

Individual or collective rights? Consequences for the satisfaction with democracy among Indigenous peoples in Latin America

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ABSTRACT

For decades, Indigenous peoples and their movements have fought for the recognition of their rights. Since the multiculturalist turn, these demands are – at least partially – a legal reality in many countries in Latin America. Indigenous group rights can be attributed to individual group members or in a collective way to the group as such. Here, I investigate how these contrasting approaches impact on Indigenous citizens' satisfaction with democracy. From normative theory, I derive the expectation that incorporating collective Indigenous rights increases satisfaction with democracy, because they address the historical loss of Indigenous sovereignty and open new spaces for the participation of previously marginalized groups. In contrast, the individualization of Indigenous group rights can be seen as a form of assimilation. The empirics show that collective rights increase the satisfaction with democracy among Indigenous peoples – and among the wider public. Thus, recognizing collective minority rights does not seem to stir division but sends a message that democracy is working well.

KEYWORDS Indigenous peoples; collective rights; minority rights; satisfaction with democracy; Latin America; plurinationalism

1. Introduction

Indigenous rights are group rights. They can be granted to individuals belonging to Indigenous groups or collectively to Indigenous groups as such. But does it make a difference? Besides a philosophical and normative discussion of this question, empirical approaches are scarce. In this article, I investigate the effect of recognizing individual and collective rights for Indigenous peoples on their satisfaction with democracy (SWD).

For decades, Indigenous peoples and their movements have fought for the recognition of their collective rights. Since the “multiculturalist” or “inclusionary” turn, these demands are – at least partially – a legal reality in many countries in Latin America. Constitutional reforms in many states have recognized their plurinational character, and ordinary legislation has followed up on higher-order norms to

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protect Indigenous rights. What do these developments mean for the consolidation of democracy in a continent that has long lingered between autocratic and electoral regimes?

The stability of democracy depends on its perceived legitimacy by the citizens – particularly in the case of young and emerging democracies of the third wave of democratization like in Latin America.¹ However, SWD is comparatively low on the continent.² Especially among Indigenous communities, discontent with the political system has long been a widespread issue. Over time, Indigenous protest waves have repeatedly signalled their dissatisfaction. For Indigenous participants, such protests are not only about tangible outcomes like commodity prices but relate to their struggle to be recognized on par with the other segments of society after a century-long history of marginalization.³ A central aspect of the Latin American wave of democratization was the political inclusion of Indigenous peoples. Therefore, it makes sense, to analyse how they perceive the workings of democracy nowadays.

Findings on Indigenous dissatisfaction mirror the literature documenting lower system support of ethnic minorities in general. This line of research also found that inclusive institutions can narrow the majority-minority gap in system support.⁴ Recent studies also show that local inclusion and the constitutional incorporation of Indigenous rights enhance support for democracy within Indigenous communities.⁵

I extend this research by investigating how Indigenous SWD as a form of system support depends on the codification of Indigenous rights in ordinary legislation. The focus on ordinary law matters because abstract constitutional norms need to be made operational through lower-level legislation.⁶ Since Indigenous rights are group rights, that only apply to specific (i.e. Indigenous) groups in society, it is relevant how they are put into legal practice. A central question is: Who can claim such rights? The normative theory discusses two contrasting approaches: Liberal scholars argue that group rights should be individual rights, i.e. given to individuals qua being members of a given (Indigenous) group. In contrast, proponents of collective group rights attribute them to (Indigenous) groups per se, i.e. they might be exercised by group members jointly or through common institutions of the group.⁷ So far, this distinction has received attention mainly in the land rights literature on individually and communally held land.⁸ As I show here, Latin American legislation contains both ways to incorporate Indigenous rights. For example, the *Ley del Artesano y Artesana Indígena* adopted in Venezuela in 2009 contains many provisions to strengthen the livelihoods of (individual) Indigenous traditional artisanal workers, like freeing them from paying taxes. In contrast, the *Ley de la Revolución Productiva Comunitaria Agropecuaria* adopted in Bolivia in 2011 promotes community organizations to improve Indigenous livelihood.⁹

Unlike Human rights, group-differentiated rights introduce a middle level in the relations between individuals and the state.¹⁰ Collective group rights strengthen this intermediate level more than individual group-differentiated rights. This varying weight of the group vis-à-vis the individual and state level can have important consequences on the affected citizens. Mainly discussed in normative theory, its implications have not yet been systematically analysed empirically. In this article, I summarize the normative debate and derive empirical expectations on the impact of individual and collective group rights on Indigenous SWD.

I argue that collective rights, rather than individual rights, increase Indigenous SWD because Individual rights mis-recognize Indigenous peoples' inherent

sovereignty. In turn, feelings of mis-recognition caused by state policy break with the promise of Latin American democratization to put inter-ethnic relations on a new fundament of mutual respect. In contrast, recognizing collective rights signals that Indigenous identity is taken seriously. Moreover, collective rights increase the input and output legitimacy of the political system in the eye of the Indigenous population: They improve opportunities for Indigenous participation and autonomy and bring decision-making closer to Indigenous peoples. Therefore, I propose that a focus on collective rights in Latin American Indigenous legislation is associated with higher SWD among Indigenous peoples.

I test this hypothesis by linking the INDILEX database on the legal status of Indigenous peoples and their rights with survey data from the AmericasBarometer. Multi-level analyses support the main theoretical argument: Controlling for constitutional recognition, the more a country treats Indigenous rights as collective rights, the higher SWD among its Indigenous citizens – and in the wider society.

This finding extends prior research investigating whether the legal recognition of Indigenous rights matters at all. Some have praised the “multiculturalist” turn as the “most promising and innovative area of Latin American constitutionalism.”¹¹ However, many scholars and international institutions charged with the topic claim that a profound “implementation gap” prevents any positive change.¹² Whereas most of these studies focus on the socio-economic status of Indigenous persons, I broaden the analysis to their overall satisfaction with the political system. I show that the legal recognition of collective Indigenous rights sends an encouraging message about the intended equality of minority and majority populations, even if they might not be implemented perfectly well.

2. Concepts and theory

Human rights are individual rights. They apply to every human and regulate the relationship between individuals and the State. In contrast, Indigenous rights are group-differentiated rights (or group rights, in short). They only apply to certain, i.e. Indigenous, groups of people in society and have a “dual nature” combining an individual and a group dimension.¹³ Thus, Indigenous rights regulate the relationship between the State, Indigenous individuals, and the Indigenous group as a middle level between the individual and the state.

