

Which Mechanics Drive the 'Franco-German Engine'?

An Analysis of How and Why France and Germany Have Managed to Shape Much of Today's EU

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Introduction¹

"As EU finance ministers meet in Luxembourg today (9 October), Germany and France will step up a diplomatic drive to convince more EU countries, even outside the Euro-zone, to join them in setting up a financial transactions tax (FTT)."² This is the headline of EurActiv.com on 9 October 2012. Contrast this with the headline published by the same journal one day later: "Eleven euro zone states back financial transaction tax. Eleven Euro-zone countries agreed on Tuesday (9 October) to press ahead with a disputed tax on financial transactions aimed at making traders share the cost of fixing a crisis that has rocked the single currency area."³ According to Andreas Schieder, Austrian Deputy Finance Minister, "[t]his is a small step for 11 countries but a giant leap for Europe."⁴ What exactly happened on 9 October? How was a coalition formed that surpassed the threshold of nine member states that according to the Lisbon Treaty are needed to enable the launching of the

1. The authors wish to thank Tobias Tober for research assistance.

2. "One country still needed to launch FTT," *EurActiv.com*, <http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/country-missing-ftt-launch-news-515263> (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

3. "Eleven euro zone states back financial transaction tax," *EurActiv.com*, <http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/eleven-euro-zone-states-back-fin-news-515296> (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

4. Ibid.

enhanced cooperation procedure (Title IV, Art. 20 of the Treaty on European Union)? And which role did France and Germany play in the process? In this specific case, these two countries seemed to have played a crucial role in brokering an agreement and building a coalition that allows at least parts of the EU to move ahead in setting up a common financial transaction tax. According to Euractiv.com, Spain, Italy, Slovakia and Estonia finally supported the envisaged measures “[a]fter heavy diplomatic pressure from Berlin.”⁵ At the time of writing, it is difficult to get access to more background information on the mechanisms that led to the outcome of the FTT negotiations. At the same time, this incidence highlights that France and Germany still can share common integration endeavours and, in addition, also have the capacity to play an active role in EU policy-making, even after the latest enlargement rounds.

In this article, we theorize and empirically test theoretical mechanisms often assumed to lie behind the ‘Franco-German engine.’⁶ We thereby try to answer the question of what the ‘Franco-German engine’ actually is and how it works in theory and practice. In this context, two opposing ideas about today’s state of the Franco-German tandem are taken into account, which are exemplified by the following two citations: Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt believes that “*the Franco-German motor no longer exists*”⁷ whereas for Pedersen the “*obituary of Franco-German collaboration has often been written prematurely.*”⁸ After clearing the definitional ground, we start our analysis by first discussing the ‘Franco-German engine’ in theoretical terms. We condense the existing literature on the topic into a—admittedly highly stylized—flowchart displaying different ways how France and Germany can actively shape European policy-making and integration. We then turn to empirically applying our framework to a selection of cases relating to different decision categories as well as policy areas. In our analysis we combine different types of data. In order to investigate the impact of the ‘Franco-German engine’ in day-to-day policy-making we draw on data on EU legislative decision making, recently published in form of the “Decision-making in the European Union” (DEUII) dataset. By analysing the structure of preferences and by drawing on additional literature on this topic, we show that there is little evidence for an important ‘Franco-German engine’ constantly operating in Brus-

5. Ibid.

6. Robert Picht and Wolfgang Wessels, eds. *Motor Für Europa? Deutsch-Französischer Bilateralismus Und Europäische Integration*. Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1990. Douglas Webber, ed., *The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union*, London: Routledge, 1999, 1-20. Gisela Hendriks, and Annette Morgan, *The Franco-German Axis in European Integration*, Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2001. Adolf Kimmel, and Pierre Jardin, eds. *Die Deutsch-Französischen Beziehungen Seit 1963*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2002.

7. Thomas Pedersen, “Keynote Article: Recent Trends in the Franco-German Relationship,” *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 41, no. S1, 2003: 13-25.

8. Pedersen, “Keynote Article.”

sels ‘low politics’. We then turn to ‘history-making decisions,’⁹ which are more closely related to European integration, defined as formal changes in primary law or constitutional politics. In particular, we investigate integration in the realms of the Single Market, Schengen, European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Our case studies, indeed, unveil the existence of a causal effect of a ‘Franco-German engine’ under different conditions. They show that France and Germany continuously have managed to foster integration; albeit the mechanisms of the ‘engine’ vary across different time periods and policy areas. Therefore, we find that scope conditions—in particular the preference spectrum amongst all EU member states—strongly determine the functioning but also the chances of success of common Franco-German integration initiatives. The article ends with a comparative discussion of our results and an outlook on the potential of the ‘Franco-German engine’ in the 21st century EU.

A Theory of the ‘Franco-German Engine’

The term ‘Franco-German engine’ is amongst the political keywords that can cause a range of most different reactions from varying audiences. Continental European federalists can get teary-eyed, deploring with certain nostalgia current impasses of the integration project. They regret the absence of political leadership, in particular, after the different enlargement rounds that in their view condemn the EU to a standstill. In contrast, for grim British Eurosceptics the term evokes the unpleasant idea of a Franco-German *directoire* conspicuously undermining national sovereignties and possibly democratic achievements of nation states. For most quantitative EU analysts, finally, the term basically captures a myth, since they find so little empirical evidence of a ‘Franco-German engine’ affecting EU decision-making.¹⁰ The reactions thus differ according to political and specifically integration-related concerns but also concerning the causal importance attributed to the term’s *signifié*. In our contribution we will concentrate on this second aspect. Our aim is to clarify the concept and to contribute to a better understanding of how and under which conditions a ‘Franco-German engine’ can matter for EU decision-making. In other, more technical words, we are interested in estimating the causal effect of the ‘Franco-German engine’. Generally, a causal effect is defined as “*the effect of some change in a causal factor (X) on an outcome (Y)*,

9. John Peterson, and Elizabeth Bomberg, *Decision-Making in the European Union*, Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1999.

10. Webber, *The Franco-German Relationship*. Torsten J. Selck, and Michael Kaeding, “Divergent Interests and Different Success Rates: France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in EU Legislative Negotiations,” *French Politics*, no. 2, 2004: 81-95. Robert Thomson, *Resolving Controversy in the European Union. Legislative Decision-Making before and after Enlargement*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

relative to what that outcome otherwise would be.”¹¹ In our case, the causal effect is the impact of joint Franco-German activities being present ($X=1$) relative to not being in action ($X=0$). The outcome (Y) is most narrowly European integration.¹²

What is the ‘Franco-German engine’? The concept has often been linked to leadership¹³ or “steering capacity.”¹⁴ Webber writes that “[t]he analogy of the ‘motor’ or ‘engine’ implies that these two states have supplied the power or momentum which has driven or propelled the integration process.”¹⁵ The ‘engine’ thus contains an active momentum and implies more than a coincidence of a common political understanding. In this paper, the ‘Franco-German engine’ is understood as an intense Franco-German cooperation in view of actively promoting European integration in the sense of “improving the EU’s political and/or institutional problem-solving capacity.”¹⁶ Our notion of cooperation draws on Keohane,¹⁷ for whom “[c]ooperation occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.” Keohane distinguishes ‘cooperation’ from ‘harmony’ since “[c]ooperation, as compared to harmony, requires active attempts to adjust policies to meet the demands of others. That is, not only does it depend on shared interests, but it emerges from a pattern of discord or potential discord.” Cooperation thus necessitates some kind of interactions, exchanges or coordination between the partners. In our understanding, the ‘Franco-German engine’ has an effect if France and Germany act together as a team of integration agents that successfully drive integration forward.

In the following we will summarize large parts of the literature on the ‘Franco-German engine’ into a stylized model, depicted in form of a flowchart (Figure 1). The model basically builds on a set of institutional, structural, process-oriented and outcome variables. The first step of our model relates to the coordination of policies between France and Germany. Exchanges of information and interactions are the natural starting point for attempts to promote integration. Indeed, there is

11. John Gerring, *Social Science Methodology. A Unified Framework*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

12. Cf. on a distinction between vertical and horizontal integration Leuffen, Dirk, Berthold Rittberger, and Frank Schimmelfennig, *Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013.

13. Cf. William E. Paterson, “Did France and Germany Lead Europe? A Retrospect,” in *Leaderless Europe*, ed. Jack Hayward, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 89-110. Joachim Schild, “Mission Impossible? The Potential for Franco-German Leadership in the Enlarged EU,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48, no. 5, 2010: 1367-90.

14. Pia Christina Wood, “The Franco-German Relationship in the Post-Maastricht Era,” in *The State of the European Union. Vol. 3: Building a European Polity?*, eds. Carolyn Rhodes and Sonia Mazey, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, 221-43.

15. Webber, *The Franco-German Relationship*.

16. Schild, “Mission Impossible,” 1369.

17. Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

wide evidence for dense networks existing at most different levels between France and Germany. While some authors stress the “*parapublic underpinnings*”¹⁸ or “*human infrastructure*”¹⁹ of Franco-German bilateral relations, that is “*cross-border interactions that belong neither to the public world of states nor to the private world of societies*,”²⁰ other research has pointed out dense interactions between members of the French and German bureaucracies.²¹ For instance, Naurin and Lindahl²² in their study on coalition patterns between state representatives in Council working groups find that “[w]hen looking at cooperation patterns, the Franco-German axis, right at the centre of the picture, certainly does not seem to have lost momentum. In fact, Germany is number one on the French list of most frequently mentioned cooperation partners, and France is number one on the German list”. Data published by Thurner, Pappi and Stoiber²³ also reveals close network ties between French and German administration in the context of the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference. The close contacts between the heads of state and governments are illustrated, for instance, by the Blaesheim meetings,²⁴ which regularly bring together the French President and the German Chancellor since 2001. In addition, since the Elysée Treaty’s 40th anniversary in 2003, the Franco-German Council of Ministers officially reunites French and German ministers twice a year.

It is generally assumed that in the meetings at the administrative and governmental levels, European issues are being discussed. Beyond that, a coordination of preferences or positions takes place. Our first structural variable is the extent of overlap between the French and German ideal points concerning a policy question under concern. If the positions of France and Germany are in agreement, ‘harmony’ is given;²⁵ if not, they need to find out whether they are able to elaborate a compromise amongst themselves. If finding a compromise is impossible, a joint

18. Ulrich Krotz, “Parapublic Underpinnings of International Relations: The Franco-German Construction of Europeanization of a Particular Kind,” *European Journal of International Relations* 13, no. 3, 2007: 385-417.

Ulrich Krotz, “Regularized Intergovernmentalism: France-Germany and Beyond (1963-2009),” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, no. 6, 2010: 147-85.

19. Alfred A. Grosser, “France and Germany: Divergent Outlooks,” *Foreign Affairs* 44, no. 1, 1965: 26.

20. Krotz, “Parapublic Underpinnings.”

21. Cf. Colette Mazzucelli, *Germany and France at Maastricht. Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union*, London: Routledge, 1997.

22. Daniel Naurin, and Rutger Lindahl, “East-North-South: Coalition-Building in the Council before and after Enlargement,” in *Unveiling the Council of the European Union. Games Governments Play in Brussels*, eds. Daniel Naurin and Helen Wallace, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 64-78.

23. Paul W. Thurner, Franz Urban Pappi, and Michael Stoiber, *EU Intergovernmental Conferences. A Quantitative Analytical Reconstruction and Data-Handbook of Domestic Preference Formation, Transnational Networks and Dynamics of Compromise During the Amsterdam Treaty Negotiations*, Arbeitspapiere / Mannheimer Zentrum Für Europäische Sozialforschung 60, Mannheim: Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2002.

