession negotiations (see interview report Mögele). As indicated by Young and Wallace (2000), though, regulatory issues have become increasingly synonymous with consumer issues, embracing the producer-consumer dimension discussed above. Thus the candidates' preferences will be measured for the first two factors alone (see section 7.1, 7.2) as a concrete distinction between consumer matters and questions of regulation has been blurred by the intrusion of the consumer-producer division into the regulatory dimension.[18]

5.2.2. Fisheries

The goal of the common fisheries policies (CFP) is to provide a unified approach to the creation of a sustainable fishing industry in Europe (Franchino and Rahming 2003: 1). The danger of overfishing has stimulated efforts to restructure and develop a common fleet,

[17] The interview results (and its blocking politics during the BSE crisis) clearly indicate that the score for GB is a bit distorted. For the sake of the upcoming analysis, it will be re-coded at 30.

market and most importantly an approach to the management of resources. This entails unitary regulations on the size of vessels, the amount of fish caught and laws on packaging, etc. DEU contains information on 7 procedures and their sub-issues which reflect this conflict. For the sake of simplicity, the issues with factor loadings over 0.50, i.e. those that best explain the preference variation, are listed below.

Table 5-5. Results of factor analysis: fisheries
***Factor 1**, Eigenvalue 4,13, explaining 31.80 % of variation*

Issue number	Issue at hand	factor loading
pn6160i1	technical measures for conservation of resources: rule on number of nets	0.87414
pn9050i1	harmonization of a list of fishing infringements and sanctions to be implemented	0.71033
pn9163i2	representation of member states in the advisory council	0.79905
pn9138i1	should recommendations of regional fisheries organizations be implemented into Community law automatically or one by one	0.73860
pn9847i2	linkage with MAGP objectives	0.66659
pn9047i2	CMO in fisheries and aquaculture products	0.49499

The second factor generated by the statistical analysis linked nearly the same issues together as the first. No other factors received an eigenvalue over 2, meaning that it is doubtful that they are sufficient in explaining any preference variance along another dimension. STATA offered the following scores for each participating actor, which represent their attitude on the conflict line: open waters vs. conservation.

Table 5-6. Scorings for legislative actors for factor 1:

State	Score	Pref. 0-100	Pref. 20-80	State	Score	Pref. 0-100	Pref. 20-80
A	.8330084	59	55.4	**L**	.5307797	52	51.2
B	-.4204218	28	36.8	**NL**	-.6072747	23	34.4
DK	.4099882	49	49.6	**P**	-1.212643	8	25.1
FIN	.2188779	44	44.6	**E**	–1.32065	5	23.6
F	-1.52537	0	20	**S**	.1269958	42	43.6
D	.7990235	59	55.1	**GB**	.1214376	41	44.6
GR	-.2889644	31	38.6	**C**	2.449476	100	80
IRL	-.9188938	15	29	**EP**	1.035019	64	59
I	-.2303862	33	39.8				

Figure 5-6. Aggregated Preferences on Fisheries



[18] For results on the regulatory dimension, see Appendix A.

The scale depicts the conflict between those who lean towards open waters and unrestricted fishing, and those who side with the Com in its policies of redistribution and restrictions to preserve maritime resources. The positionings on the scale correlate rather well with both the size of the coastline and the importance of the maritime sector, with France, Spain and Portugal being the most stubborn advocates of unrestricted access to the seas. These data will serve as the basis for collecting data on the CEECs the next section.

5.2.3. The Common Market

An additional factor analysis was conducted on the myriad of Internal Market (IM) issues documented in the data set. Although the IM is in many ways the heart of the EU, disagreements frequently emerge over the level of regulation in various sectors, e.g. telecommunications, industry, energy, e-commerce, etc. In an article published between the SEA and TEU, Garrett observes a fundamental divergence in expectations on *the degree of regulation* of world's largest common market (1992: 543). Here regulation is understood as a political-economic concept referring to state intervention by regulatory agencies to correct the negative externalities of economic development. The main policy instrument is often a tight legal framework for the economy, where regulation may also manifest itself through state intervention in the form of subsidies or the direct governmental provision of a certain good. Garrett classifies GB and DK as advocates of a radical deregulation of domestic markets through EU measures, while the southern states stand for regulationist policies, with this, of course, depending on the current governing party. Germany and France (before Jospin) are placed in the middle of the spectrum and labeled as "re-regulationist" (Garrett 1992: 543), thus supporters of a social market with certain market correction measures (Hix 1999a: 239).

Any statistical evaluation of data on the IM demands extreme caution as policymaking is frequently plagued by miniscule technicalities[19] which may not deliver an aggregate picture of the central conflict issues. Furthermore, decisions effecting other policy areas or conflict lines also spill over into the jurisdiction of the IM Council, e.g. environment, consumer protection. Nevertheless, the factor analysis revealed that it is in fact matters of regulation which permeate a majority of IM decisions.[20] On the basis of 39 proposals, the analysis extracted one overwhelming dimension, accounting for 31% of the variation at hand.

[19] see interview report: Stamatopoulos

[20] This is not to be falsely understood as regulation in a consumer or environmentally-friendly sense, but as an antonym to economic de-regulation or laissez-faire.

Table 5-7. Results of factor analysis on common market decision making
Factor 1, *Eigenvalue 12,02, explaining 32% of total variation*

Issue number	Issue at hand	factor loading
pd6085i1	threshold for resale right	0.50008
pd6085i2	maximum resale right	0.70428
pd6085i3	degressivity of payments	0.76347
pd6085i4	implementation time	0.47922
pd5341i4	timing of implementation	0.52208
pd7359i2	time shifting	0.80493
pd7359i3	application of fair compensation to exceptions	0.84213
pd6112i2	labelling of chocolate	0.77762
pd6112i3	GB and Irish derogation for milk chocolate	0.76532
pd6161i1	who decides whether to replace or repair	0.68033
pd5341i4	timing of implementation	0.52208
pn6114i1	amount of comitology	0.73450
pn6114i2	specificity of origin on the label	0.79094
pn6114i3	labeling of industrial honey	0.66466
pn6115i1	designation on the label of fruit juices	0.79302

An examination of the content involved reveals that the regulation of various sectors is most likely the central issue. The factor analysis has generated scores for all actors with the underlying preference constellation:

Table 5-8. Scorings for legislative actors for factor 1:

State	Score	Pref. 0-100	Pref. 20-80	State	Score	Pref. 0-100	Pref. 20-80
A	-.575344	27	36.2	**L**	-.2520023	38	52.4
B	.8575568	74	64.4	**NL**	-.5623472	28	36.2
DK	-.907573	16	29.6	**P**	.1157996	50	50
FIN	-1.076123	11	26.6	**E**	1.518718	95	77
F	1.671449	100	80	**S**	-.874689	17	30.2
D	-.5265389	29	36.8	**GB**	-1.414764	0	20
GR	.7860552	71	62.6	**C**	-.1446191	41	44.6
IRL	-.896198	17	30.2	**EP**	.709041	69	61.4
I	1.571579	97	78.2				

Figure 5-7. Internal Market Regulation – The current preference structure



The results of the proposals in the data set correspond with those offered by Garrett (1992). The only two major policy shifts are France, who has moved towards more interventionist policies under Jospin (*Parti Socialiste*)[21], and IRL who has converged on the position of the UK. In the upcoming analysis estimates will be given on the alignment of the future members to assess the impact of enlargement on the stability of the current preference profile.

5.2.4. Additional Conflict Structures

For other significant policy areas not documented by the data set, I have drawn on other sources to construct preference scales as a framework to measure the policy positions of the CEECs. Only a quick overview of the pertinent conflict lines will be presented here as a point of orientation for collecting data.

The character of the European system of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) is bound to be profoundly changed by the entrance of 10-13 member state with weak and judicial and legal traditions. The data set contains five legislative proposals voted on by the JHA Council, including a decision on the creation of a European refugees policy. However, even more substantial issues in this political domain were the focus of the Amsterdam Treaty 1997. The data gathered by Mark Aspinwall (2001: 97) indicate the existence of one major conflict line, i.e. the extent of integration in this policy space, and offer a more robust vision of the preferences of the member states[22]. We find FIN, I, GR and A as forerunners for the communitarization of JHA, whereas GB and DK have proven to be laggards by voting negatively on a majority of the proposals made on intensifying JHA cooperation in Amsterdam. In the empirical analysis (see section 7.6), estimates will be presented on the positions of the candidate countries along this integration dimension.

The empirical section will also delve into matters of external trade, as much controversy still surrounds the role of the EU in international trade. Scholars have debated whether it is a force for global trade liberalization or a bastion of protectionism (see Meunier 2000). In many sectors the EU's trade behavior diverts from the natural pattern of a truly free market and in

[21] "In Britain, European legislation has been attacked for its over-regulation, manic harmonization and state subsidies, while the French criticise its liberalism, privatisation and laissez-faire economics" (König and Bräuninger 2002a: 83)

[22] The issues in the data set also shed light on the existence of a second political dimension in JHA, namely a left-right dimension (e.g. pn99274 on refugees). For my purposes, data on the candidate states will only be gathered along the integration dimension. Aligning the CEECs along a left-right dimension would pose many difficulties due to frequent changes in government and the weak and relatively unstable state of their respective legal systems (see Monar 2000, 2001).

many ways is schizophrenic with some sectors undergoing total liberalization while others are becoming increasingly protectionist (Bomberg and Peterson 1999: 90). The main political divide is between those states who frequently - in a reflex-like manner - oppose further trade liberalization and free traders. This group of *Colbertistes* headed by France consists of all Mediterranean member states an is sometimes joined by Austria and Belgium, wielding more than enough votes for a blocking minority. The more competitive northern states (the "*Smithites*") including D, the UK, NL, all Scandinavian members find themselves more often than not at the opposite end of the spectrum as advocates of free trade (1999: 95-96). In the following, preference profiles for the candidates will indicate to what extent the *Colbertistes* or *Smithites* will be able form alliances with the CEECs and extract more favorable outcomes.

The data set does not cover environmental decision making. This gap was filled in by drawing on two studies on the legislative procedure on environmental manners (see Tsebelis 1994; Holzinger 1995). There is a wide consensus that serious ecological problems exist that demand transnational solutions. In environmental policy making the producer-consumer dilemma resurfaces, making it difficult for the supranational actors to come to terms with the given preference heterogeneity and the north-south gap. In section 7.2.1, measurements on the attitude of the CEECs will be presented.

As for the social dimension, König (1997) illustrates how EU social policy – in accordance with Article 137 – is increasingly encompassing labor protection measures, working conditions, i.e. safety, health and hygiene matters as well as social security. Preference estimates and descriptions are offered on three ever-present conflict dimensions: the traditional conflict between labor and capital (see also Scharpf 1995), the extent of integration social matters, and efforts to improve the conditions of migrant workers (König 1997: 112). In the following sections, this dimensional framework as well as statistics on social spending will provide a basis for collecting data on the CEECs to enhance our understanding of the impact of enlargement on the European social dimension.

6. Aligning the future members

The pressing question is what will happen if new elements are added to the constellations presented above. Will the new legislative actors fall into the core? Will they form coalitions with current preference outliers or perhaps have even more extreme preferences and expectations than the current outliers? What decisional tendencies will be prevalent in

Council negotiations five years from now? The central challenge is now to derive robust and reliable data on the policy positions of the future member states within the framework laid out by the factor analysis and additional research.

6.1. Gathering data: The methodological approach

As we are dealing with states within the midst of a rapid transition, searching for concrete answers on their future political alignment requires particular caution. To increase the accuracy of the data gathered on the CEECs, I have opted for expert interviews as a primary technique. Statistical data on their socioeconomic background will be offered as a secondary source of information to support the qualitative data. This method outweighs other methodological possibilities such as coding party programs (in Maltese, Estonian, etc.) or purely statistical data on the candidate countries for several reasons. Firstly, interviews are a prime means of securing data from policy experts directly involved in the accession negotiations. Thus, the central criteria for the experts chosen is that they be high-ranking negotiating officials on the EU or CEEC side, dealing with the dynamics of enlargement in their daily work. Secondly, interviews with core policy and enlargement experts were considered the most adequate solution as we are in fact dealing with estimates and prognoses on how new actors will behave within the given structure of constraints. Mere statistical data may indeed deliver a realistic image of these nations' socioeconomic standing, but would prove to be ineffective in pinpointing their expectations in some policy areas less effected by financial questions. Experts dealing with the CEECs are aware of national peculiarities, the structural and cultural background, and have a concrete image of their behavior in the course of accession negotiations. Thus, they are able to pinpoint the most salient and problematic issues for the countries involved and deliver objective and plausible prognoses on their future behavior. Moreover, experts on the accession process and/or the candidate states themselves dispose of inside knowledge on the decision making process and can offer valuable expertise on present and future developments.

6.2. Securing Reliability

Using the results of the factor and content analysis as a point of orientation for gathering data, 16 expert interviews were carried out in Brussels in October, 2002 (see appendix for

interview reports). The selected experts can be divided into three groups in terms of the perspective from which they are dealing with EU-enlargement[23]:

1) high-ranking diplomats from the CEECs who have the regular task of negotiating accession with the European Commission,

2) EU officials involved in the enlargement negotiations in various policy areas (e.g. IM, agriculture, fisheries) and high-ranking members the DG Enlargement dealing with particular candidates,

3) the highest-ranking Commission representatives on enlargement and the future of the EU

Interviews - despite the advantages they hold in obtaining specific expert knowledge - are a social situation in which the perceptions and personal orientations on both sides of the table can pose an obstacle to collecting reliable and useful data. For this reason, I have opted to conduct interviews with the widest possible array of policy-makers, each dealing with the enlargement process from a different angle. For instance, some representatives of the candidate states demonstrated a slight tendency towards socially desirable answers in particular on future financial questions (e.g. agricultural subsidies). Thus, the interviews were constructed so that at least two, mostly three opinions, were given on the CEECs' standpoint on each conflict line. This strategy has the advantage of reducing any distortions or social desirability that may emerge in the interview situation, and thus securing highly reliable data. The standard deviation of the results offered for each variable (policy position of CEEC) as well as the mean standard deviation for each policy area have been calculated and will be presented in the following. As a rule, the constructed instruments (see Appendix B for interview structure) have been successful in generating highly reliable results that widely correspond with each other. The aggregate standard deviation for the CEEC policy positions pinpointed by various interviewees generally does not exceed 8 for scales from 0 to 100 (for exact calculations, see individual policy areas and appendix B).

6.3. The interview structure

Extensive preparations were carried out to maximize the quality of the measuring instruments and enhance the validity and reliability of the data sought after. While the factor analysis served to ensure the validity of what is to be measured, the reliability of the data was secured by collecting widely corresponding data from a large variety of perspectives on enlargement.

[23] for a detailed list of the interviewees and their background, see appendix B and interview reports

Furthermore, employing the same closed format in all interviews (excluding group 3 above) ensured that the format of the data collected from one interviewee coincided with those from others. The discussions with policy experts from groups 1 and 2 thus followed the same structure, of course with consideration of the particular role the interviewee plays in the negotiations (see appendix for interview questionnaire). Diagrams depicting the preferences constellations and conflict lines illustrated in the previous section were presented to all policy experts for visual clarity. This closed structure with visual aids was instrumental in hindering any deviations from the standard format.

The interviews with the EU policy and/or enlargement experts had several important components.[24] All EU officials were presented one-dimensional graphs depicting the conflict lines and preference values in various policy areas and requested to discuss whether they agree with the conflict dimensions and classifications at hand. The enlargement and policy experts were asked to locate the current SQ along the illustrated conflict lines. The scales resulting from the factor analysis were slightly modified in that the current members were positioned between 20 and 80 (see Appendix B) to make room for more extreme actors.

The next step involved pinpointing the expected behavior of the CEECs within these conflict dimensions. Preferences estimates were assumed to be a function of the behavior of the CEECs in the accession negotiations, their expectations of the CEECs alignment in legislative procedures as well as the socioeconomic context of the country. After locating the CEEC preferences in numerical form or in terms of a coalition, the EU policy/enlargement experts were requested to elaborate on the motives for their given estimates. As some EU representatives dealing with enlargement in a particular policy domain (e.g. trade) tended to offer the same values for all CEECs, I attempted to extract a greater degree of variation by requesting the interviewees to distinguish more clearly between countries. Furthermore, the experts were asked whether they envision any candidate states having more extreme preferences than the EU-15 in any of the discussed policy areas. All EU officials then shared insights on the evolution of the existing conflict lines after enlargement.

The format of the interviews with the CEEC representatives[25] was nearly identical. The selected diplomats were considered to be *porte-paroles* for their countries apt to explain the expectations and policy positions of their governments and populations. As central

[24] for detailed descriptions, see interview reports for Mirel (DG Enlargement), Roitmann (DG Fisheries), Stamatopoulos (DG Internal Market), Mögele (DG Agriculture), Romeo and Saab (DG Enlargement).

negotiators, the CEEC diplomats have primarily focused their efforts on completing the accession process. For this reason, it was crucial to explain to all interviewees that the legislative game will continue after enlargement and that they will have an impact on the future direction of EU policies. Thus, current conflict structures, voting patters and the SQ were presented in graphic detail. The CEEC diplomats were then asked to align their country with a numerical preference estimate or by labeling the voting coalition they intended to join.

As for the third group, consisting of the highest ranking experts on enlargement[26], the focus was put on the EU's capacity to come to terms with the interest and preference heterogeneity. A more flexible interview format was followed here, providing for in-depth discussions of an open nature. These interviews dealt less with preferences, but more with the consequences of enlargement in terms of institutional constellations. Viable options for governance after enlargement were discussed and prognoses were offered for individual policy areas and EU decision making in general after enlargement.

7. Results and Data Analysis

The selected social science techniques and the measuring instruments provided a solid basis for identifying the fundamental political orientation of all candidate states along the selected conflict lines. All interviewees related to the one-dimensional scales and their inherent conflicts, while sharing their insights on 1) where to align the CEECs in various policy spaces, 2) what the CEECs expect from different policy areas, and 3) and how this will reshape the legislative game. In the upcoming section the results will be presented and interpreted in terms of their effects on the logic, process, and outcome of decision making. Past enlargements have profoundly altered the precarious balance between those states for whom agriculture still plays a substantial economic role and those states with an agricultural sector in decline. It is safe to say that southern enlargement tipped the equilibrium towards higher agriculture expenditure, while northern enlargement in 1995 brought Sweden – a vehement motor for reform (S) – as well as moderate Austria and Finland onto the playing field. Agriculture has been a highly sensitive area in the enlargement process, provoking

[25] for details, see the following interview reports: Ostrowski (PL), Boháč (CZ), Becsey/Borbély (H), Javorčík (SK), Milukas (LT), Vigants (LV), Halliste (EST).
[26] see interview reports Landáburu, Mitek-Pedersen. The results will be integrated into section 9

disagreements on along several dimensions. Since the number of people who fall under the existing support schemes will be severely augmented, the shadow of enlargement has sparked a multi-faceted debate on the raison d'être of the CAP (Sharman 2003: 2). To complicate matters, the data set delivers an aggregated "level of disagreement" of 66.4[27] for agriculture among the EU-15. What kind of impact will enlargement have on the already existing tensions in EU agricultural policy, and in particular its inherent distributive conflicts? In the following I argue that the current reforms of the CAP will indeed alleviate some of the negative externalities of enlargement. However, the heterogenization of agrarian preferences and expectations will revitalize the (currently relaxed) tensions between net-payers and net-receivers and intensify struggles between burden and benefit sharing, both in the agrarian sector and elsewhere.

A significant part of the expert interviews was dedicated to the relationship between agriculture and industry in the candidate states and the potential of both sectors to affect policy outcomes. Besides extracting a preference value for each state, the political weight and cohesiveness of agricultural and industrial groups on a domestic level was a central topic of discussion. All enlargement and/or policy experts were given an overview of the current political dilemma surrounding the reform of the CAP and asked whether their country (or the country they are an expert on) will be a force for further reform, i.e. reductions in direct payments, or for the maintenance of support schemes to contribute to the livelihood of the agricultural sector. The EU-experts additionally identified the current policy SQ. A mean value for each legislative actor was calculated, resulting in the following constellation:[28]

Figure 7-1. State and supranational positions on agricultural subsidies



(current states = factor analysis results; CEECs =interview results)

	EU-15		EU-25	
Minimum-Maximum	0	88.9	0	100
Mean value	47.6		52.2	
Median	47		64.8	

[27] mean value of the "level of disagreement" measured for all agricultural issues.

[28] for values from individual enlargement/policy experts, see appendix B; see also "a note on the scaling procedure".

Median weighted by Council votes	63.6	72.2
Standard deviation (from mean)	31.4	31.6
Skewness	-.15	-.35

(see appendix for calculation technique)

In terms of reliability, the mean standard deviation for the agricultural preferences gathered from multiple interviewees was calculated at 5.77. As illustrated, the current SQ is gradually shifting from the right side of the scale towards the left, i.e. the reduction of subsidies. The data depict an even more pronounced variation among the positions of CEECs than among the EU-15, with a majority of them falling into the group of subsidy-dependent states, though.

All data point to PL being the most extreme actor on payment matters. The motives for this are straightforward. As illustrated below, the fabric of society in the CEECs varies greatly from that of the EU-15 (ca. 5% employed in agriculture, 80% in industry and services), with nearly an equal number Poles employed in agriculture as in industry, while Czech industry employs nearly ten times larger workforce than agriculture (Eurostat 2002).[29] LT, H and LV are also assumed to align themselves with the current subsidy-dependent states.

Figure 7-2. Agriculture as % of GDP

CZ	EST	H	LV	LT	PL	SK	SLO
3.7	3.6	5	5	10	3.8	4.5	4

(Source: CIA World Factbook 2002)

Figure 7-3. Sectoral Employment in the CEECs



(source: Eurostat 2002)

[29] Other sources indicate that PL's agricultural sector is larger, as it serves as a survival net for the unemployed, e.g. Polska Statystyka Publiczna 2002: 28.4%; CIA World Factbook 2002: 27.5%

Imminent enlargement will compound the already existing agricultural heterogeneity (Bomberg and Peterson 1999: 124) both in terms of employment structures but also in terms what is produced and how it is produced. We find Malta, a producer of vegetables to whom the current payment schemes do not apply, and the industrial Czech and Slovak Republics clearly on the side of the reformers, while EST and SLO remain moderately dependent on agricultural funds. It should be noted, though, that CZ, SK and M indeed prefer a decrease in agricultural spending, but simultaneously advocate an increase of the total EU budget (see König and Bräuninger 2002b). However, institutional and organizational factors may even be more significant than the size of the sector. Despite internal divisions, the Polish (and to a lesser extent the Hungarian) agricultural sector has the advantage of being politically bolstered by several political parties that thrive on mass support (Sharman 15: 2003). Thanks to their size and organizational capacity Polish agricultural interests have been effective in anchoring themselves in the political landscape, which, for example, has led to violations of agricultural trade liberalization (see section 7.7). To multiply the existing *problematique*, the current junior governing party PSL (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* – Polish People's Party) as well as the influential *Samoobrona* (Self-Defense) have been successful in reducing the domestic debate on EU membership to the agricultural dimension. The most noteworthy effect of this strategy is that the Polish national interest has become inseparable from agricultural interests (see also Kopecký and Mudde 2002). The mere size of the sector, combined with its capacity to mobilize political and popular support, has trapped PL into automatically equating the national interest with agricultural needs, making it a tenacious defender of support schemes. Thus, integrating this inefficient[30], yet institutionally privileged sector will continue to have acute consequences on supranational bargaining, even if Polish farmers initially receive only a portion of the funds allocated to EU-15 farmers. The inability of poorly organized agrarian groups from LT and LV to channel their demands explains their more moderate position on subsidies and indicate that domestic institutions are a significant intervening variable.