In consequence, the state can either recognize individuals as the holders of Indigenous rights – or the group in a collective fashion. Individual group rights are granted directly to Indigenous individuals as members of an Indigenous group. This entails a thin conception of the group level: The main decision-making about Indigenous rights is made by the state and the group level only serves as a selection criterion to determine which individuals (i.e. the ones belonging to the Indigenous group) can benefit from those rights. In contrast, collective group rights are held by the group as such. This entails a thick conception of the group level: The state delegates decision-making to the group how to implement Indigenous rights in the respective area.¹⁴

This distinction between individual and collective group rights and the ensuing “issues of right-holders [...] are not insignificant” and can be discussed on several levels.¹⁵ The philosophical and normative considerations summarized in the following paragraphs represent the backdrop to derive expectations about the empirical expectations of the dimensions of Indigenous group rights on SWD.

The philosophical question is, whether groups can actually be the holders of rights? “Ontological individualists” argue that a group’s interests are always reducible to the interests of its members.¹⁶ In their view, ethnic groups lack the agency to effectively exercise rights.¹⁷ In contrast, proponents of collective group rights argue that the Indigenous rights to cultural survival and self-determination cannot be exercised by individuals alone but entail a collective dimension by definition.¹⁸ Moreover, Indigenous collectives could exercise group rights just like other nations or social groups through representatives or formal organizations.¹⁹

However, this philosophical discussion is rendered obsolete by reality since Latin American legislation reflects both conceptualizations. For example, Peru and Colombia adopted legislation on Indigenous education in the 2010s. Law 29.735 of Peru (2011) grants each student the right to receive intercultural bilingual education. Colombia’s Decree 1953 of 2014 allows Indigenous communities to establish educational institutions and administer Indigenous curricula independently. Both pieces of legislation pursue a similar goal – to implement intercultural bilingual education for Indigenous communities – but follow different strategies. In Peru, the government grants the right to individual students who are members of Indigenous groups. In contrast, Colombia empowers the Indigenous communities as an intermediate level between the individual and the state.

The normative question is, whom group-differentiated rights should be attributed to? Liberals argue that collective Indigenous rights are fundamentally in opposition to Human rights, which are supposed to protect individuals against collective power. Consequently, they subordinate collective interests to individual liberties.²⁰ Some of them reject collective rights even completely.²¹

In contrast, proponents of collective rights refuse the idea that Western legal philosophy could determine the design of Indigenous rights. They argue that due to their ancestral occupation of the land, Indigenous peoples possess inherent sovereignty, which was unjustly taken away from them through colonization.²² In this sense, Indigenous rights cannot be *given* to Indigenous peoples, but just *restored* or *recognized*.²³ The restoration of this inherent sovereignty, Indigenous thinkers argue, must be based in Indigenous identity and traditions, which entails a distinctive collective dimension.²⁴

I do not attempt to resolve this normative debate, but to investigate the empirical consequences of the two dimensions of Indigenous group rights. They might have a different impact depending on the outcome of interest. Here, I elaborate how individual and collective group rights relate to Indigenous peoples’ SWD. This outcome implies an Indigenous view on democracy. Therefore, the theoretical answer to the research question needs to consider Indigenous perspectives on the individual and collective rights debate.

A series of scholars have argued that (neo-)liberal approaches to multiculturalism can have adverse effects by reproducing colonial power relations.²⁵ While most of this literature is based in anglophone settler colonies, this argument also applies to Latin America.²⁶ In this perspective, the liberal preference for individual group rights is one aspect that contributes to the continuation of colonial attitudes towards Indigenous peoples. Individual group rights make Indigenous peoples essentially similar to other social groups protected by the state, like the elderly, that however lack the distinct collective group identity of Indigenous peoples as descent-based imagined communities.²⁷ Wolfe describes this separation of Indigenous peoples from their

collective identity as an attempt to reduce the claims of Indigenous movements to “a depoliticized branch of the welfare bureaucracy.”²⁸ Thus pressing Indigenous rights into the individualized language of the existing Human rights system can represent yet “another form of assimilation.”²⁹ Furthermore, the codification of Indigenous rights as individual rights perpetuates the paternalist stance that dominated states’ treatments of Indigenous peoples for a long time: it is the state that grants these rights in a top-down fashion. By unilaterally defining the scope of these rights in a “monological” way, the state limits the opportunities for the self-determination of Indigenous peoples.³⁰

These considerations are relevant for the Indigenous perception of democracy because Indigenous movements and the democratization process in Latin America have been closely intertwined.³¹ To address a deep crisis of legitimacy, constitution-makers around the continent recognized the pluri-national character of their societies. This reflects Indigenous peoples’ self-image as sovereign nations and promised to fulfil Indigenous movements’ demands to be recognized as equals.³² Thus, the Latin American wave of democratization not only introduced competitive elections, but embarked on a journey of decolonizing inter-ethnic relations.³³ Although recognizing some rights, the individual approach would mean to revert on these promises of pluri-national democracy and neglecting a key demand of Indigenous movements.

In contrast, granting autonomy rights to ethnic groups can improve the stability and quality of democracy in plural societies.³⁴ Besides ethno-federalism, decision-making power can be devolved to minority groups in various ways – e.g. through collective group rights. This should improve Indigenous perception of democracy because in societies divided along ethnic lines, simple “majority rule is not only undemocratic but also dangerous because minorities that are continually denied access to power will feel excluded and discriminated against and may lose their allegiance to the regime.”³⁵ Indeed, collective rights can create feelings of recognition that increase the legitimacy of the state in the eye of ethnic minorities, as experimental evidence from the Philippines suggests.³⁶ This finding is not surprising as many Indigenous peoples have a “community-centered” cosmivision, in which the individual cannot be separated from the collective.³⁷

Furthermore, collective rights not only truly recognize Indigenous identity, but also improve both the input and output side of political legitimacy, which have been shown to drive popular SWD.³⁸ First, collective rights open opportunities for participation. By delegating the decision-making to the group level, collective rights allow Indigenous groups to make sovereign choices over their own matters and give them the freedom to decide how things are done. Thus, collective rights grant autonomy for Indigenous peoples and widen participation spaces for previously excluded groups.³⁹ Evidence from Colombia shows that the recognition of collective land rights has indeed stimulated new modes of self-organization in ethnic groups.⁴⁰ The establishment of formal collective rights could even represent an incentive for group members to engage in collective action, as their benefits can only be reaped jointly with others.⁴¹

