

Konfliktjournalismus
Conflict Journalism

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Die Studie analysiert, wie arabische Israelis seit 2000 in den israelischen Nachrichten dargestellt werden, nachdem sich ein fundamentaler Wechsel in der politischen und sozialen Realität sowohl der arabischen als auch der jüdischen Bürger Israels ereignet hatte. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird der Berichterstattung über vier Ereignisse gewidmet:

- die Proteste im Oktober 2000,
- die Ankündigung konkurrenzfähiger Angebote für Channel 2 in den Jahren 2003-2004,
- den zweiten Libanon-Krieg, und
- die Veröffentlichung Futur of the Arab Palestinian in Israel Ende 2006 durch das National Committee for the Heads of Arab Local Authorities in den nationalen Fernsehsendern und zwei Zeitungen.

Qualitative und quantitative Textanalysen zeigen, dass die arabischen Bürger meist nicht zur Kenntnis genommen werden, aber wenn sie dargestellt werden, dann vorrangig als Feinde und sehr selten als gleichberechtigte Bürger. Am Beispiel der aktuellen Debatte über Sprache und Integration von Minderheiten wird der Frage nach dem Zusammenspiel zwischen Gegenstandsverständnis, Wissensideal und Erkenntnisinteresse in der Migrationsforschung nachgegangen. Dabei wird die These vertreten, dass in einer mainstream-orientierten Forschungspragmatik, in deren Rahmen die Kontrolle von Bedingungen und Effekten menschlichen Verhaltens vordergründig ist, Fragen nach den Aufgaben der jeweiligen Wissensbildung in den Hintergrund geraten. Im Unterschied zu einem Bedingungsdiskurs – in welchem der technischen Verwertbarkeit von Wissensbildung für die Begründung der Angemessenheit des je eigenen Ansatzes eine entscheidende Rolle zukommt – wird hier die Notwendigkeit eines auf die Gewinnung emanzipatorischen Reflexionswissens abzielenden Erkenntnisinteresses für die Migrationsforschung herausgearbeitet und die Relevanz des Capabilities-Approach für eine Neuorientierung in der Interkulturellen Forschung und Bildung begründet.

Zur Autorin:


Prof. Anat First, Dekanin der School of Communication, Netanya College, Israel. Forschungsgebiete: Darstellung von Minoritäten, insbesondere Frauen und Araber; Darstellung des Multikulturalismus in verschiedenen Fernsehgenres während der Hauptsendezeit; israelische Kultur im allgemeinen; Globalisierung/Amerikanisierung und Aushandlung nationaler Identitäten.

Adresse: Netanya Academic College, 1 University St. Kiryat Yizhak Rabin, Netanya, 42365, Israel.
eMail: d_first@netvision.net.il

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Enemies, fellow victims, or the forgotten? News coverage of Israeli Arabs in the 21st century

This study examined Israeli-Arab citizens' representation in Israeli news media as of 2000, when fundamental changes occurred in the political and social realities of both Arab and Jewish citizens. The present examination paid particular attention to coverage of four momentous events – namely, the protests in October 2000, the announcement of a competitive bid for Channel 2 during 2003-4, the Second Lebanon War, and the publication of Future of the Arab Palestinians in Israel at the end of 2006 by the National Committee for the heads of Arab local authorities – by the national television channels and two newspapers. Qualitative and quantitative textual analyses revealed that Arab citizens are mostly symbolically annihilated, but when presented they are identified chiefly as enemies and very seldom as equal citizens.



On the author:

Prof. Anat First serves as Dean of School of Communication, Netanya College, Israel. Her main fields of research include: Mediated representations of minority groups particularly women and Arabs; multi-culturalism as reflected in various genres on prime-time television; Israeli culture in general; globalization/Americanization and negotiating national identity. She has published extensively on these subjects.

Address: Netanya Academic College, 1 University St. Kiryat Yizhak Rabin, Netanya, 42365, Israel.

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1. Introduction

Like the media coverage of any group, that of Israeli Arabs is closely allied with the sociopolitical reality in the country. Therefore examining the representation of Israeli Arabs by the Jewish majority in the Israeli media in a variety of political situations is important. In the 1990s, the representation of this group was characterized by post-colonial trends along with symbolic annihilation and defamiliarization (which also typify representation of other weaker population sectors in the Hebrew media). Arab politicians and intellectuals began to appear on TV and newspapers (First, 2002). The present paper considers the representation of Israeli Arabs in the symbolic reality at the beginning of the 21st century, examining whether the same features remain as in the 1990s.

Several reasons underlie the choice to study the period from 2000. The first relates to changes in the sociopolitical reality of relations between Israeli Jews and Arabs in the wake of different circumstances (as will be elaborating latter-on). The second concerns changes in the symbolic reality, primarily in the operation of Channel 2, the most popular commercial TV station in Israel. The third relates to the change in the interactions between these two realities – the sociopolitical and the symbolic – as a result of the antipolitical mood that has come to pervade Israel¹ (Hermann, Lebel, & Tzaban, 2008).

In view of these developments, this study compares coverage by the Israeli news media at four points of contact between the majority and the minority, in four different political contexts:

- The second Intifada – the October 2000 events, in which 13 Arab citizens were killed by security forces;²
- The eve of the issuance of franchises for the operation of Channel 2 by the Second Authority for Television and Radio (responsible for regulating commercial broadcasts) in 2003,³ during a struggle for control of one of the central arenas of symbolic reality in Israel;
- The Second Lebanon War in July-August, 2006,⁴ in which both Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel were attacked, resulting in the death of 19 Arabs and 25 Jews;
- The publication of "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel" in December 2006, in which the minority proposed a new sociopolitical agenda that challenged the power of the Jewish majority.

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1. Researchers report different types of antipolitics, from fundamental rejection of politics and the political system, through the demand to replace the existing regime with a different form of government, to criticism of the existing regime and the desire to introduce changes into it (Hermann et. al., 2008).
 2. The data regarding these events was collected as part of a study conducted by the author and Dr. Eli Avraham, funded by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University.
 3. The relevant data was collected as part of a study conducted by the author with Dr. Eli Avraham and Noa Elefant-Lefler, funded by the Second Authority for Television and Radio.
 4. We are grateful to Keren Tamam and Uri Goldstein for collecting and encoding the relevant material.

Comparing media coverage of these four situations can help clarify the relationship between the two groups and identify the dominant civil discourse in the Israeli media.

A new-old sociopolitical reality?

Arabs in Israel are "the other" virtually by definition, as they constitute a national group living in an *ethnic democracy* (Smocha, 1999). Their "otherness" is two-fold, stemming from the fact that they are a religious/ethnic/national minority in a given "imagined community," the State of Israel, and from their links to another "imagined community," the Palestinians. In addition, each of these communities – one established and the other now coalescing – is in conflict regarding definition of its own borders. The "Israeliness" of the country's Arab citizens has been a frequent subject of discussion, associated primarily with their formal status as 18% of the country's population. This means that they are subject to Israeli laws, participate in elections, and are fully aware of democratic principles and civil rights. Their "Israeliness" is also reflected in their way of life. Nevertheless, this "Israeliness" is flawed in at least two ways. First, Arabs live in the periphery of Israel and on the margins of its society and institutions, so that they constitute a sociological minority lacking influence in respect to most of the major issues affecting their lives. Secondly, their interpretation of their citizenship does not coincide with the accepted Jewish connotation of loyalty to country and identification with its Jewish character and symbols (Ghanem & Ossitzky-Lazar, 2001).

The decision to focus on media representation in the 21st century derived from the changes that have taken place in both the Jewish and Arab societies in Israel. The Jewish population became aware of the changes in Arab society during the events of October 2000, when a central role was played by a new generation dubbed the "stand-tall generation." These young men and women, the majority in their late twenties or early thirties, were born to the children of 1948, the year of Israel's independence (Rabinowitz & Abu-Baker, 2002). The group emerged in response to the appeal of the Arab parties in the '90s to "call for a fundamental change in the official definition of the State of Israel and transform it from an ethnonational to a liberal-democratic state, a country for all its citizens in which the Palestinians are recognized as a national minority" (Peled & Shafir, 2005, p. 164). The 1990s marked a change in the nature of the Israeli Arabs' citizenship. In terms of the discourse on citizenship, it might be said that the Arabs, who had been excluded from the republican or ethnonational discourse, began to benefit from and participate in the liberal discourse (for example see Kimmerling, 2004).

In the same period, Jewish Israeli society was undergoing a capitalist upheaval, which primarily entailed converting the hegemonic Fordist model into a neoliberal one spurred by rapid globalization (Filk & Ram, 2004). Significant changes were also taking place in relations between Israel and the Arab countries and the Palestinians; the peace treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994); the war in Lebanon in 1982; in 1987 the first Intifada; in 1991 the Gulf War; the Oslo Accords in 1993, declaring mutual recognition, were signed between Israel and the PLO. Thus in the 1990s, particularly after the Oslo Accords, peace was viewed as a political option in the war-torn Middle East. The new understanding intensified the political debate, leading in late 1995 to the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. In addition, in the last decade of the 20th century, some one million immigrants joined Israeli society. This mass immigration, along with globalization and a revolution in communications, led to changes in politics and values. Ethnic groups began fighting for their identity, individualism intensified together with a growing advocacy of universal values, and a civil society started to emerge (Timm, 2001). At the end of the 20th century, the Zionist ethos was epitomized in two conflicting yet converging cultural codes: the universal or human, i.e., the liberal discourse of citizenship; and the particular or national, the ethnonational discourse. The October 2000 events undermined the delicate balance that had begun to evolve in Israeli society (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2002).

In the years between the October 2000 events and the Second Lebanon War (the summer of 2006), attempts to examine the relationship between the two sectors were made both by official¹ and voluntary bodies. In 2006, relations between Arabs and Jews were again tested. Whereas the two groups had clashed in the autumn of 2000, in the summer of 2006 they both became victims of war, the targets of thousands of missiles launched at Israel by Hezbollah, (a Lebanese Shiite Muslim group) killing Arabs and Jews alike. In late 2006, the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee issued "The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel," framed by a large consensus of Israeli Arab academics and public figures. This document related nationally and culturally to the collective rights of Israeli Arabs. In terms of civil discourse, the group was seeking to reposition itself in the liberal discourse while generating a separate ethnonational discourse.

During this same period, clear indications of antipolitics became discernible in contemporary Israel. As a rule, citizens recognize the importance of the 'political', and feel anger and frustration with the system, which is not fulfilling the tasks expected of it, and with decision-makers, who are not attentive to the public's needs and wishes, and prefer to promote their own interests over the public's. The 'antipolitical' is not characterized by an 'exit', and often shows increased interest in public issues (Hermann et al., 2008). The media allows the voice of antipolitics to be heard, thereby strengthening its po-

1. For example, the Or Commission was set up to investigate the October 2000 events, publishing its conclusions in September, 2003.

sition in the balance of power.

Discourse of representation

The media is the stage on which the representation process is played out, the instrument through which the images of different groups in society are disseminated and restructured. These images help to shape the worldviews of individuals and groups, enabling continuous negotiation both with sociopolitical reality and other individuals (Kellner, 1995). At the same time, the media is the primary agent for instilling ideology, enabling the social world to be regimented, both overtly and covertly, in a manner consistent with the worldview of the "strong," while silencing the "weak" (Hall, 1997). Thus, by repetition, a symbolic space represented by the discourse of the "strong" is created. In it, according to Orbe (1998), groups of "others" adopt the discourse of the "strong." This dynamic is often evident in the colonialist representational discourse, disseminated by official school texts as well as popular texts, which has often served as an authoritative tool for constructing images of both the "strong" and the "weak."

Representation as a constant act of constructing identities also constitutes a force for creating stereotypes, which help to structure "otherness" in an orderly interpretive scheme perceived as natural. This scheme serves as an instrument for perpetuating stigmas and exclusion, and as such is a major element in colonial discourse. However, given that representation is a dynamic process, "otherness" can be presented in a positive light, as a challenge to the existing order, thereby enabling the emergence of post-colonial discourse (Bhabha, 1994; Hall, 1997). This type of discourse can be seen in the attempts of minorities to propose alternative agendas.

Relations between the "strong" and the "weak" have been investigated in respect of three factors: 1) visibility – the presence or absence of "others" in the written and/or photographic text, measured by means of a "head count"; 2) the quality and nature of visibility – in what roles, contexts, and behaviors are members of the different groups shown; 3) majority-minority relations – the degree of interactions between the groups (Avraham, First, & Elefant-Lefler, 2004; First & Avraham, 2004; Greenberg & Brand, 1994). The discourse of representation is an integral part of the discussion of media frameworks, as it refers to the content of the framework (First, 2002). In other words, the mutual relationship between the manner of representation and the media framework gives rise to the media product. (First & Avraham, Forthcoming).

The representation of Arab citizens as "others" in the Israeli media is neither fixed nor homogeneous; it is influenced by political relations between the various Arab groups and the state at any given moment (First, 2002). Studies from the 1990s¹ found that the Hebrew media tended to ignore the Arab population, and the coverage that did relate to it generally dealt with offenses: crime, hostile activities, violence, breaches of the public order, etc. (Wolfsfeld, Avraham, & Aburaiya, 2000). Arabs were viewed as a menace and an enemy by the sociopolitical environment. Furthermore, Israeli Arabs were perceived stereotypically by the mass media as a threat to the Jewish majority. They were often depicted by means of generalizations which presented a negative image that could also be found in other systems in society (First, 2002; Liebes, 1997).

As noted above, the discourse of representation relates to symbolic reality, so it is also important to consider constructs and dominance in this context. From the late 1980s and throughout the '90s, the Israeli media ecology underwent a series of changes, the primary one being the end of the monopoly previously held by Channel 1, the single state-supported TV station. In 1988, cable TV arrived in Israel (although it did not broadcast news and current affairs programs), and in 1993 Channel 2 was officially launched. This revolution altered viewing habits, with more hours spent in front of the television and more TV sets per household. In addition, the news was aestheticized and subjectified (Liebes, 2003). A second commercial station, Channel 10, began operating a decade after. The borders of prime time were now extended, beginning every evening at 7:00 with a newscast. In fact, news and current affairs programming in general was expanded, thereby also expanding representation in symbolic reality of the more highly regarded groups in society.

The current study focused on two key questions relating to print and electronic media coverage of the four events listed above:

- How were Israeli Arabs, the "other" in Israeli society, represented in news reports of the two different types of national conflict?
- How were Israeli Arabs represented in "normal" times (between or after the conflictual events)?

1. Research into the representation of Israeli Arabs gained momentum in the 1990s. Before that time, study of the image of the Arab was limited, dealing with official sources and primarily textbooks rather than popular culture (e.g., TV programs, the press, radio).

2. Method

In order to examine these questions, quantitative and qualitative content analyses were performed on items relating to the events appearing in newspapers and TV newscasts.

Quantitative analysis

For the period of each of the events, a coding system was developed to aid in measuring the dependent variables. Validity and reliability of the system were ensured by the use of three judges (male and female Jewish students in different degree programs in Media Studies), who yielded a mean intercoder agreement rate of 93% for the different variables. To achieve this high rate of agreement, the judges underwent prior training and several pretests were conducted. Since the analysis related to two essentially different types of media, print and electronic, two separate coding sheets were designed.

The coding sheet for the press as well as the TV broadcasts contained the following variables: name of newspaper/broadcast; date; page in the paper/ ordinal number of item in broadcast, mention of the item in the headlines ; length of item; classification of event; name and ethnicity of reporter; theme of coverage; reliance on quoted sources [provide name]; inclusion of name and description of Arab casualty; name used to refer to the group; depiction of Arab participant and biographical details provided; reference to civil protest, terrorism, Arab and Palestinian world; description of historical circumstances or group's demands; subjects covered in item.

Events analyzed

October 2000 events. On Thursday, September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon, then leader of the opposition, visited the Temple Mount. The following day, at the conclusion of Friday prayers on the Temple Mount, clashes again broke out between the Muslim worshippers and the police, with dire consequences: seven Arabs were killed and hundreds of Arabs and dozens of policemen were injured. At the same time, fierce battles were taking place between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the territories (outside the borders of the State of Israel). The conflict between the Israeli security forces and the Arab civilians spread to various locations within the country and lasted for nearly two weeks. By the time it was over, thirteen Arab citizens had been shot dead (Peled & Shafir, 2005).

The eve of the issuance of franchises for the operation of Channel 2 (2003; 2005). In late January 2005, four groups submitted bids to operate Channel 2, the major commercial TV station in Israel. Two were to be awarded an exclusive franchise that would be in effect until 2015¹. One of the key issues on the public agenda during the time leading up to the tender was the question of cultural diversity in commercial TV broadcasts. The bidders were asked to enhance cultural diversity which stemmed from the results of a study commissioned in 2003 by the Second Authority for Television and Radio. The study examined the representations of different social groups on the commercial television channels 2 and 10 (Avraham et al., 2004). During the run-up to the issuance of the broadcasting franchises, a follow-up study was conducted, and the results were published in 2005.

The Second Lebanon War. The official name given by Israel to the war waged from July 12 to August 14, 2006 in Lebanon and northern Israel. Fighting began with the abduction of two Israeli soldiers by members of Hezbollah. Over the course of 34 days, battles raged between Israeli troops and Hezbollah fighters in south Lebanon, the Israeli Air Force attacked targets deeper in Lebanon, and Hizbullah fired thousands of missiles of different types at Israel, striking at the civilian population (Shelah & Limor, 2007). It is suggested that the coverage of the war contributed to the antipolitical mood in Israeli society.

"The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel." This document, framed by the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee and the Committee of Local Arab Authorities and published in December 2006, outlines the authors' vision of the future character of Israel and its transformation into a country for all its citizens, Jews and Arabs alike. Reviewing the history of the establishment of Israel from the vantage point of Israeli Arabs, it presents the Palestinian historical narrative. The "Vision" contains a list of historical and legislative demands for far-reaching changes in the civil status of the country's Arab citizens. In the broader context, it can be seen as a further step in the consolidation of Israeli Arabs as a political community representing a national minority within the State of Israel.

1. In essence, the choice of the franchisees would determine who would control the predominant TV content in the country, and who would benefit from the anticipated income from commercials during this period, estimated at 68 billion shekels.

Sample

Event	Media	Sampling dates & nos.
October 2000 events^a	Newspapers: <i>Haaretz</i> , <i>Yedioth Aharonoth</i> Television: Channels 1 & 2	Sept. 29-Oct. 14, 2000 241 items 181 news items
Eve of issuance of Channel 2 franchises^b	Television: Channels 2 & 10	19 weeks in 2003 2,222 news items ^c in 2004
Second Lebanon War	Newspapers: <i>Haaretz</i> , <i>Yedioth Aharonoth</i> Television: Channel 10	July 12-Aug. 14, 2006 113 items mentioning Israeli Arabs 500 items on the main evening newscast
"Future Vision of Palestinian Arabs in Israel"	Newspaper: <i>Haaretz</i> Electronic media: ynet.co.il, nrg.co.il	Dec. 2006-Jan. 2007 11

- a. For a detailed discussion of this event, see First & Avraham (2004).
- b. For a detailed discussion of this period, see First & Avraham (2004).
- c. In other media genres, no more than a negligible number of references were made to Arab citizens (Avraham et al., 2004).

Overall, in each period there was a relatively small number of Israeli-Arab citizens. Therefore simple distribution breakdown was sufficient.

Qualitative analysis

The main methodology used in this analysis was a qualitative content analysis. Researchers using this method consider texts to reveal general discourse patterns (Pauly, 1991) through the appearance of motifs, characteristics, labels, definitions, stereotypes, and generalizations presented in the media as exclusively characterizing specific social groups (Dahlgren & Chakrapani, 1982). Using this method, general patterns of discourse characteristic of the Arab population's coverage were extracted from 181 television news items. These patterns were identified on the basis of the theoretical framework discussed above – factors 2 and 3 in representation's discourse – that is, the quality and nature of visibility and the majority-minority relations. Thus, I looked at patterns of relevant discourse such as: generalization, exclusion, legitimization, type of voice (Avraham, 2003; First, 2002), sanitation, comparison, personification, demonization, and context (Liebes, 1997).

The qualitative analysis referred to both text and image based on the perception according to which images cannot be understood without their captions (Barthes, 1977) and that words hold greater power than do television images (Schudson, 1995). For this reason the following analysis refers first to verbal texts and then to the corresponding visual components.

3. Results

A brief review of the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses appears below. The results are presented in the chronological order of the events to which they relate.

October 2000 events

During the first two weeks of the second intifada, a total of 181 relevant TV news items were broadcast, 118 on Channel 1 and 63 on Channel 2. The mean length of an item was approximately two minutes. On five of the 14 days of the study, Channel 1 presented over 10 items dealing with Israeli Arabs in its various newscasts, whereas over 10 items appeared on Channel 2 on only a single day. Israeli Arabs were the subject of the opening item on three evenings, all on Channel 2. Of the 181 items, 67 were mentioned in the headlines of the newscast. A total of 241 items appeared in the print media, divided almost equally between *Yedioth Aharonoth* (113) and *Haaretz* (128). The subject was deemed of prime importance, as most of the reports appeared on the front page or the news pages (First & Avraham, 2004). Although the data indicates an increase in the press coverage of Israeli Arabs compared to previous investigations (Wolfsfeld, Avraham, & Aburaiya, 2000; First, 2002), the number of references to this group was still far below its proportion in the population.

The framing of the coverage in the press, and even more so on television was typified by depiction of the group as a whole in reference to disruption of the public order by objects. Disassociation between all Israeli Arabs and their status as citizens was found both in print and in TV newscasts. They were seen on the screen in demonstrations resulting in casualties or damage, rioting, or at funerals, that is, primarily in the context of violence. Moreover, stress was laid on the severity of the conflict. In view of the large number of items relating to this aspect of the events, the coverage of casualties appears surprising: on Channel 1, only 14 items (11%) made reference to casualties among Israeli Arabs, and the number on Channel 2 was even lower (4 items; 6%). When they were mentioned, the Arab casualties were again generally objectified: In other words, no biographical details, such as name, age, place of residence, or occupation, were provided (First & Avraham, 2004). For example, the report of Yael Sternhell on Channel 1's 7:30 newscast (Oct. 2, 2000) said: "It [x] began in the territories. Rioting by Israeli Arabs too. In Nazareth and Sakhnin several casualties have been laid to rest in recent days." [The anonymity of the description is particularly striking because of what is missing: the precise number of casualties buried or their names. Such information would be included in any report of the killing of Jewish citizens (for further examples, see: Dor, 2001; Zanberg et al., 2001). On the whole, the voice in the items was the hegemonic Jewish voice. Thus, 32% of the items made reference to Jewish leaders, whereas Arab leaders were mentioned in just 14%. Security was the predominant discourse, with the majority of items offering broad coverage by and on the security forces, principally the police. Only five days after the start of the events did any commentary critical of the police appear in the press (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, Sever Plotzker, Oct. 4, 2000, p. 2). The dissociation of Israeli Arabs from their status as citizens and characterization as belonging to those responsible for the clashes was intensified by the context. That is, the coverage related to them as a group and linked them with the Palestinians in the territories and with the intifada. Most of the coverage ignored the reasons and historical causes behind the events, focusing almost exclusively on the violence itself. Only 12% of the items on both TV channels related to historical factors, and the group's demands were presented in a mere 6% of the items (First & Avraham, 2004). In addition, the overwhelming majority of journalists reporting on the Israeli Arab population were Jewish. In contrast to the absence of the Israeli Arab narrative, the Jewish narrative was presented by the use of terminology drawn from the War of Independence, for example: "Yesterday, for the first time since 1948, the Galilee was cut off from the center of the country after thousands of Arab demonstrators blocked most of the roads" (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, "Intifada in the Galilee and Jaffa," Oct. 2, 2000, pp. 4, 23).

In comparison to the results of studies of the coverage of Israeli Arabs during previous events, in 2000 there was a rise in the visibility of this sector of the population and their voice was heard, albeit to a very limited extent. Their presence was felt as early as the Channel 1 7:30 news on the day Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount (Sept. 28, 2000). While both newspapers contained harsh criticism of the Arab members of Knesset, they also printed items that were critical of the Israeli right and displayed understanding of the anger of Israel's Arab citizens. Criticism of the political system (the police, the minister of public security, etc.) appeared mainly in op-ed pieces which expressed empathy with the pain of the "other" and a desire to continue to live together, as well as disapproval of the "we." In *Haaretz*, alongside commentaries by Gideon Levy and Amira Hass and critical pieces by Aviv Lavie, Nir described "excited youngsters talking in hoarse voices about 'the Jewish occupation', discrimination, humiliation, unemployment, and frustration" ("Showing Concern for the Temple Mount and Protesting Discrimination," Oct. 3, 2000). In *Yedioth Aharonoth* as well, which generally tends to present the Jewish viewpoint, other voices could be found in news items as early as the second day of events (e.g., Sami Michael, "Save My City," Oct. 3, 2000, p. 4). The objectification of Israeli Arabs ended on the fourth day: the news page (page 2) of *Yedioth Aharonoth* ran the pictures of six of the Arabs killed in the clashes, and *Haaretz* printed the names and pictures of all the casualties.

On the whole, power remained in the hands of Jewish male reporters (90% of all items). They chose to associate Israeli Arabs with the Palestinians in the territories and to demonize the Arab parliamentarians, accusing them of behavior ranging from improper conduct to incitement (First & Avraham, 2004).

Eve of the issuance of Channel 2 franchises: Struggle for control of symbolic reality:

In the course of this period, the representation of Israeli Arabs was examined twice, once in 2003 and again in 2005. The results of the first measurement showed reference to the group in 3% of the 2,222 TV news items analyzed. In the main, they appeared in the context of aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (e.g., internal politics, activities of the security forces, international diplomacy), with a mere five items dealing with the quality of life of this population (with neither positive nor negative judgments), as compared to 403 reporting on the life of the Jewish sector. In the fields of economics, business, commerce, and industry, Jews predominated, appearing in 133 items, whereas not a single item featured Arab citizens. Israeli Arabs were covered in 75% of the reports on breaches of public order, with their voice being provocative four times more frequently than that of Jews. In terms of the balance of power, in 99% of the coverage, the voice of the newsreader, expert, or commentator was Jewish (Avraham et al., 2004). No differences were found between Channel 2 and Channel 10 in respect to the representation of this sector of the population.

The follow-up study (La'or et al., 2006) was conducted shortly before announcement of the results of the tender (Oct., 2004-March, 2005), when the contenders had already been presented with the data regarding the presence and absence in the media of different groups in the population. The quantitative results indicated no improvement whatsoever in the representation of Israeli Arabs in news and current affairs programs on the commercial stations. In fact, reference to Israeli Arabs dropped from 3% to 2%. In the words of the research report: "The representation of minorities remains insufficient relative to their proportion in the population. The minimal representation of Israeli Arabs and new immigrants is particularly glaring" (La'or et al., 2006, p. 3). The franchisees appear to have defined the borders of representation primarily in ethno-centric terms. Indeed, Dr. Amal Gamal describes the condition of Israeli Arabs as "still suffering from double exclusion. By and large, they are excluded from the TV screen, and when they do appear, they are typically presented in a stereotypical manner implying cultural and social subservience" (ibid., p. 57).

Second Lebanon War

The most striking finding from this period is the drop in the visibility of Israeli Arabs in the media as compared to both the coverage of the October 2000 events and the data of the Second Authority for Television and Radio. Of the 500 items on the war shown in the various newscasts and bulletins on Channel 10, only 20 centered on Israeli Arabs. This is despite the fact that Arabs accounted for 40% of all civilian casualties in Israel. The mean length of the items on this sector of the population was two and a half minutes. A similar picture emerges from analysis of the print media. Over the course of the war, Israeli Arabs were mentioned in 113 items in the two papers (*Haaretz*, 68; *Yedioth Aharonoth*, 45).

However, the few Arab citizens who did appear in the print and electronic media were not anonymous. As a rule, a full biography was presented, including name, place of residence, and often occupation and severity of injury. In the newspapers, Israeli Arabs were the subject not only of news items, but also of human interest stories (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 28%; *Haaretz*, 22%), with the coverage tending to depict them as fellow victims (*Yedioth Aharonoth*, 73%; *Haaretz*, 59%). Reporting in *Yedioth Aharonoth* was largely episodic; that is, there was no reference to failings on the part of the authorities or the question of compensation for damaged property. These issues were, nonetheless, addressed in *Haaretz*. For example, an article headlined "Compensation Forms – Only in Hebrew" (*Haaretz*, Aug. 4, 2006, p. 6) reported on the demand of the human rights organization Adalah that this problem be redressed, along with the response of the Social Security Institute. Nevertheless, the process of inclusion was interspersed with motifs of distancing and defamiliarization. This range of representation derived both from the dominance of the Jewish voice (in news items as well as commentaries and op-ed pieces), and from the Arab voice, which refused to condemn Hassan Nasrallah, (secretary-general of Hezbollah) as demonstrated by an article by Jackie Khoury (*Haaretz*, July 24, 2006, p. 6) headlined: "Nasrallah's Missiles Threaten to Ignite Tension Between the City's Jewish and Arab Citizens." The writer depicts two leading figures in the city of Acre, Arab MK Abas Zkoor and Chief Rabbi Yosef Yashar, both proponents of coexistence. After the first missile attack on Acre, Zkoor appealed for an end to the fighting, calling on "leaders on both sides to act rationally and stop the destruction and killing." This, however, did not satisfy Rabbi Yashar, who regretted that Abas "did not denounce Hizbullah." Another headline stated "Israeli Arabs Do Not Know Who to Blame – Olmert or Nasrallah" (Yoav Stern, *Haaretz*, July 26, 2006, p. 1). The writer reported that "while the family of the two children refused to condemn Nasrallah, members of Awad's family held him responsible for the crisis [the "two children" and Habib Awad were Israeli Arabs killed in missile attacks – A.F.]. These two opposing opinions demonstrate the diversity of the Arab public, as well as its confusion."

The op-ed section of *Haaretz* contained several pieces by Israeli Arabs against the war (e.g., "War Won't Bring Peace," Raja Zatra, Aug. 13, 2006, p. B1), along with a number of items dealing with this population's opposition to the fighting. *Yedioth Aharonoth* published human interest stories, including "Youngsters 2006" (Shaul Golan, Aug. 1, 2006, *24 Hours* magazine section, p. 4), in which a quarter of the page was filled by a picture of a handsome young Arab, posing like a model, at his place of work. The caption read: "The routine of war. Wassim Zidani, 19, from Tamra, an employee of a pipe and piston factory in the industrial zone of Kiryat Bialik. He has worked in the plant for almost a year, along with his father, who has been there for many years. They are bused to the job, and work 8 hours a day. Aside from one employee on vacation, all the others showed up for work on all the days missiles were falling, as did the owner. Wassim: 'What do we have to fear?'"

The few items on the Channel 10 news that were devoted to Israeli Arabs demonstrate the ambivalence between representing them as "others" or as equally vulnerable fellow citizens. On July 20, 2006, the TV correspondent could not accept the views of the father who lost two children in a missile attack and yet was unwilling to condemn Nasrallah. What is more, the father blamed the Israeli government throughout history for the death of his children. Later in the item, however, the reporter displayed empathy for this man, offering a historical explanation for the discrimination against Israel's Arab population and describing their feelings. Thus they were presented at one and the same time as traitors and as people whose distress was understandable. A similar example can be found in Ruby Hammershlag's item about Kfar Rajar, a town which straddles the Israel-Lebanon border. Broadcasting on July 25, 2006, the correspondent referred in the very same breath to the local population and to Hizbullah, making it difficult to understand whether Rajar was an Israeli village or a Hizbullah

stronghold. Later in the item the picture became clearer when the reporter interviewed the head of the local council and even allowed him to make a direct appeal to the Israeli authorities for food supplies because "we're talking about human beings here, not animals."

A process of defamiliarization can be seen in most of the televised news items. For example, an item broadcast on July 19 opened with the reporter declaring: "Shortly after five o'clock this evening, the largest Arab city in Israel also came into Hizbullah's line of fire." This, then, was not just another city whose citizens were attacked, but the city of the "others" – Nazareth – and the population was astounded. "The citizens are in shock. No one thought Hizbullah would aim its missiles here." When the reporter appeared unable to understand how Arabs could be targeting Arabs, one of the residents came to his aid: "Missiles can't distinguish between Jews and Arabs," explained the man from Nazareth, adding, "We're all in the same war and share the same fate."

