

LOOKING BEYOND THE PLAN AND UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS: LESSONS FROM REA VAYA

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ABSTRACT: African cities have to manage rapid urbanization and mobilization to decrease road congestion and air pollution that hinder economic development and social cohesion. This paper presents public policy research that applied the concepts and language of Ostrom's Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) framework to systematically describe the implementation of sustainable public transport policies in the Greater Johannesburg Area/South Africa. This mixed-method study focuses, in particular, on the process of developing a single trunk route of the Rea Vaya Bus Rapid Transit system (Phase 1A).

Key words: institutional analysis, collective action, public transport, urban mobility

Background

African cities currently encounter the highest rate of urbanization and the lowest rate of economic growth (United Nations, 2014). Investments in an effective, efficient, and low cost transport system can generate highly beneficial returns, both economically and socially (Copley, 2010; Beukes et al., 2011). In this context African cities like Johannesburg, Lagos and Addis Ababa have started to establish public transport services as a reliable, accessible, safe and low-carbon alternative to the unofficial minibus industry (Kumar et al., 2012; Voukas and Palmer, 2012; Replogle and Kodransky, 2010). An example is Phase 1A of the Rea Vaya Bus Rapid Transit System BRT in the Greater Johannesburg Area/South Africa that has been operated by the Bus Operating Company (BOC) Pi-oTrans since February 2011. Not only was it the largest public transport project implemented in post apartheid South Africa, it was also the first system of its kind to take up operations on the African continent in an effort to manage scarce road capacity to support economic growth and well being.

It is commonly assumed that Phase 1A, the Rea Vaya BRT route connecting the township of Soweto to the Central Business District and Ellis Park Stadium, was successfully implemented only because the City of Johannesburg (CoJ) offered unofficial minibus taxi operators long-term benefits from shares in the Rea Vaya BOC in compensation for any short-term losses from curtailing operations along the route (Rahim, 2014). Examples of a transition to a BRT system not entailing such a measure, like the TransMilenio BRT in Bogota/ Colombia, raise the question what other factors could explain the observed outcome.


The here presented paper demonstrates how policy research can utilize the concepts and language of the Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) framework (Ostrom et al., 2014; Blomquist and DeLeon, 2011; Ostrom, 2007) to systematically identify and analyze other factors that potentially influenced the negotiations between the CoJ and the Taxi Industry Negotiation Team (TINT) that, in January 2010, resulted in signing the Phase 1A Participation Framework Agreement, which was the first milestone towards replacing 585 minibus taxis with 143 BRT buses (McCaul and Simphiwe, 2011).

A Diagnostic Approach to Describe Collective Action

The Rea Vaya BRT is being introduced to tackle urban road congestion that affects thousands of residents daily in the Greater Johannesburg Area (TomTom Traffic Index 2015). According to McCaul and Ntuli (2011) and Rahim (2014), operators of the unofficial minibus taxis and the official bus drivers are one group of actors using the network to earn a living. Another group presumably consists of commuters who depend on the road network to access jobs, education and other basic services, and the CoJ relying on commuters to flourish. Each of these actors develops and expresses preferences about how the network should be managed to reduce traffic congestion, depending on the information they possess about the effects of specific policy actions and the costs and benefits they assign to a particular outcome. CoJ represents the actors of the second group and has the means to mobilize investments, such as grants to develop the Rea Vaya BRT. However, actors in this group have less power and resources to control decisions concerning road transport than the operators of the minibus taxis, who are well organized in trade unions and have proven to be able to mobilize resistance on short notice. Within the socio-cultural context of Johannesburg this inequality has grown over time and without an additional incentive neither of these groups is likely to collaborate with the other.