24. For an overview on the meetings between 2001 and 2009 “Archives-Les rencontres de format Blaesheim,” *Portail France-Allemand*, <http://www.france-allemande.fr/Archives-Les-rencontres-de-format>, 1723.html (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

25. Again cf. Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

Franco-German initiative is very unlikely. This, in turn, significantly decreases the chances for a European agreement on integration policies for which support from both France *and* Germany is generally considered a necessary condition. If, however, the Franco-German interactions result in a compromise, or ‘harmony’ is given right from the start, these two countries can launch a European initiative. Such an initiative can relate to a situation in which gridlock amongst EU states prevails, or can relate to a new issue, not discussed at the European level before. In both cases, we can speak of ‘agenda-setting’.

At this point, the ‘Franco-German engine’ needs to interact with the other member states at the European level. Here we assume that an initiative of the two central European powers in the decision-making process should catch the attention of the other member states. Sufficient support of the latter is crucial for the successful transition of the Franco-German initiative into a European integration step. This is because European integration issues, or matters of ‘high politics’ defined as changes in the primary law, generally demand for unanimous decisions of all EU member states. This also means that each member state can prevent integration advances by a veto. In most other issues of ‘low politics’ or ‘day-to-day policymaking’, however, voting usually happens under qualified majority; although even here a consensus generally is the norm.²⁶ If a Franco-German proposal finds support by a sufficient number of other member states, a new policy or integration step is possible. Of course, as being forward-looking actors, Germany and France should take the anticipated reactions of the other actors or veto players into account.²⁷

Support for a Franco-German initiative can be attained *per se*, by the simple location of the proposal in the preference spectrum. In fact, it has been argued that “[p]aradoxically, the greater the divergence between French and German preferences on a given issue is, the more likely it is that, if a common Franco-German position is developed, this will be ‘multilateralized’ and taken over by the EU as a whole.”²⁸ This hypothesis predicts that support on the EU level should be higher in the Franco-German ‘compromise’ scenario as compared to the ‘harmony’ scenario sketched above. In the case of initial dissent between France and Germany, there is a higher likelihood that the positions of other member states might also be accounted for. While other member states might see a danger of a Franco-German *directoire* in the case of ‘harmony’, they might accept a Franco-German compromise proposal developed after an initial dissent, because they assume that their preferences

26. Mikko Mattila, “Roll Call Analysis of Voting in the European Union Council of Ministers after the 2004 Enlargement,” *European Journal of Political Research* 48, no. 6, 2009: 840-57. Jeffrey Lewis, “How Institutional Environments Facilitate Co-Operative Negotiation Styles in EU Decision Making,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 17, no. 5, 2010: 648 – 64.

27. George Tsebelis, *Veto Players*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

28. Webber, *The Franco-German Relationship*.

might be taken into account. Theoretically this is linked to principal agent theory and transaction cost economics. In such a reading, negotiations on a compromise between France and Germany represent negotiations between two major “*hypothetical coalitions [...] each of whose members share a common interest in a certain potentially salient aspect of the expected outcomes of policy interactions.*”²⁹ The two countries at the centre of Europe then act as representatives or “*proxies,*”³⁰ for ‘their’ hypothetical coalition. If they are regarded as agents,³¹ the other EU partners of their hypothetical coalitions can be regarded as the principals. For the principals, the delegation of the negotiations to the ‘Franco-German engine’ lowers transaction costs since interactions between two actors can be regarded as more stringent as compared to negotiations between 27 countries. In particular, other EU member states can hope for a ‘sounder’ outcome of the negotiations as well as a quicker resolution of conflicts. However, delegation is only legitimate or at least acceptable if the respective internal cohesion of the hypothetical coalitions is strong, i.e. preferences within the group of countries overlap.³² Interestingly, network analyses of EU decision-making show that France and Germany, indeed, seem to tie Northern and Southern camps in the EU.³³ Also data on preferences reveal that France and Germany are often located in different camps.³⁴ But again, this does not preclude that France and Germany cannot play an active role if their initial ideal points diverge.

At the same time, there are additional mechanisms that can explain why a Franco-German proposal might find support. Constructivists might argue that persuasion can take place. On the rationalist side, support can be ‘bought’ through side payments and linking issues. A negative side payment would be coercion in the form of some form of threat. Finally, support might be gained by playing the exit option card. The credible threat of a Franco-German ‘going it alone’ might ‘discipline’ those states that are reluctant towards a new integration step but that are even more reluctant towards France and Germany circumventing the EU. Against the backdrop of the institutionalized enhanced cooperation procedure, the exit option card can also be played inside the EU by creating a subgroup of countries that is willing to pursue a common policy without all nations on board.

29. Fritz W. Scharpf, *Games Real Actors Play. Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.

30. Schild, “Mission Impossible.”

31. Gary J. Miller, “The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 8, 2005:, 203-25.


32. Miller, “The Political Evolution,” 206.

33. Cf. Naurin and Lindahl, “East-North-South.”


34. Robert Thomson, “Actor Alignments in the European Union before and after Enlargement,” *European Journal of Political Research* 48, no. 6, 2009: 756-81.

Figure 1: Stylized model of the Franco-German engine

STEP 1: Franco-German level



STEP 2: EU level



Finally, it could be hypothesized that the structural variables, in particular the location of the Franco-German positions in the entire EU preference spectrum, can impact on the actions taken by the Franco-German couple. If more distant initial policy positions of France and Germany demand from these two actors the formulation of policies that fall into the common win-set of all EU actors, this policy compromise should be easier to 'sell' to the others than policies that merely reflect Franco-German 'harmony'. In a similar vein Schild³⁵ argues that "[a]t the European level, leadership ambitions will be more acceptable if France and Germany can convince their partners that they are exercised in the name of common European

35. Schild, "Mission Impossible," 1384.

goals and not only in the national interests of the two presumed leaders.” Accordingly we expect that the use of coercion or side-payments as a strategy to build support for a policy proposition is more likely in the case of initial Franco-German ‘harmony’. Figure 1 summarizes the main components of our theoretical model.

Methods and Data

In the following empirical chapters we will apply our theoretical framework to selected instances of EU decision-making. The main analytical question driving our case studies is whether there is evidence of a ‘Franco-German engine’, i.e. whether France and Germany successfully act together as a team of integration agents that drive integration forward. If the answer is yes, how does it work? If no evidence for a ‘Franco-German engine’ is found, we want to explain why there is none. The case studies are constructed around the following questions: do bilateral interactions occur and does a Franco-German compromise or policy proposal (‘agenda-setting’) result from these interactions? Relating to preferences, we investigate whether there is a convergence of Franco-German preferences in the specific case and how the positions of France and Germany relate to the spectrum of preferences in the EU. We then trace the process of European policy-making. Particular focus will be laid on the question of the mechanisms of the policy process, as causal process observations³⁶ are important for establishing causality.³⁷

The empirical chapter of this article comprises two main parts. We first discuss the relevance of the Franco-German engine for ‘policy-setting’ and ‘policy shaping decisions’,³⁸ i.e. its role in ‘day-to-day policymaking’, by drawing on the “Decision-making in the European Union” (DEUII) dataset.³⁹ Based on our analysis of the preference structures and the related analysis by Thomson,⁴⁰ we argue that the impact of the ‘Franco-German engine’ in ‘low politics’ seems limited, in general. We do not exclude that Franco-German ambitions in individual cases might matter, but overall there is little systematic evidence that a ‘Franco-German engine’ broadly marks EU policy-making.

In the second part, we analyse integration related questions, concentrating on issues of vertical integration. The reason for excluding horizontal integration,

36. Henry E. Brady, “Data-Set Observations Versus Causal-Process Observations: The 2002 U.S. Presidential Election,” in *Rethinking Social Inquiry*. Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, eds. Henry E. Brady and David Collier, 2010, 237-42.

37. Note that the resistance towards taking mechanisms empirically into account might explain some parts of the scepticism vis-à-vis the ‘Franco-German engine’ in the quantitative literature.

38. Peterson and Bomberg, *Decision-Making*.

39. Robert Thomson, Javier Arregui, Dirk Leuffen, Rory Costello, James Cross, Robin Hertz, and Thomas Jensen, “A New Dataset on Decision-Making in the European Union before and after the 2004 and 2007 Enlargements (Deuii),” *Journal of European Public Policy* 19, no. 4, 2012: 604-22.

40. Thomson, *Resolving Controversy*.

i.e. enlargement, is that the literature generally agrees that we cannot speak of a ‘Franco-German engine’ towards enlargements.⁴¹ France, in particular, has acted as a brakeman in the first enlargement round,⁴² and the same according to most observers can also be said about the latest rounds of Eastern enlargement.⁴³ Concerning vertical integration we have selected different ‘high politics’ or ‘history-making decisions’⁴⁴ from different policy areas. In maximizing the variance between policy areas, we follow Gerring’s⁴⁵ “diverse case” selection strategy which can be used for hypothesis building and hypothesis testing purposes. In our case studies we use process-tracing⁴⁶ to distil the presence and the functioning of a ‘Franco-German engine’.

Empirical Analysis

Day-to-day Policy Making

The impact of the Franco-German tandem in day-to-day policymaking is hard to assess, given the sheer quantity of legislation passed by the European Union. While there certainly are examples of law-making where France and Germany seem to play a special role—consider for instance the most recent case of the financial transaction tax to which we referred to in the introduction—it is hard to assess whether such examples actually reflect regular patterns. In addition, it is unclear whether these two countries form a unique case or rather stand for just one coalition pattern amongst numerous others. Most research on the Council underlines that, indeed, coalition patterns seem rather unstable.⁴⁷

A recently published extended version of the DEU dataset,⁴⁸ containing information on the preferences and saliences of EU actors can help to shed some light on at least some questions that we raised in our theoretical part of this article. In particular, it contributes to a better understanding of the preference structure

41. Cf. Hendriks and Morgan, *The Franco German Axis*.

42. Cf. Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998.

43. Patrick McCarthy, “France, Germany, the IGC and Eastern Enlargement,” in *The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union*, ed. Douglas Webber, London: Routledge, 1999, 43-59. Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” *International Organization* 55, no. 1, 2001: 47-80. Frank Schimmelfennig, *The EU, Nato and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

44. Peterson and Bomberg, *Decision-Making*.

45. John Gerring, *Case Study Research. Principles and Practices*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

46. Alexander L. George, and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.

47. Mikko Mattila, “Voting and Coalitions in the Council after Enlargement,” in *Unveiling the Council of the European Union. Games Governments Play in Brussels*, eds. Daniel Naurin and Helen Wallace, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 23-35.

48. Cf. Thomson et al., “A New Dataset on Decision-Making.”

underlying EU decision-making. In fact, a previous and more limited version of this dataset has also been used by Selck and Kaeding⁴⁹ for their analysis of interests and success rates in EU decision-making. We basically replicate their work to also include the period after Eastern enlargement into our analysis. The dataset, in total, contains information on 125 legislative proposals issued between 1996 and 2008.⁵⁰ On the basis of expert interviews, a team of researchers collected information on the positions of the member states, the European Commission and the European Parliament for all these issues. In addition, the outcome was coded. For all issues the positions are coded and normalized to range between a position of “0” and “100”. “0” and “100” thus form the extreme points in the spectrum of positions of all actors and the reference point.⁵¹

Table 1 Correlation matrix and average distances between member state positions; Source: DEUII (Thomson et al. 2012); the table replicates and extends Selck and Kaeding’s (2004) table 5.