The question of Israeli Arabs' identity was ever-present, with the question "are 'you' part of the 'we'?" looming large. In an item broadcast on Aug. 7, 2006, a resident of Wadi Nisnas, an Arab section of Haifa, stated after a missile attack that "you can't destroy a whole nation," and wondered how long "you" (the Jews) would continue to try to do so. The reporter asked, "What do you mean by 'you'? Don't you feel part of us?", and the interviewee replied, "You don't let us feel part of you." TV correspondents repeatedly examined the identity of the Arab population. Particularly interesting is the ambivalent attitude regarding the Druze, members of a religious group with connections to Islam, and who serve in the Israeli army. Thus, for example, Yinon Magal described the return of a Druze unit from the battlefield (Aug. 14, 2006). The item opened with a shot of dusty soldiers carrying the Israeli flag, as the reporter declaimed that this Druze unit was coming back from a month of fighting. After praising their operations, he stated that none of their members was injured. "How did that happen?" he asked one of the soldiers, Tarek Abid. Abid explained: "The warriors have no fear. They are united around the same objective, soldiering, fellowship, everything." Later, as the soldiers were shown resting on the banks of the Sea of Galilee and meeting with their families, the reporter turned to one man holding his son in his arms with his father by his side. "Do you have any family in Lebanon?" he asked. The father, Gamal Abu Salah, replied, "Yes." Magal then asked his son the soldier: "And when you're fighting there, do you think about the fact that you have family in Lebanon?" "Of course," he answered. "But I don't know any of them. You can't tell who's a relative and who isn't. Whoever's shooting at you, you shoot back." The reporter went on to declare that "the army considers these men very brave soldiers," and noted the number of terrorists they had killed. The item concluded with a further interview with Tarek Abid about the fierce battle fought at Beit Yahoun. The difficulty, the soldier explained, was that terrorists were everywhere.

Apart from several op-ed pieces written by Israeli Arabs and items by non-Jewish male journalists, which appeared in both papers (a total of seven pieces written by Arab journalists or politicians), the dominant representer was the male Jewish reporter, who made use of republican discourse and allied himself with the homefront which was hurting and had no doubt who was to blame. When discussion of the homefront related to Israeli Arabs, the same pressing questions about instrumental issues, such as shelters, supplies, or early warning systems, were raised, but were generally accompanied by concerns regarding the degree to which these citizens identified with the shared fate. The group of Israeli Arabs was represented by the interview with Azam Azam (an Israeli Druze businessman jailed for spying on Egypt and released after 7 years),(Channel 10, July 25, 2006), who spoke of the loss of citizens from the Arab village of Marar. This item related solely to bereavement and pain, arousing empathy that was reinforced by the words of other witnesses to the event. The other group given expression in this context was the authorities, represented by the police and Transport Minister Shaul Mofaz. The police explained that they were charged with protecting Israel's Arab population and were carrying out that task, and Mofaz declared that after the missile attacks there could be no doubt that the Arabs were part of the State of Israel and the common struggle against Hizbullah, and that they would enjoy the same protection as every other citizen of Israel. In addition to Israeli Arabs, Jewish citizens, and the Jewish establishment, reporters used another player in the arena to frame the Arab population. This was Hizbullah leader, Nasrallah. With his help, it was a simple matter to turn Israeli Arabs into the enemy, as he himself regarded them as martyrs.

Indeed, throughout the war, journalists played an active role in framing Israeli Arabs. This is illustrated very clearly by the dispute in *Haaretz* between the journalist Ben Caspit and MK (Knesset member) Ahmed Tibi. Caspit expressed incredulity at Tibi's conviction that Minister of Defense Amir Peretz was a terrorist and Nasrallah was not. He called on the Arabs either to decide they were loyal citizens or to leave the country (Aug. 1, 2006). Tibi replied that it was his democratic right to oppose the war, even if Jews regarded his opposition as betrayal. He, stated that he was born in Israel and would continue to live there (Aug. 2, 2006). But it is the article by Uzi Benziman that appeared in *Haaretz* a month after the end of the fighting (Sept., 2006) which best demonstrates the same sort of framing offered by Amnon Abramowitz during the October 2000 events (First & Avraham, 2004). According to Benziman, and other Jewish Israeli journalists, "During and after the Second Lebanon War, the Israeli Arabs crossed the lines." Thus Benziman explicitly defines the status of this population, once again, as the enemy.

"The Future Vision of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel"

A review of *Haaretz* and the Internet sites of the other two leading Israeli papers, Ynet.co.il (*Yedioth Aharonoth*) and nrg.co.il (*Maariv*)¹ revealed only a small number of items on this subject. *Haaretz* published 8 items on the news pages, one in the financial section, and 22 op-ed pieces by Jews or Arabs; none of the Internet sites had more than five items appearing in various sections. Although the Hebrew press presented the views of the authors of the "Vision" and public figures from the Arab population, the pieces prepared by Jewish journalists centered on the threat to Israel's Jewish identity, a framing that delegitimized both the document and its authors.

Writing in *Haaretz*, Yoav Stern (Dec. 10, 2006) reported on the appeal of the head of the Higher Arab Monitoring Committee, Shauki Hatib, to the Israeli public to conduct a debate of the document "not in the corridors of the General Security Agency, but in the public discourse." According to Stern, Hatib "was responding to the remarks of the head of the Security Agency, Yuval Diskin, in a meeting of the government, claiming that the document threatened the Jewish and democratic identity of Israel and reinforced the Palestinian identity of the Arabs in the country." Stern went on to state that the Vision's provisions "indeed attest to the trend in the Arab public to strengthen their independent identity in confronting the establishment. The document reflects the demand to grant collective rights to this public which they do not now enjoy. In the section dealing with relations with the government, the document demands the right of veto for the Arab population in critical decisions, in effect turning Israel into a binational state." This type of reporting was typical of the established media.

Enemies, fellow victims, or the forgotten?

Since 2000, discourse on Israeli Arabs has been primarily ethnonational, with the postcolonial discourse fading into the background. The analysis shows that the positioning of this sector of the population in the media has remained unchanged, both when they represent the other side in the conflict and when the enemy is across the border. Moreover, the visibility of Israeli Arabs in the media has declined since 2000 (see data, Wolfsfeld, 2007).

The media represented the October 2000 events as a clash between Israel's Jewish and Arab citizens largely in dichotomous fashion: the apprehensive Jews were the "good guys," and the Arabs were the "bad guys," perceived as collaborators with the Palestinians in the territories. Their political leaders played the role of chief instigators. The Jewish ethnonational discourse in sociopolitical reality was duplicated in symbolic reality, and the critical voices fell silent. Israeli Arabs were positioned as a menace on Israel's national security map, and their loyalty to the country was questioned. This, together with the Jewish public's sense that it was under threat, cast Israeli Arabs as part of the enemy (Smootha, 2006). Thus, the "otherness" of this population was intensified by the fact that they could not take part in the discourse, not only because of its nature, but also, and perhaps more significantly, because they were perceived of as the enemy. This discourse was represented by a wide range of journalists who enlist in times of crisis (Zandberg & Neiger, 2005) and fill most, but not all, of the media space. In the cracks and small gaps that remained, a liberal discourse was conducted on the subject of the rights of Arab citizens and discrimination.

Even after the October 2000 events were over, they continued to impact the quantity and quality of the televised representation of Israeli Arabs. Channels 2 and 10 reneged on their promise to increase the visibility of Arabs on screen.² Thus, despite the explicit assurances of the station editors and managers to give higher priority to the representation of Arab citizens, their visibility on both channels declined. The follow-up study of the Second Authority for Television and Radio, which examined representations of various groups in Israeli society, found that while the Zionist religious public and new immigrants were represented more in the run-up to issuance of the Channel 2 franchises, the presence of Israeli Arabs on news and current affairs programs dropped from 3% to a mere 2%.³

During the Second Lebanon War, the media played a major role in shaping the homefront (Liebes & Kampf, 2006) and giving it a voice. This function became even more significant in view of the ineptness of the political establishment.⁴ In light of the role of the print and electronic press in representing the Jewish civilian population (Keshev (2007), the scarcity of references to the suffering caused to Arab citizens is especially conspicuous. What is more, even in items about Arab civilians, who account for 60% of the population of Haifa and northern Israel, the region which came under attack, the coverage opened with the question of their loyalty and identity, and only later moved on to a description of their human suffering. The thematic framing, which called for discussion of the government's investment in infrastructure in the Arab sector (such

1. The Internet search was conducted in December, 2006 and was restricted to the sites of the established newspapers. Since that time, many more references to this subject have appeared in both political and academic contexts.
2. See Anat Balint's interview with Hulud Masalha of the ilam Center (*Haaretz*, Feb. 12, 2006).
3. The current paper relates only to news and current affairs programs. Until recently, Israeli Arabs did not appear on the screen in Hebrew programming. In the past few years, however, Arab actors have begun to be included in Hebrew-language soap operas, reality programs, and TV dramas.
4. For the role of the media in times of crisis in shaping the civil society, see Frosh & Wolfsfeld (2007).

as enforcing the regulations concerning shelters and sirens) was absent from most of the items. In addition, coverage of the evacuation of particularly vulnerable Jewish populations from the north of the country made no mention of the unique difficulties typically involved in asking Arab citizens to leave their homes.

Given the growing ethnonational discourse after the Second Lebanon War in both the sociopolitical and symbolic realities, the attempt of Israeli Arabs to initiate discourse on their rights met with fierce opposition. That is to say, in the months following the war, the country refused to conduct a public, i.e., media, discussion of a subject that appeared to be a threat to the Jewish nation. Thus, discourse on the rights of Israeli Arabs, perceived as an Arab ethnonational discourse, remained a source of conflict between the two communities. Bhabha (1994) contends that identity is constructed in respect to the other. It might therefore be said that Jewish identity is dependent on Palestinian identity, and vice versa. According to Bhabha, this relationship creates a middle ground which he terms "third space." It would seem, however, that coverage of Israeli Arabs does not yet follow this pattern of relations. If a "third space" should ever develop here, it is likely to emerge first in other genres perceived as less threatening to the shaping of the national Jewish identity.

Israel is an ethnic democracy (Smooha, 1999) that still manages to promote the principle of ethnic unity. In contrast to the antipolitical discourse that pervades the media, the country does not cross the national line. Nevertheless, it would appear that alongside this imagined unity – a unity that was once represented by republican discourse and is today represented by ethnonational discourse – the liberal discourse of civil rights continues to exist and develop in some eras. It seems that one can find an Arab in reality shows or even in drama (which is not a stereotype), but not in the news or on commentary shows.

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On the author: Prof. Anat First serves as Dean of School of Communication, Netanya College, Israel. Her main fields of research include: Mediated representations of minority groups particularly women and Arabs; multi-culturalism as reflected in various genres on prime-time television; Israeli culture in general,; globalization/Americanization and negotiating national identity. She has published extensively on these subjects.

Address: Netanya Academic College, 1 University St. Kiryat Yizhak Rabin, Netanya, 42365, Israel.
eMail: d_first@netvision.net.il

Rousbeh Legatis

Konfliktfelder journalistischer Praxis in Kolumbien

Die chronische Unsicherheit für Journalistinnen und Redakteure in der Ausübung ihres Berufes in Kolumbien speist sich aus vielerlei Quellen und ist nach wie vor gravierend. Aktuell sind es – neben den Indikatoren extremer physischer Gewalt (wie tätliche Angriffe, Misshandlungen, Entführungen und Morde) – in der internationalen Diskussion oft unbeachtete Problembereiche, wie mangelnde Ausbildungsangebote, unzureichende Infrastruktur am Arbeitsplatz, prekäre Lohnverhältnisse, fehlende Unabhängigkeit gegenüber Herausgebern und ein wenig ausgebildetes Verständnis der Berufsethik, die die journalistische Arbeit in Kolumbien prägen. Diese strukturellen Probleme führen zu qualitativen – speziell in der Konfliktberichterstattung. Aber statt Stillstand vollzieht sich ein Wandel. Kolumbianische Journalisten verändern ihr Selbstbild, entwickeln ein Problembewusstsein bezüglich ihrer eigenen Arbeit und gehen die Defizite aktiv an.



Zum Autor:

Rousbeh Legatis, Politikwissenschaftler und freier Journalist, u. a. für die internationale Presseagentur Inter Press Service (IPS). Nach seinem Diplom an der Freien Universität Berlin liegen seine Arbeitsschwerpunkte aktuell in der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, bei der Rolle von Medien im Peacebuilding sowie bei der Media Assistance.

eMail: rousbeh.legatis@googlemail.com

Rousbeh Legatis

Conflict fields of journalistic praxis in Colombia

The chronic uncertainty for journalists and editors in carrying out their professional work in Colombia has many sources and has been serious for decades. Currently – besides indicators of extreme physical violence (such as daily attacks, abuse, kidnappings and murders) – problem areas are strongly marking journalistic work in Colombia that are often neglected in the international discussion, such as inadequate training offerings, unsatisfactory infrastructure in the workplace, precarious wage situations, lack of independence in relationship to editors and a poorly taught understanding of professional ethics. These structural problems produce qualitative deficiencies – especially in conflict reportage. But instead of stagnation, change is occurring. Colombian journalists are revising their self-image, at the same time developing a problem consciousness in their own work, and are actively trying to correct the deficiencies.



On the author.

Rousbeh Legatis is a political scientist and independent journalist, among others for the Inter Press Service News Agency (IPS). Since earning a Masters degree at the Free University of Berlin, his work has focused on peace and conflict research. His current interest is in the role of the media in peace-building and media assistance, as well as in constructive conflict transformation in conflict countries and societies marked by the experience of violence.

Address: eMail: rousbeh.legatis@googlemail.com

Rousbeh Legatis

Konfliktfelder journalistischer Praxis in Kolumbien

Abstract: The chronic uncertainty for journalists and editors in carrying out their professional work in Colombia has many sources and has been serious for decades. Currently – besides indicators of extreme physical violence (such as daily attacks, abuse, kidnappings and murders) – problem areas are strongly marking journalistic work in Colombia that are often neglected in the international discussion, such as inadequate training offerings, unsatisfactory infrastructure in the workplace, precarious wage situations, lack of independence in relationship to editors and a poorly taught understanding of professional ethics. These structural problems produce qualitative deficiencies – especially in conflict reportage. But instead of stagnation, change is occurring. Colombian journalists are revising their self-image, at the same time developing a problem consciousness in their own work, and are actively trying to correct the deficiencies.

Kurzfassung: Die chronische Unsicherheit für Journalistinnen und Redakteure in der Ausübung ihres Berufes in Kolumbien speist sich aus vielerlei Quellen und ist nach wie vor gravierend. Aktuell sind es – neben den Indikatoren extremer physischer Gewalt (wie tätliche Angriffe, Misshandlungen, Entführungen und Morde) – in der internationalen Diskussion oft unbeachtete Problembereiche, wie mangelnde Ausbildungsangebote, unzureichende Infrastruktur am Arbeitsplatz, prekäre Lohnverhältnisse, fehlende Unabhängigkeit gegenüber Herausgebern und ein wenig ausgebildetes Verständnis der Berufsethik, die die journalistische Arbeit in Kolumbien prägen. Diese strukturellen Probleme führen zu qualitativen – speziell in der Konfliktberichterstattung. Aber statt Stillstand vollzieht sich ein Wandel. Kolumbianische Journalisten verändern ihr Selbstbild, entwickeln ein Problembewusstsein bezüglich ihrer eigenen Arbeit und gehen die Defizite aktiv an.

1. Annäherungsversuch an den Gegenstand journalistischer Konfliktberichterstattung

Die Ursachen und damit der tatsächliche Beginn des heute die kolumbianische Gesellschaft prägenden multi-dimensionalen Gewaltkonflikts wurzeln tief in der Geschichte des südamerikanischen Landes. Der oftmals angeführte Zeitpunkt des verheerenden Bürgerkriegs in den 1950er Jahren, die so genannte *Violencia*, und die anschließende Entstehung einer bewaffneten Oppositionsbewegung (*Guerilla*)¹ gegen das etablierte politische Ausschluss-System (*Staat*)², in den 1960er Jahren, ist sicherlich ein entscheidender Moment, doch nicht der Anfang des kolumbianischen Konflikts. Oligarchische Machtstrukturen, gewalttätige Unterdrückung sozialen Protests sowie ein Bekennungszwang zu der liberalen oder konservativen Seite waren bereits vor der *Violencia* prägende Merkmale des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens in Kolumbien.³ Zu den anfänglichen, weit in die Geschichte des südamerikanischen Landes zurückreichenden Primärkonflikten sind in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts weitere Sekundärkonflikte hinzugekommen. Der interne bewaffnete Konflikt Kolumbiens beruht in seinem Kern auf Problemen des sozial-politischen Ausschlusses, extrem ungleicher Verteilung von Reichtum, Kampf um gesellschaftlichen Einfluss und Teilhabe, sowie um den Zugang zu ökonomischen und ökologischen Ressourcen. Kernprobleme, die bis heute überwiegend unangetastet bleiben. Gewandelt hat sich nur die Erscheinungsform des Konflikts, angetrieben durch weitere Entwicklungen und Dynamiken: neu entstehende Gewaltakteure (Auftragskiller, Paramilitärs, private Sicherheitsdienste), Drogenhandel und die enormen Einnahmen daraus für alle Konfliktparteien, sowie ein verbleibendes Staatsdefizit.

Bei dem Versuch, die aktuelle Lage in Kolumbien begrifflich zu fassen, herrscht eine kontroverse Debatte darüber, welcher Terminus – „Terror- und Drogenbekämpfung“, „bewaffneter interner Konflikt“, „interner Krieg“ – die Situation adäquat beschreibt und damit die politische, soziale, ökonomische und ökologische Realität in Kolumbien umfasst. Die Benennung des Problems, dem sich nationale und internationale Akteure in Kolumbien im Rahmen ihres Engagements gegenübergestellt sehen, ist nicht einheitlich. Dass es Begrifflichkeiten sind, die eine politische Argumentation und aus ihr heraus Handlungslegitimationen bestimmen, lässt sich an der Verwendung des Begriffs der (weltweiten) „Terrorbekämpfung“ erahnen, der bei vielen menschenrechtspolitisch fragwürdigen Aktionen zur Rechtfertigung vorgebracht wird. Auch in Kolumbien geht es um einen solchen Wortstreit, der den Staat entweder als stark und handlungsfähig zeigt (Terror- und Drogenbekämpfung), als hilfebedürftig und unzulänglich, was seine Kontrolle des Gewaltmonopols angeht (bewaffneter interner Konflikt) oder

1. Die bis heute bedeutendsten *Guerilla*organisationen in Kolumbien sind zum einen die *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (Revolutionäre Streitkräfte Kolumbiens, *FARC*) und zum anderen das *Ejército de Liberación Nacional* (Nationale Befreiungsarmee, *ELN*).
2. Die für Kolumbiens Geschichte und heute immer noch prägende Polarisierung der Bevölkerung zwischen Liberalen und Konservativen gipfelte von 1948-1958 in einen Bürgerkrieg, der nur noch unter der Bezeichnung *Gewalt* (*Violencia*) in den kolumbianischen Geschichtsbüchern geführt wird. Beendet wurde er durch ein Abkommen, die *Frente Nacional* (Nationale Front), zwischen Liberaler und Konservativer Partei, das die Macht paritätisch verteilte. Gemäß diesem Abkommen stellte jeweils eine der beiden Parteien alle vier Jahre den Präsidenten. Eine Parteien-Pluralität wurde verhindert, indem alle politischen Ämter untereinander aufgeteilt wurden.
3. Zu weiteren Informationen über Ursachen, Entstehung und Entwicklung gewalttätiger Strukturen innerhalb der kolumbianischen Gesellschaft vgl. Palacios und Safford 2008, Palacios 2007 und Kalmanovitz 2006.

als unfähig und machtlos für die Regentschaft im Staat (interner Krieg). Es sind verschiedene Begriffe, die innerhalb des Diskurses über den kolumbianischen Konflikt synonym, komplementär, kompensatorisch oder diplomatisch gewählt werden. Eine Definition des kolumbianischen Konflikts muss eben so offen wie flexibel gegenüber den sozialen Realitäten des Landes bleiben und wird an dieser Stelle als ein langwieriger offener interner bewaffneter Konflikt mit kriegsähnlichen Ausmaßen gesehen.¹ Dabei handelt es sich um eine Akkumulation multikausaler Gewaltprozesse – sowohl direkter (physischer) als auch struktureller Art –, die in ihrer aggressiven, multiphänomenalen und persistenten Form alle gesellschaftlichen Sektoren des kolumbianischen Lebens berühren oder durchdringen. Diese Ausführungen sollen die Komplexität aufzeigen, mit der sich Journalisten bei ihrer Arbeit inmitten des Konflikts konfrontiert sehen, und die sie medial zu verarbeiten und zu erklären haben.

Charakteristisch für den dauerhaftesten bewaffneten internen Konflikt Lateinamerikas: ein Nebeneinander schwer greifbarer, persistenter Gewaltprozesse und sich verändernder Konstellationen der Gewaltakteure und –profiteure. Die Geografie des Konflikts weist mehrere Konfliktherde auf, die nicht gleichmäßig über das Land verteilt sind und sich in unterschiedlichen Entwicklungsstadien befinden.

Während sich bisher keine tiefgreifenden Veränderungen innerhalb des Konflikts und seiner zugrunde liegenden Ursachenkomplexe einstellen, änderten sich seine Rahmenbedingungen seit Ende der 1990er Jahre fortwährend – und mit ihnen auch der Gegenstand, über den es zu berichten gilt, sowie die Rolle, die Medien innerhalb des Konflikts eingenommen haben. Dem Scheitern der vierjährigen Regierungsverhandlungen mit der größten Guerillaorganisation FARC im Jahr 2002 folgte die vom damaligen Präsident Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2010 im Amt) präferierte aggressiv-militärisch Konfliktlösung (die sich zuallererst gegen die FARC wendet), sowie der von der Regierung initiierte Demobilisierungsprozess der Paramilitärs seit 2003.² Ein Konfliktlösungsansatz, den der im Juni 2010 zum Präsidenten gewählte Konservative Juan Manuel Santos versprach weiterzuführen. Hinzu kommen die Verstrickungen externer internationaler (staatlicher und zivilgesellschaftlicher) Akteure in den Konflikt, deren Engagement verschiedene Implikationen für die gewalttätigen bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen mit sich bringen.³

Die daraus resultierende Aufgabenstellung für Journalistinnen könnte nicht schwerer ausfallen.⁴ Die Arbeit in zwei gleichzeitig verlaufenden Prozessen: einem offenen bewaffneten internen Konflikt und einem Prozess, der zumindest von der kolumbianischen Regierung als beginnender „Postkonflikt“ bezeichnet wird.⁵ Beide gilt es, zu beobachten, zu erklären und zu hinterfragen.

1. Auf die hier verwendeten Adjektive „offen intern bewaffnet“ und „kriegsähnlich“ wird zurückgegriffen, um die Bedeutung und die Überlagerung der unterschiedlichen Gewaltniveaus zu betonen, die in Kolumbien vorzufinden sind und waren. Leitende Idee ist die definitorische Unterscheidung zwischen Krieg und bewaffnetem Konflikt, die mal quantitativ (mehr als 1000 Tode im Jahr = Krieg) mal qualitativ (Systematisierungsgrad der Aktivitäten, Akteurskonstellationen, etc.) vorgenommen wird. Der erst genannte Terminus „Krieg“ verweist auf eine extremere Form der Gewalteskalation als der letztgenannte „bewaffneter Konflikt“.
2. Ein Prozess, der nicht zuletzt wegen der immer wieder nachgewiesenen Verbindungen zwischen staatlichen Streitkräften oder politischen Entscheidungsträgern und Paramilitärs sowie deren anhaltenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen noch während der Verhandlungen – ein klarer Bruch der vorhergehenden Verhandlungsvoraussetzungen mit der Regierung (u. a. eine Niederlegung der Waffen, seitens der Paramilitärs) – in die Kritik geriet. Bis Ende 2005 sollten alle Kampfverbände des paramilitärischen Dachverbands Auto Defensas Unidas de Colombia (Vereinigte Selbstverteidigungskräfte Kolumbiens, AUC) demobilisiert sein, so die Zielsetzung Uribes. Bis heute kann dieser Prozess nicht als abgeschlossen gelten. Alte, als demobilisiert geltende Kampfverbände bewaffneten sich neu, Machtstrukturen und soziale Kontrollmechanismen in ehemals von Paramilitärs kontrollierten Gebieten – z. T. mit den selben Machthabern – bestehen weiter fort, wurden weiter konsolidiert oder gesichert. Zu vertieften Analyse des Paramilitärphänomens in Kolumbien vgl. u. a. HRW 2005, Rangel 2005 sowie CNRR 2007.
3. Während sich die USA durch ihre massive Unterstützung (finanziell, personell sowie mit Know-How) des von der kolumbianischen Regierung durchgeführten „Plan Colombia“ auszeichnen, ein aggressiv-militärisches Vorgehen gegen Drogenhandel (u. a. mit Pestizidbesprühungen, durchgeführt durch private Sicherheitsfirmen aus den USA) und zur Niederschlagung der Aufstandsbewegung, tut sich die EU durch die Installation von sechs so genannten Peace Laboratories (Friedenslaboratorien) in den Regionen des Landes hervor. Für einen umfassenderen Überblick zum externen Engagement in Kolumbien siehe Kurtenbach 2001, 2004. Für eine kritische Betrachtung des US-Engagements und des Plan Colombias vgl. u. a. Kurz und Muno 2005 sowie die thematischen Homepages von Human Rights Watch (<http://www.hrw.org/americas/colombia>) und dem Colombia Program des Washingtoner Thinktanks Center for International Policy's (<http://www.ciponline.org/>).
4. Um Satzungen wie der/die Vertreter/in bzw. EntscheidungsträgerInnen zu vermeiden und den Text lesbar zu gestalten, wird die männliche und weibliche Form in zwangloser Weise abgewechselt. Damit sind keine entgültigen Funktionsfestlegungen oder Herabsetzungen der Geschlechter verbunden.
5. Obwohl kritische Stimmen aus dem In- und Ausland die Identifizierung eines Postkonflikts in Kolumbien als Regierungspropaganda und nicht hilfreich für ein tieferes Verständnis empfinden oder für verfrüht halten, diskutieren seit einigen Jahren Politikerinnen, Akademiker und Vertreterinnen der Zivilgesellschaft die Frage, ob sich Kolumbien in einem beginnenden Postkonflikt befinde und was daraus folge (vgl. u. a. Cárdenas 2003, FIP 2006). Die Kategorie Postkonflikt tauchte im Rahmen der staatlichen Bemühungen um einen Demobilisierungsprozess der paramilitärischen Verbände auf; nachdem also ein Konfliktbearbeitungsinstrument zur Anwendung kam, welches entwickelt wurde für Zeiten von Waffenruhe oder Friedensabschlüssen.

Dazu gehören einerseits die andauernden aggressiven, militärischen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den Konfliktakteuren (was u. a. die Kenntnis neuer und alter Akteurskonstellationen, veränderter Dynamiken und der weiterhin unberührt bleibenden Konfliktursachen beinhaltet), sowie deren Auswirkungen auf die zwischen den Gewaltakteuren aufgeriebene Zivilbevölkerung. Andererseits sind es Entwicklungen im Rahmen des Demobilisierungsprozesses von ehemaligen Kämpfern, sowie die Implementierung und Anwendung der dazu formulierten Programme und Gesetze, die beobachtet und analysiert werden müssen. Die Berichterstattung umfasst außerdem die besondere Rolle der Opfer und ihre Situation im Reparations- und Aussöhnungsprozess, die Strafprozesse gegen die Täter sowie ihre adäquate Reintegration in die Gesellschaft.

Für einen Journalismus, dessen Entwicklung und Ausformung über Jahrzehnte durch einen bewaffneten Konflikt geprägt wurde, ist das Verstehen und Berichten über Elemente einer – zu Recht oder zu Unrecht so bezeichneten – Postkonfliktphase eine große Herausforderung (Sierra 2008). Hier sind es zusätzliche andere Themen, Akteure und Faktoren, denen Beachtung geschenkt werden muss, als in einem bewaffneten laufenden Konflikt.

Trotz der gewaltgeprägten Gesellschaftszustände der vergangenen Jahrzehnte, die sich u. a. als determinierende Rahmenbedingungen für journalistische Arbeit erwiesen (Bedrohungen, gewalttätige Übergriffe, Entführungen, Morde etc.), übernahmen Journalisten und Redakteurinnen – vor allem in den großen Medienunternehmen des Landes – eine zunehmend selbstbewusstere Rolle innerhalb des Konflikts. Die Situation der Journalisten in den ländlichen Regionen bleibt allerdings sehr problematisch.

2. Neupositionierung des Journalismus im Konflikt

Nur auf den ersten Blick erscheint die Situation in Kolumbien häufig als eine callejón sin salida (Sackgasse ohne Ausweg). Eine der umfangreichsten Konfliktstudien der vergangenen Jahre trägt einen hoffnungsvolleren Titel: „El conflicto, callejón con salida – Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 2003“ (Der Konflikt, Sackgasse mit Ausweg). Die Studie des United Nations Development Program (UNDP, in Spanisch: PNUD) identifiziert gerade die Arbeit der Medien – neben der Bildung der Bevölkerung – als eines der wichtigsten Instrumente, um den notwendigen, tiefgreifenden Wandel in einer gewaltgeprägten Gesellschaft wie der Kolumbiens herbeizuführen (PNUD 2003). Journalistische Arbeit bedeutet einen großen Schritt auf der Suche nach einem Ausweg, da sie neue Bilder sozialer Realitäten schaffen und damit neue Orientierungspunkte für die in einer Gesellschaft zusammenlebenden Menschen bieten kann.

Während der Nachweis eines Kausalzusammenhangs zwischen journalistischer Arbeit in Krisengebieten, bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen oder Kriegen und einem sich einstellenden Frieden schwerlich einwandfrei nachweisbar ist, gibt es allerdings mehrere Gründe, Medien als bedeutend im Bereich des Peacebuildings zu bewerten:

Erstens: Medien nehmen zwischen zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren einerseits und staatlichen sowie internationalen Organisationen andererseits, eine intermediär verbindende Rolle ein. Ihr Einsatz- bzw. Arbeitsbereich umfasst sowohl die partizipative Horizontale als auch die hierarchische Vertikale innerhalb einer Gesellschaft. Medien verlinken gesellschaftliche Gruppen über geografische und soziale Grenzen hinweg und vermitteln Standpunkte und Handlungen politischer Entscheidungsträger zu den Betroffenen.

Zweitens: Journalisten können durch ihre Arbeit in Konfliktländern einen wichtigen Beitrag zum weiteren Verlauf der Konfliktaustragung leisten. Sie prägen Interpretationen und Lesarten von Entscheidungsträgerinnen und Strategen durch ihre Darstellung, Abbildung und Erklärung von Ereignissen. Ihre Arbeit eröffnet im besten Fall die Sicht auf neu entstehende Handlungsoptionen, im schlechten Fall verdeckt sie diese oder legitimiert die falschen.

Drittens: Medien versorgen durch ihre Berichterstattung die betroffene Bevölkerung mit lebenswichtigen Informationen, zum Beispiel über Fluchtwege aus umkämpften Regionen, Wasservorräte und medizinische Versorgung oder über ihre Rechte gegenüber staatlichen Institutionen, sowie über die Bewegungen bewaffneter illegaler Gewaltakteure.

Viertens: Medien üben auch in Konfliktsituationen eine Watchdog-Funktion aus. Sie beobachten, inwiefern gewählte politische Strategien sich in die Praxis umsetzen lassen, wenn sie auf die Lebensrealitäten der lokalen Bevölkerung treffen. Oder sie bringen Erfahrungen aus anderen Ländern in die politische Debatte um adäquate Problemlösungen ein.

Trotz erheblicher Schwierigkeiten, denen kolumbianische Journalistinnen bei ihrer Arbeit ausgesetzt waren und sind, spielen sie spätestens seit Ende der 1990er Jahre eine immer deutlichere Schlüsselrolle innerhalb des Konflikts, prägen seinen Verlauf mit und tragen zu seiner Transformation bei.

Die historische Entwicklung der Medien im vergangenen Jahrhundert in drei Phasen zusammenfassend, unterscheidet der bereits erwähnte Bericht der Vereinten Nationen drei verschiedene Epochen: die des „sentido filial“ (des kindlichen Verstands, 1950er bis 1960er Jahre), jene des „síndrome del verde oliva“ (des olivengrünen Syndroms, 1960er bis 1980er Jahre) und die des „guerra por las audiencias“ (des Krieges ums Publikum, seit den 1990er Jahren).

Ursprünglich entsprachen die dominierenden Printmedien in Kolumbien ihrem Inhalt nach Parteiblättern, die in der ersten Epoche, zu Beginn der 1950er Jahre fern ab von neutraler Berichterstattung, Leser in Gefolgschaften für religiöse und politische Projekte verwandeln wollten. Dies traf auf alle Zeitungen zu, egal ob liberale, konservative, kommunistische oder katholische. Sie präsentierten den Konflikt in einer distanzierenden – schwer mit eigenen Lebensrealitäten in Verbindung zu bringenden – Weise und verorteten ihn in den ländlichen Regionen. Journalisten suggerierten, dass nach einer Konflikt-Beendigung militärische repressive Mittel von Nöten wären, um die verbleibenden Teile der Konfliktparteien unter Kontrolle zu behalten, was als leichte Aufgabe beschrieben wurde.

Zwischen 1960 und 1980 wurde das „síndrome del verde oliva“ für Journalistinnen, die im Konflikt arbeiteten, bestimmend. Dieses Syndrom hat seine Ursprünge in der Zeit der Frente Nacional, als militärischen Sicherheitskräften mit olivgrünen Uniformen die Kontrolle über Belange der öffentlichen Ordnung übergeben wurde.