Within the context of the future legislative game, this preference constellation will not only sharpen the divide between industrial and agricultural economies, but will also aggravate

[30] These inefficiencies are manifested both in numerical terms (20+ % of the working population, but approximately 4% of economic output) as well as in the current trend towards smaller farm units, less use of machinery and greater reliance of labor and animal power (see Sharman 2003; interview report Mögele). This implies that enlargement will not only complicate legislative procedures, but also demands an intense modernization process, which remains beyond the scope of this analysis.

(currently relaxed) tensions between net-payers and net-receivers. Thus, even if the current CAP reforms were to have the effect of mitigating the divergence, there is reason to postulate that this divide will quickly spill over into other cohesion matters. Traditionally, more wealthy states have been able to buy the support of the poorer agricultural states for their policies by securing them access to cohesion funds (see Allen 1996; Carubba 1998). In other words, the structural funds were not merely designed to bring about internal cohesion, but as a means of gaining political support from poorer states. National governments have been able to dictate the pace of integration through the strategic allocation of funds - a tactic which has facilitated history-making decisions leading to the SEA and TEU (Allen 1996: 220). However, imminent enlargement will inevitably polarize the industrial-agrarian or rich-poor divide, limiting the feasibility of this policy making mode. The results indicate that the magnification of tensions between burden-sharing and benefit sharing will inexorably complicate Council decision-making on matters involving the allocation of agricultural or other funding (see table 7-1).

The vital question is to what extent the Nice stipulations will serve as a remedy to this preference polarization. Taking into account the risk of generalization[31], the following table links the measured preferences with the voting power of the Council actors:

Table 7-1. Potential voting coalitions after enlargement: agricultural funding

	Status Quo EU-15 *(excluding CEECs)*		**EU-25 under the Nice Treaty**[32]			
	votes of 87	votes by %	number of votes	votes in %	population %	number of states
QMV	62	71.3%	235 of 321	73.4%	62%	13
Blocking minority	26	28.8%	87	27.1%	39%	13
The reformers (M, S, DK, GB, NL, CZ, SK, A, D, FIN, L)	41	47.1%	131 of 321	40.8%	44.6%	11
Subsidy dependent states: (PL, GR, E, P, H, CY, LV, LT, I, F, SLO, IRL, EST, B)	46	52.8%	190 of 321	59.1%	55.3%	14
The CEECs	--	--	84 of 321	26.1%	16. 6%	10
The South (F,I,E,P,GR,)	38	43.6%	109 of 321	33.9%	39.22%	5
The North (D,GB,NL,B, A, S, FIN, DK, L)	49	56.3%	117 of 321	36.4%	44.22%	10

[31] Voting behavior is of course an issue-specific phenomena. The calculations reflect the fundamental political alignment of the actors resulting from the factor analysis and interviews.

[32] As the Nice Treaty provides a framework for an EU with 27 members, calculations were made on the basis of 25 members. The highest necessary QMV quota has been pegged at 73.4 and will be used here tentatively.

Should the Commission further pursue its strategy of gradually reducing direct payments (see figures 7-1, 7-4), it will be confronted with much greater resistance than in the past, as the group of subsidy dependent states account for ca. 60% of Council votes and more than half of the population. The given constellation also poses a predicament in that the CEECs and the South will presumably be legislative allies on agricultural matters, but staunch opponents in regard to the allocation of the funds that they collectively seek to maintain. The "rumps" in the following illustrations depict the core areas of preference concentration in the EU-15 and EU-25, making it clear that the main preference concentration will shift towards upholding agricultural spending.[33]

Figure 7-4 Kernel Density Estimates EU-15 and EU-25



The benefit-sharers, i.e. the wealthy industrial states, will lose relative power, motivating them to craft strategic alliances with more moderate beneficiaries in their quest for sustainable levels of direct funding. However, such strategic tactics may not be sufficient in reducing gridlock danger after enlargement (see König and Bräuninger 2000). For one thing, the allocation of side-payments as a means of fast-forwarding the integration process will provoke more intense distributive complexities in a Union with wealthy industrial states in the minority. Regrettably, the Nice Treaty with its triple-majority requirement and elevated QMV hurdle is not a remedy to this predicament as it fortifies the already existing *SQ bias* of the existing decisional institutions. Further developments in agricultural politics will doubtlessly increase pressure to lower the Council's voting quota to overcome such governance obstacles.

[33] see Appendix C for statistical technique.

7.2. Producers vs. Consumers

In the past years, regulatory issues have been redefined and are increasingly embracing the producer-consumer dimension (Young and Wallace 2000: 17). The Treaty of Amsterdam amended Article 153 (formerly 129A), granting the EU a vital role in promoting higher levels of consumer and environmental protection, to which the co-decision procedure is generally applied. However, national regulatory preferences remain highly varied and reflect different views on the notion of risk about product safety and contrasting perceptions as to how far the EU should intrude on agricultural and industrial production (Young and Wallace 2000: 17). There is a wide spectrum of national standpoints on the significance and level of civic or consumer protection, with the north generally willing to actively champion such issues on the European level. With the EP as a strategic ally they have succeeded in anchoring consumer matters on the supranational agenda by generating a series of legislation on quality controls and product safety.

The diplomats and EU experts (DG Agriculture, Enlargement, IM) were requested to the elaborate on the expectations of the CEECs in terms of creating further consumer-oriented legislation. Thanks to the high correspondence of the collected results, the mean standard deviation was a mere 2.48. The scale indicates that the coalition of southern states will find support from the East:

Figure 7-5. The producer-consumer divide in the EU-25 (mean standard deviation 2.48)



0- against further consumer oriented regulation of the agrarian and industrial sectors
100- support extensive consumer-friendly regulation of agrarian and industrial sectors

	EU 15		EU 25	
Minimum – Maximum	0	100	0	100
Mean	45.9		28.2	
Median	53		5.5	
median weighted by Council votes	26		5.5	
Standard Deviation from mean	37.4		36.2	
Skewness	-.01		.83	

(see Appendix C for calculation technique)

Enlargement could thus fundamentally alter the legislative inertia between producer and civic interests in the EU by bringing 10 producer-friendly actors with nearly identical preference values onto the playing field. The reasons for this aversion to further consumer-friendly legislation are manifold. Contrary to widespread expectations, regulatory competition and market liberalization have not prompted a race to the bottom (see Young and Wallace 2000: 28). Instead, in the past years the Olsonian reasoning that production interests are privileged by producers' superior capacity to organize has come under fire by a series of consumer-friendly legislation in the EU having cumulated in a recent trend towards tougher standards (see Hix 1999a: 239; Young and Wallace 2000: 8-13; Olson 1965).

Consequently, an array of consumer-friendly legislation has emerged (i.e. food, product and medicine safety and labeling, transport conditions) which is often higher than national standards. Despite significantly lower levels of socioeconomic and industrial development, the CEECs must adopt these strict laws as an accession prerequisite. This has prompted them to embark on a painstaking process of harmonizing existing or non-existent legislation of this caliber according to EU law (see Gorton et al. 1998; Strezynska 2000; The White Paper 1995). This puts the transformation states in a bind. They are required to demonstrate visible proof of their capacity to "digest" the single market *acquis*, even though this type of legislation is costly and detrimental to their economic transformation and industrial development. This burden is compounded by the fact that the CEECs will most likely not be entitled to the same amount of financial support as the southern states to overcome the disadvantages brought on by increased external competition and higher environmental protection. In other words, the CEECs are expected to endure immediate costs for potential integration benefits in the long run (Hughes, Sasse, Gordon 2002: 333).

On these grounds the CEECs lament the harsh strain put on agricultural and industrial production in adopting the *acquis* and assert that a transitional phase is inevitable before consumer interests will find support. Because the current modernization process continues to rely on low labor costs, all CEEC respondents clearly rejected any further such legislation. As the Washington Consensus has led to politics of capital account liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization and trade liberalization (see Nørgaard 2000a: 2; Bodenstein and Schneider 2001: 6), low production costs are a *sina qua non* for an investment-friendly environment. The research conducted revealed no evidence, though, that the CEEC preferences will be more extreme than those of the existing producer-friendly states (e.g. E, P,

GR). Finally, Olson's logic of collective action indeed does apply to the domestic context of the CEECs, in which consumer interests are dispersed, poorly organized and politically inconsequential (partial exceptions: H and CZ) (see Strezynska 2000). As for the stability of the given preference profiles, that data indicate a harsh shift towards producer interests:

Figure 7-6. Kernel Density Estimates: Consumer interests EU-15 and EU-25



After a period of legislative progress on consumer affairs, the data point to the danger of legislative rollback, as the consumer-friendly voting block will suffer a significant loss of political leverage. This improves the position of the producer-oriented southern states, who have often posed an obstacle to the creation of any further legislation that burdens producers.[34] This has the logical implication that the current *legislative core* will expand considerably, as a majority of new and old members are resistant to any SQ-change .

Table 7-2. Producers and Consumers in the enlarged Union: Potential Coalitions

	Status Quo EU-15 *(excluding CEECs)*		**EU-25 under the Nice Treaty**			
	number of votes	votes by %	number of votes	votes in %	population %	number of states
QMV	62 of 87	71.3%	235 of 321	73.4%	62%	13
Blocking minority	26 of 87	28.8%	87	27.1%	39%	13
traditional consumer-friendly states (NL, D, DK, S, FIN, A)	29	33%	76	23.6%	27.7%	6
traditional producer-friendly states (CEECs, I, E, P, GR, F, GB, IRE)	51	58.6%	212	66%	72.10 %	17

[34] The Nice stipulations apply to an EU with 27 members. The exact threshold for a QMV and blocking minority with 25 members have yet to be determined. The highest possible QMV under any circumstances was fixed at 73.4, which will be used here as a benchmark.

In the past, though, the EU has been more successful in adopting so-called *product* standards (e.g. environmental legislation, product safety) in the midst of preference heterogeneity than *process* standards (labor protection measures; see section 7.3) (Hix 1999a: 234). Scharpf (1996) demonstrates this dilemma in game-theoretical terms. Here, the richer countries prefer an agreement on higher standards, while the poorer countries advocate lower, more flexible standards. The decisive point, though, is that both sides prefer any agreement on high or low standards to non-agreement, because non-agreement would cause unbearable negative externalities, e.g. internal market and competition distortions, cross-border pollution. Thanks to strategic agenda setting and QMV, the forerunners have been able to drag the laggards towards their ideal position (Hix 1999a: 233). However, as enlargement will reduce the relative power of the consumer-friendly block, the likelihood of such tactics without profound institutional modifications is limited.

7.2.1. Environment: The producer-consumer dilemma

The collected data imply that environmental protection is inextractably intertwined with the consumer-producer divide (see correlation matrix figure 8-1). Fearing that too strict regulations would hamper industrial production E, I, UK, P favor more relaxed common standards. In particular NL, D and the Nordic states have advocated stringent legislation which many southern European states have been unable to adopt (see Tsebelis 1994; Holzinger 1995). GR, IRE, B, and F can generally be regarded as "fence-sitters", sometimes supporting and other times rejecting such legislation. An even more severe gap exists between the western and eastern parts of the continent in terms of the level and quality of environmental protection. The goal of the interviews was thus to determine the degree of preference variation among the candidates and establish to what extent the environment has arrived on the domestic political agenda. Each policy maker was requested to transmit an ideal point into the following structure, with 0 symbolizing the total rejection of any further environmental standards and 100 representing the advocacy of strict, unitary EU standards.

Figure 7-7. Environmental protection: spanning the divide (agg. stan. dev. 6.49)



(sources for EU-15: Tsebelis 1994; Holzinger 1995; Young andWallace 2001; Bomberg and Peterson 1999)

	EU 15		EU 25	
Minimum – Maximum	16.7	100	0	100
mean	63.9		45.3	
Median	50		33.3	
Median by Council votes	50		41.7	
Standard Deviation (From mean)	31.9		34.2	
Skewness	.13		.7	

(see Appendix C for calculation technique)

The results – which delivered an aggregate standard deviation of 6.49 - indicate that enlargement will multiply the existing heterogeneity both in terms of standards, but also expectations. All data point to the reluctance on the part of the CEECs to tolerate further environmental measures on the EU or national level and a preference for the greater flexibility in product standards. However, a moderate degree of variation could be identified. The experts indicated that PL, SK and M will most vigorously reject further legislation. However, SLO and LT have suffered a lower degree of mass industrialization and environmental destruction and will not shy from further protection measures.

The data do not reflect an eternally hostile attitude of the CEECs to all environmental legislation, but should instead be interpreted as the impact of the burden inflicted upon the CEECs while quickly improving the environmental situation within the framework of the *acquis*, e.g. in area of carbon dioxide emissions.

Figure 7-8. Rapid progress in environmental protection



(source: Eurostat 2002)

Despite progress, it is assumed that the CEECs will promote policies which would give them greater flexibility in setting their own economic goals (*selective alignment:* see section 7.5). However, as EU-15 producers strongly oppose lenient provisions on product and process standards for the new members, a high conflict potential exists. Their central argument against production flexibility is that it would create an uneven playing field and give eastern

producers a competitive advantage over those who truly adhere to more rigid standards (Sedelmeier 2002: 640). The data illustrated do not go to say that the coalitions mapped out are forever fixed. In their quest for a level playing field, it is highly plausible that environment- and consumer-conscious northern states will ultimately attract the support of the so-called "fence sitters" (B, GR, F) and southern members (as well as more environmentally conscious CEECs) to obtain the necessary majority amidst the broad resistance. This would deny the low-cost states any comparative production advantages. However, the Nice stipulations (see table 7-2) and their inherent status quo bias do little to enhance the Union's ability to span this divide despite the QMV rule. In light of these realities, there is reason to expect a more gradual and cautious strategy on the part of the Commission and its allies in pushing the SQ towards further environmental conservation.

7.3. Europeanizing Social Welfare?

To a great extent, the dilemma surrounding the Europeanization of social policy is also linked to producer interests (see figure 8.1), as social protection measures frequently exert an additional strain on the production process. The wealthier member states have been compelled to advocate higher labor standards on the supranational level, as they fear that *regulatory competition* will force them into a position in which they must lower their standards to remain productive. This brings us back to the important distinction between *process* and *product* standards. Unlike in the producer-consumer domain, we are not dealing with *product*, rather with *process* standards, which are extremely difficult to implement from the supranational level downwards (Scharpf 1996: 25). The threat of "social dumping" compels richer states to support higher process standards on the European level, but if these are unattainable, they prefer no agreement whatsoever to an agreement over low standards (Hix 1999a: 234). The group of poorer states (P, E, GR) equally prefers no agreement over both low and high standards, as this enables them to attract urgently needed roaming capital.

Further market integration has made it increasingly difficult to keep the social dimension off the Community agenda (Leibfried and Pierson 2000: 268) and led to series of legislation aimed at improving working conditions and the dialogue between social partners. Despite the concrete legal anchoring of the social dimension (see Art. 136-145) and the switch to the co-decision procedure and QMV, further regulation and integration are hampered by diverging domestic social and labor standards as well contrasting views on the extent of integration. The historically rooted national perceptions of social welfare also contribute to the complexities

involved in the European social dimension. Even the highly developed European welfare states amongst themselves have adopted functionally equivalent, but institutionally diverse solutions. The spectrum spans from the tax-based Scandinavian model to the corporatist, insurance-based Continental model of social welfare, to the British system of state-free collective bargaining (Scharpf 1997: 81-83). These elaborate welfare systems are juxtaposed to the less developed southern countries who depend on low social costs to compensate for their lower industrial productivity.

Figure 7-9. Social Spending EU-15



(source: Eurostat 2002)

Recently, the Belgian government has issued a statement pleading for a more active and comprehensive social *acquis*.[35] However, strengthening community legislation on social welfare profoundly affects the relationship between labor and capital and frequently is prone to the dissent of the less wealthy member states. The pressing question is thus how the social dimension will be altered when new actors are added, whose systems of labor protection and social welfare remain in an embryonic stage at best. As such social matters are beginning to gain salience in the CEECs in light of economic unease, unemployment and increased social inequality, I will illustrate how enlargement might reshape the dynamics of social policy-making by deriving preference values for all future members. The research conducted by König (1997) has indicated that social policy measures demand intense coordination, as we do not find mere preference poles here like in the area of trade, but instead different labor and social standards as well as extremely diverse demands and expectations. Although there is no universally valid preference structure, on an aggregate level we find GR and the "Romance" countries (I, E, P) with a stronger orientation towards the SQ, while the welfare states (D, NL,

[35] "L' Europe doit s'attacher à ce qui intéresse vraiment les gens, comme la sécurité, la sécurité alimentaire, un meilleur environnement...à mon avis l'acquis social reste trop modeste." Louis Michel, 10.4.2002 Communiqué de presse. Service de presse – Affaires étrangères de Belgique.

DK, S) and those with left governments lean towards further labor protection measures (König 1997: 124) (see figure 7-10).

The selected diplomats and enlargement experts were requested to describe and justify the expectations of the CEECs along the labor vs. capital dimension (as well as the extent of Europeanization). The interviewees explained how their state would react if the EU were to generate more legislation to improve labor conditions (safety, work hours, etc.) and social welfare in harmony with Article 137.[36] The multiple results for each CEEC delivered a low standard deviation of 4.63 and revealed the following scheme:

Figure 7-10. Labor vs. Capital in an enlarged Union



0: rejection of all new legislation to protect workers
100: support all legislation to protect workers, even if they entail greater costs for employers
(source preferences EU-15: social spending per capita EU-15)

	EU-15		EU-25	
Minimum-Maximum	7.1	100	0	100
Mean value	53.9		45.4	
Median	57.7		39.1	
Median by Council votes	53		39.1	
Standard deviation from mean	31.3		30.9	
Skewness	-0.6		0.37	

(see Appendix C for calculation technique)

Enlargement will intensify the level of preference differentiation by introducing a relatively cohesive group of states in terms of their aversion to further labor protection measures. With the exception of CY and M, who have a stable social net and whose size easily allows them to digest further welfare measures, the expectations of the CEECs vastly deviate from those of the EU-15 forerunners. A crucial motivation for this standpoint is the fear of *capital migration* to eastern countries with even lower costs of labor (RO, BG). This reality as well as high unemployment rates severely restrict possibilities of labor protection measures in the advanced transformation economies. Most importantly, the socioeconomic philosophy which

[36] Matters involving migrant workers and labor mobility were not discussed

has implanted itself in the CEECs thrives on an investment-friendly climate and minimal social transfers and services (see Nørgaard 2000b).

Table 7-3. Costs of Labor per hour in the CEECs and the EU-15

CY	8.2 €	1999
CZ	3.3 €	1999
EST	1.9 €	1996
H	3.7 €	2000
LV	2.0 €	1998
LT	1.4 €	1996
M	5.4 €	1999
PL	4.3 €	2000
SK	3.0 €	2000
SLO	7.9 €	1999
RO	1.1 €	2000
BG	1.4 €	2000
EU-15	**21.45 €**	**1998**

(source: Eurostat 2002)

Table 7-4. Flows of direct investment in Eastern Europe in 2001 (Million USD)

Country	1999	2000	2001	total investments per capita 2001
CZ	6324	4986	4916	$479
EST	305	387	542	$377
H	1970	1649	2443	$244
LV	347	410	177	$73
LT	486	379	446	$121
PL	6474	8293	6995	$181
SK	390	1925	1475	$273
SLO	107	136	503	$253

(Source: Economic Survery of Europe 2002)

As the CEECs thrive on low labor costs and foreign investment, the existing asymmetries in the social policy playing field will be compounded by enlargement. This dilemma holds for both for the labor-capital dimension as well as the integration dimension, as the existing rules of closer cooperation are presently regarded as too inflexible by the questioned diplomats. As a rule, the recently adopted EU legal constraints are viewed to have greatly reduced the capacity of national governments to influence economic growth and employment. Therefore, in particular, the former socialist states are united in their reluctance to adopt the EU's social policy blueprint or grant labor protection measures a constitutional status.

Future efforts to balance out policies promoting market efficiency and those promoting social protection and equality will require extremely sophisticated coordination strategies (see also König 1997), as most CEECs frown on such measures that impede the growth or recovery of sluggish or developing economies. Enlargement thus entails a wider spectrum of preferences,

with the core of candidates solidifying the capital-oriented position of the southern members. At first sight, it would seem to be logical to claim that the southern states will profit from enlargement. However, once the social dimension regains momentum, the south – fearing "social dumping" and the emigration of their industries to low-cost eastern countries - may find itself at odds with the CEECs. For this reason, the southern states may feel compelled to join forces with their northern counterparts as advocates for higher levels of social protection to deny the capital-intensive CEECs competitive advantages in production through lower process standards and labor costs. Despite the possibility of shifting coalitions after enlargement, the feasibility of Europeanizing the social dimension will doubtlessly be hindered by the larger cleavage in overall welfare and inflexible voting thresholds.

7.4. The enlarged fisheries regime

The fisheries sector is one where political salience seems inversely related to the real economic weight of the sector, as it accounts for no more than 1% of GDP of any of the EU-15 states (Lequesne 2000: 345). Council decisions on the basis of the consultation procedure are often highly disputed, delivering an aggregate level of disagreement of 53.3 in DEU. Unlike past enlargements, the candidate states have generally agreed to adopt the existing CFP without major irritations (Fischler 2001). Accession is linked to a series of measures affecting resource management, inspections and control aimed at the conservation of the maritime stock. At the heart of the supranational legislative game lies a fundamental conflict between the Commission and its allies who actively pursue policies of control and restrictions to assure the viability of maritime resources and those states who are reluctant to take on further limitations to the sector, let alone consequently implement them (see section 5.1).

In numerical terms, the impact of enlargement on the CFP appears to be moderate, as the number of fish caught by the first round of CEECs constitutes merely 10% of the EU-15 (EU Com 2002). However, the data gathered suggest that the preferences of the candidate states – both from the Baltic and Mediterranean region- are much more divergent than those of the EU-15. The vital question is how this repertoire of opposing standpoints may encroach on the stability of the current preference profile.

The values collected in various policy and country expert interviews reflect the CEECs' attitudes of the on this surprisingly emotion-laden dimension[37].

[37] see interview reports for formulation of questions and details on national standpoints.

Figure 7-11. Open waters vs. redistribution (mean standard deviation of results: 10.63)



0 – open waters: nation states retain the right to fish along their coastline and beyond
100 – Creation of a comprehensive EU regime with the distribution of quotas; limitation of national autonomy

	EU 15		EU 25	
Minimum – Maximum	10	59	0	87.5
Mean	36.3		41.9	
Median	36.4		43.5	
Median weighted by Council votes	36.4		36.4	
Standard Deviation (from mean)	15.6		22.6	
Skewness	-.18		-.05	

The landlocked countries (H, SK, CZ, H, SLO[38]) expressed either absolute indifference or their willingness to support the Commission's strategy. However, negotiations have been more complex with the Baltic Sea states, some of whom have frequently reneged on accession agreements. Enlargement will bring two staunch opponents of further restrictions and redistribution onto the playing field, EST and PL, who were labeled most extreme actors in the EU-25. Furthermore, the gathered data visibly indicate that Malta will join the existing constellation as the most fervent advocate of fishing restrictions, as these are the most effective means of securing this struggling, yet historically anchored sector's competitiveness against Italy. As for the significance of the fisheries sector in the CEECs, the quantitative data coincide well with other structural indicators.

Table 7-5. Statistics on the Fishing and Acquaculture Sector in the CEECs

Country	*Acquaculture Production*	*Total Catches*	*Total Fisheries Exports (1000€)*	*Employment Number*
Cyprus	1422	5273	4660	1064
Czech Republic	18775	4190	24678	2423
Estonia	200	111793	73492	10618
Hungary	11947	7514	7050	4300
Lithuania	1650	33594	31567	1400
Latvia	468	125389	48671	2000
Malta	2002	1033	6013	1940
Poland	33711	253112	265056	9096
Slovakia	872	1391	1747	166

[38] Slovenia only has 35 kilometers of coastline and a maritime industry of minimal importance

Slovenia	1206	2009	6197	178
Bulgaria	7780	10556	5446	7215
Romania	8998	7843	7250	25661
Turkey	63000	575100	94170	50831

(source Eurostat 1999; Employment 2000)

In terms of policy output, the Commission's claim that the impact of enlargement on the legislative process will be minimal (EU Com: Fisheries) is debatable. Enlargement entails a substantial increase in the range of interests and patterns of dependency as the risk of exploitation is acute in the Baltic area, whose dwindling maritime stocks are shared by at least 8 states. It cannot be excluded that distributive politics involved will create highly asymmetrical patterns of resource allocation (Franchino and Rahming 2003: 25), as the maritime sector remains a historically anchored and expanding way of life for a variety of Baltic and Mediterranean states. The prime example is EST (pop. 1.8 mill.), whose fishing sector employs more people than that of PL (pop 39 mill.).