Theoretically, this setting can be described using the IAD framework (Ostrom, 2005). Its key concepts and causal assumptions are represented in Figure 1. With this guidance scholars can define an *action arena* including a number of bounded-rational *actors* (Ostrom, 1986) that come together to decide on an *action* to sustainably manage a particular resource, the level of *information* about *benefits and costs* assigned to the action-outcome linkage and *control* over a negotiation process that the actors in particular *positions* could exercise to promote a *potential outcome* (Ostrom and Crawford, 2005, p.189). It has become evident that large-scale action situations entail public, private, voluntary, and other types of actors from multiple administrative levels and issue domains, who operate within socio-cultural („attributes of the community“ hereafter) and physical/ material constraints but also within a jointly agreed and commonly known and used system of written and unwritten rules (Feital and Brondizio, 2014; Bahadur and Tanner, 2014; Béné et al., 2014; Moench et al., 2011). These so called rules-in-use (“rules” hereafter) are described as the “shared understanding by actors about *enforced* prescriptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are *required, prohibited, or permitted*” with regard to the management of a common pool resource (Ostrom, 2005, p.18), such as an urban road network (Little, 2004; Foster, 2011).

Several scholars have used the IAD framework to illustrate the process of designing and developing rules to manage common pool resources, and how these arrangements facilitate operations on the ground (Ostrom and Basurto, 2011; Clement, 2010). Central to these studies is the postulate that rules structure a particular action situation and the decision process within, because they create the musts, must nots and mays of the deontic logic (Ostrom et al., 2014). The present research follows their example and extends the study of collective action to an urban commons problem in an African context. It constitutes a backward-flowing diagnostic analysis that explores the potential of the IAD to study the process that led to the Phase 1A Participation Framework Agreement, the first step to manage the use of the road network in Johannesburg.



Compiled from Ostrom 2005, pp. 15 & 33 ; 1986, p. 18

Fig. 1: Institutional Analysis Development Framework guiding this Rea Vaya case study

Negotiating the Phase 1A Participation Agreement Framework

The data presented here was collected and analyzed between September 2014 and March 2015. The process involved two stages: Data collection started with a review of the signed Phase 1A Participation Framework Agreement and documentation that CoJ representatives published (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011), and was followed up with open-ended expert interviews (for details see Appendix A). The first interview involved Rehana Moosajee, Member of the Mayoral Committee in Charge of Transport in the CoJ (2006-2013). The second interview included Simphiwe Ntuli, Director of Infrastructure and Safety at the CoJ's Transport Department. Another interview involved Colleen McCaul, Adviser for Transport Planning and Project Manager for the Rea Vaya Consulting Team of the German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (2008-2011). Finally, Lisa Seftel, Executive Director of CoJ's Transport Department was interviewed. The data from these interviews was used to verify the secondary data and to address research gaps. Attempts to interview TINT delegates failed. Here, the research draws on secondary literature (Venter, 2013; Onatu, 2011), in particular a paper summarizing interviews that Rahim (2014) conducted with representatives of the taxi industry.

Outcome

The Phase 1A Participation Framework Agreement was the first in a series of agreements. It was signed by 31 members of the negotiation team on the 27th of January 2010 and outlines the conditions for minibus taxi operators to become Rea Vaya BOC shareholders. For instance, potential shareholders agreed to remove their minibuses from service along the Phase 1A route, and deliver the vehicles to CoJ's auctioneers for scrapping or sale. The affected minibus taxi operators can then use the return to subscribe for shares in the Rea Vaya BOC (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011). The interviewees confirmed that the actors directly involved in the decision process agreed with the decisions taken. Rehana Moosajee clarified:

..., there was usually an attempt to see maximum consensus on issues. There were mechanisms to break deadlock, but I don't think the negotiations have ever reached the point where the negotiation process had completely broken down. – Jan 5th, 2015 (15:18 – 17:57)

Actors

The interviewees confirmed that 31 signatories represented the two main parties to the agreement. On one end of the table were the delegates of TINT speaking on behalf of the members of nine taxi associations. On the other end sat the CoJ delegates. A third party on the table was a CoJ-appointed mediator who was committed to neutrality. While the CoJ and the mediator controlled the meeting agenda, TINT had the resources to mobilize members of their taxi associations to delay the implementation of Phase 1A (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011, p.9). Not directly represented on the table but influential nevertheless were the Gauteng Province Government, the National Government of ZAF and the German Society for International Cooperation who sponsor the Rea Vaya BRT. The interests of the remaining minibus taxi operators were not represented (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011, p.3).