„Damals hieß 'über den Konflikt berichten' über militärische Operationen gegen die Guerilla zu informieren. Die Meinungsäußerungen der Streitkräfte wurden zu offiziellen Verlautbarungen, weder kontrolliert vom Kongress, den Parteien noch den Medien“ (PNUD 2003: 428).¹

In den 1980er Jahren verbreitete sich das Fernsehen, begleitet von der Bebilderung zuvor nicht wahrgenommenen Leids von Opfern (Vertriebene, Folteropfer, Entführte, Ermordete etc.). Damit einher ging die Darstellung der Paramilitärs als notwendiges Übel, welche die staatliche Unfähigkeit, für Sicherheit zu sorgen, ausglich.

Im Rahmen des seit den 1990er Jahren andauernden „guerra por las audiencias“ versuchten kolumbianische Medien, sich an die Entwicklungen und Erfordernisse für die Teilhabe am globalisierten Markt anzupassen. Medienschaffende und vor allem Herausgeberinnen und Besitzer konzentrierten sich auf die Anschaffung teurer Technologien, die ständige Nachbesserung bestehender Infrastruktur, die Erforschung von Konsumentenverhalten, die Entwicklung von verbesserten Markt-techniken und auf strategisch vorteilhafte Allianzen. Ein umfassendes Überdenken des eigenen Handelns bzw. der eigenen Rolle innerhalb des Konflikts blieb hierbei zunächst außen vor.

„Zu diesen Veränderungen kamen die ökonomische Rezession und die Privatisierung des Fernsehens hinzu. Die Wähler wurden durch Konsumenten ersetzt, ausführlichere Erzählformen durch Nachrichtenformate, Ideen durch Emotionen, Parteirichtlinien durch Wettkämpfe und Unterschriften, sowie die Parteimitgliedschaft durch Konsumverhalten“ (PNUD 2003: 429).

Das von kolumbianischen Medien bearbeitete Themenspektrum und damit auch das Informationsangebot für das Publikum erweiterten sich nach den 1980er Jahren deutlich (vgl. Rey 2007). Gleichzeitig setzte Ende der 1990er Jahre eine Reflektion über die Rolle der Medien innerhalb des Konflikts im eigenen Land ein.

Mit diesem sich wandelnden Selbstbild der Journalistinnen, entstand ein kritischer Dialog sowohl auf praktischer als auch auf akademischer Ebene. Schwächen im journalistischen Handwerk wurden identifiziert, Handlungsoptionen entwickelt und Programme zu deren Beseitigung bzw. Bearbeitung in Angriff genommen. Die Konfliktberichterstattung in kolumbianischen Tageszeitungen (u. a. PAN 2004, El Tiempo 2004) und im Fernsehen wurde evaluiert (PAN 2005), Handbücher erschienen, die Anleitungen zur Berichterstattung beispielsweise über Attentate (Restrepo 2002), interne Flüchtlinge und Zwangsvertriebene (MPP 2005) sowie über Kinder im bewaffneten Konflikt (MPP 2009) bieten. Andere Autoren unterstreichen die Wichtigkeit, der von Journalisten gewählten Sprache im Rahmen ihrer Artikel und Beiträge über bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen, und erarbeiteten Wörterbücher für einen bewussteren Gebrauch einer gewaltlosen Sprache (Abello, Baumann, Cárdenas et al. 1999).² Andere Veröffentlichungen lehren den Umgang mit Quellen bei der Berichterstattung über bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen (PAN 2005) und geben praktische Tipps zum Eigenschutz für Journalisten (Márquez 2007). Untersucht wurde außerdem die Rolle kolumbianischer Medien innerhalb des Konflikts, zum Beispiel in welcher Art sie über entscheidende Ereignisse der vergangenen Jahre, wie die Verhandlungen zwischen Regierung und FARC (López de la Roche 2006) oder den Plan Colombia (Ayala und Aguilera 2001) informierten, oder welche Rolle sie beim Wiedergutmachungs- und Versöhnungsprozess zwischen demobilisierten Kämpferinnen und den Opfern ihrer Gewalttaten spielen können (FIP und Semana 2008).

Auch die Einstellung der Konfliktakteure zur Arbeit von Journalistinnen wurde analysiert. In Interviews, die 2003 mit Vertretern der FARC, der ELN und dem (damaligen) paramilitärischen Dachverband AUC geführt wurden, versuchten die Autoren des Buches „Periodismo, guerra y terrorismo“ das Bild der Medien in den Augen der illegalen Gewaltakteure herauszuarbeiten (Giraldo, Roldán und Flórez 2003).³

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1. Dieses Zitat sowie alle folgenden spanischen Zitate wurden vom Autoren selbst übersetzt.
 2. Diese Bemühungen fanden vor dem problematischen Hintergrund statt, dass Journalistinnen und Redakteure die von offiziellen Quellen benutzte Terminologie (z. B. die Bezeichnung von Akteuren als „Verbrecher“ oder „Terroristen“, die Beschreibung des Konflikts als „Aufstandsbekämpfung“ anstatt als Krieg etc.) in ihren Beiträgen permanent unkritisch wiedergaben und auf diese Weise konfliktlegitimierend wirkten.
 3. Dies ist nur eine Auswahl von konflikt-spezifischen Fachpublikationen zur journalistischen Arbeit in Kolumbien und erhebt keinen Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit.

Vom Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts bis heute wurde die Arbeit von Journalistinnen im Bereich der Konfliktberichterstattung durch drei verschiedene politische Prozesse weiter geprägt: den Verhandlungsprozess der Regierung unter Präsident Andrés Pastrana mit der FARC (1998-2002), durch die Verhandlungen im Rahmen des Demobilisierungsprozesses mit den Paramilitärs unter der Regierung Uribe (2002-2003) und die bis heute andauernden Aufdeckungen im Rahmen der so genannten „Parapolítica“.¹

Im ersten Verhandlungsprozess verfolgten die Konfliktparteien noch eine Politik der „apertura comunicativa“ (kommunikative Öffnung) in Bezug auf die Medien, in der Journalisten soweit in die Verhandlungen integriert wurden, dass ihre detaillierte tägliche Berichterstattung über Verhandlungsverlauf und –ergebnisse den Prozess direkt beeinflussten (Bonilla 2002: 40). Aus den Paramilitärverhandlungen wurden sie mit einer Strategie der „cierre informativo“ (Informationssperre) größtenteils herausgehalten und nur selten und dann sehr restriktiv zugelassen. Camilo Andrés Tamayo, Kommunikationswissenschaftler am Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), sieht nach diesen beiden Erfahrungen nun im Rahmen des Prozesses der „Parapolítica“ eine dritte Kommunikationsregelung entstehen: „el equilibrio del péndulo“ (das Gleichgewicht des Pendels). Nachdem sich Medien in der Vergangenheit eher passiv von Konfliktakteuren positionieren ließen, anstatt selbst aktiv an entscheidenden gesellschaftlichen Prozessen teilzunehmen und darüber autonom zu berichten, haben sie nun selbst einige professionelle Standards neu überdacht und versuchen, sie in der täglichen Arbeit umzusetzen. Das Pendel, welches vorher stark zwischen den Extremen ‚unbegrenzte Integration‘ der Journalisten oder ‚absoluter Ausschluss‘ hin und her schwang, kommt jetzt langsam in der Mitte zur Ruhe (Tamayo 2007: 2).

Der kolumbianische Journalismus hat die Lernprozesse der vergangenen Jahre genutzt und in die aktuelle Arbeit eingebracht. Besonders die Printmedien schafften es, die entsprechenden Themen, unanhängig von konjunkturellen Schwankungen in der Politik, weiter in der öffentlichen Debatte zu halten und den Reflektionsgrad über die Problemstellungen zu vertiefen. Der im Juni 2008 vom Lateinamerika-Bildungsverband veröffentlichte Bericht „The Other Half of the Truth Searching for Truth – Justice and Reparations for Colombia’s Victims of Paramilitary Violence“, unterstreicht zur Rolle der Medien im Parapolítica-Prozess, dass die Aufklärung über die Verstrickungen von Politikern in paramilitärische Machtstrukturen nicht etwa den Anstrengungen der Regierung Uribe zu verdanken ist, sondern vielmehr der engen Zusammenarbeit von oppositionellen Politikern, Journalistinnen und Menschenrechtsorganisationen (LAWGEF 2008: 4).² Auch der Jahresbericht der Menschenrechtsorganisation Human Rights Watch 2008 unterstreicht die positive Rolle der Medien im aktuellen Prozess (HRW 2008).

Darüber hinaus genießen Medien laut Umfragen unter der Bevölkerung ein besseres Ansehen als noch vor einiger Zeit. Und einige der großen Wochen- und Tageszeitungen – allen voran die Wochenzeitschrift *Semana* – haben sich einer kritisch-investigativen Konfliktberichterstattung verschrieben.³ So entwickelte die *Semana*, zusammen mit der Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), die konfliktsspezifische Homepage verdadabierta.com, die profunde Informationen zu Akteuren (Entstehung, Organisationsform, aktuelle Entwicklung), Dynamiken, Ursachen und neuen Herausforderungen bei der Bearbeitung des internen Konflikts liefert. Die 2008 erstmals freigeschaltete Homepage ist zum einen als Informationsquelle für Interessierte, zum anderen auch als Recherchehilfe für Journalistinnen gedacht, auf der Reportagen, Artikel und Analysen veröffentlicht sowie Diskussionsforen für einen weiteren Austausch eröffnet werden.⁴ Eine weitere kritische Plattform entstand 2009 mit der gegründeten nachrichtlichen Website lasillavacia.com. Durch kritische Hintergrundartikel, aktuelle Blogs und Foren soll ein möglichst breiter Diskussionsraum über aktuelle Entwicklungen der politischen Landschaft geöffnet

1. Die Ausmaße der massiven und systematischen Durchdringung der politischen Landschaft durch paramilitärische Akteure, die von 1999 bis 2003 in 223 Departamentos des Landes Kontrolle ausübten, wurden in den vergangenen Jahren – besonders im Rahmen des Demobilisierungsprozesses – aufgedeckt. Sie prägten einen eigenen Problembegriff: den der paramilitärischen Politik (parapolítica).
2. Der vom Organisationsverbund Latin America Working Group Education Fund (LAWGEF) veröffentlichte Bericht, führt aus: Angefangen hat es mit Vorwürfen des Kongressabgeordneten der linksalternativen Partei Polo Democrático Alternativo, Gustavo Petro, dass viele Kongressabgeordnete mit Paramilitärs zusammenarbeiten würden. Hierdurch bekamen die vorm Verfassungsgericht laufenden Untersuchungsverfahren gegen diese Politiker mehr Aufmerksamkeit. Und Medien, die darüber im Vorfeld kaum berichteten, nahmen dieses Thema verstärkt auf und trugen es so in die Öffentlichkeit. Die Untersuchung des Parapolítica-Phänomens bekam weitere Tiefe, da einige Menschenrechtsorganisationen ihre Kräfte ebenfalls auf die Analyse der Verbindungen zwischen Paramilitärs und Akteuren der lokalen und nationalen Politik fokussierten.
3. Aktuelle Umfrageergebnisse der Wochenzeitschrift *Cambio* zeigen, dass 69,9 Prozent ein positives Bild und 21,3 Prozent weiterhin ein negatives von den Medien haben. Mehr als zwei Drittel der Befragten schätzen die von Medien bereitgestellten Informationen als realitätsnah ein, während 19,7 sie eher als unrealistisch beurteilen. Der Grossteil der Interviewten nutzt das Fernsehen, um sich über die aktuellen Nachrichten zu informieren (67,2 Prozent). Sie empfinden dieses Medium noch vor Radio (8,1), Internet (9,5) und Zeitungen (21,2) als das vertrauenswürdigste (mit 54,2). Auf die Frage, ob die kolumbianischen Medien die Regierung Uribe unterstützen, stimmten mehr als die Hälfte (68,4 Prozent) zu, während 15,6 Prozent nicht dieser Meinung sind. Der Artikel, in dem die Umfrageergebnisse veröffentlicht wurden, ist im Internet nachzulesen unter: http://www.cambio.com.co/portadacambio/778/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTA_INTERIOR_CAMBIO4214051.html, zuletzt abgerufen am 20. Februar 2009. Diese Ergebnisse sollen hier nur unter Vorbehalt als tendenzieller Richtungsweiser verstanden werden, da eine Telefonumfrage mit 700 Interviews in den 13 größten Städten – so die angewandte Erhebungstechnik – kein vollkommenes Meinungsbild der Bevölkerung zu zeichnen vermag. Weitere Angaben zum methodischen Vorgehen sind im Artikel nachzulesen.
4. Die Homepage ist im Internet abzurufen, unter: www.verdadabierta.com.

werden. Anstatt der Dynamik täglicher Nachrichtenberichterstattung und Pressekonferenzen zu folgen, so formuliert die Journalistin und Gründerin der Website, Juanita León, die gesteckte Zielsetzung, sollen die Beiträge helfen, zu zeigen, wie Macht tatsächlich in Kolumbien ausgeübt wird.¹

Die bisherigen Entwicklungen im kolumbianischen Journalismus sowie in seinem Verhältnis zum Konflikt deuten auf seine schrittweise Neupositionierung innerhalb des Konfliktgeschehens und ein sich wandelndes Selbstbild unter Journalistinnen und Redakteuren hin.

Allerdings gibt es auch Besorgnis erregende Entwicklungen. Wie sehr kritische Berichterstattung politische Entscheidungsträger unter Druck setzen kann und wie diese darauf reagieren, zeigt die jüngste Umstrukturierung des zweiten investigativen Wochenmagazins Cambio, im Februar 2010. Immer wieder deckte Cambio brisante Details und Verbindungen auf: Politikern wurde ihre Zusammenarbeit mit dem Drogenhandel nachgewiesen, Allianzenbildung von Regierungsmitgliedern mit Paramilitärs sichtbar gemacht und Korruption von Parlamentarierinnen belegt. Offiziell aufgrund nicht erfüllter Renditeerwartungen wurde die Redaktion ausgewechselt, das thematische Spektrum der Berichterstattung auf Unterhaltung konzentriert und sowohl Chefredakteurin als auch Geschäftsführer entlassen. Vertreter der Zivilgesellschaft, Journalistinnen und Regierungskritiker liefen Sturm gegen die vom Verlag El Tiempo veranlasste Umstrukturierung. Sie sehen hier ein weiteres Beispiel für die „inzestuöse Beziehung zwischen der politischen Macht und den Medien“, wie es Ignacio Gómez von der Fundación Libertad de Prensa beschreibt (zit. nach Dilger 2010). Seit 2003 gibt der Verlag El Tiempo das Nachrichtenmagazin heraus, er befindet sich mehrheitlich im Besitz des spanischen Planeta-Konzerns.² Im Verlag El Tiempo hat die Familie Santos großen Einfluss, die eng mit der Regierung verbunden ist.

3. Determinanten journalistisch-praktischer Arbeit in Kolumbien

Gleichzeitig bleiben die Problemlagen des kolumbianischen Journalismus drängend und schlagen sich in vielerlei Weise in der alltäglichen Praxis nieder. Obwohl Generationen von Journalisten innerhalb des bewaffneten Konflikts aufwuchsen, ihr Handwerk erlernten und die Berichterstattung über den Konflikt seit vielen Jahren zum Job gehört, zeigen sich nach wie vor viele Mängel in ihrer Arbeitsweise, die zum einen die Konfliktwahrnehmung innerhalb der Gesellschaft verzerren und zum anderen wichtige Aspekte für eine nachhaltige Konfliktbearbeitung vermissen lassen – so werden z. B. neue Problemfelder, Verantwortlichkeiten oder Ursachen des Konflikts immer noch vernachlässigt. Álvaro Sierra, kolumbianischer Journalist und Dozent an der University for Peace der Vereinten Nationen in Costa Rica, beschreibt als eine aktuelle Entwicklung bei der Konfliktberichterstattung in den kolumbianischen Medien, dass Ereignisse und Tatsachen zunehmend verkürzt dargestellt würden.

„Die Medien berichten immer häufiger im Telegramstil: kurz, immer weniger Hintergrundartikel und Reportagen. Und die Situation der Regionen wird in den Medien in Bogotá sehr mangelhaft wiedergegeben“.³

Aktuelle Medienanalysen der Berichte über Paramilitärs und den Implementationsprozess des „Gesetzes für Gerechtigkeit und Frieden“ in Print- und TV-Medien zeigen, dass es an transparentem Umgang mit Quellen – wenn denn welche genannt wurden (im Durchschnitt waren es ein bis zwei Quellen pro Artikel) –, an Kontextualisierung der Informationen, Aufschlüsselung von Entwicklungen und präzisiertem Sprachgebrauch mangelt (Ronderos und Arias 2008: 28f).⁴ Eine andere Untersuchung von 133 Artikeln aus der Tageszeitung El Tiempo, sowie der Nachrichtenmagazine von Semana und Cambio hebt hervor, wie in der Berichterstattung über wieder eingegliederte ehemalige Kämpferinnen und Kämpfer in Verbindung mit dem Friedensprozess in Kolumbien, Stereotypen produziert werden (vgl. Gutiérrez 2007).⁵ Zwar haben technologische

1. Vgl. die Erläuterungen der Direktorin León zum Entstehen und zum selbst erhobenen Anspruch des – vom Open Society Institut (OSI) in New York finanzierten – Projekts unter der Rubrik „Wer sind wir?“ (¿Quiénes somos?) auf der Homepage www.lasillavacia.com.

2. Zur genaueren Beschreibung der Besitzstrukturen innerhalb der kolumbianischen Medien vgl. die Ausführungen im folgenden Kapitel.

3. Das Interview mit Alvaro Sierra führte der Autor telefonisch am 19. Dezember 2008.

4. Während eines Zeitraums von 10 Tagen wurde die Berichterstattung über die Aussagen des Paramilitärführers „El Alemán“ in kolumbianischen Tageszeitungen (El Tiempo, El Colombiano, El Mundo, El Nuevo Siglo), nachrichtlichen Wochenmagazinen (Semana, Cambio) und Nachrichtensendungen im Fernsehen (Noticias Caracol, RCN Noticias) untersucht. Die Analysekriterien waren: Art der verwendeten Quellen, Kontextualisierung der Informationen, Genauigkeit der Informationen und gewählter Erzählstil (Narración).

5. So zeigte die Textanalyse der ausgewählten Artikel, dass 54,4 Prozent die gleiche Sichtweise vertraten, obwohl die Autoren nachweislich mehrere Quellen verwendeten. In 41 Prozent der Fälle werden die verwendeten Quellen nicht angegeben (Gutiérrez 2007: 17). „Die Demobilisierten [Kämpferinnen und Kämpfer, d. A.] wurden in 19 von 30 (63%) der erwähnten Fälle mit negativen Konsequenzen in Verbindung gebracht, mit Bezugnahmen wie: Die Demobilisierung verliert an Kraft; Man weiß nicht was mit den Demobilisierten gemacht werden soll; Sie haben sich in eine Zeitbombe verwandelt; während es den Demobilisierten gut geht, ergeht es den Opfern schlecht; Es kommt zu einer Ablösung in der kriminellen Befehlsgewalt der Demobilisierten; Die Integration von Demobilisierten der FARC in den Prozess ist ein viel zu hohes Risiko“ (ebd.: 22).

Neuerungen (Handy, Satellitenübertragung, Internet etc.) in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten die journalistische Arbeit beschleunigt und eine Konfliktberichterstattung fast in Echtzeit ermöglicht, aber am Schreibtisch recherchierende Redakteurinnen und mit dem Handy interviewende Journalisten zeigen in ihrer Arbeit die Tendenz, ihre Informationen nicht mehr in historisch-gesellschaftliche Verhältnisse einzubetten, Hintergründe bleiben dem Publikum verborgen.

„Immer seltener gehen Reporter – speziell jene aus den Printmedien – raus auf die Strasse und sprechen mit Menschen aus Fleisch und Blut. Die Nachrichten tendieren daher dazu immer ähnlicher zu werden: mit den selben Quellen, der selben kühlen Distanz. Ein Krieg erscheint auf diese Weise sowohl pasteurisiert als auch homogenisiert. Niemand wird davon bewegt. Niemand wird davon angerührt“ (Abello, Baumanns, Cárdenas et al. 1999: 9).

Im Bezug auf Nachrichtenberichte lässt sich ebenfalls feststellen, dass Informationen, Themen und Personen nicht in Zusammenhänge gestellt werden, komplexe Konfliktlagen sind so kaum zu verstehen (Barón et al. 2004: 15).

Der bereits erwähnte Bericht 2003 von PNUD unterstreicht, dass die Medien schon in der Vergangenheit eher reaktiv als proaktiv gearbeitet, sich anstatt auf soziale Verantwortung gegenüber der Gesellschaft auf eigene, gewinnmaximierende Interessen konzentriert und in ihrer Konfliktberichterstattung auf simplifizierende Erklärungsmuster zurückgegriffen haben.¹

Kolumbianische Journalisten machen in ihrer Arbeit immer wieder den Fehler, sich bei der Recherche für Beiträge, Reportagen, Artikel und Nachrichten häufig nur auf Auskünfte offizieller Quellen, wie Regierungsvertreterinnen, Polizei und Militär zu beziehen, anstatt Stimmen von Betroffenen und aus der Zivilgesellschaft einzuholen. Es kommt zu einer verzerrten Konfliktwahrnehmung, da die Regierungsquellen ein anderes Bild vermitteln, als es NGOs und Menschenrechtler im Alltag beobachten und erleben.

Arturo Guerrero, Journalist, freier Autor und Mitarbeiter der Journalistenorganisation Medios para la Paz (MPP), benennt neben der mangelnden Recherche die Selbstzensur als eines der entscheidenden Merkmale des kolumbianischen Journalismus.

„Selbstzensur entspringt der Angst vor Bedrohung und Vergeltung von bewaffneten Akteuren. Insbesondere korrupte Politiker und Mandatsträger gehören zu den Hauptverursachern der Selbstzensur, der Bedrohung und der Taten gegen Journalisten“.²

Die Furcht, für kritische Berichterstattung sanktioniert, bedroht oder umgebracht zu werden, führt bei vielen Journalisten – besonders bei jenen, die in ländlichen Regionen arbeiten – zum Phänomen der „Schere im Kopf“. Informationen, die bei Veröffentlichung das Risiko physischer Bedrohung zur Folge zu haben, werden nicht verwendet, korruptionsaufdeckende Details nicht gebracht und kritische Berichterstattung ausgeblendet.³

Um die Ursachen für diese Mängel in der journalistischen Konfliktberichterstattung ausfindig machen zu können, die es für die Verbesserung der Arbeit und der Arbeitssituation von Journalisten zu beachten gilt, müssen die Wurzeln der Probleme von kolumbianischen Medien offengelegt werden.

3.1. Strukturen der Medienlandschaft

Die Medienlandschaft Kolumbiens zeichnet sich durch eine zentralistische Struktur aus, in der nur vier Unternehmergruppen mehr als 80 Prozent des Medienmarktes kontrollieren (König und Schuster 2008: 356). Aus ökonomischer Perspektive ist diese Landschaft stark, in ihrer geografischen Abdeckung konzentriert sie sich aber hauptsächlich auf die großen Städte.

„Unter den Medien gibt es keine Konkurrenz, es fehlt ihnen an Vielfalt“, so unterstreicht der an der Pontificia Universidad Javeriana arbeitende Kommunikationswissenschaftler, Omar Rincón. Dies zeige sich besonders bei den Zeitungen.

„Es gibt zwar starke Printmedien aber nur ein starkes Medium pro Stadt. Es ist ein medialer Zentralismus, der frappiert“.⁴

1. „Auch sie [die Medien, d. A.] setzen auf kurzfristige Lösungen, simpel, improvisiert und schwankend zwischen Frieden (verhandelt, schnell und günstig) und militärischem Sieg (schnell und leicht). Je nach Situation wurden die bewaffneten Akteure als seelenlose Mörder oder als auf ihrem Lebensweg fehlgeleitete Menschen gesehen; als Armee mit Kommando und Disziplin oder als zerfallene und unorganisierte Verbrecherbanden; als Beschützer siedelnder Bevölkerungsgruppen oder als Kartelle von Drogenhändlern. Die Dialogprozesse wurden als ehrenvolle Auswege oder gewitzte Spielzüge der Guerilla interpretiert. Die Medien nahmen an, dass die bewaffneten Gruppen kompakt, homogen und beliebigen Launen oder messianischer Führung untergeordnet sind. Weil sie die Rationalität der Akteure nicht verstanden haben, interpretierten [die Medien, d. A.] Terrorakte als Irrwitz, die Zahlung von Lösegeld als einziges Mittel gegen Entführungen, den Paramilitarismus als ein kleineres Übel und den Dialog des Bürgermeisters mit einem Kommandant wie einen Betrug. Die Berichterstattung blieb ohne Bezug zu den ökonomischen, sozialen, politischen und kulturellen Entwicklungen. Diese bestimmen in Wirklichkeit die Entwicklungen und Folgen der Gewalt“ (PNUD 2003: 429).
2. Das Interview mit Arturo Guerrero führte der Autor am 11. Dezember 2008 in Bogotá.
3. MPP ermutigt die Journalisten, ihre Berichte Redaktionen der Großstädte oder internationalen Medien anzubieten – als Gegenstrategie, so dass die Artikel herauskommen, ohne den Autoren zu schaden (aus Interview Guerrero: 11/12/2008).
4. Das Interview mit Omar Rincón führte der Autor am 20. Dezember 2008 in Bogotá.

So gibt es in Barranquilla an der Karibikküste die Tageszeitung "El Heraldo", in Medellín "El Colombiano", in Cali "El País", in Pereira "La Tarde", in Bucaramanga "Vanguardia Liberal" und in Bogotá die "El Tiempo" sowie "El Espectador".

Der Radiosektor wird heute von zwei Privatsendern bestimmt, die sich in Inhalt sowie Art und Weise der Berichterstattung sehr ähneln: den Sender Caracol und Radio Cardena Nacional (RCN). Beide betreiben gleichzeitig die meist gesehenen privaten Fernsehsender des Landes.

Das führende Medium Fernsehen, fungiere heute nicht mehr als Informationsquelle, sondern biete in erster Linie Spektakel, Klatsch und Tratsch und diene vorwiegend dem Vergnügen der Bevölkerung (aus Interview Rincón: 20/12/2008). Zwar gebe es im Fernsehen investigative Programme, wie die Sendung „Contravía“ des Journalisten Holman Morris oder das Nachrichtenmagazin „Noticias Uno“ von Daniel Coronel, doch hätten diese zu geringe Einschaltquoten, um einen signifikanten Einfluss auf den öffentlichen Diskurs auszuüben.

„Obwohl die Menschen nicht viel lesen“, so Rincón, sind die Printmedien „sehr wichtig, weil sie die Entscheidungsfindung von politisch und wirtschaftlich Mächtigen beeinflussen“ (ebd.).

Bezogen auf die zentralistischen Medienstrukturen und deren gesendete Inhalte, vermerkt der für die „El Tiempo“ schreibende Journalist weiter, dass die in den Regionen lebende Bevölkerung müde von der Großstadtberichterstattung geworden sei. Bürger- oder Gemeinderadiosender hätten für die lokale Bevölkerung eine größere Bedeutung. Landesweit gibt es mittlerweile mehr als 800 dieser kommunalen Radiostationen. Die neu entstehende Medienkultur führe zu einer größeren Identifikation der Bevölkerung mit den Medieninhalten und erlaube vorsichtige Demokratisierungstendenzen, ausserhalb der großen Städte.

Neben der Urbanisierung prägen geografische Determinanten und die Präsenz illegaler oder legaler bewaffneter Akteure Medienlandschaft und Berichterstattung. Nicht nur die schwer zugänglichen Gebiete, mit mangelnder Infrastruktur oder schwierigen Geländebedingungen – für Journalistinnen mit entsprechendem Sendeequipment oder Übertragungswagen etc. – müssen von Medien berücksichtigt werden, sondern auch die lokalen Machtkonstellationen zwischen den in der Region herrschenden Gewaltakteuren. Die Produktionen für Radio, Fernsehen und Zeitung – Liveschalten, Reportagen in den Regionen des Landes, umfangreichere Recherchereisen für Schwerpunktthemen – benötigen eine kostenintensive Logistik (auch technologischer Art), die in die Millionen gehen kann, und die auf diese Weise für kleinere Medienunternehmen unbezahlbar sind (Floréz 2008: 77).

Die vier Unternehmensgruppen, die den kolumbianischen Medienmarkt zum großen Teil unter sich aufteilen, sind: Santo Domingo, Ardila Lülle, Casa Editorial El Tiempo und die spanische Gruppe Prisa, wobei dieser Konzentrationsgrad im Mediensektor im lateinamerikanischen Vergleich nicht aussergewöhnlich ist (Mastrini und Becerra 2006: 198). Die Monopolisierungstendenzen, die sich sowohl auf die Informationen für die Bevölkerung als auch auf die politische Landschaft auswirken, sind einer fehlenden strikten Mediengesetzgebung zu verdanken.

„Die Konzentration der Medien, die – mangels eines politischen Willens der aktuellen Regierungen, (deren Kampagnen von wirtschaftlichen Gruppen finanziert sind) – ohne regulierenden Eingriff des Staates verlief, hat in Kolumbien bewirkt, dass sich Medienbesitzer, Informanten, Werbekunden, die Öffentlichkeit und der Staat ihrer Verantwortung gegenüber dem Recht auf Information entziehen. Dies führt zu einer zunehmenden Verstrickung mit partikularen Interessen in einer Weise, dass die ‚Vierte Macht‘ nur noch eine simple Illusion ist“ (zit. nach Mastrini und Becerra 2006: 179),

so María kommentiert Teresa Herrán, u. a. Medienanalytistin und Forscherin an der Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, die Auswirkung der Konzentration im Mediensektor.

Was Darío Acevedo Carmona, Historiker an der Universidad Nacional sede Medellín, ein Hand-in-Hand-gehen des Journalismus mit der Politik in Kolumbien nannte – „in unserem Land gingen Journalismus und Politik innig Hand in Hand (...)“ (Acevedo 2003: 283) – ist auch heute noch ein gravierendes Problem der Medienlandschaft. Gerade in den Zeiten der liberalen Marktöffnung in den 1990er Jahren haben sich die bis dahin eher traditionellen Familienunternehmen in mediale Großkonzerne gewandelt, die eng mit politischen Zirkeln verbunden sind.

„Es gibt keine Unabhängigkeit, die großen Medien sind generell eng verknüpft mit politischen Interessen. Dadurch gibt es auch keine unabhängige Konfliktberichterstattung“,

so Rocío Castañeda, Koordinatorin des Arbeitsbereichs „Opinión Pública“ des Friedensprogramms von CINEP.¹

Diese Verbindung zwischen Politik und Medien wird beispielhaft deutlich am Fall des Casa Editorial El Tiempo, welches zu über 50 Prozent der Familie Santo gehört, die gleichzeitig auf politischer Ebene den Vizepräsidenten und den Verteidigungsminister stellt. Die Verstrickung von Politik und Medien findet allerdings auch im kleineren Rahmen statt. So berichtet Eduardo Márquez, Direktor des Centro de Solidaridad de Colombia de la Federación Internacional de Periodistas (CESO-FIP), dass

1. Das Interview mit Rocío Castañeda führte der Autor am 29. Dezember 2008 in Bogotá.

bei einem Blick in die Liste der Besitzer der Gruppe „Vanguardia Liberal“, die ungefähr 10 Zeitungen betreibt, ebenfalls politische Einflüsse deutlich werden.¹

3.2. Arbeitsbedingungen der Journalisten

Zur Struktur der Medienlandschaft, die für eine freie Berichterstattung ohnehin problematisch ist, kommen die komplizierten Arbeitsbedingungen für Journalistinnen. Es gibt Mängel bei der Bereitstellung von Equipment, Reise- und Recherchekosten, aber auch in Bezug auf die finanzielle und soziale Absicherung. Die „condiciones laborales“ (Arbeitsbedingungen) variieren stark zwischen Stadt und Land, sowie zwischen den Regionen.

Die Ende der 1990er Jahre einsetzende ökonomische Krise in Kolumbien (1997-2001), sowie die voranschreitende Privatisierung im Mediensektor, allen voran im Fernsehbereich, hatte die Entlassung von 590 Journalisten aus Fernseh-, Radio- und Zeitungsredaktionen zur Folge – nicht mitgezählt sind hier die Journalistinnen, die auf freiberuflicher Basis arbeiten.²

Die kritische und investigative Berichterstattung der liberalen Tageszeitung El Espectador zur Drogenökonomie und der damit einhergehenden Korruption im Land führte zu einer ökonomischen Krise der zweitgrößten Tageszeitung Kolumbiens und zog eine Entlassungswelle in der Redaktion nach sich, durch die die Belegschaft um 67 Prozent reduziert wurde. Weil die Redaktion sich weigerte, Anzeigen korrupter Unternehmen im Blatt abzdrukken, hatte El Espectador massive finanzielle Einbußen. Ausserdem attackierten Drogenhändler immer wieder Redaktionsräume und Mitarbeiter der Zeitung. Trotz des Versuches der Zeitung mit Geldspritzen wieder auf die Beine zu helfen, konnte nicht verhindert werden, dass das seit 115 Jahren täglich erscheinende Blatt auf eine sonntägliche Wochenzeitung zurückgestuft werden musste.³ Als einzige überregionale Tageszeitung mit einem ähnlichen politischen Gewicht blieb somit nur noch die El Tiempo.