The growing danger of exploitation motivates us to briefly address questions of legislative and executive politics. The data indicate that the Commission will gain more allies than the "renegades" for open waters. Yet it is doubtful that enlargement will set the framework for any conservationist breakthroughs, as the open water coalition is most probably set to align itself with like-minded Baltic newcomers who resist further supranational intervention.

Table 7-6. Likely Scenarios in the Fisheries Council

	Status Quo EU-15 ***(excluding CEECs)***		**EU-25 under the Nice Treaty**			
	number of votes	votes by %	number of votes	votes in %	population %	number of states
QMV	62 of 87	71.3%	235 of 321	73.4%	62%	13
Blocking minority	26 of 87	29.4%	87	27.1%	39%	13
Commission Allies[39] (M, CZ, SK, SLO, H, A, D, L, LT, DK, FIN, GB, S, LV, CY)	36	41.3%	149	46.4%	45.27%	15
Open Waters (EST, PL, F, E, P, IRL, NL, B, GR, I)	51	58.6%	172	53.6%	54.72%	10
The Baltic Sea (S, DK, FIN, PL, D, EST, LT, LV)	20	22.9%	95	29.6%	30.7%	8
The Mediterranean (E, P, F, I, GR, M, CY)	38	43.6%	116	36.1%	36.9%	7

[39] The moderate, SQ-oriented Scandinavian states and GB were also classified as Commission allies, as they have become increasingly interested in restrictions on CEEC fishermen in the Baltic and North Sea in the past years (see Interview Report Roitmann)

The mere distributive character of fisheries policy and its legislative constellation may be prone to inefficient outcomes in the future. As Baron (1991) indicates, distributive policies often allow for the concentration of benefits and the collectivization of costs, even under majority rule. During the legislative game, actors expect that if they were to reach a similar game structure in a future game, it is in their interest to act at the present (1991: 60). This incentive frequently results in the adoption of inefficient distributive programs, as the benefits are only allocated to a minimal number of actors, while transferring the costs to the "commons". This dilemma is ever-so-present, as the Commission was unable to introduce restrictions on the size of fleets to preserve endangered maritime species in December 2002, and in turn could only insignificantly reduce the quota on catches.[40] In accordance with the Baron theory, the benefits of unrestricted fishing have been concentrated in the hands of a few (southern European Fishermen), while the costs (extinction of maritime stocks) have been collectivized to the entire population.

The scenarios presented here indicate that distorted patterns of resource allocation or "home-made" legislative gridlock (*à la Niçoise*) may be the norm for the years to come. Enlargement will also complicate the equally significant issue of implementation, which has proven to be inadequate within the realm of the EU-15 thanks to different control standards. Such effects of enlargement could, of course, be counterbalanced by a greater executive role of the Commission and more restrictions on member states (Franchino and Rahming 2003: 25; Kelemen 2000). However, since the proficiency level of inspection and control in the CEECs remains unsatisfactory even after adaptation to the *acquis*, there are solid grounds to assume that the Commission and its conservationist allies will suffer a moderate setback after this enlargement, let alone further expansion to the Black Sea region

7.5. The degree of market regulation

Enlargement will greatly increase the size of the world's largest common market. Despite the success of the EU on the economic front, there are still intense conflicts at meetings of the IM Council for which the data set yields an aggregate level of disagreement of 66.6%. Taking into account that IM policy dynamics are innately intertwined with those concerning producers and consumers, i.e. product standards, this section will assess the repercussions of enlargement from a different angle. The factor analysis has singled out one supreme conflict

[40] see Daniela Weingärtner, "die EU haut den Fisch in die Pfanne" die Tageszeitung, December 23, 2002)

over market regulation, which best reflects the given dissent among the member states and the supranational institutions in this policy domain. Although the current government party is an intervening variable, we generally observe the UK, DK and FIN in a coalition as fervent supporters of de-regulationist policies, thus minimal state intervention (see Hix 1999a: 232), while France and other southern states have continued to resist the neo-liberal, de-regulationsist trend during the period of analysis (see also Garrett 1992). Regulation may entail the maintenance of national interventionist policies and/or the support for a solid regulatory framework on the EU level for certain sectors. As previously noted, Germany and another group of states tend towards policies of re-regulation - moderate state and community intervention, i.e. a social market (Hix 1999a: 237).

Diplomats from the CEECs were first given a brief overview of the current conflict and requested to share insights on their countries' expectations towards the internal market. The experts located their fundamental position along the one-dimensional scale while elaborating on the peculiarities of certain economic sectors and the social impact of deregulation. To bolster the reliability of the data collected from the diplomats, EU representatives from the DG Enlargement and DG IM pinpointed the expected positions of the candidate states along this dimension. The aggregate results with a mean standard deviation of 8.58 are as follows:

Figure 7-12. Internal Market Policy Positions



	EU 15		EU 25	
Minimum – Maximum	0	87.5	0	100
Mean	42.2		53.3	
Median	28		62.5	
Median by weighted Council votes	50		65.8	
Standard Deviation	29.5		28.9	
Skewness	.27		-.25	

(see Appendix C for calculation technique)

Unlike in other policy areas, there are no preference "poles", but instead a spread-out distribution. Even the most competitive CEECs are expected to lean towards the continental economic tradition, advocating regulationist or "re-regulationist" policies. The preference towards a moderate dosage of regulation is rooted in the CEECs' inclination towards a

framework of "*selective regulatory alignment*" (see Sedelmeier 2002: 640; Young and Wallace 2000). This would allow the transition economies greater leverage in setting their own economic priorities and policies without being overly exposed to external forces of de-regulation and liberalization. At least in the early years of membership, most candidates express a desire for a moderately regulated economy to facilitate structural adjustments and prepare firms for European and international competition. This explains both the aversion to further harmonized product standards as well as full-scale market liberalization. Most importantly, the public sector serves as an employment buffer for the CEECs (see also Scharpf 2002: 648). Governments have relied on this oversized and often inefficient sector as an ultimate means of preventing mass unemployment, having led to the postponement of further privatization. One should also note that far-reaching de-regulation is often instantaneously related to social hardships and unemployment.[41] Thus, the success of former-communist parties can partially be explained by their advocacy of government regulation of the most problematic sectors to provide a sort of economic safety net for the losers of privatization. On these grounds, a backlash against what many view as disproportionate economic liberalization cannot be excluded.

Table 7-7. Economic regulation after Nice

	Status Quo EU-15 (without CEEC's)		**EU-25 under the Nice Treaty**			
	number of votes	votes by %	number of votes	votes in %	population %	number of states
QMV	62 of 87	71.3%	235 of 321	73.4%	62%	13
Blocking minority	26 of 87	29.4%	87	27.1%	39%	13
states with regulationist tendencies (F, I, E, M, SLO, PL, SK, H, LV, EST, B, GR, EST, CY)	46	52.8%	193	60.1%	55.07%	14
traditional de- and re-regulationist states (GB, FIN, IRL, DK, S, A, D, NL, LT, CZ, L)	42	48.2%	128	39.9	44.93%	11

This aversion towards de-regulation has and will also put the CEECs at odds with the EU's competition policy, which has disabled state interventionism and public procurement (Scharpf

[41] see interview reports CEEC Diplomats

2002).[42] Once again, questions of regulation go hand in hand with consumer-oriented legislation. The essence of economic competition is founded upon the concept of a "level playing field" which implies that IM legislation guarantees fair competition on the one hand through the free circulation of goods and services, and on the other by means of harmonizing the production process. The previous analysis has demonstrated that accommodating the CEECs into the given market structure and simultaneously generating further legislation concerning process and product standards will severely strain the EU's coordination capacity. However, the data offered do merit particular caution. The CEECs have been exposed to an unprecedented process of de-regulation, which has generated high levels of economic growth (see Sachs and Warner 1995), but also rapidly increased social inequalities (Quaisser 1997: 12-14). This has sparked highly polarized ideological conflict on issues of economic regulation. In particular in CZ, LT, EST, and LT state intervention is an extremely salient issue, provoking a large domestic schisms. Pressures for extensive de-regulation are best represented by the influential Czech *Občanská Demokratická Strana* (Civil Democratic Party), who are like-minded with the British Conservatives or the German FDP in their advocacy of high-scale economic liberalism. This is manifested by their profound criticism of the generous EU social dimension (Mudde and Kopecký 2002: 306) - and aversion towards EU regulation (ODS Party Program). The other side of the spectrum of influential democratic parties is rounded off by the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) whose politics of social spending and labor protection are generous even for western standards. Thus, concerning matters of economic regulation, any change in government may imply a drastic tilt to the opposite end of the preference spectrum.

7.6. Transnational Justice 2005

The Maastricht Treaty added two new intergovernmental pillars, one of which provides the outline for a network of cooperation among national ministries of justice and the interior. No other EU policy domain has made its way to the top of the agenda in such a short period of time as Justice and Home Affairs (Monar 3: 2001). Its subject matter involves the creation of common asylum and immigration policies, rules on external border controls, as well as a framework for combating drug traffic and fraud. Despite the chronic reticence on the part of

[42] In all fairness, one must mention that a share of the monopolized sectors are not monopolized by domestic firms, but are "exported monopolies" e.g. Deutsche Telekom controls the Slovak telecommunications sector.

EU member states, a substantial body of integrationist policies and legislation has been created (Den Boer 1996: 405) and anchored by the Amsterdam Treaty.

As central Europe remains the crossroads for smuggling and illegal immigration, efforts have been made to incorporate the CEECs into the already established framework before accession. It is odd that little attention has been given to whether the new members will become forerunners for the communitarization of this domain or join the existing group of laggards (in particular GB and DK). Data were gathered by presenting the current EU-15 preference constellation to the CEEC diplomats, who in turn numerically pinpointed the extent to which their country supports the Europeanization of this domain. In an attempt to extract greater variation, the diplomatic representatives and EU-enlargement experts elaborated on the CEECs' standpoints on a more controversial, yet highly salient element of this policy domain – the Europeanization of asylum and immigration policy. In this case, the preference data for the CEECs have less to do with economic factors than with their attitudes on this traditional integration dimension. The results may in turn give us a pre-taste of élite and popular attitudes on integration in general terms.

More difficulties and contradictory answers, were encountered in gathering data here, as JHA policies are viewed much more as a process of legal coordination and an accession formality than a political matter (see Monar 2000, 2001). This explains the higher degree of inconsistencies in the results: aggregate stan. dev. 18.88. Nevertheless, mean values were calculated as indicators of the CEECs' standpoints on this integration dimension while the EU-15 values reflect their voting behavior on JHA issues in Amsterdam (Aspinwall 2001).

Figure 7-13. Preferring Europe – Justice and Home Affairs



0: sovereignty: no further European cooperation in these areas
100: integration: complete Europeanization of these areas

(Preferences EU-15: Aspinwall 2002)

	EU 15		EU 25	
Minimum – Maximum	0	100	0	100
Mean	74.5		62.5	
Median	81.5		66.3	
Median by weighted Council votes	81.5		70.7	
Standard Deviation	25.3		24.9	
Skewness	-1.9		-.43	

(see Appendix C for calculation technique)

The resistant attitude of the candidates illustrates the current tug-of-war between competing social and political forces. One the one side, further integration is viewed as a stimulus to modernize weak and inefficient legal systems and as a bare necessity in light of the precarious geo-strategic situation (e.g. Baltic States, CY). On the other hand, the data point to a reluctance on the part of the CEECs to relinquish newly established elements of legal, political and symbolic sovereignty. Thus, exporting the EU's JHA framework involves a delicate balance between highly sensitive issues stemming from the renaissance of nationhood and practical realities.[43]

As for the general immigration dynamics, JHA is not an area prone to compromise for the sake of political integration (Monar 2001: 6). Thus, a pre-requisite for the provision of the public good of security and safety is extensive and consequent legal harmonization. However, this domain is plagued by an enormous diversity and legal inconsistencies both between the EU-15 and the candidates as well as among the candidates, who demonstrate substantial deficits. The assimilation to the existing *acquis* legislation has not only overburdened fragile judicial systems, but also raised questions surrounding the inefficient implementation capacities. As for money laundering, a number of transition CEECs have resisted the implementation of *acquis* legislation due to their acute dependence on foreign capital (see section 7.3). Such deficits also apply to visa/asylum legislation and anti-corruption measures, which have yet to be satisfactorily implemented due to the financial and organizational strains they bear (Monar 2001: 16).

On these grounds, we should anticipate the CEECs to export to judicial, organizational, and political heterogeneity into the highly rigid existing framework of cooperation (unanimity/co-decision) in JHA. Thanks to the unanimity requirement governing the bulk of JHA decision making, the complexities of the legislative game and executive implementation process will be multiplied. As for the far and few areas with QMV (see article 63), the CEECs will most probably slip into the blocking minority (see figure 7-13; Monar 2001: 32, interview report Mirel). The high degree of reluctance of the CEECs to adopt harmonized procedural standards is representative of the implementation difficulties bound to arise in the early stages of enlargement. The combination of legal and organizational diversity – and fragility in the case of the CEECs - as well as the ever-present élite and popular sentiments for the maintenance of national sovereignty will undoubtedly test the EU's capacity for diversity management. The

[43] see interview reports Mirel, Landáburu, Mitek.

data unmistakably indicate that the existing institutional structures for JHA (unanimity/co-decision) are mismatched with the increased political, legal and organizational diversity, which raises the danger of political stalemate after enlargement.

7.7. The external face of the common market

This final empirical section addresses the impact of enlargement on the EU's common trade policy. As the world's largest market, the EU has become a heavyweight in the area of trade, with some considering it to be a force for the liberalization of international markets (Hanson 1998), while others point out the protectionist behavior of the EU in certain sectors (Bomberg and Peterson 1999: 115; Meunier 2000). Although the data set does contain a proposal on banana market liberalization, I draw on Bomberg and Peterson's in-depth analysis on decision making in the external trade.[44] In various sectors the trade patterns divert from natural patterns of a truly free market and in many ways are schizophrenic (Bomberg and Peterson 1999: 90-92) with some sectors undergoing total liberalization and others becoming increasingly protectionist. As internal negotiations on trade policy are often more tedious than external negotiations, it is somewhat astonishing that the existing academic literature has failed to assess the repercussions of enlargement on trade policy. The interviews carried out with EU-officials and CEEC diplomats served to overcome this analytical deficit by mapping out future constellations after accession. This enables us to forecast whether the balance will tip towards free trade or protectionism. As the political cleavage in this policy domain is one of the largest in EU politics and because the CEECs' preferences may be decisive in the formulation of future trade agreements, trade with non-EU countries was a topic of discussion in nearly all interviews. The experts were requested to share their insights on the orientation of the relevant country in industrial and agricultural trade. Unlike issues of regulation or process/product standards, we can presume a significant degree of variation in terms of the individual countries' standpoints:

[44] As some states advocate a preferred trading status for former colonies (Bomberg/Peterson 1999: 108), a restriction to this one case may lead to distortions.

Figure 7-14. External Trade in industrial goods (aggregate stan. dev. of results: 6.28)



0 – Protectionist: maintain all tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers to protect national industrial protection
100 – liberalization: completely abolish all tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers

(preferences EU-15: Bomberg and Peterson: 1999)

	EU 15		EU 25	
Minimum – Maximum	0	100	0	100
Mean	46.7		55.2	
Median	50		66.7	
Median by weighted Council votes	50		50	
Standard Deviation	44.2		40.3	
Skewness	.12		-.29	

(see Appendix C for calculation technique)

The pinpointed SQ symbolizes the current trend towards liberalization (see Hanson 1998), thus the dismantling of existing trade tariffs and a significant reduction of protection for many industries. According to international trade theory, comparative advantage emerges from differences in national factor endowments (Kenen 2000: 19-21). Consequently, the CEECs are assumed to have a distinct advantage in the production of labor and resource-intensive products, where as the EU excels in the production of human-capital intensive and research & development goods (Weise, Bachtler, et. al. 2001). For the most part, the ongoing transformation process has been driven by trade liberalization and openness, which are synonymous with the dismantling of national trade restrictions and currency convertibility.

The results can thus be interpreted along the following lines. The industrial *export tigers* (H, CZ, SK) whose diverse and specialized export sectors are steadily anchored in the world economy, see no necessity for the maintenance of national tariff barriers to protect domestic industrial production (see table 7-8). Thus, in coalitional terms, they are likely to align themselves with NL, DK and other industrial states. Yet those states who must cope with the legacy of disproportionate mass industrialization and whose export sectors have failed to firmly establish themselves on the world market, here Poland, express a firm orientation towards protectionism.

Table 7-8. Trade data CEEC-10

	Imports as % of GDP	Exports as % of GDP	Exports as % of Imports	Trade integration	Trade Openness	competitiveness ranking WEF
CY	36.1	4.4	12.2	25.7	-	-
CZ	63.2	57	90.3	60.4	2.01	34
EST	84.5	63.1	74.6	73.5	0.79	30
H	69.1	60.5	87.6	58	2.19	28
LV	44.5	26	58.5	36.3	0.68	45
LT	46.4	31.5	67.9	40.7	1.12	40
M	95.6	68.7	71.8	78.6	-	-
PL	31	20	64.7	22.1	2.68	46
SK	66	61.4	93.1	64	3.02	42
SLO	56.1	48.1	86.3	52	-	27

(sources Trade Integration Eurostat 2000; Trade Openness Bodenstein and Schneider: 2001; Microeconomic Competitiveness Ranking Index 2002 World Economic Forum; others Eurostat 2002)[45]

Despite a steady tendency towards liberalization and de-regulation, PL perhaps demonstrates the greatest structural disparities of all CEECs because of its over-bloated agricultural sector and the high proportion of heavy industry. This has complicated the structural transition from low-skilled, labor-intensive production to more technology-oriented, skill-intensive engineering (as is the case in H) (see Burgstaller and Landesmann 1999). Thus, all signs point to PL siding with the existing coalition of protectionist states, in particular in issues involving steel, machinery and metals. The fundamental realignment of international trade patterns has also had a along-lasting impact on the Baltic States (EST in particular) who have removed nearly all tariff and non-tariff barriers in an unprecedented tempo, and are thus assumed to support free trade policies.

With the potential exception of PL, whose vital economic interests are intruded on by full-scale liberalization, the data lead to the conclusion that enlargement is not an obstacle to further industrial trade opening, but perhaps the institutions by which external trade discrepancies are mediated (see below). As for the stability of the existing preference profiles, a fundamental shift may occur, with the existing protectionist states losing relative power.

[45] 0 = high degree of economic openness; Openness= weighted index of the liberalization of the short- and long-term capital regimes, degree of import and export liberalization; see Bodenstein/Schneider 2001)

Figure 7-15. Kernel Density Estimates: EU-15 vs. EU-25 in industrial trade



However, the data imply that there is a swift divide between trade in industrial and agricultural goods, with CEECs positions rapidly shifting towards protectionism. Here Germany also frequently slipping into the group of states that resist agrarian trade liberalization (Bomberg and Peterson 1999:96). Unlike industrial trade, a realistic danger of conflict intensification exists, with some states bearing more extreme preferences than the existing protectionist coalition.[46]

Figure 7-16. External trade in the agricultural sector (mean standard deviation of responses: 7.95)



(preferences EU-15: Bomberg and Peterson 1999)

	EU 15		EU 25	
Minimum – Maximum	16	100	0	100
Mean	54		49.6	
Median	50		50	
Median by weighted Council votes	27.8		27.8	
Standard Deviation	36.2		37.3	
Skewness	.31		.34	

(see Appendix C for calculation technique)

A supreme degree of variation among the CEECs could be extracted here, as agricultural trade – both within and beyond the accession negotiations – has evoked vehement emotions in the CEEC populations. With the exception of highly competitive Hungary, the dilemma for CEEC farmers is straightforward: Their position in domestic markets is weakened by the

flood of subsidized western goods, while they remain simultaneously locked out of their major potential export market – the EU (Sharman 2003: 27). Although accession may benefit CEEC farmers by allowing them market access, they will remain at a distinct competitive disadvantage vis à vis EU-15 agricultural producers, as they will only enjoy a fraction of the direct subsidization which EU farmers receive (see section 7.1). This predicament has certainly not enhanced the overall productivity and competitiveness of the sector. The playing field for CEEC farmers is further distorted by old-fashion production techniques and infrastructural deficits.[47] Thus until a sustainable level of agricultural competitiveness is reached vis à vis the EU-15 and internationally, the CEECs (excluding H) will presumably serve as an obstacle to further agricultural trade liberalization.

In external trade agreements, the EU must negotiate as a unified entity in the shadow of the diverging preferences mapped out above. Unlike most policy areas in which legislative competencies are shared by the Com, EP and Council, trade policy remains one of the last bastions of sole Council legislative power on the legal basis of article Art. 133. As for the voting rule applied, uncertainty arises, as QMV is applied in the traditional goods sectors, whereas unanimity governs the growing non-goods (service) sector, with the states having considerable discretion in the ratification process (Meunier 2000: 107). French pressure at Nice hindered the EU from applying QMV to all areas, producing a myriad of exceptions where unanimity still governs decision making.[48]

This institutional framework - designed to keep a balance between reaping the benefits of a large internal market while retaining some degree of national sovereignty – appears to be vastly outdated, if one takes into account not only the spectrum of heterogeneity, but also the salience of trade for the CEECs. The risk of gridlock illustrated by the data suggest that a strategy of linking internal reform with territorial expansion is a vital necessity for the common trade policy. As enlargement will transform the EU into *super heavyweight* in international commerce, the existing decisional structures must be subject to a profound revision. As Meunier (2000) demonstrates, the bargaining authority is greatest in the presence

[46] It was not possible to specify a preference value for Slovenia.

[47] The highly salient preferences of PL, in particular, can also be ascribed to the fact that Polish peasants were not collectivized. This means that small, private, and non-competitive farms are the dominant type (Sharman 2003: 15).

[48] The exceptions are cultural, audiovisual, educational, social, health, traffic and transportation services (see Nice Treaty Art. 133, paragraph 6)

of an institutionally anchored common position which is not subject to internal controversy. This internal lock-in - in particular in the case of a conservative or protectionist EU - allows little flexibility in external negotiations (Schelling-Conjuncture), making it more difficult for the counterpart to extract a favorable outcome or seek bilateral agreements with disgruntled preference outliers. However, the data make it clear that applying unanimity to aggregate state preferences may be a relic of the past in light of the increased level of disagreement that enlargement entails. The tedious process of accommodating diverging national standpoints in a common EU position will overstrain the EU's capacity for diversity management and raise the costs of consensus.

8. Better understanding the results

The previous sections have served to decipher the qualitative and quantitative data on the political and economic alignment of the Central and Eastern European candidate states. To bring the domain-specific results into a broader political context, we must ask ourselves how similar the scales are to each other. This allows for a potential reduction of the number of dimensions involved as well as better understanding of the motives for the given constellations. Along the same lines, it is highly constructive to compare and contrast the preferences of present and future legislative actors in terms of their similarity, aggregated over an array of political domains.

As a springboard for further research, *bivariate correlation matrixes*[49] on the basis of state preferences and legislative actors were constructed to explain the degree of similarity of both the presented scales as well as the preferences of the present and future legislative actors. As a rule, we can speak of several tendencies, which have been singled out by the correlations (see figure 8-1). Firstly, high correlations were generated between policy domains involving *product* and *process* standards, i.e. consumer interests, environmental and social policy, indicating that legislative preferences along scales overlap each other to a certain degree. This makes it clear that we are ultimately dealing with one broader dimension, namely that of producer/economic interests vs. consumer/civic interests. As for the constellation of policy positions, the implications are clear. Enlargement will lead to an increase of the size of the *legislative core* as the number of states averse to any further consumer or welfare-oriented market regulation will inevitably grow.