	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Netherlands</i>	<i>Poland</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>Outcome</i>
<i>Correlation</i>							
France	1	0,27	0,55	0,18	0,17	0,10	0,19
Germany	-	1	0,25	0,27	0,01	0,29	0,25
Italy	-	-	1	0,11	0,33	0,07	0,21
Netherlands	-	-	-	1	0,15	0,52	0,23
Poland	-	-	-	-	1	0,15	0,25
UK	-	-	-	-	-	1	0,33
Outcome	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
<i>Average distances</i>							
France	0	35,14	23,05	37,70	36,07	41,11	37,63
Germany	-	0	37,05	33,11	43,32	32,46	34,74
Italy	-	-	0	39,92	42,53	41,40	36,57
Netherlands	-	-	-	0	39,06	23,56	35,22
Poland	-	-	-	-	0	40,42	34,89
UK	-	-	-	-	-	0	32,29
Outcome	-	-	-	-	-	-	0

In the following, we are primarily interested to find out how the preferences of France and Germany overall relate to one another. Is there a high overlap of positions between these two states relative to other countries? Table 1 replicates and

49. Selck and Kaeding, “Divergent Interests.”

50. Cf. Thomson et al., “A New Dataset on Decision-Making.”

51. Due to space constraints, we cannot elaborate the practice of the dataset in more detail; the reader is invited to consult Thomson et al. for further information.

extends previous work by Selck and Kaeding⁵² by including more data and countries. The table presents information on the correlation between the positions of different countries and the outcome of the European negotiations. Also the average distances are reported over countries and the outcome (issues for which information on one or both actors of these dyads was missing were excluded during the calculation of average distances).

The data clearly underlines that the positions of France and Germany are not particularly close to one another. In terms of preferences, France correlates a lot more strongly with Italy than with Germany. For Germany, the closest allies in terms of similar positions are the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. However, France is comparatively close as well. Particularly close ties seem to exist between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Poland is relatively far apart from most other countries in our sample. If at all, there seems to be some overlap with France.

Based on these results, the *directoire* scenario of France and Germany being in a state of ‘harmony’ (as referred to in the theoretical part of this article) and imposing their common interests on others can be discarded. In our view, Schild⁵³ is right in stressing that from this alone one cannot reject the possibility of a ‘Franco-German engine’. As discussed above, differing preferences of France and Germany might enable these countries to formulate compromise solutions that might find the support of other member states. But, unfortunately, this reasoning is not supported by the findings of Thomson.⁵⁴ Using the same data, DEUII, Thomson has investigated how good a solution modelled on the ‘Franco-German engine’ predicts the outcomes in these specific EU negotiations. Based on a comparative assessment of different models, he shows that the predictions of a Franco-German model are comparatively poor.⁵⁵ This is in line with earlier findings by de Schoutheete⁵⁶, who concludes that “*although France and Germany together have exerted a ‘significant influence on the development of European affairs’, the idea that EU decisions are to a large extent predetermined by bi- or trilateral agreements is unsupported by any evidence.*”⁵⁷ In fact, the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) generally gives us the most satisfactory account of EU decision-making.⁵⁸

52. Selck and Kaeding, “Divergent Interests.”

53. Schild, “Mission Impossible,” 1384.

54. Thomson, *Resolving Controversy*.

55. *Ibid.*, 221.

56. Philippe De Schoutheete, *The Community and its sub-systems*, ed. William Wallace, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

57. As cited by Webber, *The Franco-German Relationship*.

58. Cf. Christopher H. Achen, “Institutional Realism and Bargaining Models,” in *The European Union Decides*, eds. Robert Thomson, Frans N. Stokman, Christopher H. Achen and Thomas König, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 86-123.

The DEU data unfortunately lacks information about the processes of decision-making and we can only in parts formulate inferences about the causal mechanisms. Therefore our analysis presented above is limited to an investigation of some structural but important ingredients of EU decision-making, preferences and outcomes. Building upon this basis we conclude that there is little evidence for a strong ‘Franco-German engine’ in day-to-day policy-making. Perhaps this is not really surprising, since the ‘Franco-German engine’ is usually referred to in the context of integration debates. Particularly those who regret a missing ‘Franco-German engine’ usually do not want more secondary law production from ‘Brussels’, but rather more ‘history making’ integration steps. That is why we now turn to the ‘high politics’ of European integration.

Single Market

Market integration has been at the heart of the European integration project since the 1950s. Although the development of the Single Market is still on-going, the most important major steps of market integration in Europe were taken between the 1950s and the 1990s. Most notably, of course, we think of the founding act of the European Economic Community, the signing and implementing of the Treaties of Rome as well as the ‘completing the Internal Market’ project launched during the 1980s. Much has been written on these topics, including the role of the ‘Franco-German engine’.⁵⁹ Therefore we only shortly address the role of the ‘Franco-German engine’ in market integration, before moving to other at least in parts less exploited policy areas.

There is general agreement that France and Germany can be considered pivotal actors in the founding of the Common Market. However, one must not forget that the Benelux countries and federalists around Jean Monnet were the driving force behind the treaty establishing the European Economic Community. For example, it was the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, who was mandated by the Messina conference of 1955 to draft a report on economic integration that later formed the basis for the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) preparing the Treaties of Rome. For Gerbet “[l]a ‘relance européenne’ qui suivit à partir de 1955 ne fut pas une initiative franco-allemande, mais bénéluxienne. Elle se concrétisa cependant grâce à l’accord des deux pays, la France obtenant l’Euratom et l’Allemagne le Marché Commun général, par les traités de Rome en 1957.”⁶⁰ Gerbet stresses that France and Germany did not launch the initiative but that these two

59. Cf. Pierre Gerbet, “Le rôle du couple France-Allemagne dans la création et développement des communautés européennes,” in *Motor für Europa? Deutsch-Französischer Bilateralismus und Europäische Integration*, eds. Robert Picht and Wolfgang Wessels, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1990, 69-119. Leuffen et al., *Differentiated Integration*.

60. Gerbet, “Le rôle du couple France-Allemagne,” 21.

countries decisively shaped the “modalities”;⁶¹ showing that many compromises were worked out between France and Germany, on parts at the highest political level between Guy Mollet and Konrad Adenauer.

Similarly, Gerbet finds for the Single European Act (SEA) that “[l]’*entente franco-allemande joua un rôle non exclusive mais important dans l’adoption et la mise en œuvre de l’Acte Unique européen pour la réalisation du grand marché intérieur.*”⁶² This is in line with most intergovernmental accounts of the SEA.⁶³ German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Italian counterpart Emilio Colombo issued one of the first visible intergovernmental initiatives, which served as basis for the heads of state and government for their “Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart” of June 1983, paving the way for the Dooge Report and the Commission White Paper “Completing the Internal Market”. The latter was in fact elaborated under the supervision of British Internal Market Commission Lord Arthur Cockfield. There is thus little evidence of a pronounced Franco-German agenda-setting in case of the SEA. However, a necessary step for fruitfully engaging in these negotiations was the resolution of the British budgetary question at the Fontainebleau European summit in June 1984, where Germany and France played a crucial role. The decision to appoint Jacques Delors as Commission President can also be seen as an important contributing factor to the successful outcome of the SEA negotiations.

The SEA combines market-liberalization measures with institutional reform. It was not before the shift in French economic policy-making in 1983 that France became ready to follow the road of liberalization. According to Moravcsik: “*EC reform rested on interstate bargains between Britain, France, and Germany. An essential precondition for reform was the convergence of the economic policy prescriptions of ruling party coalitions in these countries following the election of the British Conservative party in 1979 and the reversal of French Socialist party policy in 1983.*”⁶⁴ Especially France and the United Kingdom held diverging preferences on the SEA. While the French government under Mitterrand, largely supported by Germany, was pushing for institutional reforms of the EU, the United Kingdom was more interested in the liberalization part of the package. For Nicholas Jabko the “*key political actors who became the promoters of Europe in the 1980s and 1990s were extremely strange bedfellows. They shared a desire to change the status*

61. Gerbet, “Le rôle du couple France-Allemagne,” 80.

62. Gerbet, “Le rôle du couple France-Allemagne,” 72.

63. Cf. Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community,” *International Organization* 45, no. 1, 1991: 19-56. Geoffrey Garrett, “International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community’s Internal Market,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2, 1992: 533-60.

64. Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act,” 21.

quo, but for very different reasons.”⁶⁵ For Moravcsik⁶⁶ “[t]he only major exception to lowest-common-denominator bargaining concerned whether to amend the Treaty of Rome to promote majority voting on internal market matters. On this point, the British yielded to Franco-German pressure to convene an intergovernmental conference, at least in part because the Franco-German position was backed by the threat of exclusion.” According to this logic, France and Germany managed to keep the UK on board with their threat of ‘going it alone’.⁶⁷ ⁶⁸ It has also been argued that the assurance of increasing structural funds and promoting coherence in the EU can be regarded as a positive side-payment to assure the Southern member states’ support for market liberalization. The doubling of structural funds was finally decided at the Brussels summit of February 1988; Germany contributed to this augmentation in substantive terms.⁶⁹

How important was the ‘Franco-German engine’ for bringing about these major steps of market integration? Certainly, the consent of France and Germany is a necessary condition for the success of these measures. However, this also holds for the other actors since all member states under the condition of unanimity possessed a veto threat in the negotiations.⁷⁰ The only means to overcome a possible veto was to issue exit threats, which according to some observers was, indeed, used by France and Germany in order to ‘discipline’ the UK which was more reluctant concerning the institutional reforms of the SEA. While France and Germany clearly supported integration in both cases, the treaties of Rome and the SEA, agenda-setting was often executed by other actors: agreement on the Rome treaties was fostered by the Benelux countries and Jean Monnet’s action committee for the United States of Europe, while in the case of the SEA different governmental, parliamentary and supranational actors as well as transnational interest groups such as the European Round Table of Industrialists actively set the agenda.⁷¹ At the same time, Germany and France contributed to elaborating

65. Nicolas Jabko, *Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe, 1985-2005*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006, 28.

66. Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act,” 49.

67. We will see the working of this mechanism in more detail in our chapter on the Schengen border regime.

68. Gerbet disagrees partly concerning the overlap of French and German positions: “*Les intérêts de la France et de l’Allemagne ne coïncidaient pas. [...] Mais en dépit des divergences sur les problèmes techniques, les deux délégations française et allemande prirent conscience de l’enjeu politique et s’accordèrent pour aboutir.*” Thus, they agree on the greater outlook, but favour different means. In such a perspective, the general goal of fostering European integration is an important element of the Franco-German engine. In the end, the outcome seems to be quite in line with these Franco-German goals. See Gerbet “Le Rôle Du Couple France-Allemagne,” 115.

69. Cf. Dirk Leuffen, “Cohabitation und Europapolitik. Politische Entscheidungsprozesse im Mehrebenensystem.” Zugl: Mannheim, Univ Diss, 2006, Nomos, 2007.

70. Tsebelis, *Veto Players*.

71. Cf. Wayne Sandholtz, and John Zysman, “1992: Recasting the European Bargain,” *World Politics* 42, no. 1, 1989: 95-128 Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act.” David Cameron, “The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences,” in *Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the ‘New’ European Community*, ed. Alberta Sbragia, Washington: Brooking, 1992, 23-74. Garrett, “International Cooperation.”

compromises that critically shaped the negotiation outcomes. Our picture of the Franco-German engine in market integration is thus mixed. In both instances, Franco-German coordination seems to have reduced transaction costs, as expected by the theory. At the same time, it is difficult to attribute a strong causal role to the ‘engine’ as such. In our reading, it rather acted as a facilitating and only partly as an outcome-shaping factor.