Durch die ökonomische Krise zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts wurden viele vormals fest angestellte zu freiberuflichen Journalisten. Sie erhielten durchschnittlich 70 000 Pesos (etwa 30 €) pro veröffentlichtem Beitrag und mussten – da Personal abgebaut wurde – zwischen 12 und 15 Stunden arbeiten (MPP 2004: 9f). Heute haben 51 Prozent der kolumbianischen Journalisten eine „vinculación laboral“ (gesichertes Arbeitsverhältnis) durch einen unkündbaren festen Vertrag (Mastrini und Beccerra 2006: 180). Die übrigen sind so genannte feste Freie Mitarbeiterinnen mit einem 1-Jahres-Vertrag (21 Prozent), oder sie arbeiten ganz frei und bekommen ausschließlich einzelne Beiträge, Artikel und Reportagen bezahlt, ohne irgendeine soziale Absicherung (12 Prozent). Eine weitere Gruppe lebt lediglich von ausgeschriebenen Werbeetats politischer Akteure und Wirtschaftsunternehmen (16 Prozent). Die Reporter platzieren Aktivitäten und Produkte der Kunden in ihren Sendungen oder Artikeln und werden dafür bezahlt.⁴

Der Wandel in der kolumbianischen Medienlandschaft wirkte sich auch auf die Personalstruktur in den Redaktionen aus. Es komme zu einer Verjüngung in den Redaktionen, die einen Mangel an professioneller Erfahrung im Beruf mit sich bringe, so Omar Rincón. Heute haben 84 Prozent der in Kolumbien arbeitenden und registrierten Journalisten eine zertifizierte Ausbildung, die übrigen 16 Prozent sind so genannte – durch lange Erfahrung im Beruf qualifizierte – „periodistas empíricos“ (Mastrini und Beccerra 2006: 180).

1. Die Probleme, die für Journalisten aus dieser Verquickung von Wirtschaft, Politik und Medien entstehen, sind für Márquez, mit dem der Autor ein Interview am 20. November 2008 in Bogotá führte, eindeutig: „Es ist absolut klar, dass die hier betroffenen Journalistinnen und Redakteure einen ersten Typ von Selbstzensur durchlaufen. Natürlich werden bei der El Tiempo angestellte Journalisten nicht den Vizepräsidenten [Francisco Santos, d. A.] angreifen, denn er ist Gesellschafter. Auch den Verteidigungsminister [Juan Manuel Santos, Ende 2009 von seinem Amt zurück getreten und voraussichtlich Präsidentschaftskandidat in den Wahlen 2010, d. A.] sowie seine Politik der Demokratischen Sicherheit, können sie nicht engagiert attackieren, denn auch er ist Gesellschafter der Zeitung aus dem Hause Casa Editorial. Ein anderer Fall ist RCN. Ein dort arbeitender Journalist kann sich nicht mit den Zuckerrohrschneidern solidarisch zeigen, die fordern, als vollwertige Arbeiter anerkannt zu werden. Denn dann verliert er mit Sicherheit seinen Job. Zum einen wird die Selbstzensur bestimmt durch unternehmerische oder politische Interessen der Medien selbst und zum anderen folgen Journalisten, ohne dass es ihnen jemand sagt, diesen Linien“ (aus Interview Márquez: 20/11/2008).
2. Die 1997 gegründeten privaten Fernsehsender Canal RCN und Caracol erhielten 2001 85 Prozent des öffentlichen Werbebudgets. Durch die Privatisierung und die allgemein angespannte wirtschaftliche Lage in dieser Zeit, kam es auf diese Weise zu einer „reducción de voces y opiniones“ (López de la Roche 2005: 29). Von 15 der im Jahr 2001 existierenden Nachrichtensendungen, blieben lediglich zwei im Geschäft: Noticiero CM& und Canal Uno. Auch der Kultur- und Bildungsender La Señal musste seinen Betrieb einstellen (Fundación Guillermo Cano Isaza 2006: 16).
3. Seit Mitte 2008 erscheint die El Espectador, die in den Besitz der Gruppe Santo Domingo übergang, wieder täglich. Die Tageszeitung El País veröffentlichte anlässlich der ersten neu erscheinenden Ausgabe als Tageszeitung den Artikel *'El Espectador' regresa como diario*. Im Internet abzurufen unter: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Espectador/regresa/diario/elpepuint/20080512elpepuint_4/Tes, zuletzt abgerufen am 19. Februar 2009.
4. Die von Mastrini und Beccerra zuletzt genannte Zahl von 16 Prozent erscheint eher fraglich angesichts der Tatsache, dass eine nationale, umfassend anerkannte Journalistenorganisation oder Gewerkschaft nicht existiert, und damit die Erhebung der Arbeitsverhältnisse und die Gesamtzahlen von in Kolumbien tätigen Journalistinnen nur als Tendenz genommen werden können.

„Die so genannten ‚empirischen‘ Journalisten weichen der größer werdenden Zahl an professionellen Journalisten, die in Journalistikschulen oder Fakultäten der Kommunikationswissenschaften ausgebildet wurden. Andere stammen aus unterschiedlichen Disziplinen, aber mit universitären Abschlüssen und Mediene Erfahrungen“ (Rey 2007: 34).

Innerhalb der Medien hat sich eine starke Hierarchie zwischen Direktoren bzw. leitenden Redakteurinnen und dem großen anderen Teil der Redaktion heraus gebildet, in der die Löhne nicht festgelegt sind.¹

„Die Erstgenannten sind Medienakteure mit enormer Macht, hohen Gehältern und öffentlichem Ansehen, die wegen ihres Divatums und ihrer exzessiven Geltungssucht kritisiert werden. Dadurch nähern sie sich auf eine gefährliche Weise an die Zentren der Macht, von denen sie schließlich selbst ein Teil werden“ (ebd.).

Eine ausbleibende Reform dieser disparaten Lohnstrukturen im Journalismussektor, die damit einhergehende fehlende finanzielle und soziale Absicherung in Verbindung mit einem aus journalistisch-ethischer Perspektive problematischen Entlohnungssystem für geleistete Arbeit, führt heute zu einer Abhängigkeit von Journalisten in ihrer Arbeit, die die Presse- und Meinungsfreiheit enorm beeinflusst. Als Gegenleistung für produzierte Beiträge in Zeitung, Radio und Fernsehen erhalten Freie Mitarbeiterinnen (ohne andere Vertragsregelungen) als „Lohn“ Sendezeit bzw. Platz in einem Printmedium, die sie als „cupos“ (Kapazitäten) an Werbekunden verkaufen können. Manchmal bekommen sie dazu einen Mindestlohn ausgezahlt, der momentan bei knapp 491 000 Pesos (ca. 186 Euro) liegt – oder gar nichts. Gerade die Bedeutung der „pautas publicitarias“ (Werbeaufträge), von denen die Sicherung des Lebensunterhaltes vieler Medienschaffender abhängt, ist extrem angewachsen. Alle, für diese Studie interviewten Expertinnen und Experten bewerteten diese Tatsache als eines der aktuell gravierendsten Probleme im kolumbianischen Journalismus und hoben hervor, dass eine solche „Entlohnungsweise“ besonders in den ländlichen Regionen verbreitet sei. Gerade hier sind die Etats privater Unternehmen relativ gering, während staatliche Institutionen über einen höheren Werbeetat verfügen – die Summen machen insgesamt 50-60 Prozent der öffentlichen Werbaufträge aus (ADC 2008: 58). Dieser Umstand erhöht die potentielle Gefahr der politischen Einflussnahme auf journalistische Berichterstattung deutlich. Carlos Cortés, von 2005-2009 Direktor der Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa (FLIP) und Kommunikationswissenschaftler unterstreicht:

„Die lokalen Behörden nutzen die öffentlichen Werbeaufträge willkürlich aus. Die Medienunternehmer garantieren keine akzeptablen Arbeitsbedingungen, was sich unverzüglich gefährdend auf die journalistische Unabhängigkeit auswirkt. Nicht nur bezogen auf das Überleben der Journalisten, sondern auch auf die mögliche Recherche und die Vertiefung von Themen“ (Cortés: 7/01/2009).²

Der Radiojournalist Fernando Carvajal Díaz aus dem Bundestaat Popayán berichtet:

„Die Nachrichtenberichtersteller leben überwiegend von den öffentlichen Werbeeinnahmen. Wobei sie [die Journalisten, d. A.] die Werbeplätze zuerst dem Bürgermeister und den öffentlichen Einrichtungen anbieten. Bei denen wird begonnen, da sie am meisten bezahlen“ (zit. nach ADC 2008: 58).³

Mabel Morales, seit mehr als 20 Jahren leitende Nachrichtenredakteurin beim Radio RCN in Barranquilla, verweist darauf, dass ihr Lohn kaum zum Leben ausreicht, und dass sie auf den Abschluss von Werbeaufträgen angewiesen sei – so wäre es schon immer gewesen, seitdem sie mit dem Radio angefangen habe (ebd.: 57).⁴

Dass sich außerdem die Arbeitssituation in den ländlichen Regionen deutlich von jenen in der Stadt unterscheidet, hebt Fabio López de la Roche, Historiker und Medienwissenschaftler am Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI) an der Nationalen Universität Kolumbiens in Bogotá hervor. Während in der Hauptstadt und in anderen Großstädten relativ gute Bedingungen für journalistische Arbeit vorzufinden sind – was intellektuelle, institutionelle und finanzielle Ressourcen betrifft – zeigt sich in den Regionen ein anderes Bild. Die stattgefundenen Lernprozesse von Journalisten, bezüglich ihrer Rolle in der Konfliktberichterstattung und im Friedensprozess, variiert stark. In armen und weitabgelegenen Regionen des Landes sind die Journalistinnen vor allem „empíricos“ und es mangelt an Möglichkeiten, über die ihre Kolleginnen und Kollegen in den großen Städten verfügen (De la Roche 2005: 40). Die journalistischen Lernprozesse mit Themen wie systematische Recherche, Berufsethik, Beherrschen von verschiedenen Stilmitteln, verinnerlichte Arbeitsnormen und Weiterbildung ist damit sehr verschieden in den jeweiligen Regionen (ebd.).

1. Dies berichtet Paola Valderrama, bis 2009 Projektkoordinatorin bei der Organisation Proyecto Antonio Nariño (PAN) in einem Interview mit dem Autoren am 3. Dezember 2008 in Bogotá. „Es gibt keine Regeln was die Lohnbestimmungen der Journalisten betrifft oder wie entschieden wird, dass beispielsweise eine TV Moderatorin 30 Millionen Pesos [c.a. 11 380 € pro Monat, d. A.] und ein Reporter 1 Million Pesos [c.a. 380 € pro Monat, d. A.] verdient. Ich glaube die Kriterien orientierten sich bisher mehr an der Werbung, der Einschaltquote und den entstehenden Dynamiken dieser beiden Faktoren, anstatt an Maßstäben der Arbeit wie Leistung und Ausbildung“ (aus Interview Valderrama: 03/12/2008).
2. Das Interview mit Carlos Cortés führte der Autor am 7. Januar 2009 in Bogotá. Am 23. April 2009 wurde diese Problematik von Cortés auch der Organisation Amerikanischer Staaten (OAS) im Rahmen der „Sesión Especial sobre el Derecho a la Libertad de Pensamiento y de Expresión y la Importancia de Medios de Comunicación“ vorgetragen. Zum globalen und gezielten Einsatz dieser Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen als Instrument der „soft censorship“ von Regierungen gegen Journalistinnen und Medien vgl. u. a. Podesta 2009.
3. Einnahmen, die Journalistinnen machen können, wenn sie die freien Kapazitäten in ihren Sendungen an Händler, Geschäfte, Firmen etc. verkaufen, liegen bei weitem unter den Summen, die politische Einrichtungen und Akteure zahlen (ebd.).
4. Das Problem der „pautas publicitarias“ ist in vielen Ländern Lateinamerikas zu beobachten. Vgl. hierzu ADC 2008.

Ein weiterer ökonomischer Faktor beeinträchtigt speziell eine qualitativ hochwertige Berichterstattung über das Konfliktgeschehen. Logistisch aufwendige Produktionen werden nicht ausreichend von Redaktionen und Herausgebern finanziert, so dass Reporterinnen in Konfliktzonen oft auf die Kooperation mit den Streitkräften (Militärtransporte per Hubschrauber, etc.) angewiesen sind oder auf anderem Weg in die schwer zugänglichen Gebiete kommen müssen.

„Ich musste oft von meinem Chef hören: ‚Ah, nein ..., wenn Sie das Militär nicht mitnimmt ..., es gibt kein Geld‘. Es ist sehr schwer, einen neutralen und objektiven Bericht zu machen, wenn Du mit den Streitkräften mitreist“ (MPP 2004: 25).¹

Rechercheteams, die in die Regionen reisen, um Informationen und Interviews zu sammeln, wurden im Lauf der Zeit reduziert (Floréz 2008: 76). Bezahlt die Redaktion allerdings die entsprechenden Kosten, entsteht bei manchen Journalisten Publikationsdruck. Um die Investition vor der Chefin rechtfertigen zu können, erfinden sie mitunter sensationelle Meldungen bzw. Geschichten und schicken sie an die Heimatredaktion (MPP 2004: 25).²

Obwohl die schlechten Arbeitsbedingungen ein grundlegendes strukturelles Problem des kolumbianischen Journalismus sind, welche die Qualität der Konfliktberichterstattung direkt beeinflussen und determinieren, bleiben sie weitgehend unangetastet. Eduardo Márquez, von der Unterstützungsorganisation für Journalisten CESO-FIP, kritisiert:

„Keiner NGO [Nichtregierungs-Organisation, d. A.] gefällt es, diese Themen zu bearbeiten – tatsächlich macht es auch keine –, denn dies heißt, sich mit den Medienunternehmern und den Arbeitgebern direkt anzulegen“ (aus Interview Márquez: 20/11/2008).³

3.3. Ausbildung von Journalisten

40 kolumbianische Universitäten und Fachinstitutionen bieten die Ausbildung zur Journalistin an. Mangelnde Analysefähigkeit, fehlende Kenntnisse der Geschichte des eigenen Landes und deshalb gravierende Probleme bei der historischen Einbettung aktueller Ereignisse sowie ein kaum vorhandenes Verständnis des politischen Systems, seines Aufbaus oder seiner Aufgaben- und Problembereiche – so kritisierten Teilnehmer und Referentinnen der „II. Conferencia Internacional – Estrategias de apoyo al periodismo y los medios en Colombia“, im November 2008 in Bogotá kolumbianische Studenten der Kommunikationswissenschaften und des Journalismus. Diese Situation beobachtet auch Ana Lucía Duque, Dozentin in der Escuela de Redacción de El Tiempo, in der bereits arbeitende Journalisten weitergebildet werden. Sie plädiert für einen Wandel des Journalismusstudiums in einen Postgrado (Aufbaustudiengang). Es habe sich gezeigt, so Duque, dass Redakteure und Reporterinnen, die bereits ein anderes Fachstudium abgeschlossen haben, fähiger für kritische Analyse und die Erläuterung komplexer Sachverhalte, aber auch im Umgang mit journalistischem Handwerk (Recherche, Quellengebrauch, Internetnutzung etc.) seien, außerdem verfügten sie über eine umfassendere Allgemeinbildung. Omar Rincón, der u. a. als Journalistikprofessor an zwei Universitäten lehrt, sieht ebenfalls strukturelle Probleme in der Ausbildung, allerdings sei das nicht die Schuld der Studentinnen, sondern in erster Linie ihrer Lehrer:

„Ich glaube, wir haben dabei versagt, Kommunikationswissenschaftlern und Journalisten beizubringen, mit den eigenen autonomen Kopf zu denken. Wir lehren sie, Theorietexte der Kommunikationswissenschaften und der Politik wiederzugeben, aber nicht, die Welt aus der Logik der Kommunikation zu betrachten, was Denken mit dem eigenen Kopf bedeuten würde. Sie sind Journalisten, die nichts zu berichten haben. Sie haben keinen Bezug zur Welt. Sie wissen viele journalistische Techniken, wie Interviews zu führen oder Reportagen zu schreiben, aber sie haben nichts zu erzählen. Sie recherchieren nicht viel, können das Publikum bzw. die Leserschaft nicht fesseln, weil sie sich nicht mit der Gesellschaft und ihren Empfindungen befassen. Das aber ist fundamental wichtig für den Journalismus“ (aus Interview Rincón: 18/12/2008).

Viele Hochschulen sind privat finanziert und verlangen Studiengebühren, die angesichts der großen Armut im Land problematisch erscheinen.⁴ Rocío Castañeda, vom CINEP, kritisiert darüber hinaus die Lehrinhalte.

1. Das Zitat stammt aus einer Studie, die die Journalistenorganisation Medios para la Paz (MPP) durchführte. Dabei wurden 120 in Konfliktzonen lebende und arbeitende bzw. durch ihre dortige Arbeit bedrohte Journalistinnen und Redakteure aus Radio, Fernsehen und Zeitung interviewt. Ziel war es, zu analysieren, wie Informationen über den Konflikt produziert werden. Darüber hinaus galt es, die Beziehung zwischen journalistischer Arbeit und Bedrohungen oder Risiken, die Journalisten immer wieder erfahren, offen zulegen.
2. Von einem Fall berichtet ein Journalist aus Bogotá: „Nachdem wir bereits eine Woche mit der Armee mitreisten, ohne dass was passierte, schlossen wir Journalisten einen Pakt. Wir fünf fragten: Was machen wir, damit wir was nach Bogotá zu berichten haben? Wir haben keine Toten, nur verlassene Lager, und nicht einen Guerillero. (...) Mit diesen [wenigen, d. A.] Informationen hätten man uns alle rausgeworfen. Die Abmachung bestand darin, die Schlagzeile ‚Hundert Guerilleros getötet in der größten Militäroffensive aller Zeiten‘ zu melden. Das war stark und kam auf der ersten Seite der Zeitungen. Und es war ein Skandal. Natürlich ... danach haben unsere Kollegen gesagt das wir vom Militär bezahlte Journalisten waren“ (MPP 2004: 24). Zwar stellen Fälle wie dieser die Ausnahme dar, doch kommen sie vor.
3. Einzige Ausnahme bildet die Federación Colombiana de Periodistas (FECOLPER), die mit Hilfe der CESO-FIP vor einigen Jahren gegründet wurde. Weitere Ausführungen dazu folgen im Schlusskapitel des Artikels.
4. Die Semestergebühren bewegten sich 2001 zwischen 500 bis 2000 US Dollar, was sich lediglich Angehörige der Ober- und oberen Mittelschicht leisten können (Schumacher 2001: 53).

„In der Universität mangelt es an einer Beschäftigung mit den Themen der Ethik, an Training professioneller und praktischer Routine im journalistischen Alltag, sowie Hilfen für eine verantwortliche Produktion“ (Castañeda: 29/12/2008).

Diese Ausbildungsdefizite spitzen sich in ländlichen Regionen, in denen es wenige Hochschulen oder Fachinstitutionen gibt, enorm zu. Das unterstreicht auch German Rey, Professor für Kommunikationswissenschaften an der Pontificia Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá. Die Angebote konzentrierten sich auf die Großstädte des Landes (Rey 2007: 35). Die Probleme im Ausbildungsbereich seien nach wie vor groß, aber er könne generell eine Professionalisierung des kolumbianischen Journalismus in den vergangenen 20 Jahren feststellen.

3.4. Die Sicherheitslage

„Weil das Neutralitätsprinzip gegenüber der Zivilbevölkerung – zu der auch Journalisten zählen – permanent negiert wird, sind sie [die Journalisten, d. A.] innerhalb des bewaffneten Konflikts einem ständigen Risiko ausgesetzt. Häufig zwingen Konfliktparteien (staatliche Sicherheitskräfte, Paramilitärs oder Guerillagruppen) Journalisten, die weiterhin aus einer Kampffzone berichten wollen, sich zur Propaganda für deren jeweilige Sache [der bewaffneten Akteure, d. A.] zu verpflichten. Und dies ist nur im besten Falle so ...“.¹

So beschreibt Andrés Monroy, bis Oktober 2009 Rechtsberater bei CESO-FIP und Experte zum Thema Informationsfreiheit in Kolumbien, die Lage von Reportern, die den Konflikt zum Thema machen wollen. Außerdem sei die Gesellschaft derartig polarisiert, dass viele Menschen nur noch eine Unterscheidung in „Freund oder Feind des Staates“ vornähmen. Journalistinnen gerieten schnell ins Fadenkreuz der Gewaltakteure, staatlicher und nicht staatlicher Seite, wenn sie „militärische Aktionen wie extralegale Hinrichtungen – in verharmlosender Weise ‚falsche Erfolgsmeldungen‘ (falsos positivos) genannt – in Frage stellen, wenn sie in unabhängiger und objektiver Weise versuchen, über den Konflikt zu berichten oder wenn sie schwere Menschenrechtsbrüche untersuchen“ (aus Interview Monroy: 4/2/2010).²

Aktuelle Zahlen zeigen, dass die Fälle physischer Gewalt gegen Journalisten und Medienschaffende in Kolumbien in den vergangenen Jahren stagnieren. Weder konnte eine signifikante Abnahme noch eine entsprechend starke Zunahme verzeichnet werden, wie es die FLIP in ihrem aktuellen Lagebericht vermerkt. Die Aggressionen gegenüber Journalisten reichten von erniedrigender Behandlung bis zu körperlichen Übergriffen, die von Beamten und staatlichen Sicherheitskräften ausgingen. 2009 wurden 157 Fälle von „violaciones a la libertad de prensa“ (Verletzung der Pressefreiheit) registriert, was im Vergleich zum Vorjahr eine Zunahme bedeutet (2008 wurden 129 Fälle verzeichnet). Bei einem komparativen Blick auf die letzten Jahre zeigt sich die Persistenz der Unsicherheitslage für Journalisten (2006 kam es zu 140 registrierten Fällen; 2007 zu 162).³ Im Jahr 2009 wurden 74 Journalisten bedroht und 30 in der einen oder anderen Form misshandelt. Die Schwierigkeiten bei der Bezifferung physischer Gewalt werden deutlich, wenn es um die aktuellen Morde an Journalisten geht. Während 2008 keine registriert wurden, bestätigte die FLIP 2009 einen Mord an einem Journalisten, der nachweislich mit dem Beruf des Opfers zusammenhänge. „Reporter ohne Grenzen“ registriert zusätzlich noch den Mord an dem Journalisten Diego Rojas Velásquez am 22. September in der Nähe von Caramanta im Nordosten des Landes. Und der kolumbianische Journalistenverband Federación Colombiana de Periodistas (FECOLPER) geht von 6 Morden an Journalisten im Jahr 2009 aus.⁴ Verantwortlich für die unterschiedlichen Angaben seien verschiedene Filtersysteme, weiss Andrés Monroy. Während FECOLPER alle Morde an Journalistinnen und Medienschaffenden aufzeichnet, baute die FLIP einen Filter ein: er bewertet nur die Morde als relevant für die Statistik, bei denen der Nachweis für einen direkten Zusammenhang mit dem

1. Das Interview mit Andrés Monroy führte der Autor telefonisch am 4. Februar 2010.
2. Mit den „falsos positivos“ sind jene systematischen Morde staatlicher Streitkräfte an Zivilisten gemeint, die in den vergangenen Jahren in Kolumbien von Menschenrechtsorganisationen, nationalen und internationalen Medien aufgedeckt und dokumentiert wurden. Nach der Tötung unschuldiger Bürger, zumeist Männer, wurden ihnen Uniformen angezogen und sie wurden als Guerillakämpfer ausgegeben. Der Grund: so sollten die Erfolgsbilanzen des militärischen Vorgehens der Regierung zur Beendigung des Konflikts geschönt werden. Es gab u. a. Abschlußlisten getöteter Guerilleros, deren Ermordung mit Geld oder Urlaubstagen für die Soldaten belohnt wurden. An dieser Stelle fehlt der Platz, weiter auf die mit den extralegalen Hinrichtungen zusammenhängenden Ereignisse und Hintergründe einzugehen. Bei Interesse ist die allgemeine Berichterstattung von nationalen und internationalen Medien zu empfehlen.
3. Unter „violaciones a la libertad de prensa“ subsumiert die Fundación Libertad de Prensa (FLIP) folgende Indikatoren: Aggressionen (inhumane und erniedrigende Behandlungen) gegenüber Journalistinnen, Entführungen, Behinderung journalistischer Arbeit, im Konflikt verletzte Medienvertreter, Anschläge auf mediale Infrastruktur, Morde, illegale Festnahmen und Bedrohungen. Der in diesem Zusammenhang benutzte Begriff der Pressefreiheit orientiert sich in seiner Form am Recht der Freien Meinungsäußerung, welches eine adäquate Mixtur zwischen freier Meinung, der Möglichkeit diese offen zu ver- bzw. übermitteln, dem freien Zugang zu Quellen und ihrer einschränkungsreichen Verbreitung darstellt (Vivanco 2007: 11). Zu weiteren Informationen und Definitionen der von der FLIP verwendeten Indikatoren vgl. die Angaben auf der Homepage der Organisation, im Internet abzurufen unter: <http://www.flip.org.co/secciones/rap/definicion.html>, zuletzt abgerufen am 30. Dezember 2009.
4. In ganz Lateinamerika sei es 2009 zu 30 Morden an Journalisten gekommen, wobei Kolumbien, nach Mexiko (mit 13 Morden) an Platz zwei steht, noch vor Guatemala (4), Honduras (2) und Brasilien (2), so FECOLPER in einer Pressemitteilung am 17. Dezember 2009. Zu weiteren Informationen zu FECOLPER sowie entsprechenden Dokumenten vgl. die Homepage der mit ihr kooperierenden Organisation CESO-FIP: www.fipcolombia.com.

Beruf des Opfers einwandfrei erbracht wird. Die Tatsache, dass Journalisten und Redakteurinnen oft zusätzlich Nebenberufe ausüben, um ihren Lebensunterhalt zu bestreiten, und während der Ausführung eines solchen ermordet werden, verschleiert häufig den Zusammenhang mit ihrem journalistischen Beruf.

Insgesamt wurden in den vergangenen 30 Jahren mehr als 130 Journalisten in Kolumbien wegen ihrer Arbeit ermordet, d. h. durchschnittlich 4 bis 5 jährlich.

Einschüchterungen und Bedrohungen, soweit sie angezeigt und registriert wurden, bleiben die häufigsten Formen der Gewalt gegen Journalistinnen.¹ Sie geschehen nach Angaben der Pressestiftung FLIP zum Beispiel per Telefonat, Textmessage oder Mail. Außerdem würden die Polizei oder andere staatliche Autoritäten dieses Problem nicht ernst genug würdigen (FLIP 2009: 17). Tatsächlich gingen von Beamten und staatlichen Sicherheitskräften ca. 40 Prozent der beschriebenen Verletzungen im Jahr 2009 aus (FLIP 2010: 20), während es im Vorjahr 31 Prozent waren (FLIP 2009:12). Allerdings besteht auch hier ein deutlicher Unterschied zwischen Stadt und Land, wie Carlos Cortés Castillo berichtet:

„In Kolumbien gibt es starke Institutionen. Allerdings befinden sich diese in sehr zentralisierter Weise nur in einigen Städten oder in Bogotá. Jene Zonen des Landes, in denen es eine schwache Staatsanwaltschaft gibt, wo lokale Verwaltungsorgane von bewaffneten Gruppen kontrolliert werden, wo sich Unternehmen des Drogenhandels etabliert haben und in denen ein allgemeines Klima der Gewalt herrscht, das sind Regionen wo Journalisten ihre Arbeit definitiv schwer gemacht wird“ (aus Interview Cortés: 07/01/2009).

Die am stärksten betroffenen Regionen sind die Bundesstaaten: Valle del Cauca, Atlántico, Antioquia, Caldas, Tolima und Huila. Am häufigsten wurden Pressevertreter und damit die Pressefreiheit in der Hauptstadt verletzt. Dies Zahl rührt daher, dass die Medienkonzentration in Bogotá am stärksten ist und dort viele Journalistinnen arbeiten.

Die Auseinandersetzung mit den Problemen der Korruption und des internen bewaffneten Konflikts erhöht für Journalisten deutlich das Risiko, bedroht zu werden oder physische Gewalt zu erfahren. Besonders die Berichterstattung über Belange der öffentlichen Ordnung (bewaffnete Konfrontationen, Zusammenstöße zwischen Demonstranten und Sicherheitskräften, Berichterstattung über Morde etc.), so Mauricio Durán, bei der FLIP zuständig für Schutz und Monitoring, provoziert die höchste Zahl an gewalttätigen Übergriffen auf Journalistinnen.²

Staatliche Schutzprogramme, von der Regierung 2009 mit mehr als 85 000 Millionen Pesos (ca. 32,2 Millionen €) finanziert, verbleiben nach wie vor defizitär. Das bereits 1997 vom Innenministerium initiierte Programm u. a. für bedrohte Journalisten verzeichnet in seiner praktischen Umsetzung bis heute gravierende konzeptionelle, personelle sowie finanzielle Unzulänglichkeiten. So spionierten die Personenschützer vom kolumbianischen Geheimdienst, in dessen Verantwortungsbereich das Schutzprogramm übergeben wurde, die Journalisten aus, anstatt adäquat für ihren Schutz zu sorgen. Außerdem, so Teilnehmer des Schutzprogramms, seien die Bodyguards nicht gut ausgebildet und unvorbereitet und würden merklich zu wenig Erfahrung mitbringen. Die Kapazitäten des Programms sind durch die Menge der Anfragen um Schutz überlastet. Folge: Die Teilnehmerzahl der Journalisten, die Schutz erhalten sinkt, aufgrund von fehlenden Ressourcen – von 10.716 (2008) auf 10.000 (September 2009). Zwischenzeitlich fehlte es an ausreichend Geld, um zusätzlich notwendige Personenschützer, Flugtickets oder Benzin für Transporte zu bezahlen. Zwar wurde nachbessert, doch die Planungsunsicherheit bleibt.³

Die langwierigen psychologischen Folgen der Angst, die durch die permanente prekäre Sicherheitslage und die persönliche Bedrohung von Leib und Leben bei Journalistinnen in Kolumbien entstehen kann, und ihre sozialen Auswirkungen sind quantitativ und qualitativ schwer zu bestimmen. Es gibt von staatlicher und zivilgesellschaftlicher Seite her keine ausreichenden Ansätze, dem wichtigen Thema der seelischen Belastung von Journalistinnen und Medienschaffenden gerecht zu werden.⁴

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1. Es komme aus verschiedenen Gründen dazu, so die FLIP in ihrem Bericht 2009, dass Verletzungen der Pressefreiheit nicht angezeigt würden. Zu den Gründen zählen u. a.: die Bedeutung eines solchen Verbrechens wird nicht richtig eingeschätzt, Angst vor den Folgen einer Anzeige oder mangelndes Vertrauen in staatliche Vertreter, fehlende Unterstützung des Mediums, in dem die Betroffenen arbeiten oder Unwissen darüber, wie ein solcher Fall zur Anzeige gebracht werden kann (FLIP 2009: 17).
 2. Das Interview mit Mauricio Durán führte der Autor telefonisch am 26. Dezember 2009.
 3. Einen guten und aktuellen Überblick zum Schutzprogramm der Regierung, sowie zu seinen Problemen bietet der von Andrés Monroy verfasste Artikel „La otra cara del Programa de Protección del Gobierno“, aus dem auch die hier verwendeten Zahlen stammen, erschienen auf der Nachrichtenwebseite lasillavacia.com. Im Internet zu finden unter: <http://www.lasillavacia.com/historia/4726>, zuletzt abgerufen am 30. Dezember 2009.
 4. Ausnahme bildet hierbei ein 2007 von der FLIP herausgegeben Handbuch, „Manual para el apoyo emocional del periodista“, zum Erkennen psychischer Belastungen bei Journalisten sowie zum Umgang mit ihnen. Herunterzuladen auf der Homepage der Organisation.