Action Situation

The interviewees explained that prior to and during the negotiations of the Phase 1A Participation Framework Agreement, the actors had to choose between supporting or boycotting Rea Vaya. CoJ for instance chose to support the project by generating interest in and support. While some TINT representatives chose to support Phase 1A, others considered a boycott via direct action or refusal to participate in any deliberation. It was in the interest of the mediators to facilitate dialogue and help the actors to arrive at a shared understanding about the action with the most favorable outcome for all.

The evidence suggests that at the micro-level each party lacked comprehensive information to identify the best possible action at the beginning of the negotiations. Simphiwe Ntuli elaborated:

We represented the City of Johannesburg, our role was to provide all the necessary information to the taxi industry to make informed decisions about their participation in the process, the City of Johannesburg also sponsored the process by paying for the cost of negotiations, the cost of appointing a mediator, the cost of technical support to the industry. – Jan 8th, 2015

All interviewees agreed that although the CoJ could easily access relevant decision channels and had access to information about the relevant policies and plans and the resources to disseminate these at the beginning of the negotiations, they lacked access to the local knowledge on the ground. TINT on the other hand, had insights about the minibus industry but lacked the legal and technical knowledge (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011, p.13). This eventually changed during the months of negotiations, as the CoJ set out to create an equal state of knowledge between the parties and to establish a culture of (mutual) trust. For example, TINT delegates were invited to several informal consultations as well as a joint field trip to Bogotá/Colombia prior to official negotiations. The interviewees confirmed that in the process, CoJ delegates started to understand the concerns of the minibus taxi operators represented by TINT, and suggested to lower the costs that Phase 1A would create for the minibus taxi industry (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011, p.11).

The case is relatively unique in this regard, since CoJ had no other choice but to enter negotiations with the industry due to its capacity to boycott the Rea Vaya implementation at any time. The CoJ in contrast had a comparably lower level of control over the course and the outcome of the negotiations, which put the industry on an equal footing with the CoJ. The available evidence suggests that during the months of negotiation both TINT and the CoJ contemplated possible outcomes of either joining or boycotting the Rea Vaya BOC (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011, p.13). The CoJ would benefit much from the realization of such a prestigious large-scale project and improve their public image one year before municipal elections and shortly before the 2010 FIFA World Cup (Moosajee, 5th Jan 2015, 18:07 – 22:36). In comparison, TINT saw little benefit in joining and feared economic uncertainty should they no longer be able to rely on income from their minibus taxi operation (Rahim, 2014, p.75). The taxi industry's assessment of the Rea Vaya project can be split into two disparate considerations: On one hand, the whole industry was aware of its high importance for Johannesburg's transport sector and used its powerful position to force outcomes that would improve their status quo. On the other hand, the industry was divided in the contemplation whether Rea Vaya should be seen as a window of opportunity to escape the informal economy or if the trust-building efforts of the CoJ were only a means to an end to get the industry under control and to permanently terminate their illegitimate status as the incumbent (Venter, 2013). Thus, different groups of the minibus sector instrumentalized the power of their industry to pursue contradicting outcomes. As a result of these processes, some parts of the industry refused to become part of the negotiations altogether, while others decided to join. Those groups of the industry that demonstrated the willingness to cooperate with the CoJ were provided with sufficient information and knowledge about Rea Vaya by their technical advisors and the CoJ. Rehana Moosajee observed:

Certainly from where I sat, and the fact that we had technical advisors for the project, we were constantly certain that the leaders we were speaking to agreed that they participated in a vision that was greater than their individual needs, which is really about the city of the future. – Jan 5th, 2015 (18:07 –22:36)

The fact that the CoJ had the resources to initiate and facilitate the negotiations with the minibus sector concerning the provision of economic incentives helped. Nevertheless, the parts of the industry that TINT did not represent remained suspicious of the process and final decision (Rahim, 2014), despite CoJ’s efforts. Rehana Moosajee confirmed this observation:

There were many suspicions raised about a range of issues, including the negotiations themselves. The first study had been undertaken in 2006 that was just individual representatives of Greater Johannesburg Regional Taxi Council and Top 6 Taxi Management – that was even before the Council had fully approved the realization of a Bus Rapid Transit. In 2007, we had a follow-up study tour with two representatives each from 18 associations and immediately upon return from that study tour there were already noises being raised about the City buying out representatives by taking them on international trips. By December of that year, there was the signing of a memorandum of understanding with Top 6 and Greater Johannesburg and those documents indicated the willingness of the industry to discuss these matters with the Municipality. By that point already, there were sections of the minibus taxi industry that were raising all kinds of suspicions. Partially, there were internal dynamics and internal leadership struggles: One of the issues that was raised is why is the City speaking to these particular leaders, these are not our leaders. Of course that were leaders that have been elected through a formal election process in the taxi industry that we recognized. Our response from the Municipality was well, if these are not your leaders replace them and we will speak to your new leaders. That was a big issue. – Jan, 5th 2015 (18:07 –22:36)

While Table 1 summarizes the evidence describing the six elements of the action situation, the following three paragraphs introduce the rules, the attributes of the community and the physical material conditions that may have helped to structure this setting.

Tab. 1: Elements of the Action Situation: An Overview

	City of Johannesburg (CoJ)	Taxi Industry Negotiation Team (TINT)	Mediator
Position	Delegate	Delegate	Appointed Mediator
Actions	Agenda-setting, initiation of negotiations with taxi industry	Influencing public opinion by strikes and riots and temporal blocking of the public transport in Johannesburg	Mediate negotiation process
Information	Access to all relevant information and documents, except taxi industry insights	Relied on information provided by CoJ, but had insight knowledge about taxi industry	Delegates’ feedback about the negotiation process
Control	Controlled resources	Controlled public opinion	None

	City of Johannesburg (CoJ)	Taxi Industry Negotiation Team (TINT)	Mediator
Costs/ Benefits	Bear the costs of the negotiation, but benefit from an improved public image and demonstrate political power by realizing a prestigious project	Losing the taxi business and control over the transport sector, while gaining economic security in the long term	Maintain or lose reputation as a successful mediator
Potential Outcomes	Phase 1A Rea Vaya BRT negotiations collapse or succeed and help tackle the traffic congestion problem in Johannesburg		

Rules-in Use

According to Lisa Seftel, the negotiation team started its work upon the basis of a broad mayoral mandate but with no further guidance:

...we more or less went along as it happened – Jan 19th, 2015 (4:54 – 6:41).

In this context, TINT and CoJ agreed on a number of rules prior to negotiating the Participation Agreement Framework. Colleen McCaul argued that:

The terms of reference were agreed between the City and the taxi industry – nothing was imposed by one party on the other - 9th Jan 2015 (6:04 – 7:13)

Simphiwe Ntuli confirmed that CoJ hoped and managed to avoid “the situation of ‘winner’ takes all.”

These arrangements, which emerged from various attempts to build a culture of (mutual) trust (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011, p.25), outlined that (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011, pp.11-12):

- The taxi industry has to be included and heard in the whole of the Rea Vaya BRT planning process.
- Only operators directly affected by Phase 1A are part of the negotiations.
- An independent and experienced mediator is chairman of the negotiations.
- Proposals have to be realized as they are they decided upon; no ex post facto changes are allowed.

When asked about concerns or suspicions about the agreed rules of procedure during the negotiations, Simphiwe Ntuli replied:

Yes, all the time some people from the taxi industry were suspicious about rules. Sometimes they had the view that the rules were in favor of City and not them. But the facilitator handled such problems very well.- Jan 8th, 2015

Attributes of the Community

When CoJ first contemplated the Rea Vaya project levels of trust between the industry and CoJ representatives they were low, creating a problem. On one hand, CoJ could not ignore the historically evolved position of power of the minibus taxi industry in Johannesburg’s transport sector (Rahim,

2014). On the other hand, they also couldn't ignore the fact that the industry was organized and well capable of successfully rallying its members to boycott the project. Colleen McCaul and Rehana Moosajee clarified that:

If there wasn't trust in each other all the time, there was certainly trust in the process. For example we had – we arranged – I organized grants – for a negotiation skills training before the negotiations started. So, the City team and the taxi industry team – we jointly went and got trained in negotiation skills and so on. That kind of things helped a lot - McCaul, Jan 9th, 2015 (19:28 – 20:49)

I think the honest discussions were important. I think the investment of time and resources and study tours and capacity and getting them technical advisors, thus creating a fair playing field between the City bureaucracy and the minibus taxi industry – all of them were really important trust building mechanisms. - Moosajee, Jan 5th, 2015 (22:48 – 31:07)

When asked why CoJ invested in resources involving the taxi industry, Colleen McCaul argued:

... for the City [CoJ] it [Rea Vaya BRT] wasn't just a transport project. It was very much about involving the taxi industry and giving it a more formal place in the City economy. So the City probably wouldn't have pursued if the industry had rejected it. But it's theoretically possible: The City could have operated it as a City company and just cancel the permits of the taxi industry when they expired. But there would have been a lot of – a great deal of resistance, much more than there was. That was quite a political project, so the City would never have wanted that. - 9th Jan 2015 (14:40 – 15:39)

Lisa Seftel also highlighted the difficult conditions under which the TINT delegates operated:

Then, the other thing, which was more in the background but very important was that you needed to know that when there were threats of violence, the police could act. And there was a lot of violence, a lot of threats of violence, a lot of intimidation of the people in the taxi industry negotiating team. And the police wasn't always be able to respond as the taxi industry would have wanted, you know. So often, a guy said: They are not supporting us, we are going to be murdered and you don't care. You are safe in your beds at night and we are under threat. They also lobbied really hard, you know, that they needed personal guards. It's a very difficult thing to give people personal guards. But eventually, the mayoral committee decided to give them private security. So, you need to know there is legitimate police and security. That also helped the process. -19th Jan 2015 (10:20 – 12:45)

Physical/ Material Conditions

Sanctioning actors that in any way obstruct the introduction of a reliable, accessible, safe and low-carbon public transport system was not a feasible option in this case. Like common-pool resources (Ostrom, 1990, pp.30-33), the road network in the Greater Johannesburg Area is characterized by the difficulty of excluding people from using this particular resource system. Another problem is the fact that every person using the system leaves less of the resource available for use by others (Foster, 2011). While CoJ can keep up the levels of maintenance required in this context, it faces the challenge of a growing appropriation problem. In other words, too many people use the resource.

This can result in the levels of urban road congestion observed in the Greater Johannesburg Area day in and day out. This dilemma already obstructs economic growth; the creation of jobs to accommodate people moving to or visiting the city; and subsequently increases the likelihood of violence and segregation. Rapid urbanization and globalization catalyze these risks (Chakwizira et al., 2011; Onatu, 2011). In addition, the decision of the FIFA to stage the well attended final of the 2010 World Cup in Johannesburg threatened to exacerbate the existing problem even further (Moosajee, Jan 5th, 2015, 18:07 – 22:36).

Although the geographical conditions and urban settings would have allowed an expansion of the road network to accommodate increasing demand, it was not a desired action due to the levels of air and noise pollution that road traffic generates (Chakwizira et al., 2011; Onatu, 2011). Hence, the Gauteng Province Government, the National Government of ZAF and the German Society for International Cooperation responded by making the financial resources to facilitate a speedy implementation of the Rea Vaya plans available to help sustainably manage the growing pressure on the road network during the World Cup but more importantly in the context of current and expected urban growth rates (McCaul and Ntuli, 2011, p.3).