Schengen

The idea of an abolishment of border controls at EC internal frontiers goes back to the 1970s. Point 10 of the final communiqué issued at the European Summit held in Paris on 9 and 10 December 1974 mandated the European Commission to set up a ‘working party’ on the establishment of a European passport Union. The Report presented by the Commission to the Council on 3 July 1975 states that “[t]he second immediate objective of the Passport Union is the abolition of identity checks at Community internal frontiers, irrespective of whether these are carried out on nationals of the Member States or of non-member countries. This would however necessitate reorganization of the checks at external frontiers of the Community to be carried out by each Member State on behalf of all others, and this could be a starting point for the development of a common approach on the part of Member States in that they would accord equality of treatment to nationals of all non-member countries.”⁷² While the Paris summit communiqué of 1974 suggests a uniform support for the establishment of a passport union, the member states in reality were more divided on the issue. According to Gehring’s⁷³ succinct analysis, the six founding states who broadly supported a passport Union encountered fervent opposition from the new member states. The United Kingdom and Ireland did not have land borders with the other member states; the same holds for Greece, which had acceded to the EC in 1981. At the same time, ideational or identity-related reasons also seem to have impacted on at least the British reluctance towards integration in this policy field.⁷⁴ Ireland did not want to endanger the Common Travel Area with the United Kingdom; Denmark, in the 1980s, in order to scrap its borders to the south, would have needed to establish new borders to the north and leave the Nordic Passport Union.⁷⁵

The diverging preferences amongst the member states concerning the abolishment of border controls in the early 1980s resulted in a genuine gridlock in

72. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 7/75; COM(75) 322; 2 July 1975.

73. Thomas Gehring, “Die Politik des koordinierten Alleingangs. Schengen und die Abschaffung der Personenkontrollen an den Binnengrenzen der Europäischen Union,” *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* 5, no. 1, 1998: 43-78.

74. Cf. Leuffen et al., *Differentiated Integration*.

75. Cf. Ruben Zaiotti, *Cultures of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.

this field. Different Commission proposals for promoting the passport Union were substantively watered down by the member states.⁷⁶ All this stood in sharp contrast to the enormous progress that was achieved in ‘completing the Internal Market’ at that time. Against this backdrop, François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl took a decisive step in June 1984, by announcing a gradual abolishment of controls at their common borders. The decision was formalized through the Saarbrücken Agreement of July 1984.⁷⁷ The Benelux countries, already united in a passport Union since the 1960s, reacted rapidly: By addressing a memorandum to France and Germany, they demanded the establishment of a common border regime that was to become the ‘Schengen Agreement’, signed in the small border town of Schengen (Luxembourg) in June 1985. As an international legal agreement, ‘Schengen’ at its inception did not fall under the EC’s treaty framework; in fact, it explicitly side-lined it. At the same time, the preamble signalled the European ambitions of the project by including a reference to citizens of all EC member states.⁷⁸ This is why ‘Schengen’ can be called a ‘laboratory’ for enhanced cooperation.⁷⁹

‘Schengen’ was implemented by the Schengen Convention that was signed in 1990 and entered into force in 1995. It was finally incorporated into the EU legal framework through a protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty. In 1997, Austria, Italy, Portugal, and Spain joined the regime, to be followed by Greece in 2000 and the members of the Nordic Passport Union (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Norway) in 2001. In 2007, all accession states from the first round of Eastern enlargement (with the exception of Cyprus) joined the Schengen Area. Switzerland became a member in 2008, Liechtenstein in 2011. Bulgaria and Romania at the time of writing still negotiate their accession into ‘Schengen’. The Treaty of Amsterdam granted an opt-out to the UK and Ireland. Simultaneously, the treaty allowed these countries to opt-in in the future, i.e. to take part in some or all of the arrangements of the Schengen *acquis*, albeit after unanimous agreement of the Schengen member states in the Council.⁸⁰

Gehring⁸¹ attributes great importance to the ‘Franco-German engine’ in the case of ‘Schengen’. Through a policy of “*koordinierter Alleingang*” the two countries signalled their readiness to move forward in their integration endeavours,

76. Cf. Hans Claudius Taschner, “Schengen oder die Abschaffung der Personenkontrollen an den Binnengrenzen der EG.” In *Vorträge, Reden und Berichte aus dem Europa-Institut*. Saarbrücken: Universität des Saarlandes, 1990.

77. Cf. Gehring, “Politik Des Koordinierten Alleingangs.”

78. Cf. Taschner, “Schengen.”

79. Jörg Monar, “The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors and Costs,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39, no. 4, 2001: 747-64.

80. Cf. Leuffen et al., *Differentiated Integration*.

81. Gehring, “Politik des koordinierten Alleingangs.”

if necessary even beyond the treaty framework. The centripetal forces of ‘Schengen’⁸² underline that France and Germany—under specific conditions—were able to actively shape an integrationist agenda by making an active use of exit threats.

How does the ‘Schengen’ case relate to our theoretical framework? We see that there is, indeed, a close Franco-German coordination between actors on different governmental levels. Since 1983, contacts between Mitterrand and Kohl displayed a new quality and their common endeavours seemed to find support on lower governmental levels. This appears necessary to provide the logistic support for developing, for example, the Saarbrücken Agreement. In the case of ‘Schengen’ we find strong overlapping preferences between the two heads of state and government, Kohl and Mitterrand. The Benelux countries align with France and Germany, but despite general support by the European Commission these actors did not succeed in getting the brakemen’s consent. In fact, there have been two camps inside the EU—those in favour of closer cooperation in justice and home affairs, and those who are more reluctant. Since the intra-EC negotiations broke down against the institutional backdrop of unanimity that is necessary in order to extend the Communities competences, France and Germany decided to play the exit card. The Saarbrücken Agreement that led to ‘Schengen’ thus signalled the strong support for cooperation in the policy area and the willingness to ‘go it alone’, if necessary. As Gehring⁸³ and others have underlined, the decision to leave the treaty framework was a means of last resort. The idea was not to hollow out the Community policy of free movement of persons but rather to enhance it. The development of vertical and horizontal integration in this policy field over time makes ‘Schengen’ a success story for both, the European project and the ‘Franco-German engine’. This ‘engine’, however, had its greatest impact at the initial phase of the ‘Schengen’ process. At later stages, we find less evidence for a Franco-German effect on deepening and widening the border regime.

Economic and Monetary Union

Integration in the policy fields covered by the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is clearly a case in which Franco-German cooperation is not characterised by ‘harmony’⁸⁴ from the outset, but by a continuing need for compromise. French and German preferences in these fields generally do not overlap, with the exemption of an overall preference of integration over non-integration,

82. Cf. Alkuin Kölliker, “Bringing Together or Driving Apart the Union? Towards a Theory of Differentiated Integration,” *West European Politics* 24, no. 4, 2001: 125-51.

83. Gehring, “Politik des koordinierten Alleingangs.”

84. Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

which is shared by both countries, predominantly for economic reasons.⁸⁵ Negotiations on concrete ‘history-making decisions’⁸⁶ have constantly highlighted a ‘double antagonism’ of the two main economies at the centre of Europe, which concerns both their economic convictions and their political visions for the Euro area.⁸⁷ In the 1970s-1990s, ‘Economists’ (led by Germany) wanted to supranationalise monetary policy *after* the achievement of sufficient economic harmonisation, while ‘Monetarists’ (led by France) argued for the introduction of a common currency as a catalyst, i.e. *before* economic harmonisation was achieved. Moreover, since the 1980s and until today there is a conflict between ordo-liberal proponents of ‘free-market competition’ (led by Germany) and more state interventionist supporters of a European *gouvernement économique* (led by France). In the literature, these differences can be traced from the negotiations surrounding The Hague Summit in 1969 at which President Pompidou and Chancellor Brandt asked for the later called ‘Werner Plan’ that sketched the way to EMU, over European Monetary System (EMS), the Maastricht Treaty negotiations that set up EMU, the conflict on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), until the recent reforms of Euro area governance in the context of the ‘Euro Crisis’.⁸⁸

Despite these major differences of the two largest Euro area economies,⁸⁹ decisive—however differentiated⁹⁰—integration steps have been taken in the last two decades. On the one hand, the Maastricht Treaty set up EMU and supranationalised monetary policy, which is exclusively governed by the supranational European Central Bank (ECB) since 1 June 1998. On the other hand, economic and especially fiscal policy have become a matter of intergovernmental coordination with Maastricht. Moreover, initial steps towards more supranational economic

85. Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 386ff.

86. Peterson and Bomberg, *Decision-Making*.

87. Ivo Maes, “On the Origins of the Franco-German EMU Controversies,” *European Journal of Law and Economics* 17, no. 1, 2004: 21-39.

88. Richard E. Baldwin, and Charles Wyplosz, *The Economics of European Integration*. Second Edition, Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Education, 2006. Jens Beckert, and Wolfgang Streek, “Die Fiskalkrise Und Die Einheit Europas,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 62, no. 4, 2012: 7-17. Paul De Grauwe, *Economics of Monetary Union*. Eight Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Kenneth Dyson, *Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe*, London and New York: Longman, 1994. Kenneth Dyson, *The Politics of the Euro-Zone: Stability or Breakdown?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Kenneth Dyson, and Kevin Featherstone, *The Road to Maastricht. Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Martin Heipertz, and Amy Verdun, “The Dog That Would Never Bite? What We Can Learn from the Origins of the Stability and Growth Pact,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 5, 2004: 765-80. Martin Heipertz, and Amy Verdun *Ruling Europe. The Politics of the Stability and Growth Pact*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Jean-François Jamet, Werner Mussler, and Stefaan De Corte, eds. *EU Economic Governance: The French and German Views*. Brussels: Centre for European Studies, 2011. Erik Jones, *The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union: Integration and Idiosyncrasy*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. Tobias Künstein and Wolfgang Wessels, “Die Europäische Union in der Währungs- und Finanzkrise: Eckdaten und Schlüsselereignisse,” *Integration* 20, no. 4, 2011: 308-22.

89. OECD, *OECD Economic Surveys: Euro Area 2012*, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012

90. Leuffen et al., *Differentiated Integration*. 152ff, 165.

governance have recently been taken in response to the ‘Euro Crisis’ between 2010 and 2012. Today, EMU is complemented by the reinforced ‘Stability and Growth Pact’ and the intergovernmental ‘fiscal compact’, which at the time of writing is in process of ratification. All in all, EMU with the Euro as single currency at its core, is justifiably called “*the flagship project of European integration*.”⁹¹ What about the ‘Franco-German Engine’ in this case? Does it exist, and if yes, how does it work? In order to answer these questions, we analyse the two most important ‘history-making decisions’ more closely, namely the set-up of EMU, accorded with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, and the reform of the EMU in the context of the ‘Euro Crisis’ between 2010 and 2012.

The ‘Franco-German Engine’ is widely seen as crucial for the successful negotiation process of the Maastricht Treaty and especially the set-up of EMU.⁹² In fact, the two countries represented “*a privileged, inner negotiation core*”⁹³ of the two most important veto players in the general EMU negotiations. All French and German governments since the late 1960s had a strong interest in economic and monetary integration in general—especially for economic reasons,⁹⁴ but also for ideological ones.⁹⁵ For France, EMU was the way to reconcile its “*desire to bind Germany into the EU and the Atlantic alliance with French ambitions to build an economy equivalent to Germany’s*.”⁹⁶ A common currency of a larger group of European countries, including the United Kingdom or Italy, was regarded as a means to loosen the Bundesbank’s power over its own interest and exchange rate policies, at a time in which the German central bank was widely seen as “*Europe’s de facto central bank*.”⁹⁷ Supranational discretion over monetary policy was thereby envisioned to be counterbalanced by the set-up of a strong intergovernmental *gouvernement économique*.⁹⁸

By contrast, the foundation of Germany’s general preference for economic and monetary integration lies in its history-induced sense of responsibility for Europe. This is why, despite concerns of a potential loss of German influence in

91. Simon Hix and Bjorn Hoyland, *The Political System of the EU*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

92. For an overview, see Mazzucelli, *Germany and France at Maastricht*.

Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 379ff. Kenneth Dyson, *The Politics of the Euro-Zone: Stability or Breakdown?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 76.