4. Wandel statt Stillstand

Weder lässt sich sagen, dass Medien und die in ihnen arbeitenden Journalistinnen und Redakteure es in Kolumbien leicht haben, noch dass sie sich damit abfinden. Trotz schwieriger struktureller und sozio-politischer Bedingungen, besonders in den Regionen, ist seit Ende der 1990er Jahre ein immer deutlicherer Wandel im Selbstbild kolumbianischer Journalisten feststellbar. Sie veränderten ihre eher passiv-reaktive Haltung hin zu einer tendenziell aktiveren Rolle in der Konfliktberichterstattung. Unter Journalisten und Reporterinnen herrscht eine rege Debatte über das eigene Handeln und die eigene Rolle in der kolumbianischen Gesellschaft – auch in Bezug auf die Probleme, die sich aus den monopolistischen Medienstrukturen ergeben und darüber, wie ihnen zu begegnen ist. Ferner wird es bei genauerem Hinschauen schwieriger, zu beurteilen, was für eine Situation tatsächlich im Land herrscht (Krieg, bewaffneter Konflikt, Postkonflikt). Auch hierrüber wird unter Journalisten gestritten, und manche sind der Auffassung, dass es sich um einen Prozess eines internen bewaffneten Konflikts mit Postkonfliktstrukturen handelt. Schließlich fällt auf, dass sich so manch kolumbianisches Medium (vor allem die Printmedien) vom „Labdog“ zum „Watchdog“ der Politik entwickeln – dies trifft zumindest auf jene zu, die in der zentralisierten Medienlandschaft dazu privilegiert sind, weil sie in einer gut etablierten Redaktion mit ausreichenden Ressourcen arbeiten, sowie über entsprechende Analysefähigkeit und Sensibilität verfügen. Der Wandel des kolumbianischen Journalismus und seine Neupositionierung zeigen sich ebenfalls durch wachsendes lokales Engagement. Im Lauf der Zeit gründeten sich in Kolumbien verschiedene spezialisierte Organisationen, die mit jeweils anderen Themenschwerpunkten und methodischen Ansätzen versuchen, Journalisten und Redakteurinnen in ihrer alltäglichen und in ihrer konfliktspezifischen Arbeit zu unterstützen. Die jeweiligen Angebote, begleitenden Analysen und Projekte werden subsummiert unter dem Begriff der „Media Assistance“. Kolumbianischen Media Assistance Organisationen sind u. a. die Fundación Nuevo Periodismo Iberoamericano (FNPI, gegründet 1994), die Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa (FLIP, 1996), Medios para la Paz (MPP, 1996), das Centro de Solidaridad de la Federación Internacional de Periodistas Colombia (CESO-FIP, 2000), das Proyecto Antonio Nariño (PAN, 2001) sowie Reporteros de Colombia (2005). Ihr Engagement nimmt zu, konkretisiert und manifestiert sich. 2007 gegründete sich außerdem der, bereits erwähnte, bis heute einzige überregionale Journalistenverband Kolumbiens, die Federación Colombiana de Periodistas (FECOLPER). In ihm schlossen sich bisher 1300 Journalistinnen und Redakteure, aus 21 – von insg. 32 – Departamentos zusammen. Ziel von FECOLPER ist es die schlechte Arbeitssituation von Journalisten zu verbessern, um damit die Qualität der Information zu steigern.

Der Bereich der Media Assistance ist bisher allerdings noch nicht konsolidiert. Das bestätigen auch die Mitarbeiter des Proyecto Antonio Nariño (PAN) und haben sich dieses Problems jetzt angenommen. Neben ihrem erklärten Ziel, die Presse- und Informationsfreiheit zu fördern, verschrieben sie sich deshalb außerdem in jüngster Zeit der verbesserten Koordinierung und Kooperation von journalistischen Unterstützungsprogrammen. Diese Abstimmung des lokalen Engagements ist ein wichtiger Ansatzpunkt, um das Potential der „Media Assistance“ effektiver auszuschöpfen. Nur eine Zusammenarbeit der verschiedenen Organisationen kann die komplexe Problemlage journalistischer Arbeit angehen.

„Media Assistance“ als Transformations- bzw. Bearbeitungsansatz von Gewaltstrukturen wird zwar Gewaltprozesse, wie sie in Kolumbien bestehen, nicht alleine hin zu friedensfördernden Verhältnissen transformieren. Aber sie ist ein wichtiges und nachhaltiges Instrument der Konfliktbearbeitung, und entfaltet ihre Wirkung erst langfristig. Sie stellt somit kein Objekt politischer Konjunkturschwankungen dar.

„Media Assistance“ kann Journalisten helfen, mit ihrer Berichterstattung Medien zu dem zu machen, was sie in einem Peacemaking Prozess sein können – ein wichtiges Instrument auf dem Weg zum Frieden.

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Über den Autor: Rousbeh Legatis, Politikwissenschaftler und freier Journalist, u. a. für die internationale Presseagentur Inter Press Service (IPS). Nach seinem Diplom an der Freien Universität Berlin liegen seine Arbeitsschwerpunkte aktuell in der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, bei der Rolle von Medien im Peacebuilding sowie bei der Media Assistance.

Adresse: eMail: rousbeh.legatis@googlemail.com

Jairo Ordóñez

Möglichkeiten des Journalismus als Friedensstifter an der Peripherie: Der Fall Kolumbien

Der Artikel analysiert Darstellungen des Kolumbien-Konflikts in den Leitartikeln unabhängiger kolumbianischer und internationaler Medien sowie den Einfluss dieser Darstellungen auf das Konfliktverständnis der Leser. Zwar gibt es in Kolumbien unabhängige Journalisten, nach den Prämissen dieser Forschungsarbeit jedoch müssen sie als Opfer der Polarisierung bezeichnet werden, weil sie unbewusst den Krieg unterstützen. Jedoch könnte es mit der Hilfe internationaler renommierter Medien gelingen, den unabhängigen kolumbianischen Journalismus in Richtung eines Friedensjournalismus zu verändern, denn die Untersuchung hat gezeigt, wie er verändert werden muss, damit er seiner Funktion, die Bürger über den Konflikt zu informieren und aufzuklären, gerecht werden kann. Die Ergebnisse des Experiments waren ermutigend, und wenn sie in die Praxis umgesetzt werden, könnten sie einem Land eine Chance geben, das dringend Frieden braucht.

Zum Autor:

Jairo Ordóñez erwarb den Titel eines Dr. rer. nat im Fach Psychologie an der Universität Konstanz. Er ist Mitglied des Forums Friedenspsychologie (FFP) und Professor an der University of Ibagué (Kolumbien).

Adresse: Calle 23 H No. 107 A – 23. Bogotá, Colombia.

eMail: Jairo_e_2000@yahoo.com

Jairo Ordóñez


The possibilities of journalism as peace building on the periphery: The Colombian case

This article analyzes the way the Colombian conflict is represented in Colombian and international qualitative independent opinion articles and their influence on readers' understanding of the conflict.

In Colombia there are independent journalists, but according to this research, they are victims of polarization and for this reason support the war, although without a conscious intention to do so. Nevertheless, with the help of international qualitative media it would be possible to reorient Colombian journalism to journalism pro peace.

This research suggests that Colombian journalism must and can be reoriented to a more proactive approach. The results of this experiment are encouraging, and perhaps if they were introduced into praxis, they would provide an opportunity for a country that desperately needs peace.

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On the author:

Dr. Jairo Ordóñez earned a PhD in Psychology at the University of Constance in Germany. He is a member of the German Peace Psychology Association and a professor at the University of Ibagué (Colombia).

Address: Calle 23 H No. 107 A – 23. Bogotá, Colombia.

eMail: Jairo_e_2000@yahoo.com

Jairo Ordóñez¹

The possibilities of journalism as peace building on the periphery: The Colombian case²

Kurzfassung: Der Artikel analysiert Darstellungen des Kolumbien-Konflikts in den Leitartikeln unabhängiger kolumbianischer und internationaler Medien sowie den Einfluss dieser Darstellungen auf das Konfliktverständnis der Leser.

Zwar gibt es in Kolumbien unabhängige Journalisten, nach den Prämissen dieser Forschungsarbeit jedoch müssen sie als Opfer der Polarisierung bezeichnet werden, weil sie unbewusst den Krieg unterstützen. Jedoch könnte es mit der Hilfe internationaler renommierter Medien gelingen, den unabhängigen kolumbianischen Journalismus in Richtung eines Friedensjournalismus zu verändern, denn die Untersuchung hat gezeigt, wie er verändert werden muss, damit er seiner Funktion, die Bürger über den Konflikt zu informieren und aufzuklären, gerecht werden kann. Die Ergebnisse des Experiments waren ermutigend, und wenn sie in die Praxis umgesetzt werden, könnten sie einem Land eine Chance geben, das dringend Frieden braucht.

Abstract: This article analyzes the way the Colombian conflict is represented in Colombian and international qualitative independent opinion articles and their influence on readers' understanding of the conflict.

In Colombia there are independent journalists, but according to this research, they are victims of polarization and for this reason support the war, although without a conscious intention to do so. Nevertheless, with the help of international qualitative media it would be possible to reorient Colombian journalism to journalism pro peace.

This research suggests that Colombian journalism must and can be reoriented to a more proactive approach. The results of this experiment are encouraging, and perhaps if they were introduced into praxis, they would provide an opportunity for a country that desperately needs peace.

1. Introduction

The main goal of this study is to analyze the representations of the Colombian Conflict in Colombian and international opinion articles and to study their effects on readers' understanding of the conflict. In the Twentieth Century, three civil wars have wrought havoc in Colombia, and yet today war still seems a distant phenomenon for the majority of Colombians. The country's largest and most important cities have been growing and have experienced construction booms in the last few years, especially private developments featuring luxury apartments, houses and shopping malls offering prestige brands. Many of their residents purchase luxury goods at Calvin Klein, Versace or Hugo Boss boutiques and enjoy coffee or cocktails in elegant and exclusive bars and restaurants. At the same time, however, thousands of people have lost their lives in the fighting, millions are displaced (Colombia has one of the worst indices of displacement in the world, surpassed only by Sudan), and hundreds of people languish in the hands of kidnappers. In fact, Colombia is one of the ten least peaceful countries in the world,³ close in the rankings to Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan, among others. How can two such different countries coexist side by side?



Picture 1: Bogotá City – The Capital of Colombia

Even more surprising is that the average Colombian does not know much about the Colombian conflict. For them, Colombia has problems just like any other country, and the situation is nothing unusual or remarkable. In the same way, they cannot explain why the guerrillas are fighting or what the relations are between the paramilitaries and the government. Furthermore – although Colombia is one of the three most important recipients of U.S economic aid – they also cannot explain what exactly this US aid consists in.

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2. This research would have been impossible without the scholarship and help of *Colfuturo* and the *DAAD* (Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst – German Academic Exchange Service).
3. The Economist Intelligent Unit (2008): *Global Peace Index*. London: The Economist.

This lack of awareness and the apparent economic boom are part of the same conflict that has displaced millions of people in the last 20 years. On the one hand, the government is conducting a massive propaganda campaign to promote disinformation and to keep people from learning about its paramilitary aims. It wants a country free of guerrillas with a weakened opposition so that the paramilitary mafia can more freely exercise significant political and economic influence to partially legalize its criminal activity in a country already highly corrupted by the Narcotraffic¹. Corruption has distorted the actions of the guerrillas and of a significant share of Columbia's politicians and businesspeople. However, the US War on Drugs demands some results, which up to now have been minimal with respect to the Narcotraffic, but very successful against the guerrillas, who are to some extent the competitors of the paramilitaries in the drug trade.² Another consequence of the war on drugs is the imprisonment of some drug dealers, although under very comfortable and lenient conditions. For this reason, we can regard these jail terms as a form of legalization: After serving a short jail sentence, the drug dealer is washed "clean" and returns to his illegal business activities^{3,4}. All this explains the disinformation promoted by official propaganda and the average Colombian's lack of knowledge about it.

On the other hand, the apparent economic boom in Colombia represents the infiltration of the illegal economy into the legal one. Many enterprises and investments are simply fronts for money-laundering activities; others are set up using illegal money, although their activities are actually legal and may even be profitable. Many investors belong to small drug cartels, an effective strategy, in contrast to the big and highly visible cartels of the 80s (Pablo Escobar's cartel, for example). These small cartels represent a new emergent social class in Colombia, whose investments create apparent prosperity in some sectors, while for the majority of Colombians the economic situation is very harsh. Many of the three million people displaced by the conflict are refugees, and hundreds of thousands have become economic migrants living in Europe and North America. Others suffer from unemployment, and many others cannot compete with the enterprises founded by the drug traffickers.⁵ The government spends most of its budget on the military. Key sectors such as logistics and scientific research receive little attention, which makes Colombia's industries and economy uncompetitive and unattractive for foreign investments. However, the partial defeat of the guerrillas and the imposition of the paramilitary regime have produced a *Pax Mafiosa*^{6,7} (a period when an illegal party won the war and imposed its order), which offers better general indicators (fewer violent deaths, for example) and attracts some legal national and foreign investment.

To avoid further escalation of the Colombian Conflict, it is essential to have independent media that can expose the lies of the official propaganda, alert citizens to the risks of accepting the illegal system (the *Pax Mafiosa*) and enlighten them about the importance of democratic means for solving the conflict. (In the current climate of polarization, the official propaganda denounces the opposition and independent candidates as "enemies" and "guerrilleros"). With better information, the media audience would be in a better position to choose politicians who are interested in peace and in peaceful conflict resolution. Understanding what is happening in Colombia would enable citizens to reject illegal practices and the use of force as a solution (the current military strategy and the infiltration of the paramilitary mafia into the government).

But, this task is very difficult for the Colombian media. Colombia is one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists to work.⁸ Media workers face intimidation by drug traffickers, guerrillas and paramilitary groups. More than 120 Colombian journalists were killed in the 1990s, many for reporting on drug traffic and corruption.⁹

However, there is an initiative by leading Colombian journalists: *Medios Para la Paz* (Media for Peace), established to address the difficulties of reporting the news in the midst of a violent conflict. Much of its work focuses on approaches to reporting that can have a positive impact on efforts to achieve peace. But its philosophy: "The first commitment of the journalist is to the victims of the war, and not to the soldiers,"¹⁰ chooses advocacy in favor of the victims and against the victimizers, and thereby promotes more polarization. These kinds of approach are common with Colombian journalists, probably because many of them have been victims of the violence or are afraid of becoming future victims.

1. Rensselaer W. Lee III and Thoumi, Francisco E. (2003). "Drugs and Democracy in Colombia." In: Godson, Roy (Ed.) *Menace to Society: Political Criminal Collaboration around the world*. Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick: (U.S.A) and London. P. 73.
2. Pizarro, Eduardo and Gaitán, Pilar (2006). "Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative: Lights and Shadows." In: Loveman, Bryan (Ed). *Addicted to Failure*. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield. Publishers. Pp. 53-79.
3. Amnesty International. (2005). *Colombia, The Paramilitaries in Medellín: Demobilization or Legalization*. Pp. 48-49. Available at: www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR23/019/2005/en/dom-AMR230192005en.pdf.
4. The New York Times: "Colombia's Capitulation." July 4, 2005.
5. Camacho Guizado, Alvaro. "Paramilitarismo y Mafia" (Paramilitarism and Mafia). In: *El Espectador*. October 3, 2004.
6. Herran, Jairo cited by Bristow, Matthew. "Pax Mafiosa." In: *Colombia Reports*. December 11/2005. Available at: Colombia-reports.blogspot.com/2005/12/pax-mafiosa.html.
7. Duzán, María Jimena. "La Paz no es el Fin de lo Ilegal" (Peace is not the End of the Illegal). In: *El Tiempo*. September 13, 2005.
8. Moreno, Gloria. "Colombian Journalists are haunted by fear of death." In: *Press Freedom: Safety of journalists and impunity*. New York: Unesco, 2007.
9. BBC.com Country Profile: Colombia
10. Corporate website of Media for Peace. www.mediosparalapaz.org

In contrast, the international qualitative media are in a better position to report on the Colombian conflict; they are not directly involved, have economic and technological resources and are sufficiently "distant" to avoid censorship and pressure from armed actors.

2. Aim of the study

In Colombia, there are independent journalists, but according to this research, they are victims of the polarization and, therefore, they support war, although this is not their intention. However, with the help of international qualitative media, it would be possible to redirect this independent journalism toward a less polarized form of journalism.

We will analyze how Colombian journalists portray the Colombian conflict using escalation-supporting schemes:¹

1. Focusing on violence, sensationalism, personalization, patriotism and exclusion-inclusion biases toward certain groups and persons
2. Using simplistic descriptions rather than analyses of complex conflict origins, causes and contexts
3. Opposing narrow aspects of the conflict instead of broader human and other conflict dimensions
4. Using schemes featuring sport-related terminology, e.g., "us" versus "them," "winners" and "losers," rather than longer processes of conflict resolution or transformation.

Also, we will analyze how international media portray the Colombia conflict using schemes that promote de-escalation:²

1. Exploring the backgrounds and contexts of conflict formation, and presenting causes and options on each side so as to portray the conflict in realistic terms, transparent to the audience
2. Giving voice to the views of all the rival parties
3. Offering creative ideas for conflict resolution, peacemaking and peacekeeping
4. Exposing lies, cover-up attempts and perpetrators on all sides, and revealing the excesses committed by, and the suffering inflicted on people of all factions
5. Paying more attention to peace stories than is common in conventional conflict coverage
6. Expressing criticism of all conflict parties, not just of certain ones

In order to examine the interaction effects of these two kinds of approach on representations of the Colombian Conflict, we chose three Colombian media for which independent journalists write: *El Tiempo*, *El Espectador* and *Cromos*, and from the international media we chose: *BBC News* (online version), *The New York Times* group, *The Washington Post* and *The Economist*. From these media we selected what we regarded as opinion articles (unlike news articles, opinion articles offer analyses and are critical). Using these sources, we tested the following hypotheses:

H1. The opinion article authors in the international media use their independence, resources and privileged positions to do depolarized journalism.

H2. In Colombia, independent and critical journalists publish qualitative opinion articles, but they have chosen advocacy (journalism of attachment) as a way to contribute to peace.

H3. Readers of international articles (depolarized journalism) can better understand the conflict than can the readers of the Colombian articles (advocacy journalism).

H4. Depolarized journalism represents an opportunity to re-contextualize and redirect independent Colombian journalism in a more proactive way and to produce the highest level of understanding about the Colombian conflict.

3. Methods and results

3.1 Methods used for the content analysis of the articles

For this analysis we selected articles published between 2005 and 2007, because in this period the Colombian conflict underwent significant transformations, among others:

- For the first time, a very large number of government coalition members (approx. 50, including members of Parliament, ministers, mayors, governors and other office holders) are in jail or being prosecuted on charges of having ties to the Mafia.³

1. Shinar, Dov (2007). "Peace Journalism: The State of the art." In: Shinar, Dov & Kempf, Wilhelm (Eds.), *Conflict & Communication Online*, 6 (1) 2007. Berlin: regener. Accessible at: www.cco.regener-online.de

2. Nohrstedt, Stig A. & Ottosen, Rune. "War Journalism in the Threat Society: Peace Journalism as a Strategy for Challenging the mediated Culture of Fear?" In: *Conflict and Communication on line*, 7 (2) 2008. Accessible at: www.cco.regener-online.de

3. El Tiempo. "Parapolitics caused confrontation between Congressmen and Ministries." In: *El Tiempo*. February 28, 2007.

- It is possible to assess the results of the government program "Democratic Security," a military strategy for achieving peace, after a first period of implementation (2002-2006) and the beginning of the second period (according to the government, the "solution" and "end" of the Colombian conflict).
- For the first time, the phenomenon of parapolitics (the relations between the Mafia and politics) is being widely discussed by the media and acknowledged by the government.
- For the first time, the guerrillas (especially FARC) seem to be losing the war.
- For the first time, a Colombian president has been re-elected to consecutive terms despite numerous accusations that he supports the Mafia.

The variables were defined in terms of the explanations of the Colombian conflict given in the selected articles. For example, in the selected articles the focus was on the paramilitaries, and for this reason, 'Paramilitaries' was chosen as a variable. Other criteria for selecting variables came from the following questions in the basic scheme of the *conflict*: Who is fighting (Armed Actors)? Who are the civilian victims? What is the political perspective of the conflict (Political Actors)? Are there any peace initiatives? The question: *Why are they fighting?* does not have a simple or direct answer, and it is answered with the other questions; for this reason there are no specific variables for this question.

To measure the variables, we used QDA Miner v 2.0.7, a computer program designed for quantitative and qualitative data analysis. Each article was entered into the program in the space created for each media (*The Economist*, *El Tiempo*, etc.) in the corresponding year (2005, 2006, 2007). After that, each category and its related variables was created in the program (the categories contain more than one variable), and when a variable was found in the text, it was coded, making it recognizable to the computer program. Once the variables were recognizable, it was possible to measure the number of times (presence) that each variable appears in the text. For example, if we search for the variable *Colombian President* in *El Tiempo* for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007, the program can count each code marked as *Colombian President* and indicate that this variable appears 293 times. For this analysis, a total of 7,171 codes were marked for all the variables. In some cases, the code has exactly the same name as the variable. In other cases, it is linked by a pronoun, name, adjective or any allusion to the variable made by the author of the article.

After measuring each variable, it was necessary to standardize the presence of each one according to the total number of codes in each media by year, in order to make a comparison of the standardized values and the corresponding statistical analysis of them.

Variable	Category
Colombian Government	Politics
Colombian President	Politics
USA	Politics
Parapolitics	Politics
Democracy	Politics
Killing	Killing
Massacre	Killing
Homicide	Killing
Genocide	Killing
Extra-Judicial Executions	Killing
Children	Civilian Victims
Indians	Civilian Victims
Journalists	Civilian Victims
Trade Unionists	Civilian Victims
Displaced Persons	Civilian Victims
Kidnappings	Civilian Victims
Peasants	Civilian Victims
Evictims	Civilian Victims
Colombian Armed Forces	Armed Actors
FARC	Armed Actors
Paramilitaries	Armed Actors

Variable	Category
Criminals	Armed Actors
Drug Trafficking	Armed Actors
Mafia	Armed Actors
Terrorism	Armed Actors
Peace	Peace
Demobilization	Peace

Table 1

To measure the results for each group, we used different tests, parametric as well as non-parametric: ANOVA, Kruskal Wallis, Mann Whitney U, and Bonferroni, to ensure the robustness of the results and to obtain clear differences among significant, tendency to be significant, and not significant. With only one test, this differentiation would be very weak, but with many tests, the differentiation becomes clear and very well supported.

3.2 Results of the content analysis by categories

The general results of the content analysis by categories and their variables are summarized in the following analysis:

Politics. This category refers to the role in the Colombian conflict of the Colombian government, the Colombian President, the opposition, the phenomenon of parapolitics (infiltration of paramilitaries into the government) and the War on Drugs, in which the USA plays a very important role.

The international articles place more emphasis on the role of the USA in the Colombian conflict, for which it is a highly significant variable. They also devote somewhat more space to the phenomenon of "parapolitics." Both are key topics for understanding the course of the war over the last few years, the defeat of the guerillas and the consolidation of the Mafia's political and economic power.

On the other side, the Colombian articles tend to emphasize Alvaro Uribe (personalization of the conflict) and say more about democracy, but do so only in order to make a clear distinction between good and bad. All the variables related to *Politics*, with the exception of *USA (what it is significant)*, have a tendency to be significant when we compare both media. This means that the presence of each variable and the identification of key political actors have a tendency to be significantly different in the Colombian and the international articles.

Killing. It is possible to say that the international articles have a general view of the category of *Killing*. They prefer to speak about killings and massacres, but do not say much about polemical and dramatic situations with strong political connotations like genocide. The American media deviate somewhat from this tendency, probably because of the great involvement of the USA in the Colombian conflict.

On the other side, the Colombian articles, especially in *El Espectador*, give a more detailed explanation of the different kinds of Killing in Colombia, although *El Tiempo* is an exception to this tendency and is close to the international articles. Two variables in this category have a significant P value, *Homicide* and *Genocide*, which appear more frequently in the Colombian articles, thereby creating a clear difference in their communicative style in comparison with the international articles. The Colombians are more specific about *Killing* than the general view found in the international articles.

The other variables related to *Killing* have a tendency to be significant when we compare both media. This means that in this category the presence of each variable and the relevance of each kind of Killing have tendency to be significantly different in the Colombian and the international articles.

Civil Victims. This category refers to the civilian victims named in the selected articles: Child Soldiers, Displaced, Elite Victims, Indians, Peasants and Trade Unionists. In this category, we found that *Peasants* and *Displaced Persons* have a tendency to be significant, but only when we make comparisons with the Colombian articles. It is interesting to see how, regardless of the dramatic situation of the *Trade Unionists* in Colombia (the country has the highest rate of crimes against trade unionists in the world¹), none of the media emphasize this topic, and to the contrary it is in part ignored. Because of this, both media are similar in this "ignorance" and do not show a significant difference in the presence (in this case, actually absence) of these civilian victims.

1. International Herald Tribune/Associated Press. 91 trade unionists killed in 2007. November 20, 2008.

The other variables related to *Civilian Victims* have a tendency to be significant when we compare both media. This means that the presence of each variable and the relevance of each civil victim has tendency to be significantly different in the Colombian and the international articles.

Variable	Results of the tests	Media Compared
Trade Unionists	Not significant	
Terrorism	Not significant	
Peace	Not significant	
Displaced Persons	Tendency to be significant	Only in The Colombian media
Peasants	Tendency to be significant	Only in the Colombian media
Col Gov	Tendency to be significant	Both
Col. Pres	Tendency to be significant	Both
Parapolitics	Tendency to be significant	Both
Killing	Tendency to be significant	Both
Massacre	Tendency to be significant	Both
Extra-Jud Exec.	Tendency to be significant	Both
Children	Tendency to be significant	Both
Indians	Tendency to be significant	Both
Journalists	Tendency to be significant	Both
Kidnapped Persons	Tendency to be significant	Both
E Victims	Tendency to be significant	Both
Guerrillas	Tendency to be significant	Both
Paramilitaries	Tendency to be significant	Both
Drug Trafficking	Significant	Both
Mafia	Significant	Both
Homicide	Significant	Both
Genocide	Significant	Both
Demob.	Significant	Both
Democracy	Significant	Both
Col Arm.Force	Significant	Both
USA	Highly Significant	Both
Criminals	Highly Significant	Both

Table 2: Variables and levels of significance

Armed Actors. This category refers to the armed actors named in the selected articles: the Colombian Armed Forces, Criminals, Drug Trafficking, the Colombian Secret Police, Mafia, Paramilitaries and Terrorism. When the Colombian articles discuss *Armed Actors*, they focus on *Criminals*, *Colombian Armed Forces* and the *Mafia* (for which the P values exhibit significance or high significance when we compare the Colombian articles with the international articles). Although the Colombian articles are very critical of the government, they have a tendency to use more terminology borrowed from official propaganda, such as *Criminals*. Likewise, they have a tendency to give more space to the *Colombian Armed Forces*, making a clear differentiation between "them" and "us" (journalists as "good" and the Colombian Armed Forces as "bad"). In contrast, international articles avoid the terminology and conceptions of official propaganda.

Colombian articles also devote more space to the *Mafia* variable than do international articles, although both media give it a marginal presence, the only exception being *El Tiempo*. However, its presence is significantly greater in the Colombian articles, and this is a very important point, because *Mafia* is a concept that the official propaganda avoids. It is a concept that helps us to understand the new political and economic situation in Colombia.

The international articles focus on *Drug Trafficking* (whose P value is significant when we compare the Colombian articles with the international articles). *Drug Trafficking* is one of the principal "Armed Actors" and one of the most important causes of the war.

Terrorism, a typical concept in official propaganda, is avoided by both media, and consequently its presence is very marginal. The presence of this variable does not show a significant difference between the articles.

Paramilitaries and Guerrillas also have a tendency to be significant when we compare both media. In general, this means that the presence of each variable and the emphasis on each armed actor has tendency to be significantly different when we compare Colombian articles with international articles.

Peace. This category refers to the peace process between the Colombian government and the paramilitaries. For this study we chose the term "demobilization," which was often used in the media. This category has a very marginal presence in both media, and therefore it does not reveal a significant difference. On the contrary, the paramilitaries' demobilization process displays a significant difference in its presence. This could reflect the strong criticism in both media, made in different ways. It has more presence in the international articles, where this polemical process is clearly defined as a legalization of the crimes of the paramilitaries, rather than as a process of justice intended to build peace.

3.2.1 Correlations in the Colombian Articles

In the Colombian articles, the highest correlation values are concentrated in the following variables:

USA. In the Colombian articles, this variable has a negative correlation with *Democracy*. For the Colombian articles, *USA* and *Democracy* are opposites and mutually exclusive.

Parapolitics. This variable has a negative correlation with *Massacre*, *Homicide* and *Indians*. Colombian articles prefer to speak separately about the political strategies and the violence, massacres, homicides and attacks of the paramilitaries against Indians, although both phenomena are very closely related.

Killing. This variable has a negative correlation with *Journalists*, *Drug Trafficking* and *Demobilization*. Despite attacks on journalists, it is very clear in the Colombian articles that they are not the principal victims of the war. However, these articles do not relate *Killing* with *Drug Trafficking*, although drug trafficking is one of the most important causes of the conflict.¹ Journalists treat *Demobilization* as an independent phenomenon unrelated to *Killing*, although the most important Colombian drug lords take part in it and for many this process is a legalization of their crimes, which include homicides, massacres, killings and many others.

Killing also has a positive correlation with *Democracy* and *Criminals*. For the Colombian articles, *Killing* is a threat to *Democracy*, and for this reason, they make parallel comments on *Killing* (as a problem) and *Democracy* (as the solution). The relationship between *Criminal* and *Killing* corresponds with the scheme Perpetrator – Crime.

Massacre. This variable correlates positively with *Terrorism*. For the Colombian articles, *Massacres* are *Terrorism*. However, this equation is inaccurate, because usually *Massacres* are committed for economic benefits, and they are not committed as retaliation against state actions, as is *Terrorism*.

Homicide. This variable has a positive correlation with *Extra-Judicial Executions*, *Indians*, and *Colombian Armed Forces*. For the Colombian articles, some homicides are *Extra-Judicial Executions*. They emphasize that the Indians are victims of homicide and in many cases describe these homicides as crimes committed by the Colombian Armed Forces (extra-judicial executions).

In the Colombian articles, this variable also has a negative correlation with *Mafia*. It means that the *Mafia* variable is not directly related to *Homicide*, although the *Mafia* commits many crimes in Colombia. The Colombian articles prefer to use other names for the *Mafia*, and consequently the *Mafia* seems an isolated phenomenon.

Trade Unionists. This variable has a negative correlation with *Demobilization*. The Colombian articles do not directly link crimes against *Trade Unionists* to the *Demobilization Process*, although it is likely that many of the perpetrators of these crimes are participating in the process.

Kidnapped Persons. This variable has a positive correlation with *Guerrillas* and *Elite Victims*. For the Colombian articles, in the majority of cases *Guerrillas* are behind kidnappings, and the articles have a strong tendency to identify the kidnapped persons with Ingrid Betancourt (the *Elite Victim* of this analysis).

Criminals. This variable has a positive correlation with *Trade Unionists* and *Peasants*. When the Colombian articles refer to *Criminals* without identifying *Guerrillas*, *Paramilitaries* or any others, they relate these *Criminals* to *Trade Unionists* and *Peasants* as their victims.

1. Lektzian, David; Gates Scott (2005). *Drug, Governance and Civil War*. Oslo: Center for the Study of Civil War & Norwegian University of Science and Technology.

Colombian Armed Forces. This variable has a negative correlation with *Peace*. For the Colombian articles, the *Colombian Armed Forces* are synonymous with war and for this reason represent the antithesis of *Peace*, and in the articles, the presence of one excludes that of the other.

Paramilitaries. This variable has a positive correlation with *Mafia*. For the Colombian articles, '*Paramilitaries*' is related to *Mafia*, but although this correlation is strong, it is not very frequent.

Drug Trafficking. This variable has a positive correlation with *Journalists*, *Mafia* and *Demobilization*. For the Colombian articles, *Drug Trafficking* is a threat to freedom of the press. *Drug Trafficking* is related to the Colombian *Mafia* and the Process of *Demobilization*, in which many drug lords take part covertly.

In general, the content analysis shows that the Colombian journalists chosen for this study use emotional schemes to explain and represent the Colombian conflict, preferring personalization to the analysis of objective causes. In the same way, the Colombian media describe more than they analyze and make a clear differentiation between victimizers (for example, The Colombian Armed Forces) and victims (for example, Indians). With this simplification, the Colombian media avoid examining very complex actors like the USA, which at the same time supports and attacks the paramilitaries, or actors like the peasants, which are impossible to classify as solely victims or victimizers. The Colombian media ignore the fact that in any conflict all the parties tend to be both victimizers and victims at one time or another.

3.2.2 Correlations in the international articles

In the international articles, the highest correlation values are concentrated in the following variables:

USA. This variable has a negative correlation with *Colombian President*. For the international articles, the *USA* is an independent power in the Colombian conflict. For this issue, they write separately about the *Colombian President* and the *USA*. The *USA*, with its high level of intervention in and policy-making for Colombia, is seen as an independent key actor, although an intruder and in opposition to the Official Government.

Parapolitics. This variable has a positive correlation with *Kidnapped Persons* and *Elite Victims*. For the international articles, *Parapolitics*, *Kidnapped Persons* and the Kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt (an *Elite Victim*) are symptoms of the political crisis in Colombia. *Parapolitics* represents the infiltration of the Mafia into the government, and the Kidnapping of Ingrid Betancourt the failure to reach an agreement with the guerrillas to liberate hundreds of politicians, members of the Colombian Armed Forces and civilians – in other words, the inability of the government to successfully negotiate with the guerrillas.