Second, collective rights can improve the output dimension of political legitimacy. By devolving powers to the group level, collective rights bring decision making closer to their beneficiaries and thereby increasing responsiveness to their needs.⁴² While this argument of decentralization theory has received mixed empirical evidence, it might

still have merit in the case of Indigenous rights: Given their distinct culture paired with a high social vulnerability, culturally sensitive solutions are especially important when dealing with Indigenous issues.⁴³ Collective rights facilitate to deal with this issue more appropriately by involving Indigenous expertise in the decision-making process. Thereby, collective rights can contribute to improve the output side of the political system for Indigenous peoples.⁴⁴ For example, empowering communities to self-organize health care systems has proven a fruitful approach to extend coverage and provide culturally appropriate medical services for Indigenous peoples.⁴⁵

In summary, by truly recognizing Indigenous identity, enhancing participation opportunities, and improving decision-making, collective group rights can serve as an instrument to de-colonize Latin American law⁴⁶ – and contribute to the realization of a “kinder, gentler” form of democracy in Latin America.⁴⁷ I therefore hypothesize:

The more Indigenous rights are codified as collective rights, the more satisfied Indigenous peoples are with democracy.

3. Research design

3.1. Analytical method

To test this hypothesis, I combine individual level survey data from the AmericasBarometer with legal data on the country level.⁴⁸ Since the observations (survey respondents) are nested in survey rounds within countries, the errors might be correlated within this hierarchical structure. Therefore, I estimate multi-level models with random effects at the country and country-year levels as recommended by Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother.⁴⁹ This approach allows to disentangle the effects of individual and country-level factors and to estimate standard errors correctly. Another advantage of multi-level models is that they can deal with unequal sampling sizes within the nesting structure.⁵⁰

Overall, I estimate two sets of multi-level models: I start with random intercept models in the Indigenous sub-sample of the overall survey population. This investigates the effect of Indigenous legislation (as operationalized below) on Indigenous respondents' SWD. Then, in a second step, I broaden the analysis to the full sample: In random coefficient models, I introduce cross-level interactions which allow to compare the effect of Indigenous legislation on the difference in the satisfaction rating of Indigenous and non-Indigenous respondents.

Indigenous respondents are identified through a survey item on ethnic self-identification. The answer categories for this ethnicity variable include Indigenous, Mestizo, White, Black, Mulato, and other. It has been shown that the socio-political context and exact question wording can influence whether individuals declare themselves as Indigenous.⁵¹ Considering this fluidity of ethnic identity and given the large share of the Latin American population with mixed Indigenous-European descent (Mestizos), I use a narrow and wide version of Indigenous identity. The narrow version includes respondents only, who self-declared as Indigenous. The wide version combines all respondents self-identifying as Indigenous and Mestizo.⁵² In total, Mestizos make up half of the sample and Indigenous respondents represent another 12%. The overall scope of the study is determined by the data availability of dependent and independent variables. It covers all 16 Latin American countries that hosted politically relevant Indigenous groups from 2004 to 2018.⁵³

3.2. Dependent variable

I operationalize the dependent variable with a dichotomized item from the Americas-Barometer indicating whether the respondent is, in general, satisfied “with the way democracy works” in their country. Conceptually, this outcome represents the middle of the continuum from diffuse to specific system support.⁵⁴ Some scholars caution that the indicator on SWD “taps multiple dimensions of political support, and the mix of those dimensions varies across both individuals and nations.”⁵⁵ However, there is also recent evidence that survey takers across cultures share a minimal understanding of democracy’s core characteristics.⁵⁶ Linde and Ekman conclude that SWD is “not an indicator of support for the principles of democracy. Rather, it is an item that taps the level of support for how the democratic regime works in practice”⁵⁷ – which corresponds to the hypothesis to be operationalized.

Still, Valgarðsson and Devine caution that the results might depend on the survey source and find different levels of SWD in the Latinobarometer and AmericasBarometer.⁵⁸ Both survey projects follow similar methodological approaches. However, on average, the AmericasBarometer samples twice as many Indigenous respondents. This represents a decisive advantage because the small demographic size of the Indigenous population in many countries. I therefore rely on this data source, which seems justifiable as the difference in satisfaction rates detected by Valgarðsson and Devine remains almost constant over time. That means, both sources trace similar developments in the indicator (albeit on a different level).

To address the issue that different indicators of system support might measure the same thing, I exploit several variables on the issue in the AmericasBarometer. They cover the continuum from pride in one’s nationality (diffuse support) over support for democratic principles to the specific approval of the incumbent government. The correlation matrix (Table A2, online appendix) shows that these measures are only weakly related. Specifically, Figure A3 (online appendix) illustrates that Indigenous support for democracy is rather stable on a high level in most countries, whereas satisfaction fluctuates more. Nevertheless, as explained below, I control for these factors in the robustness checks for the multiple regression analysis.

3.3. Independent variable

To operationalize the salience of collective rights in Indigenous legislation, I rely on the INDILEX dataset (for an exact description of the sampling and coding procedures, see the Codebook in the Online Appendix). This dataset contains all legislation referring to Indigenous peoples and their rights adopted in Latin America during 1989-2018. The content of the dataset was sampled from official sources by selecting all articles of laws and decrees with legislative force adopted on the national level that contain keywords to describe Indigenous groups: *indígena/s* and its synonyms *nativo/a/s*, *originario/a/s*, *aborigen/es*, *autóctono/a/s*, *Indio/s*, and the proper names of politically relevant Indigenous groups as identified by the EPR dataset.⁵⁹

Each article in the dataset was manually categorized whether Indigenous groups are treated as *individuals* or *collectives*. In a process of semantical coding, it was determined whether each article belonged to either of the categories based on the attributes the keywords co-occurred with.⁶⁰ Attributes describing Indigenous groups as individuals include, for example, *members of* Indigenous peoples, *speakers of* Indigenous

languages, *persons identifying as* Indigenous, and *individual* Indigenous rights. For example, art. 16 of Colombia's law no. 691 (2001) is coded as individual right because each member of Indigenous peoples is guaranteed subsidized health care.