[49] The missing values were replaced with those of the most correlated state in the EU-25 bivariate analysis.

Figure 8-1 ‘How similar are the scales? Correlations between policy domains (about here)

Figure 8-2 ‘Correlations of CEEC policy positions for nine political conflicts (about here)

Otherwise, we also find a moderately high correlation (see figure 8-1) between the values measured for matters of agricultural subsides and trade policy.[50] Once again, the fabric of the economy plays a significant role as the industrially oriented states tend to join the coalition of free-traders, in particular in industrial goods. Both the current and future agrarian states (e.g. P, GR, PL), on the other hand, have a pronounced desire to protect their both their less competitive industry as well as agricultural producers by advocating protectionist measures both in the industrial and agricultural sectors (see section 7.7). This explains in part the striking similarity between Poland and France, Spain, Italy, etc., who will be policy allies in nearly all political domains, while becoming rivals when it comes to the allocation of structural and cohesion funds.

Additional bivariate correlations were carried out both among the CEECs' preferences (figure 8-2) and with the preferences of all EU-25 states (see Appendix C).[51] The data essentially do not necessarily confirm the nonchalant presumption that the future members will have equal preferences and join a common voting block (see Kerremans 1998). Instead, the data speak for relatively varying policy positions of the new members (see figure 8-2). On issues involving production costs and the division between economic and civic interests, the CEECs frequently clump together, but elsewhere we frequently find a greater variation in preferences than among the EU-15 (see Matrix EU-25 Appendix C).

The preference diversity among the candidates has the positive externality of generating greater coalition possibilities between larger current member states and new members. Instead of a voting block, we will most likely find preference *clumpings* among the CEECs. This applies, in particular to LT and LV, joined by SLO, whose preferences are highly correlated. The same holds for the *industrial export tigers* H, CZ and SK, who will likely form coalitions in all policy areas. In particular the Mediterranean states CY and M vastly differ from their eastern European counterparts in their political disposition. The same also holds for Poland. Its relatively extreme policy positions have made it sort of an "outsider", even among the CEECs, as its preferences at best only moderately correlate with those of the other CEECs. The domain-specific analyses have indicated, in fact, that Poland's current political alignment is much more in tune with that of France and its southern counterparts (see Appendix C for

[50] This appears in the matrix as a negative correlation (-.729), as the agricultural states received high values on the scale from 0 to 100 (see figure 8-1) while protectionist states received low values (see figures 7-14, 7-16). Inverting one of the scales would of course deliver a high positive correlation.

[51] Only the bivariate correlations of the CEECs are presented here for reasons of space. For the preferences of all states (EU-25) see Appendix C.

bivariate correlation EU-25) than with other CEECs. Both from an aggregate as well as domain-specific level of analysis, we find PL and F with nearly identical preferences.

The low correlations between smaller northern states (DK, S, NL) and the industrial and economically open central European states (CZ, H, SK, EST) are a bit deceiving and can basically be reverted back to the reluctant attitude of these states on process and product standards. Outside of this, though, there are solid reasons to assume that DK, NL, FIN, etc. will find their *sphere of influence* in these countries, in particular when it comes to matters of external trade, economic regulation and agriculture. The strategic position of LT and LV is also of worthy of particular attention. In terms of preferences, they remain somewhat closer to the southern states and PL, but boast extensive historical and economic ties to Scandinavia and Germany (as well as Poland). Thus, it is highly likely that both fronts will exert pressure and seek to pull the Baltic States into their respective voting camps. Finally, less influential CY and M only moderately correlate with one another. Malta is the most erratic of all actors, frequently finding itself at the extreme contours of the policy space, lacking a steady ally across all policy domains. Cyprus most frequently finds itself more in line with its Mediterranean counterparts than the other CEECs (see bivariate correlations in Appendix C).

9. Conclusion: Political Options in an enlarged Union

The present paper has taken on the ambitious task of lifting the veil of ignorance surrounding EU-enlargement and the policy positions of the CEECs. The dual research challenge entailed a factor analysis to pinpoint the central conflict dimensions in EU-decision making and the most frequent coalition patterns. This provided the foundation for expert interviews with chief negotiators from the EU and CEECs on the political alignment of the candidate states along the most significant conflict lines in European Union politics. Previous research is unanimous in its claim that enlargement will have a profound and long-lasting effect on policy making in the EU. However, on the basis of weighted quantitative and qualitative data, this study aimed to delve much deeper into exactly how and why enlargement will intrude upon the current relative stability of decision-making, not only in broader terms, but also in a policy and/or dimension-specific context.

Other scholars have dedicated great attention to the EU's legislative game, while recent studies have begun to reflect on the impact of enlargement and the presently ongoing process of "institutional engineering" (see Olson 2002). In this analysis I have attempted to build on

the state of the art literature by synthesizing the political preferences of the EU-25 with possible legislative constellations and institutional underpinnings by which they will be governed. In harmony with the presented working hypotheses, the realistic scenarios mapped out make it evident that territorial expansion will have the inevitable effect of "stretching out" the EU policy space by increasing the already existing heterogeneity of preferences and expectations. A thorough evaluation of the collected data tentatively supports the hypothesis that this political and socioeconomic diversification will aggravate political, financial and legislative tensions and severely complicate intergovernmental bargaining encounters. Expanding the legislative playing field to 25 goes hand in hand with an increase in socioeconomic disparities, making consensus, let alone unanimity, no longer a viable option for innovative governance.

9.1. Linking Reform and Enlargement

It is premature to forecast how enlargement will affect rational policy making modes (side-payments, log-rolling, issue-linkages, strategic agenda setting, etc.) in the EU. However, the collected data and the sketched out scenarios provide a solid foundation to assess the viability of the EU's institutional design. Thus in this final section, I will briefly address the EU's capacity to remain a source of policy innovation in the midst of actor heterogenization and institutional change, while laying out the path for further research.

In the past fifty years, there has been a more consistent trend towards institutionalized cooperation in western Europe than any other region of the world. The underlying process of integration has been driven by two separate, but perhaps related forces: the *dynamics of widening* (horizontal extension) and the *dynamics of deepening* (vertical extension, transfer of competencies to the supranational level). Although the parallelism between territorial expansion and internal consolidation has yet to be fully understood (see Schneider 2002), both have proven to be incremental processes, thus constantly moving forward, albeit in erratic fashion. The interplay of these forces has transformed the EU into a complex, dynamic, and pluralistic setting (Olson 2002: 581). However, in the shadow of further horizontal integration (widening), the future *dynamics of deepening* remain uncertain, raising questions on how the absorption of new members will reshape the phenomenon of political consolidation. For this reason the EU has re-entered a crucial phase of institutional reform deemed to compensate for the negative externalities of enlargement. In order to stimulate the dynamics of deepening, the

Union must be equipped with appropriate institutional mechanisms. The domain-specific analyses have demonstrated that enlargement entails increased bargaining complexity, a greater span of preference divergence, as well as a higher level of disagreement on the course of integration, and in particular regulatory matters. Thus, in a complex and dynamic EU, the main challenge lies first and foremost in sustaining elastic institutions with adaptive capacity.

The very current process of engineering institutions to cope with the diversity is plagued by two persistent dangers. Firstly, institutional modifications aimed at coming to terms with heterogeneity increase the danger of the EU becoming so elastic that its internal cohesion becomes fragmented or begins to dissolve. Secondly, by demanding an unsustainable level of internal consolidation, i.e. convergence, there is a realistic danger that an irreconcilable cleavage between a group of core members and the rest will emerge (see Wallace 1996: 84), which would mar the political unity of the organization. Viewed from this angle, the endeavor of drawing up a blueprint for effective governance is an extremely delicate balancing act.

However, as Steunenberg indicates, the Nice stipulations seem to overemphasize the *power to block* to the disadvantage of the *power to change policy* (2002: 136). Believing that it would bolster their position in decision-making, each member state insisted in its own voting criteria, producing a legislative system with high viscosity, thus a nearly insurmountable status-quo bias (Tsebelis and Yatagangs 2002: 304). This institutional rigidity *à la Niçoise* implies that *preference convergence* is a prerequisite for policy change. However, all gathered data on the CEECs and the decision making process point to the opposite, i.e. an inexorable expansion of the preference spectrum. This pertains, in particular, to matters involving process and product standards, but also agricultural funding, fisheries and trade.

From a normative standpoint, it is essential to construct institutions that promote progress and manage diversity instead of waiting to seize the opportunity of preference convergence.[52] Or, in other words, the negative externalities of enlargement (e.g. preference divergence, financial burdens, legislative inertia) must be balanced out by seizing and exploiting the positive effects of system change (institutional revision, renewed political agenda). Doing otherwise would entail an even more negative externality of enlargement, namely that the core of the existing EU legislation expands, making it nearly impossible to alter the SQ thanks to the high level of disagreement and inflexible voting quotas (see also Tsebelis and Yatagangs 2002). However,

[52] see interview reports Landáburu General Director DG Enlargement. A central claim was that in the early years of the EU-25, further integrationist steps or legislative advancements will no longer be mediated by institutions, but can only be achieved by "seizing the opportunity of preference convergence and political will."

risk-averse behavior is a prime characteristic of EU decision making and the politics of institution-building (Bomberg and Peterson 2000: 39). Instead of exploring the potential of newer, and perhaps more viable institutional designs, policy makers have tended to exploit the status quo of existing arrangements.

The domain-specific results indicate that territorial expansion is more dependent on institutional reform than ever. Regrettably, the increased bargaining complexity that enlargement will produce has been juxtaposed with an institutional framework that symbolizes a significant decline in decision probability (see section 3.2). Although such demands for institutional modifications have been aired from Maastricht to Nice and beyond, the prescribed triple majority quota limits combined with growing preference heterogeneity limit the room to manœvre and hinder legislative progress. Thus, even if preferences were to eventually converge, enlargement may be synonymous with legislative regression, unless the Nice stipulations and their potential impact are subject to serious scrutiny and modification.[53] This pertains in particular to the ability of the EU to accommodate new members in those domains in which they boast more extreme preferences or a reluctance to move forward (e.g. process and product standards, JHA).

Steunenberg (2002: 112) has labeled QMV as an "*enlargement resistant effect*", meaning that a majority-based voting quota would minimize negative externalities of accession, such as gridlock. The results reveal, however, that on matters of consumer and labor regulation, fisheries, agricultural funding, etc. those who cling to the SQ easily form a blocking minority, both in terms of voting weight as well as population percentage. Although QMV certainly is a prerequisite for governance capacity in an enlarged Union, there is no magical recipe for encouraging legislative progress. Nevertheless, further diversity management measures are a *sina qua non* for sustaining transnational governance capacity. From a normative perspective, this would entail institutional adjustments aimed at promoting the EU's *decisional* and *discretionary* flexibility, in order to alleviate the conflict intensification that enlargement brings about.

9.2 Decisional Flexibility

Decisional flexibility comprises the institutional fabric by which decision making is governed. For example, decreasing the QMV quota to a simple 2/3 majority would facilitate greater

[53] See also Baldwin, Widgrén, et. al. 'Nice Try: Should the Treaty of Nice be ratified?" (Forthcoming) CEPR

legislative decisiveness and perhaps reduce the necessity of side-payments to overcome an untenably high voting quota (see also König and Bräuninger 2000; Giering 2001). Other deliberations have examined the role of the new co-decision procedure and its implications for the integration process (see Tsebelis and Garrett 2000; Crombez 2001). The domain specific analyses demonstrate, however, that the co-decision procedure may have negative implications for effective governance in the EU-25. Co-decision has significantly reduced the relevance of the Commission on policy outcomes by reverting agenda-setting and bargaining functions back to the Council in the Conciliation Committee. This increases the bargaining leverage of the member states, while making the Parliament a "co-equal legislator" (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000) who enters the bargaining procedure on equal terms with the Council. As enlargement will increase preference differentiation in the Council - and most likely in the Parliament as well-, future bargaining constellations may overstrain the institutional framework laid out by co-decision. Instead of institutions that allow for the given heterogeneity to flourish, the results point to an urgent need to bolster the authority of a supranational institution (e.g. the Commission) with informational advantages as a unified weight against a divided Council.

9.3. Discretionary Flexibility

An equally significant, and perhaps inevitable political option would involve an increase in the *discretionary* flexibility of the EU to balance out diverging interests. As the CEECs simultaneously find themselves in the midst of a process of economic transition, they will be hesitant to support certain types of legislation (e.g. consumer-friendly policies, economic deregulation, labor protection initiatives). This inevitably complicates both the decision-making process and the politics of implementation. Enforcement problems might arise if a state joins the organization, but later on refuses to live up to the obligations of the accession treaty (Schneider 2002: 193). Along the same lines, Mbaye (2001) has exposed a parallel between administrative constraints (bureaucratic efficiency, corruption and fiscal resources) and the capacity of member states to appropriately implement community legislation. Thus, the mere organizational and financial fragility of the candidates will likely impede the smooth implementation of EU legislative outcomes.

Along these lines, the risk of both legislative stalemate as well as implementation obstacles may lead to a fundamental alternation of the relationship between the supranational actors.

The combination of inflexible voting institutions and increasingly divergent preferences will augment the size of the *legislative core* (see Tsebelis and Yataganas 2002), making any modification of the SQ through legislative decision making alone an extremely demanding task. This holds, in particular, for consumer and social welfare issues, in which both the south and the east loathe the thought of any modification of the status quo. This is likely to compel supranational actors to increase their discretionary room to manœvre. Similar to the Luxembourg period, which was characterized by pervasive legislative gridlock, the Commission, the Court of Justice and supranational bureaucrats are likely to seek more discretionary power to draw past legislative outcomes closer to their ideal point. As the CEECs often resist further integration/regulation (on product and process standards) due to the conflicting goals inherent to economic transformation and European integration, the supranational actors will take the first step in interpreting the existing body of laws. These in turn can no longer be overruled by the legislative body.[54]

In the transition phase, strategic *discretionary flexibility* is therefore a crucial element. Transferring greater authority to the Commission as the head of the bureaucracy and discretionary flexibility to the Court of Justice would provide the political cement for overcoming administrative deficits. Another related strategy for diversity management, however, lies in a temporary transition period purposefully geared at facilitating the processes of economic and political transformation and Europeanization simultaneously. By acknowledging that these processes often involve conflicting goals, the EU could provide the new members greater discretion in the implementation policies which are detrimental to the transformation process (e.g. labor protection, free trade in agriculture) and politically or financially non-viable. Leaving some room for the temporary *mutual recognition* of diverse standards would have the positive externality of mitigating the danger of a popular backlash and the blockade politics which obstructed the EU's decision making ability after southern enlargement. In the short run, this tactic would reduce the risk of legislative gridlock, while promoting further political legitimacy and internal consolidation in the long run.

9.4. Future Research

The phenomenon of enlargement and the domain-specific results offer a gold mine for further research. It was out of the scope of this analysis to assess in-depth which states lie within the

[54] See also König and Bräuninger (2002b), who arrive at a similar conclusion.

legislative core of the presented conflict dimensions. Further research must build on the collected data by pinpointing to what extent enlargement may lead to the expansion of the core and the conditions under which the candidate states may fall into the core. This would provide a robust indicator of the likelihood of altering the legislative status quo. As the present paper has primarily restricted itself to legislative scenarios, it would be constructive to delve into matters of agenda-setting. The imperative question is the extent to which the CEECs – in light of their diverse expectations - will be able to alter the EU's policy agenda. This analysis has offered robust predictions on the future development of various conflict lines, yet it remains open to further research whether enlargement will activate latent conflict dimensions or generate new ones in EU politics.

As the EP has consistently gained legislative weight, future research should address the impact of preference diversification on parliamentary decision making. The hypothesis that enlargement will increase the level of heterogeneity and disagreement in the Council must also be applied to the EP. Further fragmentation has the potential of reducing the Parliament's bargaining authority in the Conciliation Committee under the co-decision procedure.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the preferences of the candidate states are not static. Once a certain threshold of economic development or integration has been reached, preference constellations may shift. This pertains, in particular, to those transformations states who attempt to emulate the socioeconomic, political and legal model of neighboring EU members (e.g. the Baltic States and Scandinavia; Hungary and Austria). The vital question is thus whether preferences will become more homogeneous over time and what role supranational institutions might play in this process of convergence. Returning to institutional constellations, the rational choice institutionalist paradigm provides fertile ground for the study of how institutions can bring about stability in the midst of actor heterogenization. Although intensive work has been invested in making the current process of expansion as smooth as possible, this analysis has made it evident that institutional re-evaluation must commence in the near future in order to mitigate the negative externalities of an increasingly rigid institutional design.

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Appendix A

A note on the scaling technique:

The scaling procedure had three important steps:

1) creation of preference scales with the EU-15 resulting from the factor analysis or other sources
2) re-scaling to larger scales with the EU-15 occupying only values between 20-80, leaving space for potentially more extreme CEEC actors. This served to establish whether any CEECs will be preference outliers
3) Condensation of the scales after gathering data with the EU-25 so that the outliers actually receive the most extreme values

e.g. scaling process for the conflict line: agricultural subsidies

Step 1) creation of a 0-100 scale with the results of the factor analysis



Step 2) Scale with re-calculated values (EU-15 between 20-80) presented to experts to gather data on the CEECs:



Step 3**)** Re-calculations to a scale (EU-25) in which the preference outliers actually received the most extreme preferences between 0 and 100:



The Factor Analysis with "Decision Making in the European Union"(factors, loadings, actor scores)

N.B. For reasons of space, only the factors which were actually used as a foundation for gathering data on the candidates will be presented here. For an overview of the content of the issues that correspond well (factor loadings) with the dimensions at hand as well as the resulting preference constellations, see section 5.1.

```
Notes:1.  (/m### option) 0.98 MB allocated to data

. use "C:\DATA\mydata.dta"
. edit

* Factor analysis to determine dimensionality of agricultural decision making
  and preference profiles
* issues with unanimous preference configuration and low salience not considered

.factor  pn0250i1 pn9202i1 pn9202i2 pd9204i1 pd9204i2 pd9204i3 pd9204i4 pd8323i1 pd8323i2
pd8323i3 pn8110i2 pn8110i1 pn0358i1 pn0358i2 pn8092i1 pn8092i2 pn8092i3 pn8092i4 pn8092i5
pn8109i1 pn8109i2 pn9246i1 pn9246i2 pn9072i2 pn9072i3  pn9236i1 pn9236i2 in 1/17, pcf
mineigen (2)
(obs=17)

           (principal component factors; 4 factors retained)
  Factor     Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative
-------------------------------------------------------------------
     1        9.60968         5.30784      0.3559         0.3559
     2        4.30184         0.95530      0.1593         0.5152
     3        3.34654         1.10935      0.1239         0.6392
     4        2.23720         0.80281      0.0829         0.7220
     5        1.43439         0.06621      0.0531         0.7752
     6        1.36818         0.26519      0.0507         0.8258
     7        1.10298         0.06637      0.0409         0.8667
     8        1.03661         0.27733      0.0384         0.9051
     9        0.75928         0.21846      0.0281         0.9332
    10        0.54082         0.10094      0.0200         0.9532
    11        0.43988         0.11677      0.0163         0.9695
    12        0.32311         0.13648      0.0120         0.9815
    13        0.18663         0.03110      0.0069         0.9884
    14        0.15553         0.05926      0.0058         0.9942
    15        0.09626         0.03520      0.0036         0.9977

              Factor Loadings
    Variable |      1          2          3          4    Uniqueness
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------
    pn0250i1 |   0.72939    0.27781    0.04952   -0.25556    0.32305
    pn9202i1 |   0.79794    0.16756   -0.12721    0.18245    0.28575
    pn9202i2 |   0.41339   -0.04616    0.72545    0.13717    0.28189
    pd9204i1 |  -0.37542    0.78436   -0.11659   -0.13429    0.21222
    pd9204i2 |  -0.08810    0.78392    0.20117   -0.09642    0.32794
    pd9204i3 |  -0.19931    0.68333   -0.06496    0.37510    0.34842
    pd9204i4 |  -0.11561    0.63547    0.34502    0.43806    0.27188
    pd8323i1 |   0.07581    0.25754    0.36948   -0.58369    0.45072
    pd8323i2 |  -0.43316    0.36284    0.33834    0.16418    0.53928
    pd8323i3 |   0.08549    0.15704    0.41110    0.27475    0.72354
    pn8110i2 |  -0.34506   -0.77735    0.32752   -0.20526    0.12726
    pn8110i1 |   0.41571    0.76448   -0.25346    0.08210    0.17177
    pn0358i1 |   0.81756   -0.15538    0.19208   -0.05543    0.26748
    pn0358i2 |   0.70964   -0.15626    0.57007    0.05340    0.14418
    pn8092i1 |  -0.81787    0.19839    0.30228    0.11666    0.18675
    pn8092i2 |  -0.84774    0.17806    0.08314    0.38564    0.09400
    pn8092i3 |  -0.76393   -0.00893   -0.03673    0.12615    0.39908
```

```
    pn8092i4 |  -0.83299    0.09270   -0.15868    0.04551    0.27028
    pn8092i5 |  -0.85400   -0.06354    0.30211   -0.08240    0.16859
    pn8109i1 |   0.85960    0.30510   -0.08146   -0.11134    0.14896
    pn8109i2 |    0.84658    0.18157    0.02251   -0.24090   0.19181
    pn9246i1 |   0.01520    0.48235    0.21853   -0.63294    0.31874
    pn9246i2 |  -0.54643    0.18224    0.46145   -0.38777    0.30490
    pn9072i2 |   0.62658   -0.06276    0.56677    0.38171    0.13652
    pn9072i3 |   0.62658   -0.06276    0.56677    0.38171    0.13652
    pn9236i1 |   0.24590   -0.26471   -0.43459    0.39376    0.52555
    pn9236i2 |   0.63975    0.28353   -0.59638    0.08349    0.14768
```

* determined which issues correspond with the extracted factors

(based on unrotated factors)

*creation of scores for legislative actors along three main factors

```
. score f1 f2 f3 f4
```

```
. list f1
            f1
  1. -.5064449  Aus
  2.  .4190395  Bel
  3. -1.419995  DK
  4. -.5347269  Fin
  5.  .8128515  Fra
  6. -.4876923  Ger
  7.  1.570661  Grce
  8.  .6695893  Ire
  9.   .956597  Ity
 10. -.0358064  Lux
 11. -.8391158  NL
 12.  1.368456  Port
 13.  1.435168  Spa
 14. -1.483791  Swe
 15. -1.194651  UK
 16. -.3233859  Com
 17. -.4067525  EP
 18. -.5597099  Parl
 19.  .3137689  RP
```

```
. list f2
            f2
  1.  .6827328  Aus
  2. -.1079161  Bel
  3. -.8294724  DK
  4.  1.958541  Fin
  5.  1.323489  Fra
  6.  1.439159  Ger
  7. -.8048916  Grce
  8.  -.253192  Ire
  9. -1.683891  Ity
 10.  .3141001  Lux
 11. -.9107095  NL
 12.  .2459306  Port
 13. -.2482766  Spa
 14. -.7259531  Swe
 15. -1.210969  UK
 16.  .0483579  Com
 17.  .7629606  EP
 18.  .0697877  Parl
 19. -5.535372  RP
```

```
. list f3
            f3
  1. -.4726831  Aus
  2. -1.530766  Bel
  3.  .7499369  DK
  4.  .2429602  Fin
  5. -.8467559  Fra
  6. -.2970748  Ger
  7.  .9973305  Grce
  8. -.7933325  Ire
  9. -.3403079  Ity
 10. -.8075303  Lux
 11. -1.362371  NL
 12.  .3776282  Port
 13.   1.25556  Spa
 14.  .7802546  Swe
 15.  .0551578  UK
 16. -.3162041  Com
 17.  2.308197  EP
 18.  1.327999  Parl
 19.   .2218531  RP
```