93. Dyson, *The Politics of the Euro Zone*, 80.

94. Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*.

95. Dyson, *The Politics of the Euro Zone*, 79ff.

96. Jonathan Story, “Monetary Union. Economic Competition and Political Negotiation,” in *The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union*, ed. Douglas Webb, London: Routledge, 1999, 20.

97. Ibid., see also Joseph M. Grieco, “The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist Research Programme,” *Review of International Studies* 21, no. 1, 1995: 35f.

98. David J. Howarth, “Making and Breaking the Rules: French Policy on EU ‘Gouvernement Économique’ and the Stability and Growth Pact,” *European Integration online Papers* 9, no. 15, 2005.

EMU, Chancellor Kohl in particular was “*in principle pro-EMU*.”⁹⁹ An often read geopolitical argument states that Germany traded EMU for its reunification in 1990.¹⁰⁰ However, the German government “*consistently if cautiously* [promoted EMU] *from, at the very latest, the Hanover summit of mid-1988*.”¹⁰¹ It thus seems that Germany did not foster EMU for geopolitical, but primarily for economic reasons. For instance, at the late 1980s, 60% of German industrialists supported further monetary integration in view of their positive experiences concerning exchange rate stability and growing exports due to the European Monetary System (EMS).¹⁰² Moreover, some limitations on Germany’s influence in European monetary policy were generally perceived as an acceptable “*price for fostering a more effective EC coalition against Japan*,”¹⁰³ the most dynamic economy of the 1980s. Nevertheless Germany strongly advocated for independence of the future European Central Bank (ECB), favoured stability-oriented convergence criteria, and opposed political influence of member states via a *gouvernement économique*.

Economically inevitable, the EU provides “*only one bed for two dreams*”¹⁰⁴ in this policy field. This is why Germany and France once again became ‘strange bedfellows’.¹⁰⁵ In order to find compromise between their diverging preferences on central policy issues like the degree of vertical integration of monetary policy, the distribution of power between EU institutions, or the timing of EMU,¹⁰⁶ Germany and France ‘institutionalised’ their relation through a complex and multilevel framework of bilateral negotiation forums, including formal and informal Franco-German summits, the Franco-German Economic Council, secret Franco-German ‘bilaterals’ in parallel to the IGC on Maastricht, as well as regular meetings of high governmental officials.¹⁰⁷ The intense and trustful cooperation enabled the partners to act as “*the key political animateurs of EMU*”¹⁰⁸ that provided the project with “*the essential drive and legitimacy*.”¹⁰⁹

99. Dyson and Featherstone, *The Road to Maastricht*, 308.

100. See for example Karl Kaltenthaler, “German Interests in European Monetary Integration,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40, no. 1, 2002: 69-87. Femke Van Esch, “Why Germany Wanted Emu: The Role of Helmut Kohl’s Belief System and the Fall of the Berlin Wall,” *German Politics* 21, no. 1, 2012: 34-52.

101. Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*, 397.

102. *Ibid.*, 392.

103. Grieco, “The Maastricht Treaty,” 38.

104. Pisany-Ferry, Jean, “Only One Bed for Two Dreams: A Critical Perspective on the Debate over Economic Governance of the Euro Area,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44, no. 4, 2006: 823-44.

105. Jabko, *Playing the Market*, 28.

106. For an overview on the most salient issues, see Madeleine O. Hosli, “Negotiating European Economic and Monetary Union,” *Homo Oeconomicus* 25, no. 2, 2008: 203-23.

107. Kenneth Dyson, “The Franco-German Relationship and Economic and Monetary Union: Using Europe to ‘Bind Leviathan’,” *West European Politics* 22, no. 1, 1999: 26.

108. Dyson, *The Politics of the Euro Zone*, 79.

109. *Ibid.*

In the final compromise, accorded with the Maastricht Treaty, the design of EMU followed in essence the German/Bundesbank view, including convergence criteria, an independent ECB with a central goal of price stability.¹¹⁰ A *gouvernement économique* was not installed on the EU level. However, France “*extracted painful concessions from Germany*”, for example the institutional design of the ECB Governing Council in which the ECB Executive Board can be outvoted by national central bank governors, or the introduction of a Euro Committee, which later became the Euro Group.¹¹¹ Most importantly, France secured a fixed timetable for the introduction of the common currency in 1999. In order to avoid a veto of the third large EU economy, Britain, which opposed EMU in principle, Germany and France made use of exit threats that “*played an important role in the negotiations.*”¹¹² In view of the expected costs for London as *the* British financial centre, the government of Prime Minister Major finally *nolensvolens* accepted EMU but secured an ‘opt-out’ for its third stage, i.e. the introduction of the Euro as the common European currency.

Regarding our model, we see that Germany and France acted as *the* agenda-setter for EMU integration. Compromise between their diverging preferences was possible because political will to find it was present and strong, and a dense institutional network ensured stable and trustful negotiations. The translation of joint Franco-German initiatives into *European* integration steps was possible because the final outcomes were generally close to the mean preferences of all EU partners.¹¹³ If they were not, as in the case of Britain, exit threats were successfully used. Franco-German leadership was “*exercised in the name of common European goals*”¹¹⁴ and thus acceptable. Regarding the highly salient question of the timing of EMU, Germany and France indeed acted as “*prox[ies] for deeper divisions within the EU about EMU.*”¹¹⁵ Germany represented the ‘Economists’ camp, especially the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and—partly—the United Kingdom, while France was the proxy for the ‘Monetarists’, comprising Italy and Belgium.¹¹⁶ However, with regard to the other policy issues besides the timing of EMU there is no strong empirical backing for such a labelling,¹¹⁷ because German and French preferences on specific policy issues often lie somewhere at the centre of the preference space.

110. Hosli, “Negotiating.”
Hix and Hoyland, *The Political System of the EU*, 256f.

111. Ibid.

112. Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe*.

113. Hosli, “Negotiating,” 208.

114. Schild, “Mission Impossible.”

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. Ibid.

Two decades after Maastricht, the EU once again took ‘history-making decisions’ and fundamentally reformed EMU as well as the Stability and Growth Pact between 2010 and 2012. The reform process can thereby be understood as a ‘non-declared’ IGC: although *formally* many decisions were prepared in the usual way of EU policy making, i.e. Council and EP negotiated on the basis of a Commission proposal, the *actually* decisive preparations took place in intergovernmental settings like the “Van Rompuy Task Force on Economic Governance”¹¹⁸ or directly between the member states’ capitals. The reform was undertaken in the context of the so-called ‘Euro Crisis’ that threatened not only the directly affected countries, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy, but also the Euro area as a whole: for the first time in the EU’s history, there was (and at the time of writing still is) a possibility of *disintegration* of parts of the European project.

Throughout the whole ‘Euro Crisis’, the ‘Franco-German Engine’ was characterized by a strong general preference of preserving the Euro. In the words of French President Sarkozy at the Davos Economic Forum 2011:¹¹⁹ “*Je voudrais d’ailleurs vous dire une chose qui est très simple, c’est qu’aussi bien Mme Merkel que moi-même, jamais – vous m’entendez, jamais – nous ne laisserons tomber l’euro, jamais.*” Despite this general preference to prevent disintegration and the continuing assurances of the German Chancellor and the French President that they will “*do everything that is needed to preserve the Euro,*”¹²⁰ the whole reform of EMU and SGP demanded for compromises between diverging preferences, first and foremost of Germany and France. Instead of displaying ‘harmony’, these two countries generally strongly opposed each other, whereby acting as representatives or proxies of a “northern” and a “southern” group or hypothetical coalition of EU member states. The affiliation to these groups is similar to the above-mentioned conflict between ‘Economists’ and ‘Monetarists’: Germany’s preferences for fiscal responsibility and tough supranational surveillance of economic ‘laggards’, in combination with an *ordo-liberal*, market-based approach, matched with the preferences of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria and Finland. French preferences were largely consistent with those of Italy and Belgium, complemented by Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Especially the latter countries generally shared a preference for more relaxed fiscal policies and softer surveillance procedures, in

118. This task force was chaired by European Council President van Rompuy and comprised officials from the member states’ finance ministries, the offices of the respective heads of state and government, the ECB and the Council presidency. It was set up following a decision of the European Council. See the Council Conclusions of 25/26 March 2010, p. 5f, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/113591.pdf (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

119. Speech at the Davos 2011 World Economic Forum, <http://www.elysee.fr/president/les-actualites/discours/2011/41e-forum-economique-mondial.10535.html?search=Davos&xtmc=&xcr=>. (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

120. C.f. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 27, 2012.

combination with a greater role for (national) governments in economic governance.

The character of the ‘Euro Crisis’ as an existential crisis for EMU created a window of opportunity to reopen the 1993 Maastricht compromise on the general design of the Euro area. France’s preferences on the respective policy issues mirrored its will to finally install a ‘gouvernement économique’ for the Euro area, which it had not achieved in the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. Although Germany under Chancellor Merkel stopped refusing the term already in spring 2010,¹²¹ different visions of the content of such a *gouvernement économique* prevailed. The Economist ironically notes: “*When German bigwigs talk about economic co-ordination within the euro zone, they mean countries like Greece being forced to stick to the rules and to sort out their deficits. The French have traditionally used the words ‘European economic government’ to mean something like: politicians being allowed to bully the European Central Bank about exchange rate policies, and to flout deficit rules if their countries are large, broadly hexagonal in shape, and are known for fine wine and cheeses.*”¹²² In more sincere words, and knowing that the whole reform of EMU and the SGP as well as the preference distribution was clearly often much more complex, we identify the main contested issues between Germany and France and their respective hypothetical coalitions as follows: a) should Euro area members ignore the “no-bailout clause” of the EU treaties and quickly set up fiscal rescue mechanisms for Euro area countries in need (Germany contra, France pro), and b) should member states in turn face ‘quasi-automatic’ sanctions in order to ensure compliance with excessive deficit rules (Germany pro, France contra).