Attributes describing Indigenous groups as collectives include Indigenous *organizations, associations, or co-operatives*, as well as *collective* property or knowledge of Indigenous peoples. For example, art. 113 of Venezuela's Organic Law on Indigenous peoples and Communities (2005) is coded as collective right because Indigenous organizations must be included in the provision of health services. Likewise, Indigenous (traditional) *authorities* or other *leaders* representing Indigenous groups, and references to the *legal personality* of Indigenous groups were coded in the collective domain.

Articles can also belong to both or neither of the categories. For example, art. 121 of the Bolivian Law No. 3058 (2005) gives special protection against expropriation to individual and collective Indigenous property and is therefore coded in both categories. However, generic terms such as people, population, communities, nations, etc. were considered too unspecific for the collective domain: It remains unclear whether the actual subject of the provision is Indigenous groups per se or their members. Additionally, as these expressions occur in virtually every article, coding them as collective would render this category meaningless. Finally, the main policy domain of each article was identified, which allows to analyse the individual and collective dimensions separately for Indigenous cultural, social, economic, political and land rights.⁶¹

I constructed the independent variable as follows: For each country-year, I counted the total number of articles and the number of articles in each domain that had been adopted since the beginning of the observation period. These measures increase monotonically over time.⁶² To arrive at a temporally comparable measure, I calculated the share of the collective and individual domain relative to the total number of Indigenous articles. In the next step, I subtracted the relative size of the individual domain from the relative size of the collective domain, which resulted in the independent variable *salience of collective rights*. Theoretically, it ranges from -1 to +1, with higher values indicating a predominantly collective approach and lower values a predominantly individualistic approach. If a country does not specify the bearer of Indigenous rights at all or uses individual and collective rights equally, the salience variable takes values around zero.

When two country-years have the same value on this share-based variable, its meaning might differ depending on how much Indigenous legislation was adopted in the first place. For example, a strong focus on collective rights is more likely to positively affect SWD when it is based on many articles than in a situation where the same share results from few articles. Therefore, I control for the total Indigenous legislation adopted in each country until the year in question. Additionally, I use the Indigenous Group Rights Index by Holzinger et al. to control for constitutional protection of Indigenous rights, which drives ordinary legislation on the topic.⁶³

3.4. Control variables

Building on the general literature on the determinants of SWD, I include control variables for demographics and the input and output side of the political system.⁶⁴ All individual-level controls come from the AmericasBarometer. First, I control for gender

(indicating *female* respondents), *age* (in years), and *rural* residence. Second, I control for socio-economic outcomes that could be benefits of Indigenous legislation and drive SWD: *Education* is measured in years of schooling. And as the AmericasBarometer does not provide a consistent income variable, I use the subjective perception of a *bad economic situation* in the family. Third, I control for personal experiences with democracy, like participating in elections (*voted in last election*) and exposure to *corruption* by government officials. Finally, I control for respondents' *support for democracy*, *trust in the government* and *pride in one's nationality* to ensure that the outcome SWD is not conflated with other aspects of system support. However, these items are not consistently used in all survey rounds and significantly reduce the number of observations. Therefore, I only include them in robustness checks.

On the country level, it is paramount to control for “objective” measures of *democracy*. And to control for uneven implementation of Indigenous legislation, I include a *rule of law* indicator. Both indices come from V-Dem.⁶⁵ Like on the individual level, I also control for the output side of the political system by including the *GDP* per capita in 1.000\$ as an indicator of overall wealth (World Development Indicators by the World Bank). Since it was shown that also unequal distributions of wealth can have a negative impact on SWD, I include the Gini coefficient as a measure of economic *inequality*.⁶⁶

Finally, the following political indicators could be confounders between Indigenous legislation and SWD. Usually, leftist presidents and Indigenous representation in parliament are assumed to promote Indigenous legislation and could be associated with Indigenous SWD.⁶⁷ Therefore, I include the *president's ideology* (ranging from 0 to 20 with lower values for leftist positions)⁶⁸ and the seat share of *Indigenous parties* in parliament⁶⁹ as control variables. Finally, the legislative data was collected on the national level and local inclusion was shown to increase Indigenous SWD. Therefore, I control for *decentralization* by including the regional authority index.⁷⁰

4. Analysis

4.1. Descriptive overview

Most countries treat Indigenous rights as a rather collective than individual affair – although to a varying degree (see Figure 1). Bolivia most clearly follows the collective strategy. In contrast, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Mexico predominantly treat Indigenous rights as individual rights. While some countries like Ecuador exhibit a clear trend, temporal variance in most countries is incremental at best.

Disaggregation by policy area (see Table 1) shows that the political rights domain is the main driver of these country patterns. This result is not surprising given that political representation, autonomy and self-determination rights belong in this category. For example, collective political rights include the promotion of Indigenous political parties, the recognition of customary Indigenous law or procedures for the free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples over any projects on their communal territory. The relatively few individual political rights relate to the promotion of individual Indigenous persons' participation in public decision-making and the legal rights of Indigenous persons in court. Collective rights generally enable Indigenous self-determination in each policy area. Still, collective political rights, in specific, go

Salience of Collective Rights in Indigenous Legislation




Figure 1. Salience of collective rights in Indigenous legislation in 16 Latin American countries over time. Positive values indicate a predominantly collective approach; negative values represent a more individualistic legislation.

the furthest in restoring Indigenous sovereignty and should amplify the effect of collective rights in general: they do not only grant sovereignty in policy-specific decision-making, but also recognize Indigenous autonomy to decide in which areas to exercise these rights. If the overall hypothesis is true, an even larger effect can be expected for the political rights domain. For its theoretical and apparent empirical relevance, I inspect this policy area separately in the analyses.

According to the AmericasBarometer, on average half of all Indigenous respondents are satisfied with democracy in their country. Nevertheless, there are considerable differences across countries (see Figure A3 in the appendix): Indigenous respondents in Peru are much less satisfied than Costa Rica. Indigenous SWD seems to be declining in Colombia, whereas Ecuador exhibits the opposite trend. This roughly corresponds to the trends in the salience of collective rights in these two countries.