Discussion and Recommendations for Further Research

In conclusion, Rea Vaya is a project designed to overcome a common pool resource dilemma in the Greater Johannesburg Area. As such it has attracted much attention. It is commonly assumed that the Rea Vaya BRT Phase 1A was only successfully implemented because CoJ offered unofficial minibus taxi operators long-term benefits from shares in the Rea Vaya BOC in compensation for any short-term losses from curtailing operations along the route (Rahim, 2014). The here presented discussion further develops this argument. It suggests that including TINT in the development of the rules that structure the action situation and decision process was a crucial factor in the negotiations of the Phase 1A Participation Framework Agreement - an important milestone in setting-up the Rea Vaya BOC and implementing Phase 1A. This was not only a gesture of foresight and calculus by the CoJ, but also a political necessity in order to prevent further strikes or even riots of the minibus taxi industry. The findings complement evidence suggesting that political institutions have significant effects on the management of common pool resources in developing countries (Feital and Brondízio, 2014; Bahadur and Tanner, 2014; Béné et al., 2014; Moench, 2014); jointly developed rules more so than common patterns of neopatrimonial “big man” governance (Kirsten et al., 2009; Alence, 2004; Levy and Kpundeh, 2004).

Against this background, the success of the negotiations was not “the story of a miracle”, as Seftel (2013, p.6) suggests. It was rather the result of a right combination of top-down incentives (the creation of trust, long-term economic benefits) of CoJ and the bottom-up willingness of parts of the industry to cooperate, combined with the favorable situation of the upcoming World Cup. The historically evolved position of power of the minibus industry and the organization of the industry in associations created adequate prerequisites for direct interaction between CoJ and TINT. The central organization of the industry and its powerful position within the transport market therefore had an ambivalent character for the negotiations: On one hand, this specific organizational structure meant that the minibus industry was an influential veto player that could block the process, but on the other hand it also implied that the CoJ had someone, who represents the majority of Johannesburg’s minibus sector, to directly negotiate with. The CoJ consequently depended on the cooperativeness of the industry and, as Colleen McCaul put it in the interview:

“the City probably wouldn’t have pursued if the industry had rejected [Rea Vaya]” – Jan 9th, 2015 (14:40 –15:39).

Employing the IAD as an analytical guide, several new questions concerning the role of rules in the Rea Vaya bargaining process could be identified that could constitute the starting point for further research. This includes for example the effect of rules that regulate the entry and exit to the action situation (who could participate in the negotiations and who decided it), or rules that establish the need for trust-building measures (field trip with representatives of the minibus industry to Bogotá, informal talks, etc.) on the success of the negotiations. Although scholars have already applied the IAD to the study of large-scale socio-technical systems (Pethe et al., 2012; Vaidyanathan et al., 2013), most of its applications still focus on the governance of regionally bounded natural resources. Consequently, few modifications of the IAD have been made so far for the study of socio-technical systems, such as BRTs. An adaptation of the IAD framework to the study of man-made or socio-technical systems is imperative since existing concepts do not capture all relevant aspects of these large-scale socio-technical resource systems. An adaptation could not only contribute to a recollection of the IAD to its roots – the study of local public economies (Ostrom et al., 1961) – but might also trigger the development of a Socio-Technical Systems Framework that could coexist with the already well-established Social-Ecological Systems Framework. Furthermore, recent research analyzing the taxi industry post-Phase 1A underlines the need to investigate the role of the aforementioned factors further (Rahim, 2014). The available evidence suggests that minibus operators who were not represented in the negotiations or invited to join Rea Vaya are discontent about

losing income due to the Rea Vaya BRT (Rahim, 2014, p.78). Some of the interviewed taxi drivers allege the CoJ of having bribed minibus industry representatives prior to Rea Vaya negotiations (Rahim, 2014, p.79). This demonstrates a lack of trust in the decision process on their part.

Finally now that more than half of the world's population lives in cities, it is important to understand urban transport policy decisions that diminish road congestion as well as air pollution and contribute to urban resilience, as cities continue to grow (Bassett & Marpillero-Colomina, 2012). BRTs are no panacea to the (traffic) problems of developing cities, but purposeful means to manage road scarcity and to improve well being as well as urban mobility. This discussion has illustrated how to use the IAD as a theoretical guide to identify open questions that remain and as a potential for further research to gain a comprehensive understanding of the decision process that led to the implementation of the Rea Vaya BRT Phase 1. Of course, methodological obstacles to measure dyadic links between actors in such large-scale settings and the specific conditions under which decisions were made hinder the complete apprehension of the process that resulted in its introduction (Muno et al., 2010; deGrassi, 2008; Lande, 1983). While the IAD helps to clearly define and focus on a particular inquiry, the next step ahead is to combine this deductive approach with an innovative way to capture reliable evidence that can be compared with other urban transport policy studies.