In fact, when the ‘Euro Crisis’ broke out in early 2010 as a consequence of the financial markets’ concerns that certain peripheral Euro area members would not be able to repay all the newly issued debt bonds, i.e. investors lost confidence in those countries’ mid- and long-term solvency, interest rates for all peripheral Euro area government bonds became considerably more expensive in comparison to German government bonds.¹²³ The rising costs for newly issued government bonds forced Greece and later Ireland and Portugal to call their European partners for help. While the German reaction was widely criticised as “*ignorant*” and

121. See *Portail France-Allemand*, <http://www.france-allemande.fr/Gouvernance-economique-europeenne>, 5598.html (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

122. See *The Economist*, http://www.economist.com/blogs/charlemagne/2010/02/not_federal_union_yet (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

123. See *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/16/markets-bonds-spreads-idUSLDE61F0W720100216> (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

“reluctant,”¹²⁴ and while Chancellor Merkel found herself increasingly isolated, French President Sarkozy pushed for urgent action in the form of unconditional solidarity with the partners. In particular, France demanded for the issuing of a fiscal rescue package for Greece and setting up the “European Financial Stability Facility” (EFSF).¹²⁵ On 8 May 2010, after “a big fight between Sarkozy and Merkel,”¹²⁶ the Euro area heads of state and government eventually agreed on 123 billion Euro bilateral emergency loans to Greece and the set-up of the 750 billion Euro EFSF for the whole Euro area. At the same time, the European Council initiated the reform process to fix EMU and prevent comparable crises in the future.¹²⁷ The German government, after its initial “procrastination”¹²⁸ of the problem and its defeat in the conflict on breaking the ‘no-bailout clause’, now tried to regain momentum and preserve or rebuilt its idea of a stability-oriented EMU. Germany actively revived the ‘inner negotiation core’ with France that once again reflected the wider debate on the future of EMU. Many joint initiatives resulted from this cooperation: On 18 October 2010, the German Chancellor and the French President met at Deauville, France, and issued a common proposal for a reform of the Lisbon Treaty, focusing on the set-up of a permanent rescue mechanism within EMU, the “ESM” as well as a reform of the SGP. This far-reaching proposal was widely criticised by the other EU member states for its *directoire* style of presentation. Eurogroup-President Juncker complained about the “selfish behaviour” of the ‘Franco-German engine’ and called their exclusive handling of the issue “un-european.”¹²⁹ Later, both countries managed to issue their initiatives more smoothly and successfully initiated the ‘Euro-Plus Pact’ that includes non-Euro area members into economic coordination,¹³⁰ as well as the ‘Fiscal Compact’ that reinforces the SGP reforms of the ‘Six-Pack’ and sets up additional rules for the enforcement of fiscal stability in the respective Euro area member states, for example “debt brakes” to be inscribed into national constitu-

124. Daniela Schwarzer, “Germany and the Euro: A Reluctant Leader?,” in *Where Is Germany Heading?*, eds. Renaud Dehouche and Elvire Fabry, Paris: Notre Europe, 2010, 13-20. Kurt Hübner, “German Crisis Management and Leadership - from Ignorance to Procrastination to Action,” *Asia Europe Journal* 9, no. 2-4, 2012: 159-77.

125. See *The Guardian*, May 14, 2010.

126. Ibid.

127. For the details of the reform, see European Central Bank, “The Reform of Economic Governance in the Euro Area - Essential Elements,” in *Monthly Bulletin March 2011*, ed. European Central Bank, Frankfurt/Main: European Central Bank, 2011, 99-119. House of Lords, *The Future of Economic Governance in the EU*, House of Lords European Union Committee 12th Report of Session 2010-11, London: House of Lords, 2011. Daniele Schilirò, *A New Governance for the Emu and the Economic Policy Framework*, Mpra Paper No 30237, München: Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2011. Daniela Schwarzer, “Economic Governance in Der Eurozone,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 62, no. 4, 2012: 17-24.

128. Hübner, “German Crisis.”

129. See *Der Spiegel*, 8 December, 2010.

130. Kunstein and Wessels, “Die Europäische Union in der Währungskrise.”

tions. France and Germany originally envisioned the rules of the ‘Fiscal Compact’ to become part of the EU treaties. However, in view of a veto announced by the British government under Cameron, the ‘Franco-German engine’ once again executed an ‘exit threat’ and stepped forward outside the treaty framework. In this case, only the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic remained at the sidelines, while the other 25 member states signed the ‘compact’ on 2 March 2012.¹³¹

Regarding our model, both countries shared a strong general preference of preserving the Euro and fostering integration if necessary to this end. In view of the threat posed by the ‘Euro Crisis’ and the severe time pressure to solve it, Franco-German compromises—after an initial collision on the set-up of a fiscal rescue mechanism in spring 2010—were facilitated by a dense multilevel negotiation network between the two countries and fostered because of high time pressure to take decisions, since non-action would have caused immense (economic and political) costs for both countries. The eventual creation of the term “*Merkozy*”¹³² thereby reflects the intense personal cooperation between French President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel: like in the case of the set-up of EMU with the Maastricht Treaty, bilateral Franco-German meetings at the highest possible level in Deauville, Berlin, Paris, or Frankfurt, brought about compromises on highly technical questions of single policy-making acts.¹³³ These compromises were in the end acceptable for the other EU countries because both states acted as proxies for their hypothetical coalitions, i.e. Germany and France generally represented the often dichotomised preference space. In the case of the ‘Fiscal Compact’ that was not acceptable for the Britain, the two countries executed an ‘exit threat’ and adopted the compact in the form of an intergovernmental treaty. The fierce reaction to the Franco-German Deauville meeting 2010 however shows that European partners do not accept the perceived imposition of reforms by a *directoire* of the two largest Euro area members. Although final outcomes were often closer to the German ideal points than to the French, Chancellor Merkel’s acceptance of the introduction of a permanent bailout mechanism and its actual use to preserve Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Spain from insolvency meant giving in to the most salient demand of the “southern” group of Euro area member states. In the end, Germany’s great bargaining power due to its economic strength and time pressure in the context of the ‘Euro Crisis’ also had a decisive impact on the adoption of the ‘fiscal compact’ in its actual shape.

131. “25 EU leaders sign fiscal compact treaty,” *EurActiv.com*, <http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/25-eu-leaders-sign-fiscal-compac-news-511260> (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

132. Andreas Rinke, “Europäische Sternstunde. Wie ‘Merkozy’ Die Grundlagen Eines Neuen Europas Schufen,” *Internationale Politik* 18, no. 1, 2012: 8-19.

133. *Ibid.*

Common Foreign and Security Policy

Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is one of the least institutionalized or *communautarized* policy sectors of the European Union, as it touches core sovereignty aspects of national states which are more reluctant to transfer competencies to the supranational level in this arena.¹³⁴ Consequently, this policy field is marked by a “*dispersal of preferences*”¹³⁵ and institutional weakness—discussions generally centre around the dividing line between an inter-governmental design of CFSP with the Council as major player and unanimity as decision rule opposed to a more supranational design, with more power for the European Commission and the European Parliament and the introduction of qualified majority vote (QMV).¹³⁶ Regarding the role of the ‘Franco-German engine’ in CFSP, Peterson and Sjursen underline that “*the state of the Franco-German alliance*” is viewed as one of four “*particularly important determinants of the EU's role as a global actor*”—besides the “*performance of the Commission*”, the “*transatlantic relations*” and the “*frequency of political crisis in Europe*.”¹³⁷ According to their view, “[i]n foreign and security policy perhaps more than any other EU policy sector, the Germans rarely take position without consulting the French, who are adept at getting just enough German support to label initiatives or positions as ‘Franco-German.’”¹³⁸ In the following section we analyze five major ‘history-making decisions’¹³⁹ in CFSP, namely the European Defence Community in 1952, the European Political Cooperation in 1970, the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.

The beginnings of closer cooperation in foreign and security policy date back to the project of a European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952, which failed in 1954. It was only in 1970 that member states for the first time “*started to formally exchange information and coordinate positions*” in this policy field through the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). With the Single European Act (SEA), entering into force in 1988, EPC was situated within a legally binding framework. The Maastricht Treaty in 1993 introduced CFSP as second—but still intergovernmental—pillar into the Union's three-pillar structure. The Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 led to a revision of CFSP decision rules and the introduction of a High Representative for CFSP. The Treaty of Nice in

134. Christopher Hill, and Michael Smith, eds. *International Relations and the European Union*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011: 87.

135. Michael Smith, “The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a Post-Modern Policy Framework?” *Journal of European Public Policy* 10, no. 4, 2003: 563.

136. Cf. Hill and Smith, *International Relations*.

137. J. Peterson, and H. Sjursen, eds. *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?* London: Routledge, 1998.

138. *Ibid.*

139. Peterson and Bomberg, *Decision-Making*.

2003 did not bring important advances in foreign and security issues, but rather dealt with some “*Amsterdam leftovers*.”¹⁴⁰ With the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, CFSP was integrated into the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) as a ‘normal policy field’ and further provisions to strengthen coherence in Europe’s external action were made.

Concerning the bilateral performance of France and Germany in the field of foreign and security policy, distinction should be made between CFSP and Common Defence and Security Policy (CDSP). Although CDSP officially is part of CFSP, defence touches even more sensible core sovereign aspects of the nation-state and hence denotes slower integration than other CFSP areas. As shown in the following paragraphs, France and Germany generally do not display ‘harmony’ (as referred to in the theoretical part of this article) in CFSP and CDSP issues. Whereas a general preference for integration and strong European commitment is given, preferences diverge about the concrete level and design of foreign and security policy cooperation. French European policy is to a great extent influenced by the heritage of President De Gaulle, who advocated a Europe of nations with a strong role for member states and intensive cooperation between governments.¹⁴¹ The arena of security and defence also shows a historically grounded dividing line between France and Germany. The French idea to construct European foreign policy was regarded as a way to partly deprive Western Europe from US influence. Germany in fact always regarded a strong Atlantic alliance as a corner stone of its *raison d'état* and pursued a policy of clear *Westbindung*.¹⁴²

The set-up of a European Defense Community was addressed under the idea of German rearmament in postwar Europe and external salient issues, such as the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. The preference spectrum ranged from designing EDC as an intergovernmental organization to drawing up a supranational organization with similar form as the ECSC. The US government proposed an intergovernmental solution in 1950, accepted by Germany and resisted by France. The latter in return presented the Pleven Plan for a European Army, and after having made concessions on its original version, the US agreed on the French idea; Germany also gave its consent in 1951. The Benelux countries gave up their resistance as the US conditioned help for European economic recovery on the participation of all ECSC countries in the European Army. However, the non-ratification of the treaty by the French *Assemblée Nationale* in 1954 led to the failure of the project. The EDC does not allow specifying mechanisms for a ‘Franco-German engine’, as this clearly is a case where no Franco-German initia-

140. Hill and Smith, *International Relations*, 105.

141. Cf. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, “Frankreich in der Europäischen Union,” in *Länderbericht Frankreich*, eds. A. Kimmel and H. Uterwedde, Bonn: BpB, 2005, 384-401.

142. Heinrich August Winkler *Der lange Weg nach Westen. Deutsche Geschichte vom “Dritten Reich” bis zur Wiedervereinigung*, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000.

tive or compromise was introduced. This might be explained by the strong influence of an external player, the United States.¹⁴³

After the failure of the EDC in 1954, first cautious steps towards cooperation in foreign and security affairs were undertaken with the establishment of the European Political Cooperation in 1970. The EPC agreement based on a proposal by French President Georges Pompidou for an intergovernmental platform outside the community framework, presented at the Hague Summit in 1969. Pompidou's consent to for the first time to delegate sovereignty in this policy field towards the European level relates to German Chancellor Brandt's idea to align his *Ostpolitik* with a coordinated European foreign policy, which Pompidou wanted to anticipate.¹⁴⁴ The conference concluded that measures for the establishment of a European Political Cooperation (EPC) should be taken, member states basically shared preferences for an intergovernmental platform external to community structures. The Davignon Report,¹⁴⁵ elaborated by the foreign ministers of the original EU-Six and inspired by Pompidou's proposal, was adopted at the Luxembourg Summit in October 1970, specifying closer political cooperation in foreign and security affairs.¹⁴⁶ This case does not reveal any Franco-German bilateral initiative or compromise; developments were based on a French initiative, which was not accompanied by bilateral consultations, but was rather launched to anticipate a German initiative.¹⁴⁷

Major changes in the field of foreign and security policy occurred with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, when the former EPC was introduced as second pillar in the three-pillar model of the European Union—the birth of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Several bilateral contacts between France and Germany took place in advance. In 1988, the Franco-German Security and Defence Council was established, underlining in its founding document the importance of developing a European identity in the field of defence and security.¹⁴⁸ Joint

143. Cf. Björn Fleischer, "Negotiating the European Defence Community," *European Political Science* advance online publication, 2012: 1-11.