Table 1. Distribution of articles across policy areas and the individual/collective domain.

| Policy Area | Total Articles | | Individual Dimension | | Collective Dimension | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|--------|----------------------|-------|----------------------|-------|
| | <i>n</i> | % | <i>n</i> | % | <i>n</i> | % |
| Cultural rights (incl. language, education, religion) | 1,396 | 26.45 | 296 | 21.20 | 293 | 20.99 |
| Social rights (incl. health, gender) | 1,306 | 24.74 | 369 | 28.25 | 390 | 29.86 |
| Economic rights (incl. property rights) | 1,326 | 25.12 | 192 | 14.48 | 463 | 34.92 |
| Territorial rights (incl. land, natural resources) | 1,408 | 26.68 | 167 | 11.86 | 536 | 38.07 |
| Political rights (incl. participation, representation, autonomy, legal rights) | 1,872 | 35.47 | 229 | 12.23 | 1,286 | 68.70 |
| Other | 521 | 9.87 | 121 | 23.22 | 123 | 23.61 |
| Total | 5,278 | 100.00 | 856 | 16.21 | 2,016 | 38.20 |

Note: In the table, the total numbers and percentages do not always add up lengthwise and crosswise, because articles can be coded in several domains or no domain.

4.2. Multiple regression: Indigenous sample

In the first step of the multiple regression analysis, I investigate the determinants of SWD in Indigenous communities, i.e. only Indigenous (and Mestizo) respondents are included in the analysis. Table 2 presents two models (1 and 4) that replicate prior research on the effect of constitutional rights on democracy satisfaction. The other models contain the contribution of this article by introducing the salience of collective rights in ordinary legislation (models 2 and 5) and further zooming in on collective political rights (models 3 and 6).

The constitutional protection for Indigenous rights exhibits a significantly positive association with democracy satisfaction in model 1. However, introducing the variables on ordinary legislation, its significance drops below conventional significance in most models. Controlling for Indigenous constitutional recognition and overall Indigenous legislation, the results generally support the hypothesis: The coefficients of the collective rights variables are positive and significant when using the wide understanding of Indigenous identity (including Mestizos). The coefficient for collective political rights is even larger and statistically significant in both samples. Surprisingly, there is no statistically significant relationship between the V-Dem democracy scores and the satisfaction rating of the respondents.

A series of robustness checks largely confirms these findings (see Table A4 in the online appendix). In the robustness checks, I first include other indicators on system support as controls. Second, I use different operationalizations for democracy. Third, I exclude Bolivia from the analysis, which is a potential outlier case.⁷¹ Finally, simple logit regression with standard errors clustered on the country level represents the alternative to multi-level modelling. The only new insight of these alternative models is that the coefficients for some of the collective rights variables turn insignificant, when operationalizing democracy with the egalitarian democracy index by V-Dem. Overall, however, the results do not change. Controlling for other aspects of system support increases the significance of the collective rights variable. This means that *ceteris paribus*, the more a government emphasizes the collective nature of Indigenous rights over the individual approach, the more satisfied its Indigenous citizens. This holds true especially when zooming in on the political rights domain.

4.3. Multiple regression: comparison between Indigenous and dominant population

So far, the empirical findings support the theory. But could SWD among Indigenous respondents be driven by more general factors, that affect the rest of the society equally? Table 3 presents the results of the analyses of the full sample. Here, the variable on Indigenous identity in models 1 and 2 indicates whether Indigenous respondents' perception of democracy differs from the rest of the population (models 3 and 4 repeat the same analysis with Mestizos included in the Indigenous identity variable). And the cross-level interactions between Indigenous identity and the legislation variables check, whether this effect of Indigenous identity on SWD differs by levels of collective rights.

In these analyses, most individual and country level variables behave similarly to the results in the Indigenous sample. The coefficients of the main effects are negative for Indigenous identity and positive for collective rights. They are statistically significant at

Table 2. Regression of Indigenous satisfaction with democracy (Indigenous and Mestizo samples).

| | Sample: Indigenous Respondents | | | Sample: Indigenous + Mestizo Respondents | | |
|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| <i>Individual Characteristics</i> | | | | | | |
| Female | -0.060 (0.078) | -0.058 (0.078) | -0.059 (0.078) | -0.036 (0.026) | -0.036 (0.026) | -0.036 (0.026) |
| Age | -0.003* (0.001) | -0.003* (0.001) | -0.003* (0.001) | -0.002** (0.001) | -0.002** (0.001) | -0.002** (0.001) |
| Rural Residence | 0.247*** (0.039) | 0.248*** (0.039) | 0.248*** (0.040) | 0.195*** (0.029) | 0.195*** (0.029) | 0.195*** (0.029) |
| Years of Schooling | -0.040*** (0.006) | -0.039*** (0.006) | -0.039*** (0.006) | -0.039*** (0.005) | -0.039*** (0.005) | -0.039*** (0.005) |
| Bad Economic Situation | -0.219† (0.121) | -0.216† (0.122) | -0.216† (0.122) | -0.347*** (0.028) | -0.347*** (0.028) | -0.347*** (0.028) |
| Voted in Last Election | -0.031 (0.079) | -0.030 (0.079) | -0.031 (0.079) | 0.067† (0.039) | 0.067† (0.039) | 0.066† (0.039) |
| Corruption | -0.255*** (0.068) | -0.258*** (0.068) | -0.255*** (0.068) | -0.366*** (0.066) | -0.367*** (0.066) | -0.367*** (0.066) |
| <i>Country Characteristics</i> | | | | | | |
| Democracy | -0.267 (0.756) | -1.354 (1.025) | -1.485 (1.046) | -0.997 (1.496) | -1.558 (1.199) | -1.628 (1.214) |
| Rule of Law | 0.037 (0.692) | 0.569 (0.841) | 0.657 (0.701) | 0.917 (0.928) | 0.855 (1.012) | 1.061 (0.820) |
| GDP p.c. | 0.100** (0.038) | 0.124* (0.049) | 0.121** (0.039) | 0.070 (0.053) | 0.112* (0.049) | 0.099** (0.038) |
| Inequality | 0.001 (0.019) | -0.011 (0.020) | -0.013 (0.018) | 0.019 (0.022) | -0.002 (0.018) | -0.002 (0.016) |
| Decentralization | -0.054*** (0.014) | -0.043*** (0.013) | -0.033* (0.013) | -0.035 (0.024) | -0.028* (0.013) | -0.018 (0.013) |
| President Ideology | -0.015 (0.016) | -0.012 (0.015) | -0.011 (0.016) | -0.020 (0.019) | -0.019 (0.016) | -0.017 (0.016) |
| Ind. Party Seat Share | 1.396** (0.446) | 1.555*** (0.379) | 0.686† (0.407) | 0.917* (0.440) | 0.519 (0.459) | -0.615 (0.497) |
| <i>Indigenous Legislation</i> | | | | | | |
| Ind. Const. Rights | 0.066* (0.028) | 0.068† (0.035) | 0.057† (0.030) | 0.014 (0.058) | -0.002 (0.048) | -0.007 (0.034) |
| Ind. Legislation | | -0.001† (0.001) | -0.002** (0.001) | | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.001† (0.001) |
| Saliency of Collective Ind. Rights | | 0.638 (0.408) | | | 0.995* (0.462) | |
| Saliency of Collective Ind. Political Rights | | | 2.151** (0.721) | | | 2.888*** (0.638) |
| Constant | 0.306 (0.689) | 1.259 (0.961) | 1.175 (0.880) | -0.131 (0.764) | 1.108 (0.968) | 0.786 (0.936) |
| Variance Country Level | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.025 (0.049) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) |
| Variance Country-Year Within Country Level | 0.164** (0.051) | 0.149** (0.053) | 0.135** (0.050) | 0.176*** (0.037) | 0.176*** (0.032) | 0.154*** (0.023) |
| AIC | 9027.311 | 9023.183 | 9021.889 | 63759.858 | 63753.119 | 63745.154 |
| BIC | 9124.709 | 9120.581 | 9126.244 | 63884.334 | 63877.595 | 63869.630 |
| Log Likelihood | -4500 | -4498 | -4496 | -31866 | -31863 | -31859 |
| Observations | 7762 | 7762 | 7762 | 53701 | 53701 | 53701 |