- transformed scores for leg. actor into 0-100 scales by simple calculations:

to transform scores to scale from 0-100	*to transform resulting scores to scale 20-80*
$\frac{x - \text{lowest score}}{\text{highest score} - \text{lowest score}}$	$\frac{n}{100} = \frac{x}{60} \quad 20 + x$

```
. save "C:\DATA\agrar mit Beef.dta"
file C:\DATA\agrar mit Beef.dta saved
```

* Pinpointed the main conflict line on the basis of the content of the issues with high factor loadings

```
. use mydata
```

*conducted alternative factor analysis without BSE issues to create a preference profile for all issues involving the conflict consumers vs. producers

```
*replaced missing values with the mean value between preference of the
Commission and the reference point


. factor pn8092i1 pn8092i2 pn8092i3 pn8092i4 pn8092i5 pd9158i1 pn6114i2 pn6115i1
pd9083i1     pd9127i1 in  1/17,  pcf mineigen(2)(obs=17)

(principal component factors; 1 factor retained)
Factor     Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative

1        5.39726         4.01437      0.5397         0.5397
2        1.38289         0.21589      0.1383         0.6780
3        1.16701         0.39433      0.1167         0.7947
4        0.77268         0.34711      0.0773         0.8720
5        0.42557         0.04213      0.0426         0.9145
6        0.38344         0.18401      0.0383         0.9529
7        0.19943         0.05269      0.0199         0.9728
8        0.14673         0.06568      0.0147         0.9875
9        0.08105         0.03710      0.0081         0.9956
10       0.04395               .      0.0044         1.0000

*determined how well issues correspond with dimensions

.score f1

Factor Loadings
Variable       1    Uniqueness

pn8092i1    0.85039    0.27684
pn8092i2    0.87497    0.23443
pn8092i3    0.87531    0.23383
pn8092i4    0.84250    0.29019
pn8092i5    0.88180    0.22243
pd9158i1    0.12476    0.98443
pn6114i2   -0.88538    0.21610
pn6115i1   -0.74372    0.44688
pd9083i1   -0.26425    0.93017
pd9127i1    0.48225    0.76743

*creation of a preference profile for the consumer-producer dimension
. list f1

f1
1.  .5383892
2. -.6783423
3.  1.000232
4.  .7424848
5. -1.231716
6.  .5596523
7. -1.335696
8. -.6237165
9. -1.291316
10.  .1473483
11.  1.453787
12. -1.031703
13. -1.344185
14.  .9258057
15.  1.278489
16.  .1876378
17.   .702848
18.   .109306
19. -.6619931
```

```
. save "C:\DATA\do consumer.dta"
file C:\DATA\do consumer.dta saved

* Pinpointed the main conflict line on the basis of the content of the issues
with high factor loadings

. use mydata

* Conducted factor analysis on all Internal Market Issues to examine how well
the regulation vs. deregulation dimension is reflected by the data set and to
create a preference profile for this dimension

*missing values for all IM-issues were replaced with the mean value between the
preference of the Commission and the reference point.

. factor  pd6085i1 pd6085i2 pd6085i3 pd6085i4 pd6161i1 pd6161i2 pd5341i1
pd5341i2 pd5341i3 pd5341i4 pd7264i1 pd7359i1 pd7359i2 pd7359i3 pd8134i1 pd8134i2
pd8134i3 pd8134i4 pd8191i1 pd8191i2 pd8191i3 pd8240i1 pd8325i1 pd8325i2 pd8325i3
pd9158i1 pd9238i1 pd9238i2 pd9238i3 pd6112i1 pd6112i2 pd6112i3 pd6112i4 pn6114i1
pn6114i2 pn6114i3 pn6115i1 pn6115i2 in 1/17, pcf mineigen (2)(obs=17)

(principal component factors; 5 factors retained)
Factor     Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative

1       12.01184         5.36609      0.3161         0.3161
2        6.64575         2.15573      0.1749         0.4910
3        4.49003         0.63940      0.1182         0.6091
4        3.85062         0.92837      0.1013         0.7105
5        2.92225         1.09709      0.0769         0.7874
6        1.82516         0.43096      0.0480         0.8354
7        1.39419         0.21633      0.0367         0.8721
8        1.17786         0.11562      0.0310         0.9031
9        1.06224         0.38964      0.0280         0.9311
10       0.67259         0.14101      0.0177         0.9488
11       0.53158         0.10559      0.0140         0.9627
12       0.42599         0.09023      0.0112         0.9739
13       0.33576         0.04270      0.0088         0.9828
14       0.29306         0.09599      0.0077         0.9905
15       0.19707         0.03306      0.0052         0.9957
16       0.16401         0.16401      0.0043         1.0000

Factor Loadings
Variable       1          2          3          4          5    Uniqueness

pd6085i1    0.50008   -0.17328    0.02510    0.73217   -0.14795    0.16130
pd6085i2    0.70428    0.20936   -0.24023    0.32984    0.15726    0.26892
pd6085i3    0.76347    0.04860   -0.29167    0.35605    0.08078    0.19638
pd6085i4    0.47922   -0.18293   -0.10196    0.60486   -0.14337    0.34007
pd6161i1    0.68033    0.33679   -0.30171    0.02374    0.28989    0.24809
pd6161i2   -0.68033   -0.33679    0.30171   -0.02374   -0.28989    0.24809
pd5341i1   -0.18414    0.75833    0.40370   -0.16909    0.04068    0.19780
pd5341i2   -0.15973   -0.29119   -0.83256    0.06053   -0.24643    0.13215
pd5341i3    0.33839   -0.00104    0.59291    0.14970   -0.28950    0.42772
pd5341i4    0.52208    0.44652   -0.08123    0.35527   -0.37544    0.25428
pd7264i1    0.18272    0.30489    0.63720    0.32620   -0.16779    0.33307
pd7359i1   -0.84902    0.11559   -0.14063    0.13899    0.17985    0.19436
pd7359i2    0.80493    0.15766   -0.00863    0.15976   -0.09722    0.29219
pd7359i3    0.84213   -0.01248    0.32754   -0.02752   -0.21838    0.13493
pd8134i1   -0.80978    0.11519   -0.01151    0.06062    0.23379    0.27253
pd8134i2   -0.80434    0.36041    0.13586    0.27172   -0.22816    0.07879
pd8134i3   -0.32663    0.36234    0.30838    0.53634    0.49393    0.13530
pd8134i4   -0.08232   -0.75228   -0.14450   -0.52396    0.10151    0.12157
pd8191i1   -0.35626    0.73133   -0.13760   -0.23590    0.08868    0.25580
```

```
pd8191i2   -0.53446    0.57461    0.36519   -0.19559    0.10838    0.20080
pd8191i3   -0.19012    0.83164   -0.28433   -0.12952    0.16487    0.14743
pd8240i1    0.09835   -0.21899    0.05197    0.12154    0.59266    0.57366
pd8325i1   -0.01005   -0.47362    0.57233    0.26835   -0.13478    0.35785
pd8325i2    0.35851   -0.72239   -0.18484    0.08534    0.28087    0.22929
pd8325i3    0.22437   -0.32774    0.71025    0.20237    0.03532    0.29559
pd9158i1   -0.42763    0.07842   -0.28845   -0.14568    0.37057    0.56923
pd9238i1   -0.12095   -0.66768   -0.02162    0.41625    0.42882    0.18196
pd9238i2    0.04964    0.76669    0.01452    0.50788   -0.07440    0.14603
pd9238i3    0.17728    0.57920   -0.15687   -0.36755   -0.51942    0.20360
pd6112i1   -0.76532   -0.03548   -0.38836    0.39196   -0.23808    0.05189
pd6112i2    0.77762    0.07413    0.38097   -0.33178    0.24758    0.07330
pd6112i3    0.76532    0.03548    0.38836   -0.39196    0.23808    0.05189
pd6112i4   -0.76532   -0.03548   -0.38836    0.39196   -0.23808    0.05189
pn6114i1    0.73450    0.52806   -0.26610    0.24298    0.04989    0.04933
pn6114i2    0.79094    0.04440   -0.51810    0.11583    0.15958    0.06513
pn6114i3    0.66466    0.48648   -0.20306   -0.28442    0.21376    0.15375
pn6115i1    0.79302   -0.19946   -0.24959   -0.23418   -0.14979    0.19176
pn6115i2   -0.29532    0.27985    0.14588    0.35638    0.70313    0.19179


* determined how well issues correspond with dimension 1 (Eigenvalue 12.11)
. score f1
            (based on unrotated factors)
            (4 scorings not used)
               Scoring Coefficients
    Variable |      1
-------------+----------
    pd6085i1 |   0.37424
    pd6085i2 |   0.00000
    pd6085i3 |   0.00000
    pd6085i4 |   0.00000
    pd6161i1 |   0.00000
    pd6161i2 |  -0.51437
    pd5341i1 |   0.00000
    pd5341i2 |  -0.13907
    pd5341i3 |   0.19256
    pd5341i4 |  -0.03140
    pd7264i1 |  -0.21467
    pd7359i1 |   0.00000
    pd7359i2 |   0.00000
    pd7359i3 |   0.00000
    pd8134i1 |   0.00000
    pd8134i2 |   0.00000
    pd8134i3 |   0.00000
    pd8134i4 |   0.00000
    pd8191i1 |   0.00000
    pd8191i2 |  -0.13618
    pd8191i3 |   0.00000
    pd8240i1 |   0.08593
    pd8325i1 |  -0.01570
    pd8325i2 |   0.00000
    pd8325i3 |  -0.02038
    pd9158i1 |  -0.05333
    pd9238i1 |   0.00000
    pd9238i2 |  -0.04786
    pd9238i3 |   0.18884
    pd6112i1 |   0.00000
    pd6112i2 |   0.38028
    pd6112i3 |   0.00000
    pd6112i4 |   0.00000
    pn6114i1 |   0.00000
    pn6114i2 |   0.00000
```

```
    pn6114i3 |  -0.07031
    pn6115i1 |   0.00000
    pn6115i2 |  -0.17417

* creation of a preference profile for the most substantial factor

 . list f1
           f1
  1.  -.575344
  2.  .8575568
  3.  -.907573
  4. -1.076123
  5.  1.671449
  6. -.5265389
  7.  .7860552
  8.  -.896198
  9.  1.571579
 10. -.2520023
 11. -.5623472
 12.  .1157996
 13.  1.518718
 14.  -.874689
 15. -1.414764
 16. -.1446191
 17.   .709041
 18. -.2656879
 19. -.1534586

. save "C:\DATA\Binnenmarkt.dta"
file C:\DATA\Binnenmarkt.dta saved

*Pinpointed the main conflict line on the basis of the content of the issues
with high factor loadings


. use mydata

* conducted factor analysis on all fisheries proposals.

*replaced the missing data with the mean value of the position of the Commission
and the reference point

. factor  pn9047i1 pn9047i2 pn9047i3 pn9050i1 pn6160i1  pn8347i1 pn8347i2
      pn9138i1     pn9138i2     pn9163i1     pn9163i2     pn9255i1 pn9255i2
      in     1/17,  pcf    mineigen(2)(obs=17)

(principal component factors; 2 factors retained)
Factor     Eigenvalue     Difference    Proportion    Cumulative

1        4.13395         1.17368      0.3180         0.3180
2        2.96027         1.40119      0.2277         0.5457
3        1.55908         0.28118      0.1199         0.6656
4        1.27790         0.44543      0.0983         0.7639
5        0.83247         0.18581      0.0640         0.8280
6        0.64666         0.13787      0.0497         0.8777
7        0.50879         0.07695      0.0391         0.9169
8        0.43184         0.09605      0.0332         0.9501
9        0.33579         0.12837      0.0258         0.9759
10       0.20742         0.15098      0.0160         0.9919
11       0.05645         0.01438      0.0043         0.9962
12       0.04206         0.03476      0.0032         0.9994
13       0.00731               .      0.0006         1.0000
```

```
* determined how well issues correspond with the dimensions


Factor Loadings
Variable       1          2    Uniqueness

pn9047i1   -0.25049    0.67366    0.48343
pn9047i2    0.49499   -0.70738    0.25460
pn9047i3    0.21003   -0.76770    0.36652
pn9050i1    0.71033    0.50813    0.23724
pn6160i1    0.87414   -0.19246    0.19884
pn8347i1    0.52630   -0.22177    0.67382
pn8347i2    0.66659    0.08844    0.54784
pn9138i1    0.73860    0.46516    0.23809
pn9138i2   -0.72980    0.06476    0.46320
pn9163i1    0.24716    0.69893    0.45041
pn9163i2    0.79905    0.09935    0.35164
pn9255i1   -0.10106    0.33797    0.87557
pn9255i2    0.06425    0.48093    0.76458

* creation of preference profile for the main factor

. list f1 in 1/17

f1
1.  .8330084
2. -.4204218
3.  .4099882
4.  .2188779
5.  -1.52537
6.  .7990235
7. -.2889644
8. -.9188938
9. -.2303862
10.  .5307797
11. -.6072747
12. -1.212643
13. -1.320652
14.  .1269958
15.  .1214376
16.  2.449476
17.  1.035019

. save "C:\DATA\Fisch.dta"
file C:\DATA\Fisch.dta saved

* pinpointed the main conflict line on the basis of the content of the issues
with high factor loadings
```

Appendix B: Interviews: CEEC-Diplomats and EU-Representatives

Name	Position	Date	Init.	Language
1. Panayopolis Stamatopoulos	DG Marché Intérieur; Chef d'unité: Marchés Publics: relations internationales, élargissement, aspects économiques, procédures électroniques	15.10	PS	French
2. Libor Boháč	Third Secretary of the Mission of the Czech Republic to the European Communities	15.10	LB	German
3. Michael Roitmann	DG Fisheries: Head of Sector	16.10	MR	English
4. Rudolf Mögele	DG Agriculture; Direction H; Chef d'Unité: Élargissement	16.10	RM	German
5. Ethel Halliste	Mission of Estonia to the EU: First Secretary, Head of Press and Information	16.10	EH	English
6. Pierre Mirel	DG Enlargement; Chef d'Unité; Chef d'Équipe: Hongrie, Slovaquie, Slovénie, République Tchèque Früher: Head of Team Poland and Baltic States	17.10	PM	French English
7. Aris Vigants	Second Secretary Mission of the Republic of Latvia to the European Union	17.10	AV	English
8. Zsolt Becsey 9. Andrea Borbely	ZB: Envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire: Mission de la République de Hongrie auprès des Communautaires européennes AB: Second Secretary: Area of responsibility: social policy and employment	17.10	ZB AB	English
10.Arnoldas Milukas	Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Head of Mission of Lithuania to the EU	18.10	AM	English
11. Lars Mitek	Task-Force "L'Avenir de l'Union et questions institutionelles" Chef d'Unité: Questions institutionelles et de gouvernance	18.10	LM	English
12. Wojciech Ostrowski	Political Counsellor of the Polish Mission to the EU	21.10	WO	Polish
13. Peter Javorčík	Mission of the Slovak Republic to the European Union: Deputy Head of Mission	21.10	PJ	English
14. Eneko Landaburu	DG Élargissement: Directeur général Früher: DG Cohesion Directeur général	21.10	EL	French
15. Wahaah Saab	DG Enlargement: Head of Team Malta	22.10	WS	English French
16. Dolores Romeo	DG Enlargement : Head of Team Cyprus	22.10	DR	French

The Interview Structure for CEEC Diplomats and EU-Officials

- This questionnaire appeared in English, German, French, Polish

- The structure of the questionnaires for the EU-representatives was basically the same, yet more oriented towards the specialty area (policy domain, or particular CEECs) of the respective EU official. For details on individual interview, see upcoming interview reports

- All policy experts were first explained the purpose and structure of the research project. For each conflict line, one dimensional graphics with the current preference constellation were presented to the interviewees for visual clarity.

Agriculture

Despite its decreasing role and the diversification of national economies, agriculture remains one of the core policy areas of the EU, claiming more than half of its entire budget. In agriculture decisions we observe different conflict lines. We find a group of states (F, I, E, P, GR) who are strongly in favor of maintaining the current subsidies for farmers, for example for beef, milk and sugar production. On the other hand, there is a group of industrial member states who support all measures to reduce agriculture funding (NL, S, D, UK, DK).

- *In light of the significance of agriculture for your economy, what are the expectations of country X in agricultural decisions on subsidies?*
- *In numerical terms, to what extent will country X be a force for the abolishment or maintenance of direct payments for farmers?*



0 – abolish all subsidies for agriculture
100 – uphold all subsidies for agriculture

Producers vs. consumers

Much of EU decision making is characterized by conflicts between producer and consumer interests. Supporting consumer interests forces individual member states to comply with stricter community regulations regarding the agricultural production, e.g. conditions and sizes of cages for animals, precise labeling of products, and product ingredients. This poses an extra burden on producers, particularly those in developing economies. A group of states (primarily from the south) views such regulations as an infringement on the productivity of the agricultural and industrial sectors due to the costs involved. The northern states (DK, FIN, S, D, NL) see such regulations as a necessity for a common agricultural policy and internal market and as a means to guarantee the health and safety of customers.

- *What is the relationship between producers and consumers in country X?*
- *To what extent is your country in favor of the creation of further consumer-oriented legislation on the EU level?*

GR E P F I Ire EP L D A UK NL DK S

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

producers consumers

0- totally against further consumer oriented regulation
100- we strongly support extensive consumer-friendly regulation

Internal Market

As a member of the EU, country X will be part of the world's largest common market. Despite the success of the EU on the economic front, there are still intense conflicts at meetings of the Internal Market Council often on issues of regulation. Although this frequently depends on the current governing party, we generally observe the UK, DK and FIN preferring economic deregulation, i.e. liberalization. On the other hand, F, E, I and others are in favor of stronger regulation and interventionist policies. This entails the maintenance of means of national interventionism as well as a regulatory framework for the EU. Germany and another group of states tend towards policies of reregulation, thus state and community intervention only in certain situations.

- *With this in mind, what are the expectations of country X towards the internal market?*
- *Does country X have different preferences for individual sectors of the market? e.g. industry, telecommunications, electronics?*
- *With this in mind, do you feel that country X will be a force for further economic deregulation on the EU-level? Or more regulationist policies?*

D
UK FIN DK S IRE NL A C P L EP GR B E I F

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

Deregulation Reregulation Regulation

0 = total market deregulation on the EU and national level
100= extensive market regulation on the EU and national level

External trade policy

As the largest common market in the world, the EU has become a global power in the area of trade. Some consider it to be a force for the liberalization of international markets, while others point out the protectionist behavior of the EU in certain sectors. On trade decisions, the present member states almost automatically form two opposing groups. A group of states headed by F, E and P generally strive to protect national industries from foreign competition through protectionist measures. An opposing coalition, headed by D, the UK, DK and other northern states advocate highly liberalized global trade.

- *What is the position of country X on trade policy in the <u>industrial sector</u>?*

P S F D FIN NL
I GR A B L UK S

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

Protectionism Free trade

0 –maintain all tariff and non-tariff trade barriers to protect national industrial protection
100 – liberalization: completely abolish all tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers

Some states, in particular Germany, tend to be more protectionist when it comes to their agricultural sectors. To what extent is country X for the liberalization of trade in the agrarian sector?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

Protectionism Free Trade

Fisheries

The goal of the common fisheries policies is to provide a unified approach to the creation of a sustainable fishing industry in Europe. The danger of overfishing has stimulated efforts to restructure and develop a common fishing fleet, a common fisheries market and most importantly a common approach to the management and conservation of fisheries resources. This entails regulations on the size of fishing vessels, the amount of fish caught and laws on packaging. However, there is a group of states for whom the marine sector is of greater economic and political significance. They consider the access to open waters and lenient quotas o be a main priority.

- *What does country X expect from the common fisheries policy?*
- *How would country X react to a proposal to restrict the autonomy of fishermen - limiting access to waters and to establish a European fisheries régime?*

F E P NL B GR I FIN S UK DK L D A EP COM

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

open waters redistribution + restrictions

0 – open waters: nation states retain the right to fish along their coastline and beyond
100 –Creation of a comprehensive EU regimes with the distribution of quotas; limitation of national autonomy

Justice and Home Affairs

The treaty of Maastricht formalized a network of intergovernmental cooperation among national ministries of justice and the interior. This involved efforts to create a common asylum policy, rules on external border controls, immigration policy, as well as a framework for combating drug traffic and corruption. The UK and DK are the least "integrationist", favoring the maintenance of national sovereignty in this area, where as D, FIN, and I are among the most integrationist states, favoring extensive Europeanization in this area.

What does country X expect from the system of Justice and Home Affairs?
What is the standpoint of country X on the Europeanization of Justice and home affairs?

UK DK P F S B NL L E D A Ire I FIN

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

Absolute Sovereignty complete Integration

0: sovereignty: no further European cooperation in these areas

100: integration: complete Europeanization of these areas

And on the question of a common asylum and immigration policy requiring all states to adopt equal criteria for asylum status and take in a number of refugees proportional to population?

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
Absolute sovereignty										complete integration

0: sovereignty: purely national criteria for determining the number of refugees and immigrants
100: complete integration: unitary European criteria and set European rules for the number of refugees and immigrants

Environmental Protection

In light of scientific research and the recent turbulent weather phenomena, a wide consensus has emerged in the EU that the environment is a serious issue beyond national borders. The EU environmental policy encompasses air pollution, waste disposal, water pollution, chemical products and nature protection. A group of states (E, F, I, UK) favor more relaxed and flexible common standards because they fear that too strict regulation would severely hinder their industrial development. In particular NL, D and the Nordic states (FIN, S, DK) have advocated very stringent legislation which many southern European states have been unable to adopt.

- *What does country X expect from the common EU environmental policy?*
- *In light its financial position, how would country X react if the EU were to introduce stricter environmental legislation?*

		E P F I UK				L Ire B			FIN NL A GR DK D S		
0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	
very flexible											very strict

0: no further European environmental standards at all
100: further introduction of strict, unitary European environmental standards

Social Policy

Many observers assume the involvement of the EU in social policy to be minimal and ineffective. This policy area has frequently been characterized by member states resisting the loss of national autonomy. However, the common market has led to series of legislation aimed at improving the living and working conditions, social security measures and dialogue between social partners.
The northern states generally welcome legislation restricting the number of work hours, night labor and stand for the protection of pregnant women, extensive improvements in working conditions and equal rights for both sexes. This of course demands greater obligations on the part of employers. The southern states usually opt for the status quo, or the existing flexible regulations, because such legislation would limit the industrial productivity and increase labor costs.

- *Along those lines, what does country X expect from European social policy in the future?*

- *If the Commission were to introduce legislation on working conditions, what would be the position of country X (considering the current governing party)?*

				E F GR P I		GB B		FIN D NL S DK		
0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

strongly favor capital/production strongly favor labor

0: rejection of all new legislation to protect workers
100: support all legislation to protect workers, even if they bring about greater costs for employers

Finally we observe a conflict between those states who support active EU involvement in social policy and those who are against any form of social policy integration. For example, UK does not participate in some areas of the social dimension

- *As a future member of the EU, what do you think the degree of EU involvement in social policy should be?*

1. Active social policy involvement of the EU
2. current situation; flexible legislation
3. only the countries themselves should decide on their own social policy

Interview Report Libor Boháč

Mission of the Czech Republic to the European Communities -Third Secretary
Date: October 15th, 2002, 16:30
Interview Language: German
Length: 45 minutes

Subject Matter and Objective: Estimating the political preferences of CZ in various decision making dimensions. This was a closed interview in which the formatk laid out in the questionnaire was strictly followed. Diagrams with scales of the political alignments of the present members in various policy areas were used. As CZ is an industrial state, it was important to look for variation vis à vis the other candidates.