144. Cf. Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, "Frankreich in der Europäischen Union."

145. Davignon Report 1970, Bulletin of the European Communities, November 1970, n° 11. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, <http://www.cvce.eu/collections/object-content/-/object/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/d2fef88a-528d-42e9-a8cb-725559b57884/4176efc3-c734-41e5-bb90-d34c4d17bbb5/en> (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

146. Final communiqué of the Hague Summit, December 2, 1969, http://www.cvce.eu/obj/final_communique_of_the_hague_summit_2_december_1969-en-33078789-8030-49c8-b4e0-15d053834507.html (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

147. Further consolidation of EPC was achieved by the 1981 London Report, the 1983 Stuttgart Declaration and the embodiment of EPC into a legally binding framework with the 1987 Single European Act.

148. Deutsch-französischer Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsrat 1988, Protokoll zum Vertrag vom 22. Januar 1963 zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Französischen Republik über die Deutsch-Französische Zusammenarbeit, <http://www.ambafrance-de.org/IMG/pdf/Verteidigungsrat88.pdf> (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

letters presented by German Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterrand in April and December 1990 advocated for accelerating political union: “*The European Council should initiate preparations for an intergovernmental conference on political union. In particular, the objective is to: [...] define and implement a common foreign and security policy.*”¹⁴⁹ In February 1991, France and Germany then presented a proposal on political union, aiming at security policy cooperation in the framework of CFSP. In October 1991, a bilateral initiative on foreign and security policy was presented, informing the Council about the intention of both countries to strengthen their military cooperation,¹⁵⁰ “*central tenets of which were written into the Maastricht Treaty.*”¹⁵¹ During the meeting of the Franco-German Security and Defence Council in May 1992, agreement was reached on the establishment of a European defence corps, the Eurocorps. The founding document¹⁵² clearly underlines its European focus, as it aims at the creation of an alliance with European perspective and explicitly invites member states of the Western European Union (WEU) to participate in biggest possible extent at the Eurocorps. Concerning Maastricht CFSP changes, the preference spectrum ranged from an intergovernmental design and unanimity as general decision rule to supranational organization and (qualified) majority vote. France, as well as Great Britain, are located on the side of intergovernmentalist supporters, whereas Germany and the Benelux countries supported a *communautaire* solution.¹⁵³ Concerning CSDP, French and German preferences converged on the idea of developing own security and defence capabilities in Europe. We see a general Franco-German consent towards accelerating political union and joint European agenda setting (joint letters, proposals and initiatives of 1990 to 1992), while preferences on the concrete procedure and the shape of the institutional platforms diverged. The outcome of the Maastricht Treaty¹⁵⁴ is in line with the ‘Franco-German engine’, although a “*range of Franco-German proposals in 1990-1, including the assignment of specific tasks to the CFSP process (i.e. relations with Central and Eastern Europe, transatlantic relations, the OSCE, etc.) were not addressed by the Maastricht Treaty [...].*”¹⁵⁵

149. “Kohl-Mitterrand Letter to Irish Presidency”, in Laursen, Finn, and Sophie Vanhoonacker, eds. *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union. Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992.

150. See the Homepage of the *Eurocorps*, http://www.eurocorps.org/pdf/eng/History_of_the_Eurocorps.pdf (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

151. Alistair Cole, *Franco-German Relations*, Harlow: Pearson Education, 2001.

152. Deutsch-Französischer Sicherheit- und Verteidigungsrat 1992, Presseerklärung über die Sitzung des Deutsch-Französischen Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrats am 22. Mai 1992, La Rochelle, <http://www.amba-france-de.org/IMG/pdf/Eurokorps92.pdf> (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

153. Cole, *Franco-German Relations*, 113.

154. The Commission keeps the general right to initiate proposals, whereas the European Council defines CFSP principles and general directions. Also, some majority voting is introduced, but only if the Council unanimously decides beforehand about this exception.

155. Peterson and Sjørnsen, *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?*, 11.

With regards to a possible causal effect of the ‘Franco-German engine’, we notice that the two important veto players gave their clear consent for advancing political cooperation in foreign and security affairs. They shared a common orientation and advanced several initiatives, which other countries followed. Webber¹⁵⁶ underlines that “[a]t the operational level, the creation of Eurocorps [...] led to the development of an army corps composed of French and German units, later joined by Belgian and Spanish ones. It is essentially from the Franco-German bilateral dynamic in security and defence that most initiatives to develop European policy came, as exemplified by the central role played by France and Germany in the framework of European Political Co-operation (EPC), and, in the post-Cold War context, by the elaboration of the provisions concerning Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the Maastricht Treaty, largely under the impulse of Paris and Bonn.” However, Cole stresses that “Eurocorps is sometimes presented as a successful Franco-German bilateral initiative which subsequently dictated the norm of EU action. Its birth was celebrated by Mitterrand as evidence of France and Germany acting as the ‘motor’ of European integration in the sphere of security and defence. This perspective was not unanimously shared. [...] French and German attempts to multilateralise this bilateral initiative [were] met with stiff resistance from the UK, Italy and the Netherlands and much ambivalence from the USA.”¹⁵⁷ We therefore conclude that the ‘Franco-German engine’ was not a sufficient condition, but clearly a supporting and helpful factor for advancing CFSP with regards to the Maastricht Treaty.

For post-Maastricht and pre-Amsterdam developments, Peterson and Sjursen found that “a prior convergence of French and German positions was crucial to a number of [...] EU external policy actions—including the stability pacts, Mediterranean policy, the Transatlantic Agenda and Action Plan, and policy initiatives on relations with Russia and Ukraine.”¹⁵⁸ Policy preferences show that the two countries shared a general position for more integration, albeit differed about the embodiment. Whereas France favoured the introduction of the post of a High Representative for foreign and security affairs and was reluctant to introduce qualified majority vote, Germany emphasized the introduction of QMV and was sceptic about the High Representative. Amidst the other member states, the camp was mainly divided about the introduction of QMV. Belgium was the strongest supporter of QMV; Denmark sceptic; Ireland, Finland, Sweden and GB opposed the introduction of QMV.¹⁵⁹ In February 1996, and hence in advance of the

156. Amaya Bloch-Lainé, “Franco-German Co-Operation in Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence”, in *The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union*, ed. Douglas Webber, London: Routledge, 1999, 154-165.

157. Cole, *Franco-German Relations*, 115.

158. Peterson and Sjursen, *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?*, 11.

159. see P.-H. Laurent, and M. Maresceau, eds. *The State of the European Union. Deepening and Widening*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998: 162.

first IGC meeting on CFSP issues in May that year,¹⁶⁰ a Franco-German summit of foreign ministers was held in Freiburg where a set of CFSP guidelines¹⁶¹ was adopted and possibilities to facilitate decision-making were proposed. Both countries “agreed on distinguishing CFSP ‘decisions in principle’ (requiring unanimity) and ‘implementation decisions’ (QMV or constructive abstention).”¹⁶² They further brought up the question of solidarity and proposed to include a clause on “political solidarity” in the Treaty Text. During the IGC in October 1996, a joint Franco-German initiative on enhanced cooperation was presented.¹⁶³ In December, a joint letter by Chancellor Kohl and President Chirac was published on the issue of flexibility in CFSP. These bilateral actions led to a Franco-German compromise: the French concern that an extended majority vote could endanger national sovereignty was accommodated by the fact that the European Council kept its determining role for the guidelines of CFSP.¹⁶⁴ The actual Amsterdam policy outcomes—the introduction of the post of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy; a new decision-making process which gives qualified majority vote a more prominent role; enhanced competence for the European Council to determine guidelines—are in line with our understanding of the ‘Franco-German engine’: “*The Maastricht Treaty, as revised at Amsterdam in 1997, actually contains, as far as the CFSP is concerned, most of the Franco-German ideas, such as the creation of a High Representative for CFSP [...], a planning cell to assist the council, and the introduction of the rule of ‘closer co-operation’.*”¹⁶⁵ ¹⁶⁶ However, the 1996 IGC which prepared the Amsterdam Treaty also displayed “‘considerable fatigue’ with Franco-German tactics, with reports of ‘uncomfortable linkages drawn with EMU’ as Paris and Bonn sought to elicit support for their pillar II agenda. In the end, the French and Germans settled far less—for instance on relations with WEU

160. P.-H. Laurent, and M. Maresceau, eds. *The State of the European Union. Deepening and Widening*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998: 160.

161. See White Paper on the Intergovernmental Conference Volume II. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/igc1996/pos-fr_en.htm.

162. P.-H. Laurent, and M. Maresceau, eds. *The State of the European Union. Deepening and Widening*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

163. Joint Franco-German initiative at the IGC on enhanced cooperation, October 17, 1996, <http://tinyurl.com/bprajur> (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

164. Franco Algieri, “*Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU*,” Wien: Facultas wuv, 2010: 75.

165. Bloche-Lainé, “Franco-German Co-Operation,” 157.

166. Some of the literature presents the introduction of the post of a High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy as a common Franco-German initiative; such as in Bloche-Lainé, “Franco-German Co-Operation,” 157. However, Germany was rather reluctant in supporting the French idea of a High Representative. The idea can actually be traced back to a French proposition. See Cover Note by the French Delegation, CONF 3863/96, 28 June 1996, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/cig1996/03863en6.pdf (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

and M. PESC¹⁶⁷—*than they had originally bid for on pillar II.*¹⁶⁸ France and Germany clearly acted as agenda-setters in advance of and during the 1996 IGC and hence showed an active contribution for designing the discourse.

With the elaboration of the Lisbon Treaty¹⁶⁹ member states restarted to attach greater importance to CFSP issues. Main achievement in CFSP was the institutional restructuring of the post of the High Representative which now has a double-hat structure. Further, the post of the Permanent President of the Council and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PSC) were introduced. The extension of QMV was not introduced to the extent expected, rather the Passerelle clause (Art. 48 TEU) leaves it open to the Council to decide unanimously about certain policy areas to be voted with QMV. Concerning CSDP, no real advances were made.¹⁷⁰ Regarding preferences, France and Germany did not share a common strategic direction in CDSP; preferences diverged especially in armament cooperation and the deployment of armed forces. In this area, France rather aligned with the UK which shared the same geostrategic analysis.¹⁷¹ Despite the divergent strategic focus, France and Germany presented two common proposals in November 2002. One initiative suggested to include a clause on “*solidarity and common security*” in the Treaty, the second proposal concerned the establishment of a European Defence Agency, which was actually given birth to in 2004. However, a general Franco-German agreement about CSDP is missing, as they are indecisive about the overall direction of this issue, the role of the EU, member states or the Atlantic alliance.¹⁷² The anchoring of CDSP is in fact ascribed to the 1998 Franco-British St. Malo Declaration, which acted as “*catalyst to wider developments in the security and defence policy arena.*”¹⁷³ France and Great Britain agreed on the “*need to give the European Union (EU) the capacity for autonomous decision-making and action, backed up by credible military forces, in order to respond to international crises when the Atlantic Alliance is not involved. To avoid unnecessary duplication, it*

167. M. PESC refers to the High Representative and is deduced from the French acronym for CFSP - PESC (Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune).

168. Peterson and Sjørnsen, *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe?*, 11.

169. The Constitutional Treaty, which failed in 2005, served as basis for the Reform Treaty, signed in Lisbon in 2007 and entered into force in 2009.

170. For an overview of CFSP Lisbon Treaty changes, cf. Algieri, *Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*. Hill and Smith, “*International Relations.*” Kerstin Radtke, “The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) after the Lisbon Treaty: Supranational Revolution or Adherence to Intergovernmental Pattern?,” in *The EU’s Lisbon Treaty. Institutional Choices and Implementation*, ed. Finn Laursen, Farnham: Ashgate, 2012, 41-61. Carolin Rüger, “From an Assistant to a Manager - the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy after the Lisbon Treaty,” in *The EU’s Lisbon Treaty. Institutional Choices and Implementation*, ed. Finn Laursen, Farnham: Ashgate, 2012, 141-69.