Standard errors in parentheses

Multi-Level Logit Regression Model, Respondents nested in Country-Years nested in Countries

† $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3. Regression of satisfaction with democracy (full sample).

| | ID Variable: Indigenous Respondents | | ID Variable: Indigenous + Mestizo Respondents | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| <i>Individual Characteristics</i> | | | | |
| Indigenous identity | -0.061 (0.045) | -0.130 [†] (0.069) | -0.077** (0.024) | -0.129*** (0.025) |
| Indigenous + Mestizo identity | | | -0.047* (0.023) | -0.047* (0.023) |
| Female | | -0.045 [†] (0.024) | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.001 (0.001) |
| Age | | 0.213*** (0.033) | 0.212*** (0.034) | 0.212*** (0.034) |
| Rural Residence | | -0.036*** (0.007) | -0.035*** (0.007) | -0.036*** (0.007) |
| Years of Schooling | | -0.366*** (0.024) | -0.366*** (0.024) | -0.366*** (0.024) |
| Bad Economic Situation | | 0.098** (0.037) | 0.099** (0.037) | 0.099** (0.037) |
| Voted in Last Election | | -0.362*** (0.052) | -0.362*** (0.052) | -0.360*** (0.052) |
| Corruption | | | | |
| <i>Country Characteristics</i> | | | | |
| Democracy | -1.544 (0.989) | -1.638 (0.997) | -1.839 (1.237) | -1.741 [†] (0.967) |
| Rule of Law | 0.814 (0.924) | 0.995 (0.724) | 1.079 (1.164) | 1.137 (0.805) |
| GDP p.c. | 0.114* (0.046) | 0.104** (0.037) | 0.102* (0.050) | 0.095** (0.036) |
| Inequality | 0.003 (0.016) | 0.003 (0.015) | 0.001 (0.018) | -0.001 (0.015) |
| Decentralization | -0.028* (0.013) | -0.018 (0.013) | -0.023 (0.016) | -0.015 (0.013) |
| President Ideology | -0.020 (0.015) | -0.019 (0.015) | -0.016 (0.015) | -0.016 (0.015) |
| Ind. Party Seat Share | 0.457 (0.643) | -0.645 (0.733) | 0.469 (0.475) | -0.669 (0.555) |
| <i>Indigenous Legislation</i> | | | | |
| Ind. Const. Rights | 0.013 (0.052) | 0.007 (0.040) | 0.007 (0.055) | 0.001 (0.041) |
| Ind. Legislation | -0.001 [†] (0.001) | -0.001** (0.001) | -0.001 (0.001) | -0.001* (0.001) |
| Saliency of Collective Ind. Rights | 0.777 [†] (0.407) | 2.356*** (0.705) | 0.729 [†] (0.378) | 2.294*** (0.592) |
| <i>Cross-Level Interactions</i> | | | | |
| Indigenous/Mestizo ID × Saliency of Collective Ind. Rights | 0.168 (0.203) | | 0.245* (0.111) | |
| Indigenous/Mestizo ID × Saliency of Collective Ind. Political Rights | | 0.607 (0.415) | | 0.556* (0.258) |
| Constant | 0.792 (0.770) | 0.564 (0.824) | 1.008 (0.699) | 0.810 (0.831) |
| Variance Country Level | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.000 (0.000) | 0.009 (0.024) | 0.000 (0.000) |
| Variance Indigenous/Mestizo ID | 0.063** (0.022) | 0.057** (0.021) | 0.027*** (0.007) | 0.027*** (0.007) |
| Variance Country-Year Within Country Level | 0.175*** (0.030) | 0.157*** (0.023) | 0.158*** (0.046) | 0.151*** (0.033) |
| Covariance Indigenous (Mestizo) ID, Constant | -0.034 [†] (0.018) | -0.030 [†] (0.018) | -0.007 (0.013) | -0.010 (0.012) |
| AIC | 103507.474 | 103499.339 | 103486.752 | 103477.186 |
| BIC | 103647.953 | 103639.818 | 103627.231 | 103608.299 |
| Log Likelihood | -51739 | -51735 | -51728 | -51725 |
| Observations | 86271 | 86271 | 86271 | 86271 |

Standard errors in parentheses. Multi-Level Logit Regression Model, Respondents nested in Country-Years nested in Countries. [†] $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

conventional levels, with exception of the Indigenous identity variable using the narrow definition of indigeneity. The coefficients of the cross-level interaction terms between Indigenous identity and collective rights are positive. Yet, again, they are significant only for the broad definition of Indigenous identity.