Report: Mr. Boháč demonstrated extensive knowledge of the accession negotiations and Czech party programs. He was able to offer precise accounts of the expectations of the CZ after enlargement. Mr. Boháč immediately grasped the purpose of the scales and offered not only numerical estimates of Czech policy preferences, but also convincing reasons for the preferred political tendencies. Mr. Boháč emphasized that not all CEEC's will demonstrate similar preferences. In the case of CZ, the traditional left-right conflict is much more polarized than in other nations, with the right-wing opposition led by Václav Klaus advocating policies of radical deregulation and trade liberalization.

Agriculture: Mr. Boháč described CZ as an industrial state with no more interest in agricultural subsidies than industrial EU-15 states such as NL and A. Agriculture is assumed to account for less than 5% percent of the GDP and is a means of living for only a small percentage of the population. Nevertheless, Mr. Boháč said there is reason to presume that the CZ will fall into the group of net-receivers who may in fact strive to maintain subsidies for certain areas of agricultural production. Thus, he placed CZ at the same position as FIN and D (35).

Consumers vs. Producers: Mr. Boháč does see the emergence of consumer interests into the political space of CZ, in particular since the fall of the Klaus government. However, new legislation improving product safety and consumer rights will be met with some resistance. For this reason, he positioned CZ with IRL, which slightly tends more towards production (35).

Internal Market: Mr. Boháč stressed that the extreme polarization of the Czech political system on the left-right dimension is well reflected by the ongoing conflict over regulation. Under the Klaus administration, the country was exposed to a period of extreme deregulation. In light of widespread public dissatisfaction with the socioeconomic system and high unemployment, there has been a sort of "rollback" towards more economic regulation and state intervention. Several economic sectors have been exposed towards complete deregulation, whereas energy, one of the largest sectors, still remains in a state of high regulation. Mr. Boháč thus aligned the CZ with A on regulation issues, warning however that a Klaus government may be more deregulationist and in favor or privatization than even the most deregulationist EU-15 states (40).

Foreign Trade: In the industrial sector, nearly all tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers have been removed. By these means, there are no grounds to assume that CZ will advocate protectionist measures in industrial trade. As for agriculture, the CZ is currently more protectionist, as this sector is not one of the most competitive. Protectionist behavior on agriculture can be observed in all neighboring countries of H, who feel threatened by its competitive agricultural sector (industry = 80, agri.=30).

Fisheries: no negotiations; will be in favor of restrictions to prevent overfishing (70).

Justice and Home Affairs: CZ finds itself in a dilemma on this issue. As a crossroads for people and drug smuggling as well as immigration, CZ is doubtlessly in need of assistance on this matter. From the view of Mr. Boháč this is more of a matter of coordination and implementation, in which his country will have a limited capacity to actively participate. As for the creation of a common integration and asylum policy, he can envision resistance on the side of the population if CZ were to allow for too much integration (General: 60, asylum+immigration: 40).

Environmental Policy: As a primarily industrial country, CZ will resist further legislation in the years to come. Although there is an environmental movement, Mr. Boháč stated that it cannot be expected that CZ will be a force for greater environmental protection. Instead, in the initial period of adaptation, CZ tends towards the SQ position and takes side with production (20).

Social Policy: Mr. Boháč claimed that the popularity of the present government can in part be traced back to its support of labor. Thus, nevertheless, maintaining lower costs of labor must remain a priority to attract further foreign investment. With the present government advocating labor, Mr. Boháč assumes CZ to assume a moderate position on a European level. In the case of a change in government (to OCD – Klaus), it will strictly reject any labor friendly measures on the EU level. (35)

Credibility of interviewee and answers: very high

Interview Report: Panyotis Stamatopoulos

EU Commission DG Internal Market: Chef d'unité-Marchés publics, relations internationales, élargissement, aspects économiques, procédures électroniques
Date: October 15th, 2002, 15:00
Interview Language: French
Length: 50 minutes

Subject matter: To discuss the repercussions of enlargement on common market decision making and gain a vision of the political alignment of the CEEC's on economic issues, e.g. regulation and consumer protection. The initial goal of this interview was to establish a framework for understanding the principal conflict lines in common market decision making. This involved a discussion of the most profound difficulties in the accession process and the expected conflicts after enlargement. Furthermore the interview served to obtain prognoses on the future behavior of the candidate countries along these conflict lines.

Report: Mr. Stamatopoulos agreed with the existence of disagreements over the level of regulation and consumer issues, but stated that political scientists often go too far by labeling these as conflicts. Instead, he sees a divergence of interests which are mediated within extremely tedious negotiations and through the intervention of supranational actors. IM decision making was described as a tiring process of consensus seeking. Despite being displeased with the terminology "conflict" and "coalition", Mr. Stamatopoulos did agree that some states did demonstrate contradictory political orientations. GB is seen as leaning towards policies of deregulation, while France supported heavily regulationist policies in the European arena. He did not comment on the existence of a SQ in the area of the IM.

General evaluation and results:
Initially, Mr. Stamatopoulous claimed that decision making is not governed by any particular coalitions or general preference tendencies. Instead, he felt that it is much more of a matter of technicalities which often do not reflect the general preference configuration presented. He agreed, though, that there is a difference of opinion between deregulationist and regulationist states. But, in his opinion, it would be too simplified to speak of stable coalitions.
Concerning the CEEC's, Mr. Stamatopoulos claimed that they do not possess the "political maturity" to actively take part in the decision making process in the early stages. Considering the miniscule technicalities in IM decisions in particular, they will have a minor effect on the complicated negotiation process.
When asked about the preferences of the individual preferences of the CEEC's or a general preference tendency, Mr. Stamatopoulos said that there is a "hard core" of continental states who stand for re-regulation or moderate policies of regulation. These are opposed by the UK and some Scandinavian states. In his view, the CEEC's will align themselves with the "hard core" and will not have a greater preference for economic regulation than any other existing members. However, Mr. Stamatopoulos offered little concrete knowledge of the preferences of the member states.
In the future, he sees enlargement not reinforcing the existing conflicts, but tipping the balance towards more economic regulation and producer interests. In his opinion, this will complicate decision making and perhaps disrupt the existing equilibrium and de facto rule of unanimity.

credibility of answers and interviewee: below average

Interview Report: Michael Roitmann

EU Commission, Fisheries Directorate General, Head of Sector

Date: October 16th, 2002 10:30
Interview Language: English
Length: 1 hour

Subject Matter and Objective: An open interview was conducted with M. Roitmann, Head of Sector of the Fisheries DG, who deals with enlargement. The main objective of the interview was to assess the impact of enlargement on decision making and to construct a preference profile for the CEECs. As a general framework, the results of the factor analysis were presented. The factor analysis demonstrated that there is one major conflict line in fisheries, although different terminology may be used to describe it. On some issues it is more of a matter of Europeanization or sovereignty, on others a matter of *open waters vs. redistribution*. Mr. Roitmann agreed with this terminology and the general preferences placed along the scale, noting though that the Scandinavian states are increasingly aligning themselves with the Com.

Report: Mr. Roitmann shared detailed information on the principal difficulties involved in the accession negotiation and was able to give an account of structure of the fisheries sector in all candidate states. In light of the presently high level of disagreement in fisheries sectors, I asked Mr. Roitmann whether he felt that the added diversity would complicate the decision making process and reinforce the existing conflict lines. He did not view enlargement as a major obstacle to the creation of legislature aimed at redistributing resources and restricting the member states in their maritime autonomy. He went as far as to say that enlargement is no longer a main priority for the DG Fishery. When asked whether enlargement will have a negative impact on the Com's ability to pursue its strategy aimed a conserving maritime resources, Mr. Roitmann's answer was a clear no. In terms of fisheries, this enlargement will be less significant than southern enlargement because it only involves four maritime states, three of which are very small. Another reason lies in the great pressure exerted on the future members to accept the *acquis* and the myriad of restrictions that it contains.. Thus in comparison to past enlargements, the EU is pursuing an aggressive strategy at the outset to minimize the danger of the politics of non-compliance at a later point in time. This tough standpoint on fisheries even involves threats of non-accession in the case of non-compliance. The Commission failed to take such a forceful standpoint in previous enlargements. For example, Spain, Greece and Portugal, have often served as an obstacle to community fisheries policy and still possess very weak control mechanisms. Thus, he claims that there are two current status quo's, namely a legislative SQ (about 45) and an "implementational status quo" (about 30).

Mr. Roitmann gave detailed accounts of each future member state in terms how cooperative their behavior has been in the course of the accession negotiation and viewed this behavior as a plausible indicator of how these states may react to further proposals. The major challenges in the enlargement process are convincing states to open up their surrounding waters to vessels from other EU countries, adhere to quotas and establish necessary control mechanisms. As expected, the CZ, SLK, and H are not a factor in the enlargement negotiations and are assumed to take the same position as Lux, who is indifferent and merely shows an interest in achieving satisfactory agreements. However, Mr. Roitmann made it clear that Austria is seldom indifferent, when it comes to fisheries, but instead has proven to be a loyal partner of the Com in its quest for a community regime with the redistributive and restrictive elements. Mr. Roitmann emphasized that there have been no difficulties with SLO in the accession process, as it only has 9 vessels and a fisheries sector of minimal importance. Instead, the conflict here is played out between Slovenia and Croatia in the Adriatic.

PL is considered to be the least cooperative state. Mr. Roitmann cited the persistent importance of the maritime sector for the Polish economy, historical factors and the weak administrative

capacity as the government as reasons why PL is bound to be the most extreme actor in fisheries politics (10). The lack of cooperation and willingness to adopt the *acquis* have led to negotiation breakdowns.
Mr. Roitmann discussed the situation of the Baltic countries, for whom the fisheries sector still is of economic and cultural significance. EST has proven to be the most aggressive of all states in terms of CFP negotiations. The reasons for this also lie within its insistence on fewer restrictions for national fishermen to fish in nearby waters and its refusal to adhere to the labeled quotas. A central obstacle lies in the creation of an agreement on fishing in the Golf of Riga, where EST and LV compete over maritime resources. Here, LV is considered to be the more cooperative actor who has demonstrated a willingness to transfer fisheries policies competencies to the European level. LT is assumed not to play a great role in the CFP because a great deal of its vessels are located in other parts of the world.
CY and M will defend a moderate position on fisheries matters, as community legislation will not have a great impact on them, as their fishing "territory" extends further south than that of the rest of the EU so that the main problems are often between these countries and northern Africa.

Comments: Mr. Roitmann convincingly argued that enlargement to the area of the Black Sea (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey) will, however, have severe repercussions for EU policy making, as these countries are notorious for overfishing as their economies are still dependent on the maritime sector.

Preference Estimations:



credibility of interviewee and answers: very high

Interview Report: Rudolf Mögele
EU Commission DG Agriculture: Chef d'unité (enlargement)

Date: October 16th, 2002 11:30
Interview Language: German
Duration: 40 Minutes

Objective and Subject Matter: Agriculture is one area that will be strongly effected by enlargement. This has to do with the significance of agriculture in the candidate countries, the inefficiency of and the distortions in the sector, the crucial task of modernization involved and the financial conflicts assumed that will be intensified by enlargement. Furthermore, there are several continual political conflicts at the heart of EU agriculture. The interview served the purpose of pinpointing the major conflict lines in agriculture, discussing the impact of enlargement on decision making and mapping out strategies to alleviate more intense conflicts on this issues after enlargement. I have chosen to speak with Mr. Mögele because he is directly involved with the accession negotiations and has a thorough overview of what is at steak in the process of enlargement as well as after. Diagrams with preference scales concerning agriculture were presented to Mr. Mögele. The interview was thus partially closed and partially open.

Report: Mr. Mögele emphasized that there are a myriad of political challenges in the agricultural sector. He made it clear that the candidate countries are very heterogeneous in terms of what they produce, how they produce it and with what efficiency the agriculture sector functions. Each CEEC poses an individual challenge to the EU. He did agree with the results of my factor analysis that there are two very significant conflict dimensions: subsidies and the conflict between producers and consumers. In his view, a third dimension will be intensified through enlargement, namely the conflict over EU-regulation and "do-it-yourself" agricultural policies. All states, in particular PL, will be reluctant to agree with and implement any further regulatory measures in agricultural production.
The question over the maintenance of subsidies will evolve into a more pronounced conflict between net-financers and net-beneficiaries of the CAP. Until now, the richer states have been able to buy the support of the less wealthy agricultural states for their policies by securing them access to cohesion funds, which of course involve agriculture as well (Carrubba theory). Thus he placed the SQ in the middle at 50, as their still is a deep divide between the North and South. Mr. Mögele stressed that after enlargement this mode of policy making will no longer be sustainable.

Preferences: Mr. Mögele agreed with the positions on the scale for questions of subsidies, claiming however that A and DK are more in favor of upholding the funds than presented. As for the candidate states, PL, H and the Baltic States will be in favor of maintaining subsidies, with PL being the most extreme actor (10). Mr. Mögele described the Polish agricultural sector as incredibly inefficient. The EU has pursued a strategy of creating larger more productive farms. PL, however, has continued to do the exact opposite, though, namely breaking up larger farms into smaller territorial units. Furthermore, he described the incapacity of the Polish bureaucracy in its ability to implement the necessary reforms laid out in the EU blueprint. Thus, it not merely a question of intensified conflict lines and coalitions, but Polish membership involves the

crucial task of restructuring highly a inefficient and unproductive sector that is has strong historical ties.
Mr. Mögele described the Hungarian agricultural sector as diverse and productive to the extent that other countries have attempted to protect themselves through protectionist tarifs. Thus, it insists on its fair share of agricultural subsidies. CZ and perhaps to a lesser extent SK will have clearly less interest in EU agricultural subsidies as they are more industrialized and their leadership is does not cater to the weak farming lobbies.
Malta will be for the abolishment of the current subsidies as it produces things for which there are no funding schemes. As it is highly unlikely that new funding programs will be created, Malta will not be a motor for the maintenance of agricultural subsidies.
The behavior of SLO will be issue-specific in Mr. Mögele's estimation, as it may fall into the group of net-financers. In the initial phase, the Baltic states as net-receivers will alse generally be in favor of upholding the current subsidies schemes.
Mr. Mögele agreed that consumer interests have become an extremely important issue, with the SQ being located slightly to the left of the EP (55). When asked whether a producer backlash might emerge, Mr. Mögele said that it will be more difficult for the EU to generate further consumer-generated legislature in the following years. Implementation is also a central issue in his view, as he felt that the EU must pursue a more lenient strategy in the initial phase after enlargement. Nevertheless, he reported that consumer protection is alive and well in CZ and H, but has yet to gain ground in the Baltic States.
A great deal of attention was given to PL, with whom the negotiations have been the most intense and difficult. He described the negotiations as a tedious stop and go process in which the Polish strategy has been contradictory and has severely lacked any coherency. Any government in PL must cater to farming interests because of the size and mobilization capacity of the sector. The farmers are a heterogeneous group but are often attacted to right-wing, nationalist parties.

The implications for the EU political system are clear: 1) PL will be the most extreme actor on subsidies matters. 2) Its willingness for reform will suffer from "mood swings"; 3) questions of implementation will often suffer setbacks and require a flexibility and patience in the transitional phase. The final issue 4) was that over the regulation of the agricultural sector. He views all CEEC's as hostile to any further agricultural regulation on the EU level, with Poland (0) holding the most extreme position vis à vis the SQ (30).

credibility of answers and interviewee: very high



Interview Report: Ehtel Halliste
Mission of Estonia to the EU, First Secretary, Head of Press and Information

Date: October 16th, 2002, 14:00
Interview Language: English
Length: 35 Minutes

Subject Matter and Objective: Estimating the political preferences of EST in various conflict dimensions of decision making in the EU. This was a closed interview in which the format laid out in the questionnaire was strictly followed. Diagrams with scales of the political alignment of the present members in various policy areas were used.

Report: Ms. Halliste had an excellent overview of the negotiation process and the coordination difficulties that it entailed. She emphasized, though, that only recently had the Estonian government sparked a debate over what the country expects from European integration and the various European policy areas. With the exception of Malta, EST remains the most Euro-skeptic candidate country. The reasons for this are as follows: fear of loss of cultural and national sovereignty, too extensive economic liberalization and the assumption that EST will have little influence on EU decision making. Ms. Halliste made it clear that questions of social policy, regulation or trade liberalization are still highly contested political matters in the domestic arena. Nevertheless, she was willing to offer convincing estimates of the positions of EST on most policy areas and detailed descriptions of the political, social and economic background of her country. On many topics, she saw clear parallels between the positions of EST and Finland.

Agriculture: Ms. Halliste felt that Estonia is certainly entitled to agriculture subsidies, but as it may soon slip into the group of net-payers Estonia will be come more resistant to higher subsidies. Agriculture is responsible for 5% of its economic output. She sees EST on the same lines as D or FIN, who advocate a gradual abolishment of many agricultural support schemes (50).

Consumers vs. Producers: Estonia will clearly stick to the side of production, assuming however a position no more extreme than Italy or Spain. Consumer interests will remain a secondary matter until Estonia moves into a "post-modern" phase. (20)

Internal Market: The extreme deregulationist policies that set in after independence have caused a great deal of social suffering, which has provoked a regulationist backlash in the past years. Estonia will thus not be a deregulationist force to the same extent as Finland and will probably locate itself with the re-regulationist states with a tendency towards regulation as the liberalization of certain sectors is automatically linked with unemployment. In particular the energy sector will be very resistant to further deregulation or privatization (50).

Free Trade: As EST has removed nearly all tariff and non-tariff trade barriers in the process of economic liberalization and attracted a very high amount of foreign capital, a tendency towards protectionist measures is highly unlikely in the opinion of Ms. Halliste (80).

Fisheries: Ms. Halliste explained the Estonian standpoint on fisheries in detail and emphasized the economic and historical importance of the sector. The restrictions placed on it through the EU have provoked great dissent. In her view, EST will do everything in its power to maintain access to the waters surrounding its mainland and islands. The Mission understands the need for a policy

of conservation, but will be resistant to other EU states fishing in its historical waters and any form of restrictions. (10)

JHA: Ms. Halliste sees Estonia as a force for further integration because of the precarious situation on its Russian border. As for the communitarization of asylum or immigration policies, Estonia has given little though to this manner, as it is not a popular destination for immigrants. This contradicts the view of Mr. Mirel who considers the Russian-border states to be a greater obstacle to further integration due to fears over loss of sovereignty (70).

Environment: Estonia will be an advocate of flexible policies close to the current SQ because of the enormous task of overcoming years of environmental decay. Through pressure exerted by Finland, it will be unable to renege on commitments (30).

Social Policy: The general tendency is towards business and capital which thrive on lower labor costs. In light of the financial situation of EST and the more pressing needs of the transformation process, she felt that the EU should only moderately intervene in the social policy of the CEEC's and that EST will remain on the side of capital/production (15).

credibility of answers: high

Interview Report Pierre Mirel

EU Commission, DG Enlargement, Chef d'Unité; Chef d'Équipe: Hongrie, Slovaquie, Slovénie, République Tchèque,
Previously: Head of Team Poland and Baltic States
Date 17th October 2002
Language: English / French
Duration: 40 minutes

Subject Matter and Objective: As Mr. Mirel is extensively involved in the accession negotiations with all CEEC's, in particular with H, CZ, SLK, SLO, PL and the Baltic States. The goal was to discuss the general political tendencies of these countries which will emerge in future decision making processes. I presented Mr. Mirel graphs of the central conflict lines in EU politics and their respective preference alignments and he shared insights on the current SQ and expected behavior of the CEECs.
By gaining a perspective from inside the EU, a further goal of this interview was to balance out the "socially desirable" answers which may have been given by the diplomatic representatives of the candidate states.

Report: As one of the chief negotiators he had a clear vision of what behavior to expect of the CEEC's in future decision making processes. In most issues, he began by placing all candidate states together on the same position on the scale, while then explaining reasons why certain states may deviate from the general tendency. One of the key statements made several times is that the future members will have no more extreme preferences than the existing members on any issues. The reason for this is the extensive process of "discipline" which the CEEC's have gone through in adapting the *acquis* as well as the continuous convergence with the EU social and economic model.
Matters of decision making were briefly discussed. Mr. Mirel described the decision making process as an extremely delicate and difficult process which will not get worse through enlargement. He downplayed the significance of decision making rules, e.g. cooperation, co-decision, QMV, and stressed unanimity, vote trading and side-payments as the *modus viviendi* in practically all policy areas. Mr. Mirel believes that unanimity will continue to be the mode of decision making as a matter of fairness, but will eventually be replaced by QMV.

Agricultural Subsidies: Mr. Mirel sees the SQ at 45. Four new members will be defenders of the current system of subsidies: PL as the most extreme actor (90), followed by H (80), SLO (70), and the Baltic States (70). CZ (30) and SK (35) will be least interested in upholding subsidies.

Producers vs. Consumers: Mr. Mirel has dealt extensively with questions of quality controls in the CEEC's. As these are linked with very high costs, he presumes that it will take 3-5 years for these states to "digest" the acquis legislation (labelling, food safety, quality controls). On this case he does not differentiate among the CEEC's, aligning them with the current member states who resist extensive quality control measures and favor production (20) As for the existing legislative game, he located the SQ at 40.

Common Market: Mr. Mirel commented on the unprecedented deregulationist tendencies after the fall of communism. His observation is that a good portion of the population feels that it has suffered more under deregulation, privatization and liberalization than under the *ancien régime*. Thus Mr. Mirel feels that all CEEC's will join the regulationist group of states with F, I and E. The governing party will be a factor, however, as former socialist parties prefer a solid state framework for the economy. Mr. Mirel stressed that this tendency also applies to more competitive economies such as Slovenia and Estonia. In highly polarized countries, such as CZ

and LT, a greater tendency towards deregulation can be expected if the conservative parties return to power (now 50). After enlargement, the balance will tip towards regulation. Mr. Mirel cited the energy sector as being the most resistant to deregulation. As the telecommunications sector has yet to be deregulated in most of the CEEC's, problems may arise here if the EU pursues its present deregulationist course (SQ at 35) (CEEC's 75; CZ and LT at 50).

External Trade: Mr. Mirel located the SQ slightly on the side of the free traders (60) and proposed the hypothesis that the larger countries will be more protectionist. In this case, PL is the most extreme actor, having notorious for its protectionist policies in various sectors. As the medium-size countries have attracted the greatest deal of investment, they will most likely reject any protectionist policies. However, Mr. Mirel also sees a tendency towards protectionism in the smallest candidates, i.e. Slovenia, the Baltic States (PL=20) (H=80) (CZ=80) (Slk=80) (Slov,LT,LV,EST=50).
As for agriculture (SQ at 40), PL will be a very protectionist actor with the Baltics on its side. These are countries with non-competitive agricultural sectors. In Mr. Mirel's view, CZ, SLK, and H will favor free trade. (CZ, SLK, H= 80) (PL=10) (LT,LV=20, EST=50).

Fisheries: Here, Slovenia was the topic of discussion as PL and the Baltics were extensively discussed with Mr. Roitmann. Mr. Mirel strongly felt that SLO will not be an obstacle to the strategy of conservation and redistribution, as fisheries only play a minor role in the Slovene economy. (Slo=55)

Environment: Mr. Mirel agreed with the SQ being at about 40. He explained that environmental measures are partially financed by the individual members and partially through cohesion funds. The CEECs must further digest the current legislation. In H, CZ and SLO there is an environmental movement, but all states are assumed to resist more environmentally friendly legislation involving increased costs. The CEEC's will need years to catch up with the SQ at 40 (H,CZ,SLO=30) (PL=10) (all others 20)

Justice and Home Affairs: In contrast to some of the statements of the diplomats, Mr. Mirel feels that the CEEC's will be reluctant to give up any bit of national sovereignty. However, on questions of asylum and immigration, he believes that many CEEC's will facilitate the Europeanization of the system as immigration patterns often move through these countries. (SQ at 40) (general: all 30) (imm. + asylum= 60).