171. See Louis-Marie Clouet, and Andreas Marchetti, “Ungewisse Zukunft Der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- Und Verteidigungspolitik. Notwendige Deutsch-Französische Reflexionen,” *DGAPanalyse Frankreich* 6, 2011.

172. Ibid.

173. Smith, “The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy,” 562.

is decided that the EU should take into account the assets of Western European Union (WEU).¹⁷⁴ Related to this, on the European level, a “move towards action in areas of ‘hard security’ seemed to have gained a good deal of momentum.”¹⁷⁵ Concerning Lisbon changes in CFSP, France and Germany presented a common proposition to organize the functions of the High Representative for the CFSP and the Commissioner for external relations under one position—an idea which is now referred to as the double-hatted structure of the High Representative.¹⁷⁶ Although Franco-German agenda-setting on the issues of the mutual assistance clause and the establishment of the European Defence Agency was present, the 1998 Franco-British initiative has had far more impulse for the development of CSDP. “At the political level, the consent of geopolitical estimations and the interests of France and Great Britain, underline that such a convergence is much less given between Paris and Berlin.”¹⁷⁷ Also, “the deep difference between Germany and France with regards to the deployment of armed forces is a decisive obstacle for the extension of bilateral defence cooperation and the deepening of CSDP.”¹⁷⁸ We therefore do not find evidence for a causal effect of a ‘Franco-German engine’ for the Lisbon Treaty.

Conclusion and Outlook

Our empirical analysis underlines that the ‘Franco-German engine’, indeed, remains a “*variable Größe*.”¹⁷⁹ Its effect differs over time and policy-areas; and the mechanisms that make it effective are far from uniform. A causal impact of the ‘Franco-German engine’ has especially been detected in ‘high politics’, i.e. decisions on ‘history-making events’. Our case studies show that the ‘engine’ had a clear causal relevance in the cases of Schengen and EMU, while it was important, but not causal, for Single Market integration. Our investigation of integration in the fields of CSFP however generally rejects a causal role of the ‘Franco-German engine’. Also on the negative side, we have found little evidence of a systematic and successful policy-shaping activity of the ‘Franco-German engine’ in ‘low politics’. Similarly, it is important to stress that the ‘Franco-German engine’ does not seem to work in favour of enlargement as a form of horizontal integration.

174. Joint Declaration on European Defence issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, 1998, <http://www.cvce.eu/viewer/-/content/f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f/en> (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

175. Smith, “The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy,” 562.

176. Europäischer Konvent, CONV 489/03, “Beitrag, der von den Mitgliedern des Konvents Herrn Dominique de Villepin und Herrn Joschka Fischer übermittelt wurde,” <http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/reg/de/03/cv00/cv00489.de03.pdf> (accessed 15 Oct. 2012).

177. Clouet and Marchetti, “Ungewisse Zukunft,” 6, *own translation*.

178. Clouet and Marchetti, “Ungewisse Zukunft,” 6, *own translation*.

179. Axel Herbst, “Deutsch-Französische Partnerschaft und Europäischer Integrationsprozess,” in *Motor für Europa? Deutsch-Französischer Bilateralismus und Europäische Integration*, eds. Robert Picht and Wolfgang Wessels, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1990, 227-49.

Here, in fact, one is rather inclined to think of the often evoked Franco-German brake.¹⁸⁰ In issues relating to vertical integration, however, we find instances where Franco-German agenda-setting and compromise-seeking has contributed to promoting European solutions.

In the theoretical part of the paper, we have identified a set of structural and procedural variables. The structural variables relate to the relative positioning of France and Germany towards one another and amongst all EU member states. We have differentiated a scenario of ‘harmony’, where France and Germany agree, from a scenario of initial dissent. If a dissent cannot be solved, a Franco-German compromise, as well as a European solution, seems rather unlikely. In the other two cases, a Franco-German proposal can either receive support or refusal from the other European veto players. It has been argued in the literature that the degree of support for a ‘compromise after dissent’ might be higher than for the ‘harmony’ scenario. The reason for this is that a compromise is more likely to reunite the other players—in fact, the risk of an egoistic Franco-German *directoire* is diminished—and in addition, the other players might welcome the reduction of transaction costs brought about by the Franco-German coordination. In fact, it is sometimes assumed that Germany represents ‘Northern’ and France ‘Southern’ interests in the EU. Therefore we should also expect that France and Germany make less use of coercive means of action in cases where their proposals reflect a ‘compromise after dissent’. Accordingly, coercive means such as issuing threats should be more common in situations where the two partners agree (note that the scenario where all partners agree does not necessitate a ‘Franco-German engine’). Alternatively, France and Germany in such cases can be expected to ‘buy’ support from more hesitant partners.

Under which conditions is a ‘Franco-German engine’ successful? First of all, there need to be actors willing to set the motor into action. More directly, French and German administrations need to be ready for cooperation. Our case studies show that the readiness to compromise when agreeing on the greater outlooks is a central component of Franco-German cooperation. In numerous instances the “*improbable partners*,”¹⁸¹ indeed, start with very different ideas about the right policy answers for prevailing questions. For example, in EMU, France preferred the quick introduction of a common currency and advocated for its complementation with a strong intergovernmental *gouvernement économique*, while Germany

180. Cf. Helen Wallace, “Institutionalized Bilateralism and Multilateral Relations: Axis, Motor or Detonator?,” in *Motor Für Europa? Deutsch-Französischer Bilateralismus Und Europäische Integration*, eds. Robert Picht and Wolfgang Wessels, Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1990, 145-57. Patrick McCarthy, “France, Germany, the IGC and Eastern Enlargement,” in *The Franco-German Relationship in the European Union*, ed. Douglas Webber, London: Routledge, 1999, 43-59. Webber, *The Franco-German Relationship*.

181. David P. Calleo, and Eric R. Staal, eds. *Europe’s Franco-German Engine*. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1998.

demanded for the adoption of and adherence to strict convergence criteria and far-reaching independence of a supranational central bank from political influence. In view of the ‘Euro Crisis’, the two largest Euro area economies initially hold completely different views on how to react to the looming threat—while France demanded for quick and unconditional solidarity, Germany insisted on fiscal *rigueur* in the affected countries and the ‘no-bailout clause’ in the EU treaties. Nevertheless, in both cases the strong general preference for integration prevailed, so that French and German governments started to seek bilateral compromises.

Secondly, France and Germany need to be ready to invest the amount of resources that is necessary for developing solid policy proposals that can be ‘sold’ to the other EU member states. In case of reluctance, resources need to be spent for issuing and executing threats and/or promises. Our case studies have shown that intense bilateral administrative and political networks have been built up in preparation of the Schengen agreement, during EMU negotiations and in view of the ‘Euro Crisis’, but also prior to the decisions on the SEA as well as CSFP changes at Maastricht. In the negotiations, the exit option card historically was more often played when the two partners strongly agreed on a European policy. The most pronounced example is the case of ‘Schengen’ where such an exit threat was actually executed.¹⁸² The recently signed ‘Fiscal Compact’ is another example for the realisation of an exit threat; hence there was no initial ‘harmony’ between France and Germany. During the SEA and Maastricht negotiations, the two partners threatened the UK with exclusion from deeper integration in the Single Market and EMU, respectively, and thereby achieved a European agreement on vertical integration steps. The threat of establishing a two-tier Europe was thus used to ‘discipline’ more reluctant Europeans.¹⁸³ Similarly, support from the more reluctant southern member states was ‘bought’ through the acceptance of augmenting structural funds, what ultimately happened with the passing of the ‘Delors budgetary package’ in early 1988.

It has often been argued that enlargement makes the functioning of the ‘Franco-German engine’ more difficult.¹⁸⁴ Seeing that new possibilities of differentiated integration were installed through the Amsterdam Treaty, most notably of course the enhanced cooperation procedure,¹⁸⁵ we find that there still is room for a ‘Franco-German engine’. Note also that enhanced cooperation can be used as a threat for ‘persuading’ reluctant states. Again the example of the Financial

182. Cf. Gehring, “Politik des koordinierten Alleingangs.”

183. Leuffen et al., *Differentiated Integration*, 126.

184. Cf. Wallace, “Institutionalized Bilateralism and Multilateral Relations,” Schild, “Mission Impossible.”

185. Cf. Alexander Stubb, *Negotiating Flexibility in the European Union. Amsterdam, Nice and Beyond*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002.

Transaction Tax comes to mind. But also the Euro area unites less actors and a substantive Franco-German impact can, indeed, be detected in this policy field. An obvious example is the establishment of the fiscal pact in 2012.

Another more recent development, however, to us seems even more challenging than enlargement. In the ‘good old days’ of the ‘Franco-German engine’, European policy-making in France and Germany happened against the backdrop of the permissive consensus.¹⁸⁶ Mostly executive politicians were able to count on the silent support of their publics when they engaged in European negotiations. This is not the case anymore; politicians today regularly encounter what Hooghe and Marks¹⁸⁷ call a “*constraining dissensus*.”¹⁸⁸ More generally, with a growing public awareness and also concern vis-à-vis European issues, traditional ‘back room politics’ can no longer count on public approval. A transnational dimension of Franco-German relations therefore seems even more important today than in the past. Consequently, Franco-German actions need not only be explained to governmental European partners but also to the European public(s).

Abstract

In this article, we theorize and empirically test the mechanisms often assumed to lie behind the ‘Franco-German engine’. We thereby try to answer the question of what the ‘Franco-German engine’ actually is and how it works in theory and practice. We start our analysis by discussing the ‘Franco-German engine’ in theoretical terms. Our stylized model is then applied to a selection of empirical cases relating to different decision categories as well as policy areas. Our results show that there is little evidence for an important ‘Franco-German engine’ in ‘day-to-day’ policy-making in Brussels, but that there is indeed a causal effect of a ‘Franco-German engine’ on ‘history-making decisions’ in the realms of the Single Market, Schengen, EMU, and CFSP. Scope conditions—in particular the preference spectrum amongst all EU member states—strongly determine the functioning but also the chances of success of common Franco-German integration initiatives.

Résumé

Dans cet article, les auteurs théorisent et testent empiriquement les mécanismes qui sont souvent supposés se cacher derrière le « moteur franco-allemand ». Ils ont ainsi tenté de répondre à la question de ce qu’est en fait le « moteur franco-allemand », et comment il fonctionne en théorie et en pratique. L’analyse commence par examiner le « moteur franco-allemand » en termes théoriques. Le modèle défini est ensuite appliqué à une sélection de cas empiriques relatifs à différentes catégories de prise de décision ainsi qu’à des cadres d’action politique. Les résultats montrent qu’il y a peu de preuves d’un « moteur franco-allemand » important dans l’élaboration quotidienne des politiques à Bruxelles, mais qu’il y a effectivement un effet déterminant d’un « moteur franco-allemand » sur « les décisions d’importance historique » dans les domaines du Marché commun, de Schengen, de l’Union économique et monétaire, et de la PESC. Le champ des conditions – en particulier l’éventail des préférences entre tous les États membres de l’UE – détermine fortement le fonctionnement, mais aussi les chances de succès des initiatives communes d’intégration franco-allemandes.

186. Leon N Lindberg, and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe’s Would Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

187. Liesbet Hooghe, and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus,” *British Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1, 2008: 1-23.

188. Cf. also Anne Laumen and Andreas Maurer. “Jenseits des ‘Permissive Consensus’.” In *Diskussionspapier*. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2006.