Parapolitics also has a negative correlation with the *USA* and *Drug Trafficking*. For the international articles, *Parapolitics* is a very independent and local phenomenon not directly related to the *USA* or *Drug Trafficking*.

Killing. This variable has a positive correlation with *Trade Unionists*. For the international articles, there is a very clear pattern of *Killings* committed against members of trade unions, many of them committed with impunity and probably by paramilitaries or state agents.

Peace. This variable has a negative correlation with *Killing*, *Journalists* and *Trade Unionists*. For the international articles, the *Killing* of civilians, the censorship of *Journalists* and attacks on *Trade Unionists* are the opposite of a democratic peace. Consequently, when they speak about peace they avoid these terms and prefer to relate peace to democracy.

Guerrillas. This variable has a negative correlation with *Criminals*. As opposed to the official propaganda, the international articles treat the *guerrillas* as not simply criminals. In this way, the international articles distance themselves from the official propaganda and define the guerrillas in their own terms.

Demobilization. This variable presents a negative correlation with *Parapolitics*, *Kidnapped Persons*, *Colombian Armed Forces* and *Elite Victims*. For the international articles, the *Demobilization Process*, although controversial and closely related to the other circumstances of the war, is analyzed separately from other very important aspects of the war.

This variable also has a positive correlation with *Paramilitaries*, because the demobilization process focuses on the paramilitaries. Moreover, the articles focus on this process because it does not have clear rules, is very lax with the paramilitaries and doesn't offer adequate compensation to victims.

In general, the content analysis shows that the international qualitative media use analytical schemes to explain and represent the Colombian conflict, preferring to seek the objective causes of the conflict rather than to personalize it. In the same way, the international qualitative media analyze more than describe and display a clear effort to place information in context without taking sides with any of the actors. The International qualitative media seem interested in listening to all parties and do not find it hard to criticize them. Unlike the Colombian media, the international qualitative media present and propose possible solutions.

3.3 Methods used in the experiment

We carried out an experiment to compare the impact on readers of the representations of the Colombian conflict in selected independent opinion articles in Colombian and international media.

The impact on readers of an article on the Colombian conflict is measurable by determining their degree of understanding and ability to coherently explain the conflict and distinguish among the actors and their roles after reading the article. This implies coherence between the subjects' answers and the facts of the conflict. For example, take this fact: The Chief of the Colombian Secret Police (DAS) was prosecuted for having relations with the Colombian Mafia. If a subject responds with *Disagree* to the statement: *The Chief of the Colombian Secret Police had relations with the Mafia*, the answer is false. We understand *coherence* in the sense of the following example: If the chief of the Colombian Secret Police and other important police officials have close relations with the Colombian Mafia, it is obvious that the Mafia has relations with the Colombian Secret Police. But if a subject answers that important officials of the Colombian Secret Police have relations with the Mafia, but the Mafia does *not* have relations with the Colombian Secret Police, his response is not coherent.

To compare the two kinds of journalism, we created three groups and assigned their members the task of reading Colombian and/or international articles (which were published between 01 January 2005 and 31 December 2007):

- Group 1 read 22 articles taken from the Colombian media.
- Group 2 read 22 articles taken from the international media.
- Group 3 read both the Colombian and the international articles, so that we could compare and measure the influence of each of the media when readers have a chance to read both kinds of article.

Each group of articles contained the same amount of information, as much as is possible when articles are used without manipulation. Figure 1 illustrates the amount of information in each kind of article.




Figure 1

Each group included 22 subjects, and in order to preclude "contamination," before the experiment all subjects were given a preliminary test to make sure that they had no previous knowledge of the Colombian conflict. During the experiment, they had to make every effort to avoid exposure to media programs on or reading about the Colombian conflict (each subject was required to sign a consent form). Likewise, persons from America (North, Central and South) and Spain, and persons with contacts to or knowledge about Colombia, were excluded in the study, because it would be impossible to tell whether they were responding to the selected articles or to their previous knowledge and experiences.

The members of each of the groups were asked to evaluate 122 statements in order to measure their level of understanding and coherence regarding the Colombian Conflict.

Each statement had 5 possible responses (we used a variation of the Likert Scale), for example:

Peasants earn more from drug crops than from pineapples or other traditional products.

Agree – Agree Partially – Don't know – Disagree partially – Disagree

We defined understanding as knowledge that permits subjects to link the actors in the conflict with their actions, explain the true causes and true consequences of measurable and relevant facts, and dispose of a temporal perspective on the conflict.

The average subject was fairly young; the mean age was 24. The majority of the subjects were students at the University of Konstanz, and 94% were of German nationality. The remaining 6% were from other countries of Europe, Asia and Oceania; 47% were men and 53% women.

In all, we chose 44 articles from the Colombian and international media for content analysis. From Colombia: "*El Espectador*," "*El Tiempo*," "*Cromos*." From the international media: "*The New York Times*" (USA), "*The International Herald Tribune*" (USA – France), "*The Economist*" (GB), and "*BBC NEWS*" (World Online version).

We used four criteria for this selection: 1) Presence of independent and qualitative opinion articles about Colombia; 2) Parallelism of topic; 3) Conflict Illustration: topics relevant for understanding the Colombian conflict; 4) Contextualization: presence of enough explanatory details to make each article understandable without additional information.

To measure the results for each group, we performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA). This is a method that is widely used when it is necessary to compare and analyze more than two variables. As a follow-up to ANOVA, we used the non-parametric *Kruskal Wallis* and *Mann Whitney U* tests to ensure the robustness of the results and to distinguish clearly among significant, tendency to be significant, and not significant. Using only one test, the differentiation would be weak, but with follow-up tests, the differentiation becomes clear and very well supported. Non-parametric tests were preferred, because the number of subjects was limited to 66.

It was very difficult to find subjects with little knowledge about Colombia, a conflict with a long-term presence in the media. Moreover, subjects had to have enough time to read all the articles, which took 5 to 10 hours or more, depending on the group (the articles were divided into three groups and sent by e-mail, and after each set of articles, a questionnaire was sent by e-mail as well; in all, each subject received 3 set of articles and 3 questionnaires).

We conducted the experiment in Germany with the support of the Peace Research Group at the University of Konstanz. For this reason, we translated all the articles into German, and all the questionnaires were likewise in German.

3.4 Results of the Experiment

Concerning the categories and their variables, the general results of the experiment are summarized in the following analysis:

Politics. Table 3 illustrates the level of understanding in each group of each variable in relation to this category:

Variable / Group	Politics		
	1	2	3
Colombian Government / Parapolitics**	35.04%	43.73%	46.78%
Colombian President***	36.36%	29.34%	40.50%
Opposition**	26.26%	31.31%	39.90%
War on Drugs**	41.36%	51.82%	52.73%

***Significant between Groups 2 and 3

** Significant between Groups 1 and 3

Table 3

The variable *Colombian Government Parapolitics* is significant when we compare Groups 1 (Colombian Media) and 3 (Colombian and International Media). For the readers of the international media, it is very clear that the paramilitaries are infiltrating the government, as well as that the Colombian government plays a key role in the conflict, since the government supports the paramilitaries. For the readers of the Colombian articles, this relation is not so clear, and consequently readers can learn more from the international articles, which had the strongest influence on Group 3 (there is no significant difference between Groups 2 – International Media – and 3).

The variable *Colombian Government* is significant when we compare Groups 2 and 3. This difference in the level of under-

standing arose because the Colombian media emphasize the President of Colombia (as the opposite of the "good" citizens) and offer many details about him. For this reason, it is possible for readers to get a more complete and balanced picture of the President when they have both versions. It is important to note that despite the emotional attachment of the Colombian articles, they enable a higher percentage of understanding than do international media and therefore have the strongest influence on Group 3 (there is no significant difference between Groups 1 and 3).

The variable *Opposition* is significant when we compare Groups 1 and 3. The Colombian media have a tendency to speak more about concrete persons and concrete situations, but not to analyze phenomena as a whole, e.g., the political opposition (although in some cases the Colombian media offer more information and details). For this reason, readers can learn more about the opposition from the international articles, which analyze the topic and have the strongest influence on Group 3 (there is no significant difference between Groups 2 and 3).

The variable *War on Drugs* is significant when we compare Groups 1 and 3. The international media have a general tendency to show an interest in the role of the USA for Colombia and its War on Drugs, in which Colombia plays a central role. In contrast, Colombian media tend to make more local references. Even though the USA invests billions of dollars to support the war, the Colombian media seldom mention the USA in this connection. For this reason, the reader can understand more if they read the international media, and these media have the strongest influence on Group 3 (There is no significant difference between Groups 2 and 3).

Civilian Victims. The variable *Child Soldiers* is significant when we compare Groups 1 and 2, and 1 and 3. The international media put more emphasis on the situations of child soldiers than do the Colombian media, because Colombia and Haiti are unique cases in the Americas.¹ In these countries children serve in private armies, and from this perspective they are interesting cases for the international press. In contrast, the Colombian media see the situation as more "normal," and consequently they do not explain the problem of child soldiers in depth, resulting in the lowest level of understanding on the part of readers. Moreover, the international media have the strongest influence on Group 3 (there is no significant difference between Groups 2 and 3) Table 4 illustrates the percent of understanding in each group.

Variables / Group	Civilian Victimes		
	1	2	3
Child Soldiers*	19.09%	52.73%	53.64%
Elite Victims	42.05%	51.14%	48.86%
Indians	32.47%	33.12%	38.96%
Refugees**	45.45%	34.85%	55.30%

*Significant between Groups 1 and 2, and 1 and 3

** Significant between Groups 2 and 3

Table 4

With the variable *Elite Victims*, it is possible to see that international articles enable a higher level of understanding than articles in the Colombian media with their affective attachment. However, this variable does not reflect a significant difference between the groups.

The explanation for this result lies in the style of informing readers about victims. Colombian journalism distinguishes between "important" and "unimportant victims." This means that victims who are considered to be "good" people are assigned more value than victims who are regarded as "bad people." Moreover, Colombian journalism tries to *commove*, and for this reason it identifies a victim and tries to create an emotional attachment between the reader and this victim. In contrast, international journalism tries to inform about victims belonging to all the parties, does not make a distinction between important and unimportant victims and does not try to create a special emotional relationship between the reader and a victim "from the good people." For this reason, readers of international media can understand more about Ingrid Betancourt (the elite victim referred to by the media in the selected articles) and her kidnapping. Since the articles are less emotional, readers are able to give a more analytical reading.

The variable *Refugees* is significant when we compare Groups 2 and 3. It implies that Colombian media have the strongest influence on Group 3 (there is no significant difference between Groups 1 and 3). This means that despite their emotional attachment, Colombian media make possible a higher level of understanding than do international media, probably because in order to create sympathy (attachment) Colombian media offer numerous details.

1. Human Rights Watch. "Colombia: Armed Groups Send Children to War." In: www.hrw.org February 22, 2005

Armed Actors. The variable *Colombian Army* is significant when we compare Groups 1 and 3, and 2 and 3. The level of understanding is practically the same in Groups 1 and 2. Probably in this case the two versions complement each other. Table 5 illustrates the level of understanding in each group.

Variables / Groups	Armed Actors		
	1	2	3
Colombian Army*	30.91%	30.00%	45.45%
Colombian Secret Police	45.45%	45.45%	45.45%
Paramilitaries**	29.22%	42.42%	47.84

*Significant between Groups 1 and 3, and 2 and 3

** Significant between Groups 1 and 2, and 1 and 3

Table 5

The variable *Colombian Secret Police* has the same level of understanding in all groups. Probably information about the Colombian Secret Police is very specific in Colombian and international media, and consequently the level of understanding is the same for all three groups of readers.

The variable *Paramilitaries* is significant when we compare Groups 1 and 2, and Groups 1 and 3. Colombian media devote much space to paramilitaries, but they do not give a concrete, clear and direct explanation. For this reason, these media contribute to the lowest level of understanding. In contrast, international media are very clear and direct, and therefore enable a higher level of understanding and are the strongest influence on Group 3 (there is no significant difference between Groups 2 and 3).

Peace. The variable demobilization does not represent a significant difference between the groups, although the level of understanding is higher in Group 1 than in Group 2, perhaps because for Colombian media the paramilitaries are "Bad People," and therefore they place greater emphasis on the paramilitaries and their actions. Table 6 shows the level of understanding in each group.

Variable / Group	Peace		
	1	2	3
Demobilization	48.48%	44.55%	51.52%

Table 6

In general, the variables display a clear tendency: Group 3 has the highest degree of understanding; Group 2 does better than Group 1, and in one case better than Group 3. International articles have the strongest influence on Group 3 (these groups share more similarities in their behavior than do Groups 1 and 3).

3.4.1 Coherence

Another category of analysis was the degree of coherence¹ within each group, in other words, the degree of coherence of each subject's answers. Similar to the score for understanding, we can see a clear difference between the groups.

Based on this data, we can affirm that Groups 1 and 2 have the same level of coherence, despite the great difference between the styles of journalism and despite Group 2's significantly greater number of correct answers. This means that each kind of article is coherent in its own way. As is a clear tendency throughout the analysis, Group 3 has the highest score.

1. To measure coherence, we analyzed 15 cases with 45 questions. It was not possible to measure all the questions, because not all the questions are related.

Statistics for Test ^{a,b}	
	Coherence
Chi-square	10,565
Df	2
Asymptotic significance	.005

a. Kruskal-Wallis Test
b. Group variables: All Groups

Table 7

Statistics for Test ^a	
	Coherence
Mann-Whitney U	236,500
Wilcoxon W	489,500
Z	-.130
Asymptotic significance (2-sided)	.897

a. Group variables: Groups 1, 2

Table 8

Statistics for Test ^{a,b}	
	Coherence
Mann-Whitney U	128,500
Wilcoxon W	381,500
Z	-2.681
Asymptotic significance (2-sided)	.007

a. Group variables: Groups 1, 3

Table 9


Statistics for Test ^a	
	Coherence
Mann-Whitney U	118,000
Wilcoxon W	371,000
Z	-2.934
Asymptotic significance (2-sided)	.003

a. Group variables: Groups 2, 3

Table 10

3.4.2 Dispersion

Further, we analyzed the dispersion of each group. This means the difference in each group between the statistical median value of the subjects' answers and the answers that match the facts of the conflict. Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the results in each case. The degree of dispersion is highest in Group 1, lowest in Group 3; and between Groups 1 and 2 there are many similarities, although in Group 2 the degree of dispersion is lower. This indicates that in all cases Group 3 has a tendency to come closer to giving answers that match the facts of the conflict, while in all cases Group 1 has a tendency to be farther from these answers; Group 2 is in the middle, although it is closer to Group 1 than is Group 3.



The red lines indicate the answers that should be marked to have concordance with the facts of the conflict.

Figure 2: Group 1




Figure 3




Figure 4

3.4.3 Undecided

In order to measure whether readers were confused or not, the category of "Undecided" was defined. This refers to the number of "I don't know" responses. The more often a subject answers "I don't know," the higher is his degree of confusion. Similarly, fewer "I don't know" responses indicate a lower degree of confusion. In Group 1 there were 17.81% undecided, in Group 2 12.89% and in Group 3 8.72%. This difference between the percentages is always significant when we compare all the groups, or when we compare any two of them, as the following tables show:

Statistics for Test ^{a,b}	
	Undecided
Chi-square	19,155
Df	2
Asymptotic significance	.000

a. Kruskal-Wallis Test
b. Group variables: All Groups

Table 11: All groups

Statistics for Test ^a	
	Undecided
Mann-Whitney U	139,500
Wilcoxon W	392,500
Z	-2.410
Asymptotic significance (2-sided)	.016

a. Group variables: Groups 1, 2

Table 12: Groups 1 and 2

Statistics for Test ^{a,b}	
	Undecided
Mann-Whitney U	70,500
Wilcoxon W	323,500
Z	-4.030
Asymptotic significance (2-sided)	.000

a. Group variables: Groups 1, 3

Table 13: Groups 1 and 3

Statistics for Test ^a	
	Undecided
Mann-Whitney U	131,000
Wilcoxon W	384,000
Z	-2.610
Asymptotic significance (2-sided)	.009

a. Group variables: Groups 2, 3

Table 14: Groups 2 and 3

The relationship with the degree of understanding is inversely proportional to the degree of confusion: With more understanding, there is less confusion and vice versa. Therefore, Group 1, with the lowest degree of understanding (35.88%), has the highest level of indecision (17.81%). Group 3, which has the highest level of understanding (47.17%), has the lowest degree of indecision (8.72%). Group 2 is in the middle, with 41.13% understanding and 12.89% displaying confusion.

This indicates that the readers of the Colombian articles were confused about 18% of the questions. For the readers of both versions, with only 9% confused readers, there were 50% fewer confused readers in comparison with Group 1. Some 13% of the readers of international articles were undecided; this means 25% fewer were undecided than in Group 1. According to this data, it is evident that Colombian journalism has a greater tendency to create confusion. Although these differences are not significant, it is possible to see a clear tendency to more understanding with the international articles.

4. Discussion

This study's hypotheses are supported by the tests and the experiment performed:

H1 The opinion article authors in the international media use their independence, resources and privileged positions to do depolarized journalism.

This hypothesis receives complete support. The international articles offer explanations with more depth, focus on topics and causes related to the conflict, avoid using Manichean schemes, refrain from assigning guilt, and devote space to explaining the actions and motives of all parties. They use a more scientific scheme: Usually they present a thesis, offer some arguments and reach a conclusion. However, they offer only limited information about Colombia, because, as international media, they do not assign Colombia high priority. Consequently, international articles provide information irregularly and are less detailed than Colombian articles. More information and details about Colombia would be desirable, especially because the Colombian conflict is one of the worst in the world and is increasingly becoming a destabilizing factor in Latin America. This is suggested by Mexican involvement in Colombian drug distribution networks.¹

H2. In Colombia, independent and critical journalists publish qualitative opinion articles, but they have chosen advocacy (journalism of attachment) as a way to contribute to peace.

This hypothesis receives full support. The Colombian authors clearly take sides in favor of the victims of the conflict, and in this way they use a Manichean scheme, where the "bad" President, the rich and the paramilitaries attack the "innocent"

1. San Pedro, Emilio. "US ready to aid Mexico Drug Fight." In: *BBC News on line*. March 2, 2009. Available at: news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7918101.stm

peasants. In this scheme, the favored groups are easily identifiable as the Indians and the journalists themselves, while complex phenomena such as child soldiers receive less attention. Due to this simplification, complex and key military actors such as the USA (which finances the war, is playing a key role in the current defeat of the guerrillas and supports, but at the same time combats, the paramilitaries) have a marginal presence in the analysis. To a similar extent, the Colombian authors offer little space to the violence against trade unionists, which is among the worst in the world. This may be because the trade unionists, although a small group, are very diverse, and infiltration by the guerrillas and the paramilitaries makes it difficult to place them in a Manichean scheme

H3. Readers of international articles (depolarized journalism) can better understand the conflict than can readers of the Colombian articles (advocacy journalism).

There is partial support for this hypothesis. With the international articles, the reader can understand better, more easily identify the causes of the conflict and explain it consistently, but this higher level of understanding is not statistically significant, only higher in percentage. Moreover the level of understanding about actors and their roles in the conflict is complex and not clear. For 8 actors selected, in two cases (*Child Soldiers* and *Paramilitaries*) the international articles enable greater, statistically significant understanding. In two cases, they enable greater understanding that is not statistically significant (*Opposition* and *USA*). In 3 cases (*Colombian Army*, *Colombian Secret Police* and *Indians*) the level of understanding is practically the same, and in one case the level of understanding is lower, but not in a statistically significant manner.

H4. Depolarized Journalism represents an opportunity to re-contextualize independent Colombian journalism in a more proactive way and to produce the highest level of understanding about the Colombian conflict.

There is full support for this hypothesis. Colombian articles have a tendency to use concepts borrowed from official propaganda more frequently than do international articles (e.g., *Criminals*), which demonstrates the power of these concepts to simplify the conflict and define "good" and "bad." This is no surprise, because Colombian journalism is propaganda, although in a reverse sense, since it sides with the victims against the government.

Nevertheless, Colombian articles have some merits; they can more precisely define the kinds of *Killing* taking place in Colombia (*Genocide*, *Extra-Judicial Executions*, etc.) and their perpetrators. On the other side, international articles focus on very important issues, like the role in the conflict of the USA, a key actor that has defined the course of the war with money and technology. For this reason, it is indispensable to understand the USA's role in the Colombian war.

In the same way, international articles say more about the most important Armed Actors: Guerrillas, Paramilitaries and Drug Traffickers, one of the most relevant issues of the Colombian war. This is because the illegal drug traffic finances illegal private armies, promotes the corruption of the government, strengthens the Mafia and produces phenomena like *Parapolitics*, the infiltration of the Mafia into the government. Clearly, *Drug Trafficking* is a key topic for explaining and understanding the Colombian war.

However, both media offer a very low presence to key issues like the *Mafia* (although with significantly more presence in the Colombian articles), *Parapolitics* and *Peace*. The Mafia is a vast, complex phenomenon with political, social and economic implications and national and international consequences. The Mafia helps to explain the growth of the Colombian economy, the development of criminal organizations to import and export drugs, weapons and "money laundering" through many complex procedures. Moreover, the Mafia represents the new political and economic powers that control the country.

We could see how when dealing with very complex phenomena, the Colombian media have a tendency to speak about each actor separately and not identify the deeper relationships between and among them. In contrast, international media tend to present more complex relationships. One example of this is *Parapolitics*, which no media relate to the *Colombian Government*, the *Colombian President*, *Democracy* or *Peace*. Nevertheless, the international articles offer a correlation between *Parapolitics* and *Demobilization*. This correlation in the international articles helps us to more clearly understand how paramilitarism is being pardoned (under the facade of a demobilization process) and is constituting itself as the most relevant actor in the most important political and military spheres. Its victims, to the contrary, are being persecuted, and the opposition to the government and to the demobilization process is being defamed, disqualified, persecuted, and censored.¹

However, peace is a marginal topic in both media, although it should be a very important issue in order to initiate a discussion, at least among readers, of the peaceful resolution of the conflict. To the contrary, both media devote space principally to *Armed Actors* (an average of 48% of all the analyzed codes). Another very important topic for both media is the political aspect of the conflict (*Government*, *President*, *USA*, figures of *Parapolitics* – elite paramilitaries and politicians), with an average of 30% of all the analyzed codes, indicating the elite orientation of both media. The victims appear in third place in terms of presence, with only 12% on the average of all the analyzed codes. In fourth place comes *Peace*, with an average of 6% of all analyzed codes. In last place, in terms of level of presence, we find *Killing*, with an average of 4% of

1. Duzán María Jimena. "Las Víctimas Somos Invisibles" (We the Victims are Invisible). In: *El Tiempo*. June 27, 2005.

all analyzed codes. Perhaps devoting more space to variables related to the category of *Killing*, like *Extra-Judicial Executions*, *Genocide* and *Massacre*, could help readers to understand the critical human rights situation in Colombia and would therefore sensitize people to the war crimes taking place in the country.

After this analysis, it is clear that each of the media offers different percentages of presence for each of the most important categories and variables they use to explain the Colombian conflict (56% of the variables have a tendency to be significant, 26% are significant, 7.5 % have high significance, and only 11% are not significant). In the same way, each of the media portrays different relationships between the variables, offering different pictures of the conflict. Each media offers a different version, permits different levels of understanding and in some cases presents contradictions and similarities which the reader has to confront in order to achieve a greater level of understanding than each of the media offers separately.

The readers of the Colombian articles have the lowest level of understanding (consistency with the facts of the conflict) regarding the majority of the statements.

Although Groups 1 and 2 of the experiment exhibit the same level of coherence, despite the differences between the styles and the levels of understanding, the coherence in Group 1 (Colombian articles) is not related to agreement with the facts of the conflict, while the coherence in Group 2 (international articles) is related to agreement with the facts of the conflict.

Despite the contradictions between the Colombian and the international articles, the readers in Group 3 (the group given both types of article to read) have a tendency to choose the answer most consistent with the facts of the conflict, to give more consistent answers and to be less confused. This indicates that readers separate "advocacy" from "analysis" and prefer the latter, because, as we see, the international articles exert the strongest influence on Group 3.

Those who read only international articles understand better than those who read only Colombian articles, but not very much better. It is only when the reader can read both types of article that he acquires a better and more complete understanding. This shows that international articles (depolarized journalism) alone are not enough to explain the conflict, but they offer an adequate frame to re-contextualize and clarify Colombian articles for readers, as Figure 5 shows.




Figure 5

This also indicates that international journalism (when it is depolarized journalism) is an adequate frame in order to redirect Colombian journalism to depolarized journalism, because international qualitative articles focus on facts, data and trying to find the objective causes of the conflict. This could be a temporary or permanent solution, in order to correct communication deficiencies (Figure 6) in Colombia and in countries where independent journalists use the journalism of advocacy.




Figure 6

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On the author: Dr. Jairo Ordóñez earned a PhD in Psychology at the University of Constance in Germany. He is a member of the German Peace Psychology Association and a professor at the University of Ibagué (Colombia).

Address: Calle 23 H No. 107 A – 23. Bogotá, Colombia.
eMail: jairo_e_2000@yahoo.com, jairo.ordonez@unibague.edu.co

Stig Arne Nohrstedt & Rune Ottosen

Waffenbrüder oder Friedensfreunde? Die Darstellung der schwedisch-norwegischen Verteidigungs- und Militär-Kooperation in den Medien

Der vorliegende Aufsatz diskutiert die Relevanz von Johan Galtungs Modell des Friedensjournalismus und der kritischen Diskursanalyse anhand der Medienberichterstattung über die schwedisch-norwegische Verteidigungskooperation. Den Vorschlag einer engeren militärischen Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem bündnisfreien Schweden und dem Nato-Mitglied Norwegen analysierend, stellt der Aufsatz die paradoxe Situation dar, dass in Afghanistan sowohl schwedische als auch norwegische Kampftruppen im Einsatz sind, diese Tatsache aber unerwähnt blieb, als die schwedischen und norwegischen Verteidigungschefs in einem gemeinsamen Beitrag die Notwendigkeit einer engeren Zusammenarbeit der beiden Länder begründeten. Die Ergebnisse dieser Analyse zeigen damit gewisse Grenzen der friedensjournalistischen Perspektive auf und verweisen auf das Erfordernis eines kontextuellen Ansatzes, der berücksichtigt, dass auch "Friedensgerede" Teil eines Kriegsdiskurses sein kann.

Zu den Autoren:

Stig Arne Nohrstedt, Ph.D ist Professor für Medien- und Kommunikationswissenschaften an der Universität Örebro, Schweden. Seine Forschungsgebiete beinhalten Kriegs- und Konfliktjournalismus, journalistische Ethik und Rollen, Risiko- und Krisenkommunikation sowie Medien und strukturelle Diskriminierung. Aktuelle Buchpublikationen: Nohrstedt, S.A. & Ottosen, R. (eds.) (2005): *Global War – Local Views. Media Images of the Iraq War*. Göteborg: Nordicom; Nohrstedt, S.A. & Ottosen, R. (eds.) (2004): *US and the Others*. Göteborg: Nordicom.

eMail: stig_arne.nohrstedt@hum.oru.se

Rune Ottosen, geb. 1950, Cand. Polit. in Politikwissenschaften (University of Oslo, 1984), BA in Journalismus (Norwegian College of Journalism, 1973), arbeitete als Journalist in verschiedenen Medien (1977-84); Lecturer und Research Fellow am Norwegian College of Journalism (1984-88); Information Director und Research Fellow am Internationale Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (1989-92); Research Fellow bei der Norwegian Federation of Journalists (1993-95); seit 1996 Professor an der Fakultät für Journalismus, Bibliotheks- und Informationswissenschaften des Oslo College. Ottosen ist Präsident der Norwegian Association of Non-fiction Writers and Translators und Autor einer Vielzahl von Büchern und Artikeln zur Geschichte des Journalismus und zu Themen, welche die die Relation von Krieg und Journalismus betreffen. Aktuelle Buchpublikationen: *Journalism and the New World Order, Vol. I. Gulf War, National News Discourses and Globalization* (ed., mit Stig-Arne Nohrstedt, 2000); *Kosovokonflikten, medierna och medlidandet (The Kosovo Conflict, Media and Compassion, 2002)*.

eMail: Rune.Ottosen@jbi.hio.no

Stig Arne Nohrstedt & Rune Ottosen

Brothers in arms or peace? The media representation of Swedish and Norwegian defence- and military co-operation

This article discusses the relevance of Johan Galtung's model for peace journalism and critical discourse analysis (CDA) in light of the media coverage of Swedish and Norwegian defence cooperation. By analysing the proposal for closer military cooperation between the Nato-member Norway and the non-aligned Sweden the article emphasises the paradox that the fact that both Sweden and Norway have forces fighting in Afghanistan was not mentioned when the heads of the Norwegian and Swedish Defence in a joint article justified the need for a closer cooperation between the two countries. Thus this analysis illustrates some limitations of the peace journalism perspective and the necessity to take a contextual approach in which also the possibility of "peace talk" being part of a war discourse is considered.

On the authors:

Stig Arne Nohrstedt, Ph.D is Professor of Media and Communication Studies at the University of Örebro, Sweden. His Research areas include war and conflict journalism, journalistic ethics and roles, risk and crisis communication and media and structural discrimination. Recent books: Nohrstedt, S.A. & Ottosen, R. (eds.) (2005): *Global War - Local Views: Media Images of the Iraq War*. Göteborg: Nordicom; Nohrstedt, S.A. & Ottosen, R. (eds.) (2004): *US and the Others*. Göteborg: Nordicom.
eMail: stig_arne.nohrstedt@hum.oru.se

Rune Ottosen, b. 1950, Cand. polit. in Political Science (University of Oslo, 1984), BA in Journalism (Norwegian College of Journalism, 1973); Journalist in various media (1977-84); Lecturer and Research Fellow at the Norwegian College of Journalism (1984-88); Information Director and Research Fellow at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (1989-92); Research Fellow at the Norwegian Federation of Journalists (1993-95); Associate Professor at the Faculty of Journalism, Library and Information Science, Oslo College, since 1996; Professor in the same institution from 1999; Ottosen is also the president of the Norwegian Association of Non-Fiction Authors and Translators. Author of several books and articles on journalism history and topics related to war and journalism.
Recent book publications: *Journalism and the New World Order, Vol. I. Gulf War, National News Discourses and Globalization* (ed. with Stig-Arne Nohrstedt, 2000); *Kosovokonflikten, medierna och medlidandet* (The Kosovo Conflict, Media and Compassion, 2002).
eMail: Rune.Ottosen@jbi.hio.no

Stig A. Nohrstedt & Rune Ottosen

Brothers in arms or peace? The media representation of Swedish and Norwegian defence- and military co-operation

Kurzfassung: Der vorliegende Aufsatz diskutiert die Relevanz von Johan Galtungs Modell des Friedensjournalismus und der kritischen Diskursanalyse anhand der Medienberichterstattung über die schwedisch-norwegische Verteidigungskooperation. Den Vorschlag einer engeren militärischen Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem bündnisfreien Schweden und dem Nato-Mitglied Norwegen analysierend, stellt der Aufsatz die paradoxe Situation dar, dass in Afghanistan sowohl schwedische als auch norwegische Kampftruppen im Einsatz sind, diese Tatsache aber unerwähnt blieb, als die schwedischen und norwegischen Verteidigungschefs in einem gemeinsamen Beitrag die Notwendigkeit einer engeren Zusammenarbeit der beiden Länder begründeten. Die Ergebnisse dieser Analyse zeigen damit gewisse Grenzen der friedensjournalistischen Perspektive auf und verweisen auf das Erfordernis eines kontextuellen Ansatzes, der berücksichtigt, dass auch "Friedensgerede" Teil eines Kriegsdiskurses sein kann.

Abstract: This article discusses the relevance of Johan Galtung's model for peace journalism and critical discourse analysis (CDA) in light of the media coverage of Swedish and Norwegian defence cooperation. By analysing the proposal for closer military cooperation between the Nato-member Norway and the non-aligned Sweden the article emphasises the paradox that the fact that both Sweden and Norway have forces fighting in Afghanistan was not mentioned when the heads of the Norwegian and Swedish Defence in a joint article justified the need for a closer cooperation between the two countries. Thus this analysis illustrates some limitations of the peace journalism perspective and the necessity to take a contextual approach in which also the possibility of "peace talk" being part of a war discourse is considered.

Introduction¹

Previous research shows that the national contexts have substantial framing impacts on mediated war discourses. After 9/11 and the Global War on Terror (GWOT), international politics have changed dramatically with new foreign and security policy alliances emerging. In the Scandinavian region the previous division between Nato members (Denmark and Norway) and non-aligned countries (Finland and Sweden) is gradually reduced in importance and new patterns of cooperation are taking over. The Nordic countries are presently involved in a formal defence cooperation through, NORDCAPS (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Peace Support), NORDAC, (Nordic Armaments Cooperation) and NORDSUP (Nordic Supportive Defence Structures)².

In this paper we try to find out what this new situation means for security policy discourses in the media. By analysing the proposal for closer military cooperation between the Nato-member Norway and the non-aligned Sweden, jointly presented by the two countries' commander-in-chiefs in August 2007, we will critically discuss how useful Johan Galtung's peace journalism model is for analysis of such a debate. As a complementary approach we propose critical discourse analysis (CDA) because of its more sophisticated method for contextualising.