The aim of the paper was to initiate further discussions on the factors that can explain the successful implementation of Phase 1A of the Rea Vaya BRT and how to measure them. We conclude by recommending this approach to investigate transport policy decisions that are related to the BRT in Johannesburg or BRTs in other African cities, for this would allow a comparative study.

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Appendix A

Tab. 2: Rea Vaya Phase 1A Experts Participating the Interviews

Person	Function	Date	Medium
Simphiwe Ntuli	Director of Infrastructure and Safety, City of Johannesburg Transport Department - Not part of signing the participation framework agreement, but involved in negotiations before then	January 8 th , 2015, 12:59am - approx. 1.30pm CET	Questionnaire answered via Email
Rehana Moosajee	Member of Mayoral Committee in Charge of Transport, City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality (2006-2013) - Facilitated but did not directly participate in the negotiations	January 5 th , 2015, 8:00 - 8:35am CET	Skype interview, recorded with a digital voice recorder
Colleen McCaul	Adviser for Transport Planning and Project Manager for the Rea Vaya Consulting Team of the German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (2008-2011) - Part of the negotiations	January 9 th , 2015, 10:00 - 10.28.am CET	Skype interview, recorded with a digital voice recorder
Lisa Seftel	Executive Director of City of Johannesburg Transport Department (2009-present) - Signatory	January 19 th , 2015, 6:26 - 7:04pm CET	Skype interview, recorded with a digital voice recorder

Daniel Wegner (University of Konstanz) arranged, conducted and transcribed these interviews between September 2014 and March 2015.

Questionnaire A for directly involved actors in Rea Vaya Phase 1A negotiations*User*

- Have you directly participated in the negotiations of the Participation Framework Agreement?
- Did you act on your own or as representative of an organization?
 - If you acted as representative of an organization, why did the organization send you to the negotiations?
- How much leeway did you have during the negotiation process?
- How would you describe your role during the negotiation process? For example, did you provide information, did you sponsor the process, did you attend as a mediator or did you attend to observe the process?
- What did this role entail exactly?
- Where you able to perform this role as you had intended? Why do you think that is?

Governance system

- Which actors helped you to perform your role successfully?
- Who could have supported you more?
- Which of these actors were not directly included in the negotiations?
- How was it decided who was involved?
- Who was excluded from the negotiations?
- How were the rules of procedures decided? For example, was the decision taken by consensus or majority?

- Did anyone raise concerns or suspicion about the agreed rules of procedure during the negotiations?
 - If yes, who did it and why do you think that is?
- Which measures were taken to overcome these concerns and to build up trust between the negotiating parties?
Were all participants of the negotiations consent with the decisions taken?
 - If not, who was not consent and why?

Questionnaire B for indirectly involved actors in Rea Vaya Phase 1A negotiations

General

- How were you involved in the negotiations of the Participation Framework Agreement?
- Which actors participated in the negotiations of the Participation Framework Agreement?
- Which stakeholders were not involved in the negotiations?

Governance system

- How was it decided who was involved and who was excluded in the negotiations?
- How were decisions taken in the negotiations process – e.g. were decisions taken by consensus or majority?
- Did anyone raise suspicion about the negotiation process?
 - If yes, who did it and why?
- Which measures were taken to build up trust between the negotiating parties? (e) Were all members of the negotiations consent with the decisions taken?
 - If not, who was not consent and why?
- How were you involved in the negotiations of the Participation Framework Agreement (signed on January 27th, 2010 in Johannesburg)?
- Which actors participated in the negotiations of the Participation Framework Agreement (signed on January 27th, 2010 in Johannesburg)?
- Which stakeholders were not involved in the negotiations?

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