Regarding the main effects, this means that Indigenous respondents are less satisfied with democracy than the rest of society. The main effect for the legislation variables suggests that collective rights also have a positive impact on non-Indigenous persons' views of democracy. The positive interaction effect shows that the difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous evaluations of democracy depends on the value of the collective rights variable.

The positive interaction effect between Indigenous/Mestizo identity and collective rights is illustrated in Figure 2a-2b. The marginal effects plot (2a) shows how the negative effect of Indigenous identity is influenced by the levels of the collective rights variable: With predominantly individual Indigenous rights, Indigenous/Mestizo respondents are even less satisfied with democracy than the rest of society. But the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous population narrows, the more collective rights are incorporated. This can also be seen in the average predicted probabilities for Indigenous and non-Indigenous respondents (Figure 2b). They show the generally higher satisfaction among non-Indigenous respondents, that further rises with higher levels of collective rights. They furthermore show how Indigenous/Mestizo respondents catch up to the rest of the population the more collective rights are adopted. However, this catching-up effect is not statistically significant in the models using the narrow definition of indigeneity. This non-significant interaction might be explained by the smaller number of Indigenous respondents in the sample. Again, the robustness checks confirm these results (see Table A5 in the online appendix). This shows that the positive effect of collective rights on Indigenous perception of democracy is not driven by some external factor that impacts on the whole society equally. Although the whole population is also more satisfied with democracy the more collective Indigenous rights are adopted, this effect is even larger for the Indigenous/Mestizo population.

Again, the egalitarian index of democracy is the only one to achieve statistical significance. This suggests that minority rights are a feature of democracy that is




Figure 2. (a) Marginal effects of Indigenous/Mestizo identity on democracy satisfaction at different levels of collective rights, with 95% confidence interval. (b). Average predicted probabilities for satisfaction with democracy in Indigenous/Mestizo and non-Indigenous respondents, with 95% confidence intervals.

undervalued in conventional democracy scores⁷² – but which apparently is deemed essential to Latin American citizens when evaluating the quality of democracy.

5. Discussion and conclusion

In this article, I have investigated the empirical implications of incorporating collective Indigenous rights in the legal system of Latin American states. I derived the expectation that collective rights increase SWD among Indigenous peoples because they address their historical loss of sovereignty and are an essential element in the transformation towards truly plurinational states. Moreover, collective rights open spaces for participation for the previously marginalized Indigenous groups. In contrast, individualizing group-differentiated Indigenous rights and stripping them from their collective character, can be detrimental to Indigenous peoples' SWD.

Empirically, Indigenous peoples are more satisfied with democracy when they have more collective rights in relation to individual rights. I replicate Fierro's finding that constitutional recognition of Indigenous rights increases Indigenous support for democracy.⁷³ However, it turns out that it matters how these rights are codified in ordinary legislation. After introducing the variables on the salience of collective rights, the effect of the constitutional indicator disappears.

Compared to the rest of the population, Indigenous peoples tend to have a more pessimistic view on democracy. However, using a wide definition of indigeneity, collective rights do moderate the effect of Indigenous identity on SWD. The more collective rights are adopted, the more the gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous respondents' SWD narrows. This effect is especially large for political collective rights like autonomy and self-determination rights. Furthermore, collective Indigenous rights have a positive association with the satisfaction among respondents of non-Indigenous ethnic backgrounds as well. Thus, giving minorities collective group rights does not harm the majority's perception of democracy.

This finding contradicts the multicultural conflict thesis. In this perspective, granting collective rights exclusively to specific groups in society could lead to social division and feelings of injustice among members of the dominant population groups, eventually leading to dissatisfaction with the political regime.⁷⁴ However, this thesis finds no support in this study. Instead, the results resonate with the multicultural integration thesis that collective rights can have a stabilizing effect by integrating the minority group within the broader political system.⁷⁵ Thus, incorporating collective rights for minorities seems to send a message to the whole citizenry that democracy is working well. This relates to the fact that the successful Indigenous political parties on the continent follow inclusionary strategies.⁷⁶

Apparently, citizens in Latin America are more satisfied with democracy when Indigenous peoples enjoy collective rights. The question arises whether some third factor could confound this relationship. In the various models, I control for key variables on the input and output side of the political system like Indigenous representation in parliament, socio-economic development, and good governance. The significantly positive effect of collective rights persisted across most models.

Given the varying record of the rule of law in Latin America, it could be questioned whether the laws on collective Indigenous rights are actually implemented – an issue beyond the scope of this article. This question calls for further research. However, even

if not properly implemented, the mere legal acknowledgement of the collective rights of Indigenous communities might represent an important symbolic act to further democratization through legal reform.⁷⁷ The legal recognition signals the direction for the future development of democracy and provides Indigenous communities with a legitimation of their autonomy claims.⁷⁸

Finally, the complex relationship between individual and collective Indigenous rights leaves space for future research. Both dimensions might relate differently to relevant topics like the enforcement of minority rights or the protection of minorities within minorities. Their impact might even differ for different facets of system support. This study on the positive effect of collective rights on Indigenous SWD represents just one contribution upon which further theoretical and empirical research can build.