Earlier research

Our earlier studies of media coverage of the Gulf War 1990-91, the Kosovo War 1999, the Afghanistan War 2001 and the Iraq War 2003 have revealed the different framing of these conflicts in our respective countries' media (Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2001; Nohrstedt and Ottosen 2005; Nohrstedt, Höijer and Ottosen 2002). However, considering the close collaboration between Norway's and Sweden's troops in Afghanistan, and also with US and other Nato members' military forces during the GWOT, it seems important to analyse how these changes are discursively constructed for public information and deliberations. A particularly interesting and relevant case here is the ongoing political elitist debate within the Nordic Defence Forces seeking a new role in the post-cold war area³. The main question in this article is if and how these strategical security-policy matters are constructed and manufactured for consumption by the public opinion.

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1. A earlier version of this article was presented to the International Peace Research Association in Leuven July 18 2008 and to the International Association for Media and Communication Research's General Conference in Stockholm July 2008.
 2. For more details see: Evne til innsats. Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret: Forsvarsdepartementet 2009.
 3. For more details see Stortingsproposisjon nr. 48. Et forsvar til vern om Norges sikkerhet, interesser og verdier (2007-2008) and Stortingsmelding nr. 38. Om samarbeidet i NATO i 2008,

Methodological approach

The earlier research mentioned above concerning the Gulf War, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq were all based on extensive empirical material with comparative studies of the media coverage in several countries including of course Sweden and Norway. Several methods were used including quantitative content analyses based on issues like genres, use of sources and framing. Over all these studies represent a combination of quantitative and qualitative data, the latter often dealt with using critical discourse analyses (CDA). The character of the study presented here differs from the above mentioned since the topic, Nordic defence cooperation, was not a "hot" topic in the news¹. This is actually our first result, i.e. the lack of news journalism coverage of this important issue in main stream media. Instead of concentrating our analysis to news reporting as in previous studies, our take here is the ways in which editorials, debate and feature articles in main stream media relate discursively to the original debate item – or spin - written by the two commander-in-chiefs which brought the military collaboration plans to public attention. Furthermore, unlike our earlier studies cross national comparisons are not the aim in this article but rather comparative analysis of different types of media in an ambition to get maximum variation in our media material irrespective of whether it comes from Norwegian and Swedish media. Since the first quantitative result, i.e. the lack of substantial news material, is valid in both countries, the idea here is to look in more details of what comments – at all – followed from the initial debate article in a situation when the space for "legitimate controversy" (Hallin 1986; see also about "doxa" below) obviously was restricted to a minimum. Finally, the major purpose here is not so much the empirical results as such and as representations of the conditions of the public sphere in our two countries, but we would rather regard the argumentation as an explorative inquiry into the value of the peace journalism model for media studies of conflict communication and opinion building.

Given these considerations we selected both main stream newspapers as well as Nettavisen for our analysis². A special reason for choosing it, was the opportunity to include commentaries from the reader in blogs placed in the electronic field beneath the published article and hence providing us with responses "from below" on the spin initiated by the elite sources within the military and political sectors. Since we are using critical discourse analyses as a method, this response from the general public adds an extra dimension to the analyses.

A Nordic model?

The Nordic model is often referred to as a role model for other countries since the self image of the Nordic countries is often linked to the claim of putting humanitarian interests at the forefront (Leira et. al 2007). Issues like the quest for equality, international solidarity, the willingness to share some of its wealth with poor countries as development aid, are all included in this self image. Norway has even tried to brand itself as a "humanitarian great power" in its official foreign policy (ibid.). Analysts, like the Norwegian scholar Terje Tvedt, have criticized this rhetoric and image building claiming that also the Scandinavian countries should be judged by their actual policy rather than their self-image (Tvedt 2003). We support this criticism and will question whether Norwegian and Swedish participation as allied to US in the "War on terror" tend to play a negative rather than a positive role on the global scene. To be more precise, we will argue that this self-image might in itself become a riskfactor for the two small countries. Ignoring the actual danger in getting involved as an ally to the US in the GWOT by hiding this policy behind humanitarian rhetoric the two countries can easily be dragged into military adventures framed as peace-building and humanitarian intervention.

We will also suggest that Pierre Bourdieus notion of doxa or the doxic room, (the non-political, non-discussable room) (Bourdieu 1998). Originally the notion of doxa was used by the Greek rhetoricians as a tool for the formation of argument by referring to the common opinions, the doxa was often manipulated by sophist to persuade the people to follow the arguments of the leaders. In Bourdieu's use of the notion of doxa he suggests that some issues are not introduced to the public discourse because the leaders simply try to avoid public discussions on certain topics. These issues are so to speak kept out of the agenda leaving behind the false impression of consensus (von der Lippe 1991). We argue that doxa thus can be a useful approach to understand why obviously relevant issues like common risk for Sweden and Norway through common participation in GWOT is left out of the public debate when defence co-operation between Norway and Sweden is discussed in the media. The reason for this is that opinion polls show strong opposition in both Sweden and Norway against having troops in Afghanistan. Since there seems to be great unity among politicians in both Sweden and Norway that the two countries should support US in the GWOT, they seemingly try to avoid public debate on the issue by treating it as a topic "beyond discussion".

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1. Only eight articles were found mentioning the suggestion by the two Defence-ministeres in a search in Retriever, the electronic archive covering all major Norwegian newsoutlets, in the periode August 30- September 7. Most of the eight articles found in a search in the electronic base were editorials, commentaries or small news bulletin pieces.
 2. The eight articles found were published in (*Nettavisen* 31.8, *NTB* 31.8, *Aftenposten* 1.9, *Nationen* 1.9, *Bergens Tidende* 1.9, *Trønder-Avisa* 1.9, *Nationen* 1.9, *Dagbladet* 1.9, *Klassekampen* 4.9).

The peace journalism discourse

Peace journalism has been proposed as an alternative to traditional war journalism by several scholars and journalists after the original ideas formulated by Johan Galtung (Galtung 2002) and also criticized. BBC-reporter David Loyn is perhaps the best example of a well respected journalist in main stream media who openly has opposed the peace journalism approach. In a special issue of *Conflict & Communication* online the opponents and defenders of peace journalism are discussing its relevance and importance. Loyn prefer to use terms as "truthfulness" and "objectivity" as journalistic guidelines, even though he acknowledge the limitations of those terms: "On this analysis, if we accept that objectivity is at least a worthy aspiration, even though not a tool to achieve the 'whole truth', then peace journalism fails a key test by imposing other expectations onto journalists." (Loyn 2007:5)

Loyn is disturbed by the Galtung's original model for war- and peace journalism. According to him the categories in the model are too dualistic. He claims that journalism as it is practiced in every day news journalism seldom fits into "war journalism" or "peace journalism" categories. Loyn present his own experiences as a reporter in conflicts like Kosovo and Rwanda to suggest that if the peace journalism approach had been preferred the outcome would have been worse because it would have prevented interference to stop mass murders. In Northern Ireland he suggests that the peace journalism principle of transparency would have made the secret negotiation between the parties impossible. In the case of Kosovo Loyn comes very close to the journalism of attachment position¹ by claiming that the Serb atrocities towards the Albanian was the most important issue, and should have been in the focus of reporting. By uncritically quoting former US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, when describing the political and military nature of US military intervention (it should be winnable, there should be no other option, and there should be an exit strategy), he proves his shortcomings in understanding the character of the US superpower. Least of all a superpower can in our mind be judged solely on its own rhetoric.

In the very end of his article Lyon concludes the discussion with some interesting reflections on the quest for objectivity in journalism. In our mind the discussion should begin where Loyn stops. The weakness in Loyn's arguments is the lack of context. We agree with Jake Lynch's criticism of Loyn that propaganda by the different parties in the conflict must be contextualized into the analyses. Loyn doesn't mention propaganda and media strategies by the great powers through spin and PR and is thus unable to see what serious challenges journalism in the battlefield and warzones is confronted with. On this point another critic of peace journalism, the media researcher Thomas Hanitzch, criticize peace journalism from a totally different angle than Loyn. Hanitzch argues that the peace journalism advocates underestimate the material conditions for modern news reporting and overestimate the possibilities for journalist under hectic deadline pressure to contextualize their stories like Lynch et.al suggests. He thinks that a complex model like Galtung's scheme is unfitted for the highly standardized narrative schemes of modern news production. He thinks that promoting peace is no more noble than PR-campaigns and "journalism of attachment" which suggest military intervention to stop ethnic cleansing (like in Bosnia). Even though Hanitzch is sympathetic to many of the point suggested in peace journalism, such as exposure of lies, cover-up attempts and culprits on all sides, he suggests that this might as well be labelled as "good journalism" (Hanitzch 2007:7).

Lynch in his answer to the critics, claims that they underestimate leaders in the Western world when it comes to willingness and abilities to manipulate the media. Especially in the phase of a conflict where there is a mobilisation to go to war based on rhetorics in favour of "humanitarian intervention" (like in Yugoslavia in 1999 and prior to the war in Iraq in 2003), Lynch argues that propaganda must be contextualized by the media and it's vital that the media is not seduced by propaganda rhetoric and not adapts the vocabulary and arguments of spin doctors in favour of war. Lynch stresses that the basic aim of peace journalists is to "create opportunities for society at large to consider non-violent responses". He criticizes Loyn for underestimating the effects of propaganda.

Quoting Entman Lynch argues that in order to give the audience the full picture journalist should make visible what the propaganda machinery leaves out, i.e. peace alternatives and realistic information on the consequences of war (Lynch 2007:2).

We basically support Lynch's position and would perhaps put even more emphasis on the impact of Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) and their impact of media reporting. In retrospect many of the misleading stories defending the intervention in Iraq had their origin in disinformation caused by PSYOPS and propaganda (Eide and Ottosen 2008). One important PSYOPS operation was the US Army pulling down of the statue of Saddam Hussein and then portraying it as a spontaneous

1. The journalism of attachment was developed during the Bosnian War by the (at the time) BBC-reporter Martin Bell (1996). Bell argued that journalists have a responsibility for the development of the conflicts they are covering. Therefore, he proposes reporters assume an active position in favour of the victims of war, even if this means support for military interference by NATO. Bell argues that journalists should use their influence as journalists to try to improve the situation of those who cannot help themselves. Bells position caused a huge debate where his most important critic was Mick Hume who attacked Bell's position in the essay "Whose War is it anyway? The Danger of the Journalism of Attachment" (Hume 1997). For a full overview of the discussion see Sjøvaag 2005.

reaction from the people in Baghdad. The importance of propaganda before the war is underlined in new literature like Michael Isikoff and David Corn's book *Hubris* where the authors argue that the Bush administration misled the opinion in their campaign for war to a level that has been underestimated by the media. Vice president Dick Cheney misused CIA and picked the information that suited argumentation for a war and put aside information that contradicted claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction

For example in a speech in front of Veterans of foreign wars 26 august 2002 Cheney misused facts from CIA and claimed: "There is now doubt he is amassing (WMD) to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us" (Isikoff and Corn 2006:28-29). Isikoff and Corn reveal a forceful will in the Bush administration to go to war whatever what. When Karl Rove once told the president about polls suggesting opposition in the public opinion against war the president exploded: "Don't tell me about fucking polls. I don't care what the polls say." (op. cit.: 29). The extent of systematic lies repeated again and again had impact and the public opinion changed to be more sympathetic to war as the solution to the "problem Saddam Hussein".

Center for public integrity has documented that the Bush-administration on 532 occasions produced a total amount of 935 false statements in the period from October 2002 to August 2003 (Reading-Smith 2008).

In our view David Loyns position in the debate has a naive point of departure. It presupposes that the media start their war reporting with "blank sheets". We think that the peace journalism model might serve as a useful checklist for both journalists and media researcher as a guideline in a propaganda-infected landscape. Media researcher Wilhelm Kempf has successfully used the peace journalism approach in his own research (Kempf 2006). He basically supports the framework of peace journalism even though he criticizes the book *Peace journalism* by Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick in their criticism of Loyns position on "objectivity":

„To radically turn away from the call for objectivity, as suggested by Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) or Hackett (2006), not only endangers the acceptans of peace journalism project in the journalistic community, however, but also twists peace journalism into a form of advocacy journalism, which lead directly to PR and propaganda and can squander the trust bonus its recipients grant to peace journalism". (Kempf 2007:7)

Critique of Peace Journalism from a CDA perspective

In the vibrant debate on peace journalism (PJ) critical discourse analysis (CDA) is underestimated as supplement. CDA has emerged as one of the influential approaches within media studies in general and could play a vital role in research on war- and peace journalism as well. We believe that the debate on journalism research can gain a lot if drawing more on this linguistically inspired analysis. There are a number of consequences if this idea is pursued in war- and peace journalism.

If you define journalism as a discourse it implies that the final journalistic products are perceived to carry and contain meanings on several levels. All these levels can not be collapsed into a singular "manifest content" level. As with other fields of communication, meaning is based on multi-level interrelations. This also means that in CDA aspects of mediated conflict coverage that are rarely or at all noticed in debates about journalism, such as the importance of the context, the interdiscursive relations and the meaning of omissions, are addressed and integrated with the analysis. Considering that the discourse concept is defined by the institutional dimension, the structural conditions and the organisational setting are at the center of the attention. This is not entirely unique for the CDA but coherently treated in this approach as fundamental for any reasonable conclusions. Hence when analysing media content the layers of meanings related to and alluding to other discourses beyond journalism itself are of particular importance. These interrelated set of discourses are however not randomly configured according to our application of CDA, but rather regarded as constituting a "discursive order" with a term invented by Norman Fairclough (Fairclough 1995). We will soon exemplify the ways in which these theoretical points of departure are put in use in our analytical work, but first a few more comments to position ourself in the field of CDA research.

The label "critical" has its relevance as one common denominator for the CDA researchers as it indicates the normative character of their project(s). Meaning that communication is explored with an intention to point out other possible realities than the one under investigation. This normative orientation also comes with a theoretical focus on relations of power, dominance and hegemony. These are all challenged as obstacles to empowerment of non-elite people being caught in the discursive nets spun by ideologues, PR-strategists, politicians, etc. As indicated above one of the critical angles of CDA research is its insistance on hidden assumptions and latent, but nevertheless relevant, cognitive or emotive discursive elements.

The CDA field is inhabited by three different "schools": the socio-psychological Dutch variant with Teun van Dijk as the leading figure, the linguistic British school with Norman Fairclough as the most well-known scholar, and the discourse-historical approach developed by the Austrian school with Ruth Wodak as the leader (Wodak 1996, 2001). After Wodak's

installment in Lancaster, UK, the geographical dimension is somewhat obsolete, and in addition it should be mentioned that all these "schools" are collaborating extensively and seem to mutually regard their differences as complementary assets.

In this article we will rely mainly on the historically oriented variant as developed by Wodak and her colleagues (Wodak and Benke 2001). The main reason being their successful applications of inter-discursive analysis diachronically, and the insights they offer to understand the operations of contextual conditions for creation of meaning in different settings, e.g. parliamentary debates, public ceremonies, media, exhibitions, vox populi chat on the street corner, etc. Here we will, due to practical limitations, concentrate on journalism as a discourse related to defence policy discourses in the Scandinavian countries after the Second World War. Although this is a limited empirical basis for conclusions about the fruitfulness of applying CDA we nevertheless hope to be able to make some critical, although constructive, comments to the debate about P.J. It makes sense because a war must be analysed as a historical process starting long time before the first bullet is fired. To understand potential wars and conflicts in the years to come we must look at the arguments in the security policy debate today. As indicated above we are positive to the intentions and the critique of main-stream war journalism coming from the peace journalism movement. But it seems to us that it could benefit from an integration of some of the theoretical ideas that CDA provides when it comes to understanding meaning-making as produced by discursive acts. If Norway and Sweden will be involved in future wars we might already in the contemporary debate find the reason for this not only in the arguments supporting a war oriented policy, but also in topics that are kept out of the debate. Here we think CDA has advantages that are not captured by the peace journalism model.

In sum, we contend that the CDA approach can offer: 1) a way to manage the demand on contextual reflexivity that has been raised in the debate about peace journalism; 2) integration of the propaganda discourses during peace time, which are mainly neglected in the Galtung model, but in reality might be the most important stage for media effects on conflict escalation; 3) a historical perspective – especially in the historical CDA approach as developed by Wodak and associates – in which discursive uses of historical analogies and examples are emphasised. In the examples we are discussing below in particular two points are important. Namely, firstly that even a discourse about peace building and security plans may in its historical consequences be steps toward conflict escalation, which should not be left out of the critical analysis. Secondly, contextually speaking we suggest that even a discourse qualified as "peace journalism" according to Galtung's terminology could in the context of for example the GWOT be suspected to be the very opposite, i.e. "war journalism", in its consequences. These are the challenges for the critical media research field studying mediated conflict reporting today.

Empirical example 1: Norwegian media

In the autumn of 2007 the heads of Norwegian and Swedish Defence, Sverre Diesen and Håkan Syrén, published a joint article in Norwegian newspaper *Dagbladet* and Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter*, proposing closer cooperation between the two countries on military affairs and defence issues. Among the proposals were joint military exercises, military education, joint development of new military doctrines and cooperation in buying military equipment such as warships and vehicles. In the background here is also the recent issue of Norway replacing her F-16 fighters with a new generation of fighters where the candidates were the Swedish plane JAS Gripen, produced by SAAB, the European Eurofighter and the US-produced Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) under construction by Lockheed Martin.

As mentioned in the methodological section of this article, through a case study we will analyse how a few selected media in each country covered this initiative as a news event. We will also see what potential important issues that are kept out of the news coverage. The Swedish example is the way *Dagens Nyheter* and *Aftonbladet* reported about the *Diesen-Syrén* proposal. The first newspaper is the leading quality paper and the latter the largest tabloid in Sweden. The Norwegian case is a news story in the electronic newspaper *Nettavisen*, owned by the commercial TV station TV2. This is the only major digital newspaper in Norway which is a pure electronic publication. The other major electronic papers are web-versions connected to, and owned by a print newspaper. Our reason for choosing this internet outlet, is that the readers can comment on the article in a electronic debate forum, published after the article itself. By using this in our analyses we are able to include some of the arguments in the public discourse following the article.

The article in question was published in *Nettavisen* on 31 August 2007 and had the title "Want a Norwegian-Swedish defence". The article states that a proposal on defence cooperation turns the traditional way of thinking military affairs in the two countries upside down. Norway has traditionally been a NATO member while Sweden is a EU member.

In the article it was an a link to the published text in *Dagbladet*. In this article the question of sovereignty of the two country is adressed immediately, but with a peculiar rhetorical twist which does not invite to discussion. This crucial issue is only touched upon and then "dismissed": "We must put all old sovereignty reflexes upside down (på huvudet)." The issue of whether Sweden wants to keep the non-alignment security policy could have raised an important debate, but are expelled to a historical past. Further, the two commanders underline that the proposed collaboration is "only" about purchase of submarines, tanks, etc. Mentioned is also coordination of "supply, education, training and doctrines". The framing and tone

is assuring and comforting. These new plans are only natural, uncontroversial and part of a necessary development: "The possibilities are great already to year 2012 and will grow further in the future." The cooperation will not restrict the freedom of actions, on the contrary it will improve the relation: "A deeper Swedish-Norwegian collaboration provides opportunities to make our production of military forces more efficient. In this way we can strengthen our common influence within the entire European and Euro-Atlantic security cooperation.." This point is elaborated further: "A stronger cooperation between Sweden and Norway is therefore a complement to the present collaboration structures in Nato and EU. It facilitates the national operative capacity for both of us at the same time as it prepares the ground for increased freedom of political action in the future."

In terms of macro-theme the debate article tells that military cooperation makes it possible to finance necessary production and purchase of defence equipment. By the disposition and the selection of words and expressions the cooperation is described as economically necessary and politically wanted.. It is furthermore presented as entirely natural and uncontroversial: it is "of course nothing new", "both sides /.../ will certainly keep their full national right to make decisions about the uses of the forces", it has "strong political support in both our countries". However, a certain urgency is indicated because a choice of direction has to be decided: "We now wish to get a clear and broad political mandate to proceed from idea to action. The time is short. In both our countries the defence forces face challenges the next coming years that make decisions about the direction urgent."

In an attached interview with Sverre Diesen, he states that he foresees no big practical problems with the proposal and that he regards it a challenge to the politicians in the two countries. He further states that he has sent a written proposal to the Norwegian defence minister (at the time) Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen claiming that it's now up to the politicians to decide how close the future defence cooperation between the two countries will be. He stresses that the proposal does not include the controversy on Norway's choice of a new generation fighter planes.

Nettavisen asked Diesen if he suspects a problem in NATO because of the proposal. Diesen responds that it is unproblematic for a NATO member like Norway and a EU member like Sweden to work closely together. He also mentions that Sweden already is a member of NATO's partner organisation "Partnership for Peace" (PfP). He further stresses that Sweden is already in a process of adapting to NATO standards in a number of areas. There will be few practical problems because of this, and each country will also in the future have full control over its own defence.

Nettavisen then asks Diesen to be more exact on the issue of "common military doctrines".

He then answers (our interpretation): "Norway has not decided a hierarchy of doctrines, but there are several documents offering guidelines on a national level. When we work together in an international context, in UN, NATO, EU or in PfP it is vital that one has a common doctrine which is decisive for the policy. Thus it's logical and practical that Sweden and Norway jointly contribute to development of this doctrine".

Interestingly enough he does not comment on the fact that Norway and Sweden both contribute to the NATO-lead ISAF-force in Afghanistan. Neither the journalists nor Diesen touch upon the historical fact that before Norway joined NATO there was a Swedish suggestion to establish a Nordic defence alliance as a possible alternative solution for Norway and Denmark. This suggestion played a major role in the public debate prior to Norway's decision to join NATO (Furre 1991). Many people on the left saw this as preferred solution for Norway. Bjørgulv Braanen, the editor of the left wing newspaper *Klassekampen*, also made a point of this in his commentary on September 4 stating it as "tragedy that the plans for a joint Nordic defence cooperation was smashed after the war (Second World War, authors remark) by US-loyal top-politicians who preferred membership in NATO". *Klassekampen* with this position is a dissenting voice in the Norwegian media landscape.

The response from the readers

Twelve different contributions published on the Nettavisen's website covered a number of issues. Interestingly enough several of the comments touched upon historical facts in the relationship between Sweden and Norway.

The first one was written by Leif Rognan under the title "Illusion about security". This op-piece falls within what we can call a traditional pro-NATO discourse. He rejects the idea that even a totally integrated Swedish-Norwegian defence will offer Norway the security the country needs with Russia as an increasingly self-conscious neighbour. He suspects that this proposal will be used by the Norwegian left to weaken NATO and USA. He fears that this in practical terms will weaken "our" defence capability and bring "us" in a situation similar to the appeasement policy prior to Second World War. He ends with a wish that Norwegian politicians despite this new Nordic hype will not be tempted to undermine "our" ability to have "our" freedom and independent policy. His last sentence is: "If our foreign- and security policy shall be based on US-hatred we will face an insecure future".

The next comment is written within the tradition of what we could call a traditional historical Norwegian-Swedish quarrel. It's written by the pseudonym "Tittentei" and has the humorous title "Svorsk (Co-writing of Swedish and Norwegian in one

word) defence cooperation”.

Its ironic undertone strikes already by the introductory statement: “First vi can get back Jamtland and Herjedalen (sic!) (areas in the boarder region that once belonged to Norway).” Then Tittentei reminds us that Sweden saw to it that Norway had to pay more to EU in fees to sign the agreement of European Econmical area (EØS) than was originally proposed. She also suggest that Sweden probably will “help us” with increasing the defence expenses as well.

“Tiger” replies to this, picking up on the half joking tone, and suggest that if we must have a new generation fighter planes we should choose the Swedish fighter JAS-Gripen. But he suggests that the money instead could be used on health care and the elderly people. He also suggests that we stop the “madness” and refuse to buy the more expensive American Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

“Ola Smart” replies to this: “Bullshit! JSF is decades ahead and much more advanced than Eurofighter and Gripen. We need the best plane and JSF is the best.

“JKT” replies to this: “Of course we must cooperate with Sweden. We need much closer ties than today”.

Without saying so explicitly, this is relaunching of the old idea of a joint Nordic defence alternative, proposed by Sweden before Norway joined NATO.

The signature “Sceptical” answers ironically: “Great idea, bring in Finland and Denmark also.”

“Tordenskiold” skips the ironi and suggest that the whole Nordic region (including Iceland) should have a joint defence, both economically and practically.

“Balle Balle” answers: “This doesn’t work . The Swedes do this just to help Russia and USA to split our country in two.” He complains that the only unsolved issue is the boarder of the indigenuous Sami area. The Norwegian – Swedish issue was according to him solved when Norway left the union with Sweden in 1905. Will Swedish membership in NATO be a new beginning for a closer relationship, he wonders.

The signature “PEM” picks up on this and claims: “I never understood why the union was resolved . (...) I see no advantages with a border and customs”. He mentions similarities i language and other reasons to want the union back and regret that the plans to merge the national telecompanies Telia and Telenor failed a few years ago. He calls for a formalized cooperation in more areas. Closer ties with Sweden is much better for Norway than to traumatize the nation with a new battle over EU-membership,

The signature “Ola Smart” is provoked by this and asks “What kind of bullshit is this”. He returns to the traditional historical Norwegian-Swedish quarrel discourse and reminds that the Swedes emptied our silver mines and the Danes, during the periode when they were in union with Norway, brought us into several wars. “You are ignorant and should read more history,” he claims.

The signature “affe” agrees with the last speaker and claims that the Danes took our language away, overtaxed us and suppressed us. Ask the people on Farou Icelands if the enjoy Danish ruling, he asks polemically.

“Lars” thinks it is fine to shop in Sweden since prices are lower there. “But we are closer to Danes in mentality and way of life”, he claims. In a PS he states that even our present F-16 is more advanced than Gripen. “Sorry that’s the way it is.” But adds that the Swedes “are better than us in negotiations and agreements- there we can learn something”.

And then the debate is over. Nobody mentions the fact that Norway and Sweden are fighting together in Afghanistan as allied to US in the ISAF forces under NATO leadership in the “War on terror”. This important fact so vital for the future events in GWOT is not mentioned by Nettavisen, Diesen or any of the discussants.

Empirical example 2: Swedish media

When the commander-in-chiefs of Norway and Sweden in public present the plans for increased military collaboration, the format is a debate article to the leading quality newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* under the headline: “New defence cooperation between Sweden and Norway” (DN 31 August 2007). As mentioned above the article urges in general and vague language that old sovereignty ideas must be forgotten, and the text is obviously intended to help the readers forget all about them.

Two themes are totally absent in the article – themes that would be entirely relevant with respect to the historical-political substance of the matter:

- a. the Swedish proposal after WWII of a Nordic Defence Alliance, which had substantial support in the general opinion in the Nordic countries as an alternative to Nato, and

- b. the fact that both countries are partners to USA in the EU/Nato operations in Afghanistan as part of "the global war on terror" (GWOT).

The semantic manoeuvres that the two commanders use, clearly with an intention to avoid the later issue, is fascinating as an attempt not to raise concerns about possible conflict risks at the tangent of the far-reaching cooperation plans. Consequently through out the article they use abstract and imprecise expressions when touching upon what kind of military joint venture that may come in the future: "Euro-Atlantic security cooperation", "the international community (UN/EU/Nato)", "interational peace operations", etc.

Since the proposed military cooperation is said to include eighteen areas, whereof only five are specified in the article, it is reasonable to expect that the collaboration will increase not only between the two Scandinavian countries but also be extended to other Nato members. But this is not a theme in the article. On the contrary it is quite remarkable how one-sided and energetic it is when emphasising that freedom of action will grow because of the cooperation.

In the subsequent media coverage silence or consensus are predominant. The debate is mentioned in the news, but without mention of any crucial questions or critical comments by the news media themselves or from the public. The leading tabloid *Aftonbladet* reports briefly about the main content of the proposal, with some quotations from the article – no further comments or commentators are referred. But the implication of closer cooperation with Nato as a military alliance is remarkably absent in this Social-Democratic newspaper. In contrast three Norwegian newspapers had editorials commenting the proposal, but did not bring the story as news. Two of them were positive (*Trønderavisen* and *Bergens Tidende*), while *Nationen* is more neutral (all of them published on 1 September.2007).

However, the foreign editor of the *Dagens Nyheter* contributes with a comment. On the editorial pages the newspaper has since a number of years proposed that Sweden should apply for membership in the Nato. The plans for a joint Swedish-Norwegian military cooperation obviously give the foreign editor an occasion to once again criticise the alleged stubbornness and reluctance at the side of the politicians to spell out in public what changes have actually taken place in Swedish defence policy. The editorial's headline, "Open door to Nato", indicates that the defence collaboration should naturally be followed up with a Swedish Nato membership application. Nevertheless, this is not something the editor expects to happen. Primarily because left-wing politicians will continue its opposition and also because "there are only political losses to be made in a situation where the overwhelming majority of the Swedes are opponents to an application". This "remarkable" policy will continue, according to the editor: "It is a policy where everything that is done points in the direction of an application being the natural consequence, at the same time as the official rhetoric pretends not to know what is actually going on." He ends up with the argument that it would be more honest to be outspoken, but without expressing much hope about that. His final line of the editorial goes: "What is happening is going to happen anyway."

In an analytical comments to the proposal of defence cooperation in *Dagens Nyheter* the same day (31 August 2007) Ewa Sternberg claims that three holy cows in Swedish defence policy is on their way to the slaughter house. One of them is the non-alignment policy which is getting closer to the butcher bank due to this plan, when "we are starting knitting us together with the Nato country Norway". She also mentions the polls showing that the Swedish people is against membership in Nato. "But an alliance with Nordic neighbour-countries does not need to be perceived so negatively. Even if the cooperation with Oslo will bring us closer to Washington. (...) In the future there may be a Finnish army, a Swedish airforce and a Norwegian navy in Scandinavia."

As an additional remark to the article on defence cooperation on 31 August 2007, the web-edition of *Dagens Nyheter* in a news bulletin reports a couple of weeks later (070924) that the Norwegian broadcasting cooperation, NRK, had revealed that a classified report from the commander-in-chief, Sverre Diesen, expressed his view that Norway cannot count on Nato in case of a serious conflict with Russia. The reason being that Nato is so occupied with the GWOT. An invasion of Norway is not a realistic scenario, according to the report, but the fish, oil and gas resources in the North could become challenges for Norway in her relation with the military big power in the East.

In conclusion the Swedish media discourse on the defence cooperation is constructed as a non-controversial and un-politicised issue, although one commentator mentions that it will knit Sweden closer to Nato. Otherwise the rhetorics of the article signed by the two commanders seems to have been uncritically accepted – the proposed plans are simply the natural next steps on a road already chosen and economic gains and operational improvements are the only objectives involved. The only critical point raised is when DN once again repeats its complaints that it would be clarifying if in particular the Social-Democrats acknowledged in public what they had since long agreed to, namely increased collaboration with Nato. That there could be any conflict-risks involved in this development, e.g. becoming militarily engaged in the GWOT in Afghanistan or elsewhere, is remarkably absent in the Swedish discourse.

The debate on a joint defence revisited

In the summer of 2008 the heads of defence in Sweden and Norway picked up the debate again and now they had included the head of defence in Finland. In a joint article Sverre Diesen, Håkan Syrén and Juhani Kaskela suggested a joint Nordic defence system (Et nytt nordisk forsvar *Aftenposten* 18 June 2008).

They referred to the article by Diesen and Syrén in August 2007 and stated that many of the suggestions have been discussed further and they mention a joint report presented to the ministers of defence in Norway, Sweden and Finland, where 140 suggestions for mutual defence cooperation had been identified. Out of these they suggest that 40 can be implemented immediately. Among those 40 are: "maritime surveillance, surveillance of the airspace, mutual landforces, common areas for practice, mutual Nordic bases for sea, air, and land –support, medical support and military education".

The main argument is the budget cuts experienced by the permanent forces in the three countries. The alternatives are mutual cooperation or capacity reductions. The reason for these cut backs are presented in a subtle manner. The doxa linked to Nordic participation in GWOT is as obvious here as in the the article from August 2007. The issue is only indirectly dealt with in the beginning of the article: "Most countries in the Euroatlantic area have gone through huge reorganisation to prepare their defence to deal with increasingly complex tasks nationally and internationally".

When reading the whole report the aim to coordinate joint efforts on GWOT is more clearly expressed. In point 42.2 in the document the following statement is quite clear:

"This could mean to share burden of a task in international operations by contributing assets from all three nations, simultaneously or in sequence, into one assignment" (Nordic Supportive Defence Structure 2008:B:5).