Social Policy: Mr. Mirel reported that all CEEC's will be resistant to the creation of more improvements in work conditions as they are extremely dependent on foreign capital and investments and low labor costs. An very important factor is the de-localization of investments towards Romania and Bulgaria because of even lower labor costs, social expenditure and taxes. To the chagrin of those who advocate an active social acquis, the CEEC's will resist stronger legislation. (all=20) (SQ at 45).

credibility of interviewee and results: very high

Interview Report: Aris Vigants

Mission of the Republic of Latvia to the European Union
Second Secretary
Date: October 17th, 2002 14:00
Language: English
Duration: 30 minutes

Subject Matter and Objective: Estimating the political preferences of LV along various conflict dimensions. This was a closed interview in which the format of the questionnaire was strictly followed. Diagrams with scales of the political alignment of the EU-15 were presented to the interviewee, who shared his thoughts on the standpoints of LV.

Report: Mr. Vigants had more difficulties in sharing clear thoughts on the standpoints of LV than other CEEC diplomats. He sees a fundamental dilemma at the heart of Latvian politics: the desire to adopt the Scandinavian social model but the lack of financial means to realize this. He was quick to point out that recently a new government was elected after an electoral campaign in which EU politics was not a central issue. In his view, it is premature to pinpoint the exact standpoints of the government on issues pertinent to the EU. For this reason, he tended to assume a moderate position for LV on most matters. Nevertheless, after a few minutes of thought, Mr. Vigants was able to reveal some valuable insights on the positions of LV.

Agriculture: In Mr. Vigants' estimation, LV will become a force for the maintenance of agricultural subsidies. However, he did not envision LV as being a more extreme actor than any of the existing members, as is often assumed of PL. He pointed out the fact that farming lobbies in LV are very united and do have a significant impact on policy making. Agriculture accounts for 5-6% of the economic output (80).

producers vs. consumers: As consumer interests have yet to make their mark on Latvian politics, it is very unlikely that LV will be a force for the harmonization of consumer interests at the EU level. There will be a transitional phase in which existing legislation must be implemented before future consumer friendly laws can be a topic of discussion. As the consumer-oriented Scandinavians serve as a model, it will not defend extremely producer-oriented policies (30).

Internal Market: Mr. Vigants suggested that the position of LV is highly dependent on the governing party, as economic regulation is a highly contested issue. Generally, LV is assumed to favor regulationist policies, but since the takeover of the center-right government a more moderate position is expected (60).

External Trade Policy: Since independence there has been a tendency towards free trade in the industrial sector. Mr. Vigants positioned LV between the free traders and the moderates on the scale. As for agriculture, LV is more protectionist, as this sector remains quite inefficient (industry 65, agriculture: 20).

Fisheries: Mr. Vigants emphasized the necessity for a European regime as conflicts have emerged thanks to the aggressive fishing activities of EST in the Gulf of Riga. LV looks to the EU to provide a framework of redistribution and restrictions on fishing vessels from EST and PL More restrictions in size and quotas will be accepted to a moderate extent (60).

JHA: The interviewee cited the necessity of EU support in this area and for matters of border controls in particular. However, on immigration and asylum, Mr. Vigants mentioned that LV will be reluctant to move forward in the coming years (general=60; immigration + asylum=30)

Environment Policy: LV will not actively support any further environmental legislation in the coming years (20).

Social Policy: In the initial phase, LV will be resistant to any new social policy legislature as the implementation of past legislation has increased labor costs. In a long term perspective though, Mr. Vigants made it clear that LV will gradually converge on Scandinavian-based model if economic conditions improve. As for the Europeanization of social policy, Mr. Vigants assumed that LV would be very reluctant to take such steps (20).

credibility of results: average

Interview Report: Zsolt Becsey + Andrea Borbély

Zsolt Becsey: Mission of the Republic of Hungary to the EU
Envoyé extraordinaire et ministre plénipotentiaire
Andrea Borbély: *Second Secretary*
Area of responsibility: social policy and employment
Date: October 17th, 2002, 15:30
Duration: 1 hour
Language: English

Subject Matter and Objective: Estimating the political preferences of Hungary in various conflict dimensions of decision making in the EU. This was a closed interview in which the format of the questionnaire was strictly followed. Diagrams with scales of the political alignment of the present members were presented to the interviewees, who shared their thoughts on the standpoints of H.

Report: Issues of social policy and environment were discussed with Ms. Borbély, while Mr. Becsey shared his thoughts on agriculture, JHA, and economic matters. The interviewees emphasized the importance of the geographical proximity of Austria and Germany, whose legal and economic traditions have been or are currently being adopted by H. Both interviewees made reference to the pro-European sentiments in the Hungarian population and the general consensus for integration among a majority of the political parties. Mr. Becsey and Ms. Borbély immediately grasped the purpose of the graphs and were able to deliver honest and relatively precise prognoses on the behavior of H.

Agriculture: Mr. Becsey commented on the general state of Hungarian agriculture, which, in contrast to that of PL or Croatia, is very efficient. Thus, Hungarian government sees itself entitled to the same amount of agricultural subsidies as all current member states. Once full access to subsidies has been guaranteed, negotiations over reforms may begin. In general, Mr. Becsey sees H on the same line as Italy and IRL and other states who only agree with minor and gradual reductions in farming subsidies (65).

Producers vs. Consumers: Mr. Becsey made it clear that H will not be a force for more consumer rights and product safety. The reason for this lies in the difficulties that H has faced in implementing the *acquis* legislation in a short period of time. This has brought about severe readjustments in the means of production and is linked with considerable costs. In the foreseeable future, H will most likely lag behind the SQ when it comes to product safety and consumer rights. There are, however, no signs of H assuming a more extreme producer-friendly position than any of the existing members (20).

Internal Market: Mr. Becsey sees H at the core of the continental economic tradition, which entails a light dosage of regulation, depending on international economic conditions and the governing party. After a period of continual deregulation, popular sentiments for a more economic regulation have emerged. Mr. Becsey shared his thoughts on the current process of deregulation and liberalization of the telecommunications and energy sectors in Western Europe and came to the conclusion that H would most likely assume a moderately regulationist position in these sectors (65).

External Trade Policy: For both sectors Mr. Becsey sees H aligning itself with the free trade coalition both in the industrial as well as the agricultural sector. Due to the relative competitiveness of the Hungarian agricultural sector, no danger exists for the market. As one of the CEEC's having received the most investments, H is highly dependent on a liberalized framework for foreign trade. Due to the increasing competitiveness of the Hungarian industrial sector, Mr. Becsey also felt that there is no need for protectionist policies (80).

Fisheries: As no negotiations are being carried out, H will be indifferent on fisheries matters. In terms of voting coalitions, it will side with LUX, for whom any agreement is acceptable, as long as there is an agreement (55).

Justice and Home Affairs: In this area, it was more difficult to pinpoint a reasonable preference for H. As the future external border of the EU, Hungary does see an immanent need for a framework to combat drug traffic, people smuggling and illegal immigration through its territory to Western Europe. Not until H has reached the same standard of living as its Western neighbors can it deal with questions of asylum and immigration quotas. Popular resentment could be expected if Hungary were forced to accommodate a number of foreigners determined by the EU. This coincides well with the statements of Mr. Mirel, who also sees a mixture of nationalist sentiments reemerging after decades of oppression and the desire to combat the most pressing issues of justice and security on a European level. Thus, we can assume that H, as well as a majority of the CEEC's will not be preference outliers on this issue, but neither will they be a force for the creation of a transnational system (50).

Environmental Policy: Ms. Borbély and Mr. Becsey pointed out that there is an environmental movement in H, which can have a greater impact on policy than environmental groups in PL, CZ or other CEEC's. Nevertheless, both interviewees saw Hungary joining the SQ-states (F,E,P) in the first few years after membership, as the implementation of the *acquis* has brought on immeasurable costs and served as a strain on production (20).

Social Policy: In this area there is a definite trend towards capital or production for the simple reason that H is resistant to any means of raising labor costs. Ms. Borbély stressed that foreign companies fearing too high labor costs have already begun to move their production headquarters from Hungary to other countries even further eastward. This is viewed by many as a direct effect of the implementation of the acquis legislation (20).

credibility of answers: high

Interview Report: Arnoldas Milukas
Mission of Lithuania to the EU, Minister Plenipotentiary, Deputy Head of Mission

Date: October 18th, 2002 9:30
Interview Language: English
Length: 35 Minutes

Subject Matter and Objective: Estimating the political preferences of LT in various conflict dimensions. This was a closed interview in which the format laid out in the questionnaire was followed. Diagrams with scales of the political alignment of the present members in various policy areas were used.

Report: Mr. Milukas was initially reluctant to talk about future decision matters, as the negotiations have yet to be concluded. He felt the choice for EU membership is, for the most part, a question of identity and culture. After working a bit with the scales presented, Mr. Milukas was more willing to share his views on the background standpoints of LT both during and after accession.

Agriculture: Agriculture accounts for about 5% of the national economy with about 10% of the population involved. He made it clear that LT will be one of the countries more dependent on subsidies, however not to the same extent as PL. In this domain, LT actually profits from its Soviet past in that it has large, relatively productive farms In PL, on the other hand, there is a tendency to split large farms into smaller farms (70).

Producers vs. consumers: There is no consumer movement in LT, nor are there any pressure groups for food safety. Mr. Milikus stressed that the implementation of the EU reforms has been painful for the agricultural sector in particular. Thus, it will side with the southern member states in matters of production and consumption (20).

Internal Market: Mr. Milukas cited a stronger regulationist tendency in LT, which, however, is dependent on the government. He stressed that the Baltic states are more friendly towards regulation not because the planned economy in the pass, but because of the sinking standard of living after several years of radical deregulation. Thus, it will likely assume the same position as IRL (deregulationist with a tendency towards "re-regulation") (35).

External Trade Policy: Mr. Milukas clearly distinguished between the industrial and agricultural sector. The industrial sector is highly dependent on free trade, as exports account for 30-40% of BNP, but perhaps not to the same extent as the true "free traders" in the EU such as the UK, D and NL because of fears of unemployment. On agricultural matters, Mr. Milukas immediately aligned LT with the more protectionist countries (Industry=65; Agr=20).

Fisheries: Although fisheries are more significant than in many other EU and candidate countries, Mr. Milukas mentioned that the LT fishing sector deals with different geographical dimensions than that of PL. A good portion of Lithuanian fishing vessels are located in the Indian Ocean and are not effected by the CFP. Mr. Milukas sees LT in line with the states who prefer the creation of a European regime (60).

Justice and Home Affairs: This question was divided into different parts because of the expected socially desirable answer that LT will be a force for the creation of a European system of security and justice. Mr. Milukas cited the necessity for a stable border with Russia and

Kalingrad reinforced at the European level. On matters of a common EU system of immigration and asylum, the interviewee said that LT would opt for a more national position, albeit not one of absolute sovereignty (general=60; imm./asy= 40).

Environmental Protection: Lithuania is not hampered by the same environmental problems as the other CEEC's, in particular CZ, EST and PL. For the most part, it was not exposed to the same brand of Soviet industrialization as Byelorus and Ukraine. Thus, on environmental matters, we can expect LT not to cling as much to low standards other CEEC's . However, for the well-know financial difficulties it will not have the capacity to be a force for more environmental protection on the EU level (35).

Social Policy: In Lithuania there is a currently a situation in which the government has begun to tune into worker's interests and make genuine efforts to go beyond the community legislation on working conditions. According to Mr. Milukas, this may not be interpreted that Lithuania will be an advocate of labor in EU negotiations because of its financial situation and the necessity to attract investment, for which low labor costs are a prerequesite. In 10-15 years, though, he does envision LT pursuing a more active social policy. He felt that there are different dimensions in EU social policy, firstly the struggle between capital and labour, secondly the question of Europeanization of social policy, and thirdly the question of free movement of workers (30).

credibility of answers: above average

Interview Report: Lars Mitek

Secretariat Général de la Commission, Task-Force "L'Avenir de l'Union et questions institutionelles"Chef d'Unité: Questions institutionelles et gouvernance

Date: Friday October 18th
Language: English
Duration: 35 minutes

Subject Matter and Objective: This interview dealt less with the preferences and political standpoints of the accession candidates, but more with questions on the future institutional design of the EU. Mr. Mitek had a firm grasp of much of the scientific work in the EU decision making process and the various theories behind it. He shared his thoughts on questions of governance and political efficiency in the enlarged Union. The objective was to obtain a clear vision of the most promising strategies that the Union is applying to overcome legislative gridlock and stagnation in light of the assumed increasing preference and interest heterogenity after enlargement. Furthermore, Mr. Mitek shared his insights on the relationship between institutional reform and enlargement, while giving prognoses on various policies in the next ten years. He emphasized that enlargement is, both from the perspective of the candidate states as well as the Union, a means of modernizing post-communist societies, whose preferences will certainly change once they have reached a higher level of social and economic development.
The interview followed a closed format. As the emphasis was placed institutional design and internal reform, no preference scales were presented to Mr. Mitek. The questions asked and answers were as follows:

MD: Current European decision making is often characterized as a precariously stable with a continually high level of disagreement between member states on various matters. Many of your colleagues have stressed that decision making is extremely time consuming and tedious in its present state. In general terms, how can the EU continue to effectively govern after enlargement? Or is there a danger of reduction to the lowest common denominator?

Mr. Mitek stated that enlargement must be linked with a period of adjustment of ca. 10 years. The strategy of the EU is one of extensive negotiations and working out difficulties in advance. Current institutions are the only plausible *modus viviendi* for now and the years to come, as a fast track process as in US Congress very difficult to implement. Unanimity is the major de facto rule. Even if QMV is applied everywhere, not all obstacles will be removed. However, through enlargement the risk of loss of unanimity will grow. In his view, institutional changes don't play a major role in EU decision making, as unanimity is most often the outcome brought about by side-payments and issue-linkages.

MD: Many researchers observe a sharp north-south divide in the decision process (agriculture, environmental and regulation issues). Do you think that enlargement will intensify this conflict? Or do you see the prospect of a North-South-East division emerging in EU politics?

Mr. Mitek: There will be a love-hate relationship between the southern states and the eastern candidates. Intense conflicts over cohesion funds and infrastructure and regional spending will pervade decision making. At the same time, they will for the most part have similar views on many issues, e.g. environment, consumer regulation. Thus, the current main beneficiaries oppose new members but will be allies elsewhere in decision making.

MD: *Can you envision that new conflict dimensions may emerge in European Union politics?*

Mr. Mitek: Currently, this is a relatively tranquile period in terms of cohesion and subsidies funds. This conflict line will return to the daily agenda. A dilemma between burden sharing vs. benefit sharing will intensify. Mr. Mitek made it clear, though, that the new members will not be preference outliers in other areas not effected by structural funds.

MD: *Many observers feel that the Franco-German alliance is the main motor of decision making and that integrationist outcomes can only be expected when interests of these two countries converge. Do you feel that this alliance will be the cornerstone of policy making in the future?*

Mr. Mitek: Larger countries are well aware of the fact that they will lose some of their de facto veto power in the future. To compensate for this they will quickly pursue a policy of alliance building with the CEEC's. Thus the Franco-German alliance will remain at the core of EU politics with these two states seeking closer cooperation with CEEC's who have similar political preferences. Nevertheless, the power of the larger states will be diluted though.

MD: The EU has often pursued a strategy of linking enlargement with internal reforms. What are the most promising internal reforms to overcome legislative gridlock?

Mr. Mitek emphasized that we are dealing with a *sui generis* enlargement which is more complicated than even southern enlargement. However, he assumed that package deals will remain at the heart of policy making after accession regardless of the institutional mechanisms adopted at the next IGC. The current focus is still put on concluding the accession process.

MD: *Many politicians from the most integrationist states insist on a more solid, more comprehensive acquis communautaire. All candidate states claim they will be good Europeans. But how can the EU pursue an activist social or environmental policy in light of their difficult financial situation?*

Mr. Mitek mentioned that enlargement itself is a major achievement in terms of integration. Concerning the legislative decision making process, there will most likely be a "roll back" in the five years after enlargement. This, in particular, pertains to areas which are most dependent on state spending, e.g. consumer interests; social policy

MD: Some of your colleagues as well as CEEC representatives have shared different opinions on the area of JHA and its future after enlargement. Some consider the candidates to be a force for the Europeanization of this domain. Others warn of the desire to maintain national souvereignty in this area. What kind of behavior do you envision from the candidate states in this area?

Mr. Mitek fees the CEEC's will defend a position of (often symbolic) sovereignty in this policy space. Thus, they will be resisitent ot move further forward.

MD: *EU integration does not move in a straight line, but often follows a pattern of stop & go. In legislative terms, will the next 5 years be a period of stop or go?*

Mr. Mitek: After enlargement, a transitional phase will kick in, making legislative "roll backs" inevitable in all policy areas involving production costs, e.g. environment, social policy. Thus, enlargement is a historical breakthrough, but will impede further integrationist breakthroughs and be an obstacle to further ambitious integration efforts .

credibility of interviewee and answers: very high

Interview Report: Wojciech Ostrowski

Political Counsellor Polish Mission to the EU

Date: October 21st, 2002
Duration: 60 minutes
Language: Polish

Objective and Subjective Matter: As PL is the largest country in the negotiation processes, the interview served to gain a grasp of the political alignment of PL on the pertinent issues. It was also important to discuss the process of economic and agricultural reform as PL is the candidate with the largest agricultural sector, extreme economic distortions, and high unemployment. It was important to establish where Poland will be a preference outlier.

Report: Mr. Ostrowski spoke openly and frankly about the standpoints of PL on European integration. He avoided socially desirable answers and gave honest preference estimates, as there is an intense debate in PL over what the country aims to achieve from membership. Mr. Ostrowski noted also that PL is in favor of an intergovernmental model of decision-making, and in particular the co-decision process, in which agenda-setting and veto-power are shared by the EP and the Council. PL will thus be resistent to integration in certain areas.

Agriculture: 30% of the population is employed in the agricultural sector, which only accounts for 4% of the GDP. Three-quarters of the peasants produce only for themselves and thus are not an asset to the economy. Mr. Ostrowski made it clear that political parties cannot risk antagonizing the farming sector, not least because of its size and importance. Thus, he sees the only way of changing their otherwise negative or ambivalent attitude on integration is to promise high subsidies. PL therefore insists on the same rights to the EU-funds as all current members. He assumes that PL will be the most extreme actor for the upholding farming subsidies, i.e. 90 on the scale and not a force for reforming the system. (90)

Producers vs. Consumers: There have been implementation difficulties concerning food safety and labeling. PL has been reluctant to overburden production. Mr. Ostrowski assumes that there will be many violations of EU-law by PL in the transitional phase. Obviously, PL will not be on the side of states demanding more consumer-friendly legislation, but nevertheless not a more extreme actor than GR or E (20).

Internal Market: Mr. Ostrowski expained that the Polish economy was subject to an extreme deregulationist process after 1989 which created many hardships. The popularity of the current government (Miller PM, Kwaśniewski-President) can be expained by their inclination towards more regulationist policies and the maintenance of a social net. In the current phase of low growth and recession, Poland will doubtlessly be an advocate of more economic regulation. This is, for example, the case of the telecommunications and service sectors. (80)

External Trade Policy: Mr. Ostrowski emphasized that the government is gradually moving towards more open trade, but still demonstrates protectionist tendencies in particular in the sectors of heavy industry. The steel, machineries, and copper sectors will doubtlessly resist any further tariff and non-tariff trade liberalization on the EU-level. He sees the position of PL in harmony with the general line of P, F and GR (20).
Obviously, in light of its ineffectivity and inability to compete even with neighboring candidate states, the Polish agricultural sector will also be as protectionist as possible towards non-EU imports in Mr. Ostrowski's view (0).

Fisheries: Mr. Ostrowski described the current difficulties in the fishing sector. For him, the process of fisheries integration is multidimensional. Pressure for modernization is being exerted on PL, but it will lean towards open waters and fewer restrictions on the maritime sector (20).

Justice and Home Affairs: Currently, the protection of symbolic sovereignty will hinder grand integrationist breakthroughs. However, pragmatism will eventually prevail. At the beginning, though, a very fragmented development (40).

Environment: Mr. Ostrowski claimed that environmental policy must be decided on an intergovernmental level. PL is in a state of denial and neglect and will doubtlessly be a preference outlier here – even vis-à-vis the other CEEC's. There is no grass-roots environmetnal movement and currently there are great troubles applying provisions (0).

Social Policy: With high unemployment - even higher hidden unemployment - and a large state apparatus, PL will strongly resist any further labor protection. Keeping a friendly investment climate is a superior priority. In these terms, PL leans to the Anglo-American social model (10).

Credibility of Interviewee and answers: very high

Interview Report: Peter Javorčík

Mission of the Slovak Republic to the EU – Deputy Head of Mission

Date: October 21st, 2002
Language: English
Duration: 40 Minutes

Purpose and Subject Matter: The goal of the interview was to discuss different EU-policy areas from a Slovak perspective and to gain estimations of how Slovakia will react to certain legislative proposals. I presented Mr. Javorčík the diagrams on the positions of the current members to spark a discussion on the assumed positions of SK.

Report: Mr. Javorčík gave open and honest answers on what Slovakia expects from European integration. He stressed that economic deliberalization and liberalization took a much slower course in Slovakia than in other CEEC's, who experienced a phase of radical economic opening or "shock therapy" after 1989. His responses for individual policy areas are as follows:

Agriculture: SK does have a mid-sized agricultural sector (6.5% of population) and sees itself entitled to the same level of subsidies as current EU-members. However, SK has a much smaller interest in agricultural subsidies than PL or H and will likely be a force for reform (40).

Consumers vs. Producers: SK will be a producer-friendly country for the years to come (20).

Internal Market: Slovakia will be a force to postpone deregulation. There is still a large number of monopolies, many of them in fact being German companies; perhaps more deregulation with current center-right government (70).

External Trade policy: SK has a relatively competitive industrial sector with a highly open trade policy. 50% of GDP was reported to be from exports. As for agriculture, there will also be a tendency towards free trade (80 for both).

Fisheries: no negotiations; position between indifference and position of Commission (70).

Justice and Home affairs: SK will follow a pragmatic line and support gradual integration. SK pursues a delicate strategy here, as JHA is viewed by many as an intrusion on sovereignty (50).

Environment: Mr. Javorčík openly admitted that the environment was not a priority in the last Slovak elections and that it will not be so for the years to come. After having digested the current legislation, it will be reluctant to support any more environment-friendly legislation (10).

Social Policy: The current right-center government is more interested in attracting capital and keeping labour costs at the lowest possible level to combat unemployment and attract more foreign capital. Furthermore, he stressed that there is no such thing as a social democratic party in SK. As for the level on which social policy decisions are made, he said that SK will not be interested in the Europeanization of social policy measures that improve working conditions (15).

Credibility of interviewee and answers: high

Interview Report: Eneko Landáburu
DG Enlargement Directeur général, Formerly: Director of DG Cohesion

Date: October 21st, 2002 18.00
Duration: 55 minutes
Interview Language: French

Subject Matter and Objective: As Mr. Landáburu is the head negociator for the EU on enlargement matters, I devised an array of questions on the negotiations, the future of the EU as well as policy positions. It was important to find out how Mr. Landáburu envisions the decision making process after enlargement and his predictions for the course of integration. This interview was of an open nature, as Mr. Landáburu was a very spontaneous interviewee. This interview also served to reinforce or confirm the answers given by the previous interviewees. As the interview took place one day after the Irish referendum, the financing of the enlargement was discussed.

Report: Mr. Landáburu spoke openly and frankly about the accession negotiations and conveyed a realistic picture of future decision making. The questions I asked are as follows:

Beaucoup d'observateurs revendiquent que l'élargissement nuira à la stabilité du processus décsionel parce que il y aura une grande diversité de préferences et intérêts et plus de conflits politiques et financiers. Quel type de processus décsionel est-ce que vous envisagez après l'élargissement?