Notes

1. Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Diamond, *Developing Democracy*.
2. Segovia, Pontarollo, and Orellana, "Discontent with Democracy".
3. Yashar, *Contesting Citizenship*.
4. Elkins and Sides, "Can Institutions Build Unity"; Wimmer, "Power and Pride"; Ruiz-Rufino, "Satisfaction with Democracy".
5. West, "Decentralization"; Fierro, "Indigenous People, Recognition, and Democracy".
6. Hall, "Policy Paradigms"; Sabatier, "Policy Change".
7. Jones, "Human Rights, Group Rights".
8. Deininger and Feder, "Land Institutions and Land Markets".
9. The text of all quoted legal provisions can be found in the Online Appendix A1.
10. Van Dyke, "Review: Justice as Fairness", 114.
11. Gargarella, *Latin American Constitutionalism*, 179.
12. Economic and Social Council, "Report of the Special Rapporteur"; Wright and Tomaselli, *The Prior Consultation*.
13. Scheinin, "How to Resolve Conflicts", 221.
14. Van Dyke, "Review: Justice as Fairness", 114f; Jones, "Human Rights, Group Rights", 82ff.
15. Jovanović, "Recognizing Minority Identities", 628.
16. Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, 208.
17. Wellman, *Real Rights*, 173ff.
18. Jones, "Human Rights, Group Rights", 89.
19. Bisaz, "The Concept of Group Rights", 15.
20. Kukathas, "Are There Cultural Rights?"; Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*.
21. Rhodes, "How 'Collective Human Rights' Undermine"; Waldron, "Minority Cultures".
22. Ivison, Patton, and Sanders, *Political Theory*, 3, 9; Hale, "Resistencia Para Que?", 185.
23. Kickingbird et al., "Indian Sovereignty", 2, 9; Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination*, 257f.
24. See Wiessner, "Indigenous Sovereignty", 1170–5; Andolina, "Sovereign and Its Shadow", 724.
25. Povinelli, *The Cunning of Recognition*; Cornellier and Griffiths, "Globalizing Unsettlement".
26. Quijano, "Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality", 169.
27. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.
28. Wolfe, "Recuperating Binarism", 258.
29. Ivison, Patton, and Sanders, *Political Theory*, 6; Jovanović, "Recognizing Minority Identities", 627.
30. Coulthard, *Red Skin, White Masks*, 30f, 42; Tully, "Recognition and Dialogue", 91ff.
31. Rice, "Indigenous Mobilization".
32. Van Cott, "Building Inclusive Democracies"; Lupien, "The Incorporation of Indigenous Concepts", 766.
33. Andolina, "Sovereign and Its Shadow", 724; Sieder, *Multiculturalism in Latin America*, 2ff.
34. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*.

35. Lijphart, 32.
36. McMurry, "From Recognition to Integration".
37. King, Smith, and Gracey, "Indigenous Health", 77.
38. Dahlberg, Linde, and Holmberg, "Democratic Discontent".
39. Andersen, "Indian Nationalism", 212.
40. Velez, "Collective Titling", 123ff.
41. Heinelt, "Collective Rights, Mobilization, and Accessibility", 470.
42. Bryld, "Increasing Participation".
43. Wiessner, "The Cultural Rights of Indigenous Peoples"; Figueroa, *Indigenous Peoples and Cultural Losses*.
44. See Lupien, "Participatory Democracy", 1260ff.
45. Montenegro and Stephens, "Indigenous Health", 1865.
46. Guzmán, "Decolonizing Law".
47. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, 274.
48. LAPOP, "AmericasBarometer".
49. Schmidt-Catran and Fairbrother, "The Random Effects", 4.
50. Gelman and Hill, *Data Analysis*, 253f.
51. Moreno Morales, "The Mysterious Case".
52. Using such a broad categorization necessarily hides the diversity within and hierarchies between the Mestizo and Indigenous communities (Roitman and Oviedo, "Mestizo Racism in Ecuador"). However, treating them as clearly distinct groups would conceal the fluid margins between these groups (Telles and Bailey, "Understanding Latin American Beliefs"). Furthermore, both Indigenous and Mestizo identities are constructed in contrast to white population groups, below which they rank socio-economically throughout the continent (Bailey, Saperstein, and Penner, "Race, Color, and Income"). Rather than equating Indigenous and Mestizo communities and treating them as a homogenous group, the use of the narrow and wide definition is an attempt to reflect this ambiguity of ethnic identification and to be transparent about the views on democracy of these population groups that might have varying degrees of Indigenous ancestry or affiliation to Indigenous culture.
53. Vogt et al., "Integrating Data on Ethnicity".
54. Norris, "The Conceptual Framework of Political Support", 27.
55. Canache, Mondak, and Seligson, "Meaning and Measurement", 525.
56. Ariely, "Democracy-Assessment in Surveys".
57. Linde and Ekman, "Satisfaction with Democracy", 405.
58. Valgarðsson and Devine, "What Satisfaction with Democracy?"
59. Vogt et al., "Integrating Data on Ethnicity".
60. Janis, "Validating Content Analysis", 56; Bauer, "Classical Content Analysis", 134.
61. The coding was performed by three coders. After a thorough training period, they reached a substantial inter-coder agreement of Krippendorff's $\alpha = 0.69$ and $\alpha = 0.64$ for the individual and collective rights dimension (Krippendorff, *Content Analysis*, chap. 12; Landis and Koch, "The Measurement of Observer Agreement"). Then, each article was independently coded twice by different coders. Finally, conflicting coding decisions were resolved by an executive decision of the project leader.
62. This measure ignores the fact that sometimes laws get repealed. Unfortunately, the INDILEX database only contains data about the repeals of laws for 6 countries. Generalizing from this limited information indicates that on average only 7% of laws get abolished over time – the bulk of Indigenous legislation is there to stay. This suggests that the measurement error might be reasonably small to justify the operationalization procedure.
63. Holzinger et al., "Constitutionalization of Indigenous Group Rights".
64. Segovia, Pontarollo, and Orellana, "Discontent with Democracy", 421f.
65. Coppedge et al., "V-Dem Dataset 2020".
66. Wu and Chang, "Income Inequality, Distributive Unfairness".
67. Birnir and Van Cott, "Disunity in Diversity"; Madrid, "Indigenous Parties".
68. Baker and Greene, "The Latin American Left's Mandate".
69. Vogt, "A New Dawn?"
70. Hooghe et al., *Measuring Regional Authority*.

71. Bolivia is an exceptional case because Indigenous peoples represent the demographic majority. Under Evo Morales, the first Indigenous president of the continent, the country has also adopted the most collective rights for Indigenous peoples. This special circumstance could indeed drive Indigenous SWD in the country. Nevertheless, excluding Bolivia from the analysis, does not alter the results.
72. Wolff, Jonas. "Political Incorporation in Measures of Democracy: A Missing Dimension (and the Case of Bolivia)". *Democratization* 25, no. 4 (2018): 692–708. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1417392>.
73. Fierro, "Indigenous People, Recognition, and Democracy".
74. Fierro, 2749.
75. Chandra, "Ethnic Parties"; Fierro, "Indigenous People, Recognition, and Democracy", 2750.
76. Madrid, "Indigenous Parties".
77. Faundez, "Democratization through Law".
78. Andolina, "Sovereign and Its Shadow", 749; Lupien, "The Incorporation of Indigenous Concepts", 791f.

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Data availability statement

Replication material for this article can be accessed on the Harvard Dataverse: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/1OFACTA>.

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