Mr. Landáburu gave a realistic view after enlargement by claiming that decisions will doubtlessly become more complicated in the future. He sees a greater spectrum of interests after enlargement. He was quick to comment that even the loosening of the decision making rule is not a remedy to legislative stagnation. He felt, however, that some countries will be able to assimilate very quickly (SLO, H and the Baltics) and not have a great impact on the process. He admits that there is a nostalgia for "*Europe des six*". Thus, all necessary mechanisms must be applied to avoid the reduction to an intergovernmental forum. This also includes psychological factors such as the reinforcement of the political will (*volonté politique*).

Il y a un lien historique entre les réformes institutionelles et l'accession des nouveaux membres. Qui sont à votre avis les réformes nécessaires pour faire face aux exigences de l'élargissement pour mieux gouverner?
Mr. Landáburu agreed that this link exists. He predicts that QMV will be applied to all policy domains eventually. What is more important, in his view, are more informal institutions: higher frequency of meetings, enforcing the willingness to cooperate by refering to the consequences of non-Europe. Progress is, however, a function of coordinating preferences through tiring negotiations. Decision rules (cooperation, co-decision) are not of central importance in his view. He also advocates making the EP more transparent through more open debates, as well as publicizing the EP presidency and perhaps introducing a vice-presidency.

Est-ce qu'il y aura plus de difficultés dans le processus décisionel ou dans la mise en oeuvre des législation? Oú sera le mal à la tête plus douleureux?
→ "Sans doute tous les deux!"
Mr. Landáburu claimed that enlargement will demand politics of patience, as the current legislative core must be digested by the CEECs. What we will perphas see is *an "Europe à deux vitesses*" in the transitional phase. In doing so, integrationist breakthroughs will be made by seizing chance of policy convergence.

Croyez-vous que les États-candidats auront des préferences plus extrêmes que les États existants dans certains secteurs politiques?
Mr. Landáburu sees no reason for the candidates to have much more extreme preferences, but instead highly divergent expectations. The difficulties are compounded by the inadequate organizational and bureaucratic capacity of the CEECs which will make them reluctant to support various types of legislature. In his view, the preference diversity among the CEECs is often more striking than that between the CEECs and the EU-15.

Dans le processus décisionel il y a une division entre les États du Nord et du Sud. A-t-on peur d'une nouvelle division Nord-Sud-Est?
There is doubtlessly a risk. However, the most likely scenario is that the larger states will immediately seek to form rather stable alliances with the eastern states. This concerns, in particular, Germany and the Northern States and the Visegrad countries (without PL), where as France and PL are often politically in tune.

Quelques domaines politiques se trouvent encore dans un État de développement, par exemple,la politique sociale et la justice et les affaires intérieures. Quelles seront les répercussions de l'élargissement?
He feels that there is a realistic danger of legislative regression in particular in the area of social policy and the environment. However, in broader terms, this rollback will be compensated for by Europe regaining its "universalism", i.e. its impact on world affairs as a unified entity.

Danger de nouvelles lignes de conflit après l'élargissement?
Mr. Landáburu emphasized once again that we are dealing will very poor nations who will not have the capacity to bring new concerns and issues on to the EU agenda in the coming years.

L'application de l'acquis communautaire était une tâche rigoreuse pour quelques États-candidats. Dans quels secteurs est-ce qu'il y aviat les plus grandes difficultés? Quelles difficultés envisagez-vous dans la mise en oeuvre du droit européen après l'élargissement?
JHA; later Competition; Integration in Justice and Home Affairs is problematic due to the recovery of nationhood. Small countries fear a loss of sovereignty. At the beginning they will be an obstacle, but will eventually change their thinking. Further integration will be a slow, step-by-step process.

Est-ce que les États-candidats montront une tendance vers le commerce libre ou le. protectionnisme?
As a good deal of firms are foreign owned, almost all states will be for free trade with the exception of Poland. As for agriculture, PL will doubtlessly be more protectinoist due to archaic structures and inefficiencies. Slovenia is very open for agricultural reform

Pourriez-vous décrire un peu ces États eu égard à leur capacité d'adaptation ou assimilation; donc l'efficacité de leur bureaucracie et structures administratives?
SLO, H, Baltic Countries are very open, flexible, and capable of adapting. This also holds for the Czech Republic and increasingly for Slovakia as well. Poland is surprisingly capable, but often shockingly backwards. There have been extreme positive changes in the last 2-3 years, in particular in the Baltic States, where as Poland has failed to make greater advancements.

Interview Report: Waahah Saab
DG Enlargement: Head of Team Malta

Date: October 22, 2002
Duration: 30 Minutes
Language: French

Subject Matter and Objective: I conducted a short interview with Mr. Saab, who is one of the head negotiators with Malta. The format of the questionnaire was followed and the current preference configurations were displayed to Mr. Saab. The objective was to pinpoint the positions of Malta along the most significant conflict lines in the EU.

Report: Mr. Saab did not hesitate to give preference estimations for M and describe the negotiations. He also gave some details on the political and economic background of this country.

Agriculture: According to Mr. Saab, M has no interest in any agricultural subsidies as it is primarily a producer of vegetables, which do not fall under any of the current support schemes. He placed Malta on the conflict line at the same position of DK. He did make it clear that M will defend its share of rural development measures which fall under the cohesion funds (20).

Producers vs. Consumers: Consumer interests are very week and poorly organized in M. Producers have a greater organization capacity and are favored by the government. Thus, M will clearly not be a force for more extensive consumer protection. Mr. Saab placed Malta on the same position as GR on the preference scale (20).

Internal Market: The viewpoint of M on questions of regulation differs greatly than that of most of the other CEEC's. Monopolies are a reality in the Maltese economy, as it is a very small country sensitive to fast-paced social changes and deregulation. Mr. Saab emphasized that the EU has had difficulties in its quest to liberalize certain sectors. Thus it will strongly tend towards regulation. Mr. Saab placed Malta to the right of France (Jospin) on the regulation scale (90).

External Trade Policy: Here there is a large divide between industry and agriculture. Mr. Saab sees Malta tending towards free trade in the industrial sector (60) as it is highly dependent on free trade, not least because of its size. As for agriculture, Mr. Saab clearly views M as a protectionist actor and labeled it with 10 on the scale.

Fisheries: As for fisheries, M will be, in Mr. Saab's estimation, most inclined towards redistribution and restrictions. Thus, he sees Malta as an ally of the Com, or perhaps even more extreme. The reason for this is the necessity to restrict over-fishing by vessels from other EU states. The fishing boats of M are small and old-fashioned and thus are strongly threatened by larger vessels from other countries (85).

Justice and Home Affairs: Mr. Saab felt that there is a conflict between national sovereignty and the need to defend national borders. He did feel, though, that M does not feel threatened in its sovereignty by further cooperation in this policy area. I did not go into detail with Mr. Saab on issues of asylum and immigration, as Malta will only be marginally effected by this. (50)

Environmental Legislation: Mr. Saab said that we are clearly dealing with a country with a precarious environmental situation. This has to do partially with the heavy growth of tourism and the lack of planning on the part of the Maltese government. In his estimation, M will be highly resistant to any further environmental legislation. He placed it at 10 on the scale.

Social Policy: Surprisingly, labor interests and working conditions are a significant matter in Malta. Mr. Saab felt that such measures only have marginal effects in such small countries. Thus, he believes that M will have a pronounced interest in further labor protection measures and the EU social policy. This is partially due to the centrality of this issue in the political arena. (70)

Final comments: Mr. Saab stressed that Malta can easily be bought by other countries (side-payments) as it does not have any very intense preferences that could cause political upheaval. Thus, despite demonstrating a clear political alignment, it will prove to be a flexible actor. Difficulties may arise with Malta in the area of foreign policy because of its neutrality. The wide-spread Euro-skepticism in M is grounded upon the inflexibility of EU regulations and questions of national identity.

Interview Report: Dolores Romeo

DG Enlargement: **Head of Team Cyprus**
Date: October 22nd, 2002
Duration: 25 Minutes
Language: French

Subject Matter and Objective: The goal of this short interview was to measure the political preferences of CY from the viewpoint of Ms. Romeo, a main EU-negotiator. I also strived to get a picture of the general viewpoints of CY on integration, as the country is coming from an entirely different political, social and cultural background than the CEEC's and Malta.
Report: Ms. Romeo made it clear that EU-membership has been the main foreign policy goal of CY for decades. The main reason is that the EU is viewed as a security guarantee (Turkey conflict), while economic reasons (subsidies, structural funds) also come into play. In her view, CY has been willing to implement all legislation without difficulties.

Agriculture: Ms. Romeo reported that agriculture is the third most important sector for the economy of CY. She assumes that CY will be a catalyst for the maintenance of subsidies, as many of its production areas fall under the schemes. Along the scale, she aligned CY with GR and E (80).

Producers vs. Consumers: Here, once again, CY will be on the same line with GR, as producer interests play a minimal role. However, in her view, there have been few problems in terms of implementing legislation on food safety and consumer interest (20).

Internal Market: Ms. Romeo said that the Cypriot economy was highly regulated with many monopolies. However, it has cooperatively made efforts to reduce the level of monopolization and regulation of its economy. She feels that it will demonstrate a tendency towards regulation, but this will not be as pronounced as that of the existing member states or Malta. (60)

External Trade: As the Chypriot economy was highly protected in the past, she sees a continuation of this line in the industrial sector (40), which, however, will be more pronounced in agriculture (20).

Fisheries: in contrast to Malta, CY will tend towards open waters and fewer restrictions in fisheries matters due to its special location and the "historical attachment" to the maritime sector. However, as it only has control over a small fleet, this matter will not be crucial for Cyprus (30).

Justice and Home Affairs: The most significant reason for Cyprus' course on Europe is the security issue. Thus, Ms. Romeo feels that Cyprus will be a force to intensify cooperation in this area (70). She did not give it the highest level on the scale because of its week judicial system and its difficulties in implementation.

Environment: same position as GR; not a priority (20)

Social Policy: Ms. Romeo reported that there are strong labor unions in CY and many voices for labor improvements. As a small country, such measures are easier to digest. Thus, Cyprus will show a tendency towards labor (60). A persistent problem, though, is gender equality.

Credibility of Answers and interviewee: Very high

The Specifics of the Interview Results

CEECs Agriculture: (mean Standard Deviation: 5.77)

State	1st result	2nd result	3rd result	mean value	standard deviation	re-scaled
CY	80 (DR)	60 (RM)		**70**	**14.14**	**77.8**
CZ	35 (LB)	30 (RM)	30 (PM)	**32.3**	**2.89**	**20.5**
EST	50 (EH)	55 (RM)	70 (PM)	**58.3**	**10.41**	**64.8**
H	65 (ZB)	70 (RM)	80 (PM)	**71.6**	**7.64**	**79.5**
LV	80 (AV)	70 (RM)	70 (PM)	**70.3**	**5.77**	**78.1**
LT	70 (AM)	70 (RM)	70 (PM)	**70**	**0**	**77.8**
M	20 (WS)	20 (RM)		**20**	**0**	**0**
PL	90 (WO)	90 (RM)	90 (PM)	**90**	**0**	**100**
SK	40 (PJ)	30 (RM)	35 (PM)	**35**	**5**	**25**
SLO	50 (RM)	70 (PM)		**60**	**14.14**	**66.7**
SQ	50 (RM)	45 (PM)		**47.5**	**3.53**	**45.8**



(Preferences EU-15 factor analysis)

CEECs Consumer Matters (mean standard deviation: 2.48)

State	1st result	2nd result	3rd result	mean value	standard deviation	re-scaled
CZ	35 (LB)	20 (PM)	30 (RM)	**28.3**	**8.66**	**13.8**
CY	20 (DR)	20 (PM)	20 (RM)	**20**	**0**	**0**
EST	20 (EH)	20 (PM)	20 (RM)	**20**	**0**	**0**
H	20 (ZB)	20 (PM)	30 (RM)	**23.3**	**0**	**5.5**
LV	30 (AV)	20 (PM)	20 (RM)	**23.3**	**5.77**	**5.5**
LT	30 (AM)	20 (PM)	20 (RM)	**23.3**	**5.77**	**5.5**
M	20 (WS)	20 (PM)	20 (RM)	**20**	**0**	**0**
PL	20 (WO)	20 (PM)	20 (RM	**20**	**0**	**0**
SLK	20 (PJ)	20 (PM)	20 (RM)	**20**	**0**	**0**
SLO	20 (PM)	20 (RM)		**20**	**0**	**0**
SQ	55 (RM)	40 (PM)		**47.5**	**7.07**	**45.8**



(Preferences EU-15 factor analysis)

Results CEECs Fisheries (mean standard deviation: 10.63)

State	1st result	2nd result	mean value	standard deviation	re-scaled
CZ	70 (LB)	60 (MR)	**65**	**7.07**	**75**
CY	30 (DR)	60 (MR)	**45**	**21.21**	**43.5**
EST	10 (EH)	15 (MR)	**12.5**	**3.53**	**0**
H	55 (ZB)	60 (MR)	**57.5**	**3.53**	**62.5**
LV	60 (AV)	30 (MR)	**45**	**21.21**	**43.5**
LT	60 (AM)	40 (MR)	**50**	**14.14**	**50**
M	85 (WS)	60 (MR)	**72.5**	**17.67**	**87.5**
PL	20 (WO)	10 (MR)	**15**	**7.07**	**3.3**
SLK	70 (PJ)	60 (MR)	**65**	**7.07**	**75**
SLO	55 (PM)	60 (MR)	**57.5**	**3.53**	**62.5**
SQ	45 (MR)		**45**	**-**	**43.5**



+ restrictions

(Preferences EU-15 factor analysis)

Resultate CEECs internal market regulation (mean standard deviation: 8.58)

State	1st result	2nd result	mean value	standard deviation	re-scaled
CZ	40 (LB)	50 (PM)	**45**	**7.07**	**41.7**
CY	60 (DR)		**60**	**-**	**62.5**
EST	50 (EH)	75 (PM)	**62.5**	**17.67**	**65.6**
H	65 (ZB)	75 (PM)	**70**	**7.07**	**75**
LV	60 (AV)	75 (PM)	**67.5**	**10.60**	**71.9**
LT	35 (AM)	50 (PM)	**42.5**	**10.60**	**37.5**
M	90 (WS)		**90**	**-**	**100**
PL	80 (WO)	75 (PM)	**77.5**	**3.53**	**84.4**
SK	70 (PJ)	75 (PM)	**72.5**	**3.53**	**78.1**
SLO	75 (PM)		**75**	**-**	**81.3**
SQ	35 (PM)		**35**	**-**	**25**



(Preferences EU-15 factor analysis)

- Very problematic sectors: Energy, telecommunications, heavy industry
- Results from Panayopolis Stamatopoulos- all 70; were not considered because of lack of variation for CEECs and contradictory statements

Resultate CEECs External Trade (Industry) (mean standard deviation 6.28)

State	1st result	2nd result	3rd result	mean value	standard deviation	re-scaled
CZ	80 (LB)	80 (PM)	80 (EL)	**80**	**0**	**100**
CY	40 (DR)			**40**	**-**	**33.3**
EST	80 (EH)	50 (PM)	70 (EL)	**66.6**	**15.28**	**77.6**
H	80 (ZB)	80 (PM)	80 (EL)	**80**	**0**	**100**
LV	65 (AV)	50 (PM)	70 (EL)	**61.6**	**10.41**	**67.7**
LT	65 (AM)	50 (PM)	70 (EL)	**61.6**	**10.41**	**67.7**
M	60 (WS)			**60**	**-**	**66.7**
PL	20 (WO)	20 (PM)	20 (EL)	**20**	**0**	**0**
SLK	80 (PJ)	80 (PM)	80 (EL)	**80**	**0**	**100**
SLO	50 (PM)		70 (EL)	**60**	**14.14**	**66.7**
SQ	60 (PM)			**60**	**-**	**66.7**



(Preferences EU 15 – Quelle: Bomberg/Peterson 1999)

Resultate CEECs External Trade in Agricultural Goods (mean standard deviation: 7.95)

State	1st result	2nd result	mean value	standard deviation	re-scaled
CZ	30 (LB)	80 (PM)	**55**	**35.35**	**50**
CY	20 (DR)		**20**	**-**	**16.6**
EST	80 (EH)	50 (PM)	**65**	**21.21**	**75**
H	80 (ZB)	80 (PM)	**80**	**0**	**100**
LV	20 (AV)	20 (PM)	**20**	**0**	**16.6**
LT	20 (AM)	20 (PM)	**20**	**0**	**16.6**
M	10 (WS)		**10**	**0**	**5.6**
PL	0 (WO)	10 (PM)	**05**	**7.07**	**0**
SK	80 (PJ)	80 (PM)	**80**	**0**	**100**
SLO			**-**	**-**	**-**
SQ	40 (PM)			**-**	**38.9**



(Preferences EU-15: Bomberg/Peterson 1999)

Resultate CEECs Integration in Justice and Home Affairs (mean stan. dev. 18.88)

State	1st result	2nd result	standard deviation	mean value
CY	70 (DR)	30 (PM)	**28.28**	**50**
CZ	60 (LB)	30 (PM)	**21.21**	**45**
EST	70 (EH)	30 (PM)	**28.28**	**50**
H	50 (ZB)	30 (PM)	**14.14**	**40**
LV	60 (AV)	30 (PM)	**21.21**	**45**
LT	60	30 (PM)	**21.21**	**45**
M	50 (WS)	30 (PM)	**14.4**	**40**
PL	40 (WO)	30 (PM)	**7.07**	**35**
SK	50 (PJ)	30 (PM)	**14.14**	**40**
SLO		30 (PM)	**-**	**30**
SQ	40 (PM)		**-**	**40**

Europeanization of Immigration and Asylum Policies (mean stan. dev. 7.07)

State	1st result	2nd result	mean value	standard deviation	total re-scaled*
CY	70 (DR)	50 (PM)	**60**	**14.14**	**59.1**
CZ	40 (LB)	50 (PM)	**45**	**7.07**	**43.8**
EST	---	50 (PM)	**50**	**-**	**50**
H	40 (ZB)	50 (PM)	**45**	**7.07**	**38.6**
LV	30 (AV)	50 (PM)	**45**	**14.14**	**43.8**
LT	40	50 (PM)	**45**	**7.07**	**43.8**
M	50 (WS)	50 (PM)	**50**	**0**	**43.8**
PL	40 (PL)	50 (PM)	**45**	**7.07**	**28.1**
SK	50 (PJ)	50 (PM)	**50**	**0**	**43.8**
SLO		50 (PM)	**50**	**-**	**50**
SQ			**20**	**-**	**33**

(*mean values: JHA in general and immigration and asylum policy)
(**Preferences EU-15** = number of JHA proposals supported in A'dam; Aspinwall 2002)



absolute sovereignty total Integration

Preferences EU-15 and CEECs: Environmental Protection

Preferences EU-15: aggregated preferences: Tsebelis 1994; Bomberg/Petersen 1999; Holzinger 1995, Young and 2000
* These scholars describe the origin of several environmental laws and the positions of the member states, which were coded as follows.

"laggards" = 0, "fence-sitters" = 50, "progressives"= 100

State	Tsebelis	Holzinger	Bomberg Peterson	Wallace Young	aggregate
A	-	100	100	100	100
B	50	50	50	-	50
DK	100	100	100	100	100
D	100	100	100	100	100
E	0	0	0	0	0
F	0	0	50	100	37.5
GB	0	0	0	100	25
GR	100	0	0	100	50
I	0	0	50	100	37.5
IRL	50	50	50	50	50
L	50	50	50	-	50
NL	100	100	100	100	100
P	0	0	0	50	12.5
S	-	100	100	100	100
FIN	-	100	100	100	100
C	50	-	50	50	50
EP	100	-	100	100	100

Results CEECs Environmental Protection (mean standard deviation: 6.49)

State	1st result	2nd result	standard deviation	mean value	re-scaled
CZ	20 (LB)	30 (PM)	7.07	**25**	**22.2**
CY	20 (DR)		-	**20**	**16.7**
EST	30 (EH)	20 (PM)	7.07	**25**	**22.2**
H	20 (ZB/AB)	30 (PM)	7.07	**25**	**22.2**
LV	20 (AV)	20 (PM)	0	**20**	**16.7**
LT	35 (AM)	20 (PM)	10.06	**27.5**	**30.6**
M	10 (WS)		-	**10**	**5.6**
PL	0 (WO)	10 (PM)	7.07	**05**	**0**
SK	10 (PJ)	20 (PM)	7.07	**15**	**11.11**
SLO	30 (PM)		-	**30**	**34.4**
SQ	45 (PM)			**45**	**44.4**



strongly rejects any further measures strongly favors further measures

0: no further European environmental standards at all
100: further introduction of strict, unitary European environmental standards

Results CEECs: Social Policy- Labor vs. Capital (mean standard deviation: 4.63)

State	1st result	2nd result	mean value	standard deviation	re-scaled
CZ	35 (LB)	20 (PM)	**27.5**	**10.60**	**17.9**
CY	60 (DR)		**60**	**-**	**70**
EST	15 (EH)	20 (PM)	**17.5**	**3.53**	**5.1**
H	20 (AB)	20 (PM)	**20**	**0**	**7.1**
LV	20 (AV)	20 (PM)	**20**	**0**	**7.1**
LT	30 (AM	20 (PM)	**25**	**7.07**	**14.3**
M	70 (WS)		**70**		**90**
PL	10 (WO)	20 (PM)	**15**	**7.07**	**0**
SK	15 (PJ)	20 (PM)	**17.5**	**3.53**	**3.6**
SLO	20 (PM)		**20**	**-**	**7.1**
SQ	45 (PM)			**-**	**39.9**



0: reject any further labor protection or social welfare measures
100: supports all further labor and welfare measures, even if this entails greater costs for employers

(Preferences EU-15- social spending per capita 1998)

Total Standard Deviation of results for all Interviews, countries and policy domains: 7.876

Appendix C: Comparing Preference Profiles: EU-15 and EU-25

STATA Calculations of mean, median, median by weighted Council votes standard deviation, skewness

N.B. For reasons of space, only the calculations for the first dimension on agricultural subsidies are shown here, as the technique is identical for all other conflict dimensions.

```
*Comparison of Preference Profiles: EU 15 vs EU 25

version 7.0
capture log close
log using VerglEU15EU25.log, replace

*_____________________________________________________________________________
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use "c:\Dokumente und Einstellungen \All
Users\Magisterarbeit\Data\DatadatasetMD.dta", clear

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*-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*1st Dimension: Agricultural Subsidies

*EU15 EU15 EU15

sum agrsubs if MSorCand==1, detail
* calculates standard deviation, skewness, etc. for EU 15
*_____________________________________
*calculation of the median according to weighted Council votes
sort agrsubs MScode
gen votesum15=sum(votes15) if MSorCand==1
*MS sort EU-15 by preferences and votes

gen wmedagr15=agrsubs if votesum15>=44 & MSorCand==1
sum wmedagr15
local median=_result(5)
replace wmedagr15=`median'
*determine Position of the 44.(=Median-)vote and save as variable

drop votesum15
* deletes help variable
sort actorcod
*restores normal sorting
*_____________________________________________________

*EU25 EU25 EU25 EU25

sum agrsubs if MSorCand==1 | MSorCand==2, detail
* calculates standard deviation, skewness, etc. for EU 25

*_____________________________________
*calculates standard deviation, skewness, etc. for EU 15
```

```
sort agrsubs MScode
gen votesum25=sum(votesNic) if MSorCand~=.
*MS sort EU-25 by preferences and sum up votes

gen wmedagr25=agrsubs if votesum25>=161 & MSorCand~=.
sum wmedagr25
local median=_result(5)
replace wmedagr25=`median'
*determine position of the 161. (=Median-)vote and save as an variable

drop votesum25
*delete help variable
sort actorcod
*restore normal sorting
*_____________________________________________________

kdensity agrsubs if MSorCand==1, width(7) saving(kdenagr15, replace)
*plots kernel density estimates for EU 15!

kdensity agrsubs if MSorCand==1| MSorCand==2, width(7) saving(kdenagr25,
replace)
*plots kernel density estimates for EU-25
```

Excel/SPSS-Preference Table for all Actors (about here)

Correlation Matrix: Bivariate Correlation Matrix EU-25 (about here)