Another way to put this, which is not pointed out in the media, is that the military capacity in all the Nordic countries have been reduced because resources have been drained due to their role as allied to the USA in the GWOT war theaters in Afghanistan and Iraq. The question is of course whether the public opinion the Nordic countries would have agreed to this trade-off and the use of military and economic resources if the choice had been presented to them in a frank and open manner. In addition, at least in Swedish defence debate the huge and often badly calculated costs for the international military engagements have been hot potatoes for the government. After that large parts of the Swedish defence industry have been bought up by US capital during the recent decades, the international collaboration in the GWOT seems to be the reason for continued spending of large amounts of the tax payers' money on the defence sector at the same time as it is the lever that will eventually dispose of the traditional non-alignment policy of both Finland and Sweden.

The controversy over Joint Strike Fighter

On 20 November 2008 the Norwegian Parliament after a short debate made the principle decision to buy the US Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as the Norwegian future fighter plane. The decision happened after a long process where also the Swedish Saab Gripen was a candidate. This debate was highly relevant for the debate on closer Nordic defence cooperation. The Swedish government was involved in the marketing efforts to try to convince the Norwegian politicians to choose the Swedish plane. Including in the proposed contract was a comprehensive plan for industrial, economical and military cooperation. A Norwegian decision to buy the Swedish plane would obviously have been an important step to strengthen the Nordic cooperation. It would also mean more independent role for Norway within the US-Norwegian relationship and NATO. This issue was also controversial within the coalition government since the SV (the socialist left party) were in favour of the Swedish/Nordic solution while the AP (the social democrats) supported US –JSF solution.

When the decision was made it was met with disbelief from the Swedish government and the Swedish media. The Swedish media and politicians had problems understanding the Norwegian decision since the Swedish Gripen plane according to their estimates would have been cheaper and one important step towards a stronger Nordic defence cooperation. In Norway the public debate and the media coverage was a confusing exercise with figures since the government spokespersons insisted that the JSF-solution was both cheaper and was more suited to fulfill Norway's military commitments in international operation.

This could have given Norwegian media reason to go into a critical coverage of the whole process. But once again we saw that with the exception of *Aftenposten* the main stream media closed ranks with the government in security policy issues. The independent Norwegian defence analyst John Berg in his work has concluded that even the official US figures concludes that the Swedish Gripen solution is the cheapest (Berg 2009). The Norwegian Ministry of Defence based its report to Parliament on 27 points and succeeded to frame the debate in Parliament around those 27 points despite the fact that international experts had concluded otherwise (ibid.). In the debate on 20 November in Parliament the government claimed that 48 JSF planes could be purchased for 18 billion NOK and thus less than the Swedish Gripen. In the government report to Parliament (Stortingsmelding) one month after the decision was made it was concluded that 56 JSF planes would cost 42 billion NOK and be more expensive than the Gripen package. Again the main stream media avoided to confront the

government with the issues of prices and other facts, such as the estimated life expectancy of both Gripen and JSF (Berg 2009).

One important aspect of this debate is that the US government has clearly stated that JSF fits into the US global military strategy. The supporters for Gripen have claimed that Gripen was better fitted for the defence of the Norwegian coastal line, and claimed that Norway's role as close allied to US in the GWOT was dependent on the choice to buy JSF.

A few weeks after the Norwegian decision to buy JSF, Norway's former foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg again in a public speech tried to relaunch the idea of a Nordic defence cooperation, without getting much response in Swedish media (Berg 2009b). The Nordic defence concept is still alive in rhetoric from the Norwegian Commander in chief, Serre Diesen. In an article in *Aftenposten* 12 January 2009 under the title "Why Nordic defense cooperation?" He argues once again strongly for the use of common military equipment: "Thus, Norway, Sweden and Finland in the future will be able to operate the same types of tanks, infantry and field artillery". Strangely enough Diesen does not even mention fighter planes in this argument. Not with one word is the Norwegian decision to buy the US JSF planes two months earlier referred to.

Obviously Norway has made its choice to keep up its position as loyal ally in the GWOT as the number one priority. Sweden's dilemma to both play a role in the GWOT and to be an independent player on the industrial military market for a while led to a friction with the Norwegian government. Once again the doxa of the main stream media makes it almost impossible to confront the political and military elite on major issues the debate in Swedish and Norwegian media was reduced to nationalistic quarrel between two neighbours. Both in Sweden and Norway the unifying strategic interest seems to be the intention to continue as brothers in arms on the battlefields in Afghanistan, which therefore is not an issue in this debate.

Conclusions

The Peace journalism model as suggested by Johan Galtung is a useful tool as a checklist both for journalists and peace researchers. Since Galtung's approach is somewhat rigid it has its obvious limitations and should thus be supplemented with other methods and theories. We suggest that Bourdieu's notion on doxa and the CDA approach could be such a supplement. Even though the question of audiences as active contributors to the public discourse on war and peace have been addressed in some recent research, the general impression is that a more sophisticated meaning-theoretical point of view would help bringing the debate to a more reflexive understanding of the achievements and limits of the "PJ program" (Kempf 2007:4). The CDA approach to media studies incorporates levels of meanings and the relations between different actors in the discourse analysis as part of the context. The public debates in society have influences on media texts as do the discourses among politicians, PR-firms and spin doctors. And vice versa. In particular, the CDA perspective helps to explore in what ways mediated discourses are interrelated with for example national and transnational security-policy discourses. In the empirical examples touched upon above the silence around certain critical aspects of the plans for closer military cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden, and the hidden assumptions concerning the wider context of the US-lead GWOT are some such important – though discursively absent – interdiscursive relations.

Our point is that this silence (or doxa) about potential conflict-risks and possible involvement in future wars are not reflected in Galtung's model for war and peace journalism. On the contrary, by ignoring the potential conflict risks that may be contingent of deeper involvement in the GWOT the journalistic examples above would in some respects be categorised as "peace journalism" and in some as "war journalism". For example, although a common Nordic peaceful we-identity is appealed to there is no opposite them-identity or enemy image mentioned. It further put the emphasis on preventing future wars – although by military means. On the other hand – which would place the spin in the war journalism category – the proposal of increased Nordic cooperation in the defence sector is making potential conflict risks "opaque and secret", it is "elite oriented" and it definitely does not "uncover all cover-ups" (Galtung 2002). In addition we claim that the great varieties of positions and point of views in the public as shown in our empirical examples does not fit in neither the war-column nor the peace column in Galtung's model. The elite positions in Galtung's war model are represented by the military and the politicians, but the systematic avoidance of conflict-risks, which may facilitate a process toward military conflict escalation, is not considered by the model. The reason for this is mainly the general limitation of the Galtung-model to the stage of open war, whereas we would like to draw attention to the need of expanding the analysis to the previous stages in conflict escalation processes.

The discourse among ordinary people, though, might pick up historical links like the suggestion after the Second World War of a Nordic solution as an alternative to NATO for the Scandinavian countries, but also to mention other possible scenarios than the one promoted by the elites. New digital media offers an opportunity for the public to forward such positions in opposition to the main stream media. However, these more popular comments in our empirical cases are more ironic jokes than part of a serious discussion about the possible negative consequences of increased military collaboration. In any case, we suggest that the multi-media landscape with its different discursive spaces also should have a place in the future

debate on peace journalism.

Models such as Galtung's are probably not relevant in all conflict situations and stages. Used as a tool for assessing the journalistic contributions to conflict resolutions they are not without problems because they are generalised, although not properly contextualised. At the same time it must be admitted that there are plenty of empirical evidences that much of the war reporting in main stream media is constructed along the lines Galtung suggests. By using CDA as a supplement we suggest a more comprehensive analysis that includes both the systematic silencing of certain crucial aspects as well as the voices of ordinary people in the public discourse on war and peace issues with the objective of finding out the complex discursive constructions and structures that contribute to conflict escalations and wars.

We suggest the following:

1. Galtung's polarised two models have heuristic value for reflexive evaluation of journalistic practices – both internally within the trade and by interested people outside the profession, e.g. media researchers and audience. But they do not contain any receptivity in any other ways.
2. As a "philosophy" peace journalism is far too narrowly defined and the notion PJ could preferably be replaced by some more appropriate term, for example "consequence-ethical reflexivity", which in our view better catches the sound kernel of the PJ "program".
3. The PJ model may gain from being combined with CDA or other context oriented methods for analyses of and discussions about what discursive constructions are best at satisfying the requirements of a responsible and consequentially reflexive journalism.
4. This should extend the application field and imply that also the role of journalism in the advent of conflicts, i.e. the discursive handling of conflict risks, are exposed to critical examination.

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On the authors: Stig Arne Nohrstedt, Ph.D is Professor of Media and Communication Studies at the University of Örebro, Sweden. His Research areas include war and conflict journalism, journalistic ethics and roles, risk and crisis communication and media and structural discrimination. Recent books: Nohrstedt, S.A. & Ottosen, R. (eds.) (2005): *Global War - Local Views: Media Images of the Iraq War*. Göteborg: Nordicom; Nohrstedt, S.A. & Ottosen, R. (eds.) (2004): *US and the Others*. Göteborg: Nordicom.
eMail: stig_arne.nohrstedt@hum.oru.se

Rune Ottosen, b. 1950, Cand. polit. in Political Science (University of Oslo, 1984), BA in Journalism (Norwegian College of Journalism, 1973); Journalist in various media (1977-84); Lecturer and Research Fellow at the Norwegian College of Journalism (1984-88); Information Director and Research Fellow at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) (1989-92); Research Fellow at the Norwegian Federation of Journalists (1993-95); Associate Professor at the Faculty of Journalism, Library and Information Science, Oslo College, since 1996; Professor in the same institution from 1999; Ottosen is also the president of the Norwegian Association of Non-Fiction Authors and Translators. Author of several books and articles on journalism history and topics related to war and journalism.
Recent book publications: *Journalism and the New World Order, Vol. I. Gulf War, National News Discourses and Globalization* (ed. with Stig-Arne Nohrstedt, 2000); *Kosovokonflikten, medierna och medlidandet* (The Kosovo Conflict, Media and Compassion, 2002).
eMail: Rune.Ottosen@jbi.hio.no

Denise Sommer & Georg Ruhrmann

Thematische Strukturen und politische Zielformulierungen in der Fernsehberichterstattung über Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund

Basierend auf dem Framing-Ansatz werden Kontext und Strukturen der TV-Nachrichtenberichterstattung über Minderheiten untersucht. Innerhalb des letzten Jahrzehnts hat sich der politische Diskurs über Standards und Absichten von Integration dramatisch geändert. Im Mittelpunkt der Studie stehen deshalb Facetten der Zielformulierung (graduell versus absolut). Eine Stichprobe von 285 TV-Nachrichten über Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland wird auf implizite thematische Strukturen und politische Zielformulierungen hin analysiert. Die Clusteranalyse ergibt vier Nachrichten-Frames: Kriminalität, Migrationspolitik, Kulturelle Nähe und Terrorismus-Risiko. Sie weisen darauf hin, dass das öffentliche Bild von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund als relevante Minderheitsgruppen in Deutschland weiterhin negativ und implizit verzerrt bleibt. Das zeigt sich in der großen Häufigkeit von Risikokommunikation über mutmaßliche Terrorpläne sowie der vorherrschenden Formulierung absoluter Ziele anstatt gradueller. Die Integration des Framing-Ansatzes sowie der spezifischen Zielformulierungen erweist sich theoretisch und methodisch als fruchtbar, um den aktuellen medialen Integrationsdiskurs genau zu erfassen.

Zu den Autoren:

Denise Sommer ist wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Institut für Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft der Universität Leipzig. Forschungsinteressen: interpersonale Kommunikation, Einstellungen und Kommunikationsprozesse, Medien, Migration und Kommunikationstheorien.

Adresse: Universität Leipzig, Institut für Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft, Lehrstuhl für Historische und Systematische Kommunikationswissenschaft, Burgstr. 21, 04109 Leipzig, Germany.

eMail: dsommer@uni-leipzig.de

URL: <http://www.kmw.uni-leipzig.de/bereiche/kommunikationswissenschaft/profil/>

Georg Ruhrmann ist Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für "Grundlagen der medialen Kommunikation und der Medienwirkung" am Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaft an der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena. Forschungsinteressen: Inhaltsanalyse, Krisenkommunikation, Medien und Migration.

Adresse: Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena, Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaft, Lehrstuhl für Grundlagen medialer Kommunikation und Medienwirkung, Ernst-Abbe-Platz 8, 07743 Jena, Germany

eMail: Georg.Ruhrmann@uni-jena.de

URL: <http://www.ifkw.uni-jena.de>

Denise Sommer & Georg Ruhrmann

Oughts and ideals: Framing people with migration background in TV news

Based on the framing concept the paper explores the context and structure of TV news coverage about minority groups. A sample of 285 TV news reports on people with migration background in Germany is analyzed for its implicit plot structures and particular political goal expressions. Cluster analysis reveals four news frames: Crime, Migration Policy, Cultural Proximity, and Terrorism Risk, indicating that the public image of people with migration background in Germany remains negative and implicitly biased. This becomes evident by the large amount of risk communication about potential terrorist attacks and the prevailing expression of absolute goals compared to gradual ones. Theoretically and methodically, integrating the framing concept and specific types of goals promises deeper insight into the current discourse on integration issues.

On the authors:

Denise Sommer, Research Associate at the Department of Communication and Media Studies, University of Leipzig. Research Interests: interpersonal communication, attitudes and communication processes, media and migration and communication theories.

Address: Universität Leipzig, Institut für Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft, Lehrstuhl für Historische und Systematische Kommunikationswissenschaft, Burgstr. 21, 04109 Leipzig, Germany.

eMail: dsommer@uni-leipzig.de

URL: <http://www.kmw.uni-leipzig.de/bereiche/kommunikationswissenschaft/profil/>

Georg Ruhrmann ist Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für "Grundlagen der medialen Kommunikation und der Medienwirkung" am Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaft an der Friedrich-Schiller-Georg Ruhrmann, Chair of Mediated Communication and Media Effects, Institute for Communication Research at the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena. Research Interests: content analysis, crisis communication, media and migration.

Address: Friedrich Schiller Universität Jena, Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaft, Lehrstuhl für Grundlagen medialer Kommunikation und Medienwirkung, Ernst-Abbe-Platz 8, 07743 Jena, Germany.

eMail: Georg.Ruhrmann@uni-jena.de

URL: <http://www.ifkw.uni-jena.de>

Denise Sommer & Georg Ruhrmann¹

Oughts and ideals – Framing people with migration background in TV news²

Kurzfassung: Basierend auf dem Framing-Ansatz werden Kontext und Strukturen der TV-Nachrichtenberichterstattung über Minderheiten untersucht. Innerhalb des letzten Jahrzehnts hat sich der politische Diskurs über Standards und Absichten von Integration dramatisch geändert. Im Mittelpunkt der Studie stehen deshalb Facetten der Zielformulierung (graduell versus absolut). Eine Stichprobe von 285 TV-Nachrichten über Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland wird auf implizite thematische Strukturen und politische Zielformulierungen hin analysiert. Die Clusteranalyse ergibt vier Nachrichten-Frames: Kriminalität, Migrationspolitik, Kulturelle Nähe und Terrorismus-Risiko. Sie weisen darauf hin, dass das öffentliche Bild von Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund als relevante Minderheitsgruppen in Deutschland weiterhin negativ und implizit verzerrt bleibt. Das zeigt sich in der großen Häufigkeit von Risikokommunikation über mutmaßliche Terrorpläne sowie der vorherrschenden Formulierung absoluter Ziele anstatt gradueller. Die Integration des Framing-Ansatzes sowie der spezifischen Zielformulierungen erweist sich theoretisch und methodisch als fruchtbar, um den aktuellen medialen Integrationsdiskurs genau zu erfassen.

Abstract: Based on the framing concept the paper explores the context and structure of TV news coverage about minority groups. A sample of 285 TV news reports on people with migration background in Germany is analyzed for its implicit plot structures and particular political goal expressions. Cluster analysis reveals four news frames: Crime, Migration Policy, Cultural Proximity, and Terrorism Risk, indicating that the public image of people with migration background in Germany remains negative and implicitly biased. This becomes evident by the large amount of risk communication about potential terrorist attacks and the prevailing expression of absolute goals compared to gradual ones. Theoretically and methodically, integrating the framing concept and specific types of goals promises deeper insight into the current discourse on integration issues.

1. Introduction

Empirical research has so far been concerned with various detailed aspects of media and integration. Several studies have investigated media coverage in the press and (though much less frequently) on television with regard to the integration of minorities in many different countries. Results show that news coverage about minority groups certainly has an influence on their image and evaluation in the public (Downing & Husband, 2005; Duck, Lalonde, & Weiss, 2003; Gorham, 2006). However, considering the complex relationship between different aspects of media coverage about minorities (i.e. topics and evaluations, language and discourse, news factors, news bias etc.) *integrative* theory and research is quite rare.

Within the last decade terrorist attacks on western civilization have sensitized the public and rekindled conflicts between different social and ethnic groups. In the context of the political debate, this may have an important impact on the perception of minority groups in our societies (Norris, Kern, & Just, 2003; Ross, 2003). Indeed, the evaluation criteria and standards of integration have been publicly revised by experts and politicians. Aims and consequences of a possibly inappropriate integration policy are discussed (Allievi, 2009). This raises questions that are rather classical content analytical ones but need to be inquired from a new perspective: Which topics concerned with minority groups are selected as relevant news? How are they explained and accounted for? How are they evaluated? What do journalists claim and demand and which consequences do they expect? Hence, the *context* of coverage on minority groups, rarely considered up to now, comes into focus.

Therefore this paper attempts to examine the complex and selective nature of news coverage about integration in a complex approach that tries to capture the context factors of changing public discourses about the integration of people with migration background in Germany. Particularly, we explore German TV news coverage about people with migration background, who represent relevant minority groups in the German society, in a two-step-procedure. First, a content analysis identifies content elements like topics, style factors, news factors, attention index (news value) and discursive devices. In a second step, we explore the data in order to detect implicit plot structures inherent in the aforementioned explicit features of coverage. Based on the framing concept introduced by Gitlin (1980), Gamson (1989) and Miller (1997) and on the motivational approach of minimal and maximal goals (Brendl & Higgins, 1996) the study elaborates the specific combination of frame elements in coverage on integration.

Framing studies have shown changes in news frames after certain key events (Ross, 2003; Scheufele, 2006). Thus it makes sense to consult the framing concept for an analysis that is sensitive to context factors and their potential change. Further-

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more, in dealing with integration, the existence of different political aims becomes obvious. Therefore, we also base this research on a specific motivational goal concept – minimal and maximal goals – in order to differentiate between facets and types of remedy and treatment recommendations (Fritsche, Kessler, Mummendey, & Neumann, 2009; Neumann, Mummendey, Kessler, & Waldzus, 2005).

2. The framing concept

Frames can be described as clusters of frame elements. In other words: If certain elements of media coverage group together systematically in a specific way, they form a pattern that can be identified across several news texts in a sample (Kempf, 2006; Nerad, 2009; B. Scheufele, 2006; D. Scheufele, 1999). Thus, a frame concept is needed that provides a clear operational definition of frame elements. A widely accepted definition is offered by Entman 1993, p. 52: "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating context, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described."

Based on recent work by Matthes and Kohring (2008) we understand these elements as groups of variables, each of which may be split up into several categories that can be coded in content analysis. For instance, a *problem definition* emphasizes a specific issue to be presented in the news. A *causal interpretation* attributes risks or benefits to the activity of political groups (for example people with migration background or politicians). A *moral evaluation* can be negative, neutral or positive and refer to different issues or objects. A *treatment recommendation* can include a call for or against a certain action, in most cases in a political and/or normative direction.

The fourth frame element in particular, treatment recommendation, is supposedly crucial in public communication about integration. Therefore we introduce and focus on the motivational concept of different goal expectations (i.e. minimal and maximal goals) (Brendl & Higgins, 1996; Fritsche et al., 2009) which are sensitive to the different semantic facets of expressing remedies and solutions. If such remedies and solutions are considered within the *treatment recommendation* frame element (Entman, 1993), they can be either expressed as absolute ought (or minimal goal) standing for an obligatory standard that must be obeyed. However, they can also be presented as a gradual ideal that is subject to aspirations. We propose that the consideration of goal expectations is especially fruitful for a deeper understanding of treatment recommendations as one central framing element.

Framing refers to the mode of presentation of news schema categories (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) such as actors, topics (objects), evaluations, causes and consequences (Entman, 1993; Matthes & Kohring, 2008). Analyzing frames implies observing how journalists deal with frame elements regarding the issue in question. Entman states that "[a]ll four of these framing functions hold together in a kind of cultural logic, each helping sustain others (...)" (Entman, 2004, p. 6).

Recent research points out that frames can be identified by analyzing the four elements *and* their specific patterns, which can be imaged in clusters of news. This holds especially true for media frames operationalized as clusters characterized by typical combinations of the four frame elements. These clusters are each homogenous in their specific pattern of frame elements but significantly distinct from each other (Matthes & Kohring, 2008). Such a procedure ensures the identification of media frames independent from singular topics (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) and avoids defining frames per se as coding variables (Edy & Meirick, 2007).

2.1 Framing News Coverage about Minorities

2.1.1 Defining minority groups

Since the 1960s integration has become an important topic in German public discourse. Nowadays, about 12 million people in Germany have a migration background from a diverse variety of nations and ethnicities. Meanwhile it is widely accepted that Germany represents a modern multicultural society. However, people with migration background still form the most important minority groups in the country concerning the political debate (Beck, 2009; Geissler & Pöttker, 2006).

Therefore, first of all, it is essential to discuss which minority groups are addressed in this investigation and why. In the study at hand, the discourse about minority groups is explored for the specific case of coverage about people with migration background in Germany. *People with migration background* are thereby defined as follows:

Persons who:

- either themselves (have) come to Germany from abroad and (want to) live here temporarily or permanently or
- whose families came to Germany one or two generations before.
- They either have a cultural background differing from the German one or

- have lived for several generations in a culturally distinct area while being of German origin (= "ethnisch Zugehörige").

Hence, the study focused on people with migration background in general, without differentiating between length of stay, place of birth or specific nationalities or ethnicities of origin. By applying such a broad definition we

1. attempted to reveal which subgroups of people with migration background are treated in particular ways and
2. were able to test whether there are tendencies of generalization or projection concerning the 'whole' category of people with migration background.

In addition, another criterion applied to the sample. Our study focused on people with migration background who are neither celebrities nor any other kind of publicly known persons. We concentrate on the 'average citizen'. Thus, people with migration background well-known from sports, arts or the media were not included in the study sample. Research has demonstrated that people with migration background who have come to a status of fame or celebrity are treated differently in the media: In contrast to the 'average citizen' they are no longer subject to stigmatization, negativity and generalization (Agergaard, 2008; Wodak, 2010). However, the political debate on integration, its standards, aims and consequences, does not focus on a small privileged group of famous and successful people with migration background but on the majority of citizens representing a wide array of origins, biographies and lifestyles that are quite often just generalized to one group of 'foreigners'.

2.1.2 Empirical findings on coverage about minorities

In the following section major findings on news coverage about 1) minority groups in general as well as 2) the integration of people with migration background in Germany in particular are reported. They represent the state of the art in research on mass media and integration and identify open questions. In order to contextualize these findings for our investigation they are structured in terms of media framing. This synopsis reveals that studies about the presentation of integration in the German media mostly yield results referring to single frame elements.

Problem Definitions. Corresponding to the concept of news values, general non-content-related aspects of any event may increase the newsworthiness¹ depending on factors like controversy, aggression, damage and demonstration (Eilders, 2006; Maier & Ruhrmann, 2008; Schulz, 1982). This holds specifically true for coverage about people with migration background in Germany (Hinterhuber, 2009). Moreover, sensations as well as emotions usually dominate the reports. Furthermore, "key events" (Scheufele, 2006) dramatically affect and change media coverage. The discourse about terrorism and the potential danger of further attacks lead to a transformation of coverage about Muslim minorities in Germany: From political discussions about integration, traditions and equality the mass media increasingly turned towards security risks, suspicions, imprisonments and trials (Allievi, 2009; Beck, 2009; Croissant, Wagschal, Schwank, & Trinn, 2009).

Causal Attributions. News reports quite often present minority groups, like for example people with migration background in Germany, showing them as responsible for crime (Dixon & Linz, 2002; Zillmann & Brosius, 2000). Risks associated with migration are usually covered in a biased fashion, overestimating the amount of people with migration background as well as their crime rates (Müller, 2005). People with migration background are treated as 'objects' without any influence. They do not play an active part in political communication (Allievi, 2009). Similar results have been yielded in several analyses of coverage about different minority groups in other European countries (Allievi, 2009; Downing & Husband, 2005; d'Haenens, 2009) as well as in Australia (Poynting & Mason, 2007), Canada (Fleras, 2009) and the United States (Entman & Rojecki, 2001; Starck, 2009).

(Moral) Evaluations. Research findings show that minorities are presented with stylistic variations, signaling the relationship between the majority ("us") and the minority ("them") (Bell, 2007). Evaluations of minorities are usually expressed in a semantically negative and generalizing language (Maass, 1999; Maass, Corvino, & Arcuri, 1994). Well-established and integrated minority members who have been supporting their host countries for years are mostly presented as individual cases. They only serve as a subcategory to the larger category of their group, i.e. they are regarded as an 'exception to the rule' (Richards & Hewstone, 2001).

Treatment Recommendations. „Oughts“ and „ideals“ define motivational dimensions of journalistic treatment recommendations (Neuendorf, 2002), which are essential for message framing (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) in the special case of intergroup conflict (Fritsche et al., 2009). Goal achievement can be demanded in a more or less complex manner as Iyengar (1996) strikingly demonstrated. Hereby, the specific ways of goal expression are essential for message framing (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Two types of goal expression that have not been explored so far will be presented in the following.

1. The difference between framing and newsworthiness is rarely explained: 1) News factors are independent from news content, frames however are content bound. (2) News factors work independently of each other and (3) are not dependent on prior news decisions, while frames, activated and fitted by specific schemata can be consistent with an existing frame or not (Scheufele, 2006).

2.2 Oughts and Ideals

Minimal goals. Minimal goals or *oughts* can be defined as a general standard whose violation is seen as strongly dangerous and barely acceptable. Such minimal goals separate two different areas of valence: Failure of minimal goals clearly results in negative valence, whereas achieving a minimal goal produces a non-negative area of valence (Brendl & Higgins, 1996). Thus, minimal goals express absolute standards. As compliance with minimal goals is usually taken for granted, this situation is understood as normal and not negative. However, it is not positively evaluated either (Fritsche et al., 2009).

Maximal goals. Maximal goals, in contrast, can be understood as positively evaluated, less binding goals, comparable to *ideals* whose achievement is highly positively assessed, but not absolutely necessary. Achieving maximal goals results in a positively valued situation, whereas failure means a non-positive valence but not a negative one (Brendl & Higgins, 1996). Hence, in contrast to minimal goals maximal goals are gradual, not absolute.

Treatment recommendations thus can be expressed either in the form of a minimal or of a maximal goal. The goal that people with migration background need to learn the language of their host country, for example, can on the one hand be phrased as the minimal goal that every person living in Germany has to learn the German language and will be tested on it as a prerequisite for staying. On the other hand, it can be presented as the maximal goal that as many people with migration background as possible should learn the German language by offering them free classes which they can attend voluntarily.

Another example is the minimal goal that German society strictly expects every person with migration background to obey all rules of the social etiquette without any exceptions even if these contradict their (religious or cultural) beliefs or differ from rules in the countries of their origin. In contrast, the maximal goal would be that people with migration background follow the German social and cultural obligations as far as compatible with their own habits and traditions.

In the academic literature, scholars assume that violations of minimal goals are perceived as massive threats. Hence, conflicts resulting from these violations are supposed to be especially strong. Conflicts about maximal goals on the other hand are mostly interpreted as an expectable and legitimate situation of competition. Therefore, this differentiation provides quite a reasonable explanation for social conflict (Fritsche et al., 2009).

Compliance with minimal goals is usually taken for granted by the members of a society. However, as cultures vary in their behavioral standards and laws, people with migration background cannot always be expected to have the same oughts. Nevertheless, many of them try to adapt and to comply with the minimal goals of their host country. According to the theory, minimal goal attainment is evaluated in a non-negative way (Brendl & Higgins, 1996). The result is that this adaptation and compliance are just neither noticed nor reported because of the way they are evaluated. But as conflict between groups and negative events involving the violation of minimal goals are more likely to be reported by the media than compliance with these goals, the public image of people with migration background is endangered to remain one-sided resulting in attribution bias, outgroup hate and rejection (Downing & Husband, 2005).

From our understanding the concept of goal formulation as part of a frame offers fruitful new insights as it differentiates between more than two evaluative dimensions of treatment recommendations or remedy promotions (Entman, 2004): Non-negative does not mean positive and vice versa. This is especially important for the analysis of frames, as news selection usually follows strong criteria (Scheufele, 2006): Particularly extremely negative and negatively biased (Meffert, Chung, Joiner, Waks, & Garst, 2006) or exceptionally positive facts are reported much more often than comparatively neutral or 'taken-for-granted' events.

Based upon this reasoning one advantage for the application of this motivational concept is a methodical one. Content analyses of coverage about minorities usually measure implicit and explicit evaluations (Neuendorf, 2002). However, in most cases the assessment of evaluations is limited to positive and negative evaluations of treatment recommendations exclusively (Krippendorff, 2004). By considering the concept of minimal and maximal goals the importance of a more differentiated measurement becomes obvious. Consequently, in measuring minimal and maximal goals we gain *additional information* about the presentation of minority groups (like people with migration background in Germany) going beyond the usual evaluative dimensions.

The second reason for dealing with minimal and maximal goals is that in economical and political crisis – like for example the one arising after September 11th 2001 – *standards* of a country's cultural conception change. Existing demands on integration and inclusion were newly reflected and evaluated in the German public debate on migration (Müller, 2005). *Definitions and criteria* of what integration is – or may be – were discussed in the public sphere (Trebbe & Weiss, 2007; van Dijk, 2006). Resulting from this, new demands and treatment recommendations were addressed publicly: Former ideals of integration like speaking (or learning) the German language as well as accepting (and internalizing) the values of the German culture were now defined as oughts (Geissler & Weber-Menges, 2009; Koopmans, Statham, Giugni, & Passay, 2005; Moser, Hermann, & Hansteder, 2009).

Moreover, this happens within the context of risk communication that is contingent upon the actual *issue* or topic of economic, social or religious disintegration being assessed (Beck, 2009; Seidel, 2008). One cannot only differentiate between qualities, specific gradual steps or intensities of disintegration (Berry, Phinney, Sam & Vedder, 2006), but also between specific types of violations of minimal goals which for instance include riots in schools or subareas of towns and terrorist attacks (Tuman, 2003; Weidner, 2008). Consequently, absolute treatment recommendations as well as coverage about risks and potential dangers of disintegration now determine the discourse on integration (Ruhrmann, Sommer, & Uhlemann, 2006).

When examining the issue of integration, it is thus important to keep in mind that this process is communicated in a *journalistic* way (Seidel, 2008). Therefore we ask how the criteria and goals of integration are selected and described by the media, i.e. the journalists. Are they depicted appropriately concerning journalistic judgments and rational or emotional evaluations? Can we find displaced media frames in the discourse about integration?

3. Research Questions

The objective of this study is to analyze news frames concerning people with migration background and – within the frame element of treatment recommendations – to examine the role of the above-mentioned goal dimensions. Research has demonstrated that the key events of terrorism (Nossek, 2008; Scheufele, 2006) have changed news coverage about minorities (and specifically people with migration background in Germany). However, this finding is mainly based on the analysis of topic categories, evaluations and news factors. Context sensitive studies considering all frame elements are quite rare. Thus, we 1) postulate that different ways of treatment recommendations are crucial for the assessment of frames, and 2) ask for the context of and the relationships between the frame elements in coverage about people with migration background in Germany.

Two specific research questions (RQ) are addressed:

RQ 1: Which frames and contexts of news coverage about people with migration background can be revealed in German TV news?

RQ 2: How are treatment recommendations (gradual vs. absolute) expressed and which influence do they exert on general news framing?

4. Method

4.1 Sample

A content analysis was conducted covering the main news programs¹ broadcasted by the four major German television stations within the year 2003. All reports meeting the following criteria were included:

- Reports dealing with issues of migration and integration, like for instance migration policy or law, efforts against discrimination etc.
- Reports of any kind that had actors with migration background in them, be it as perpetrators or victims of crimes, as persons concerned by the problem covered or as interviewees for any topic.
- However, the actors with migration background were no celebrities or famous personalities.

The final sample contained 285 news reports about integration and people with migration background which met the selection criteria. News reports served as units of analysis.

4.2 Coding scheme and procedure

The four frame elements, i.e. problem definitions, attributions, evaluations and treatment recommendations, namely minimal and maximal goals, were assessed in these reports. In order to characterize the news, the coding scheme measured four groups of variables.

Problem definition. According to the functional model, news items are regarded as a result of journalistic assignment, and news factors are the means to control news values (Maier & Ruhrmann, 2008; Scheufele, 2006). Consequently, the topic categories *Crime*, *Terrorism*, *Migration* and the news factors *range of people affected*, *controversy*, *damage*, *aggression*, *visualization* and *cultural proximity* represented the "problem definition" frame element. Topic categories were measured

1. 'ARD Tagesschau', 'ZDF heute', 'RTL aktuell' and 'SAT.1 18:30'.

as dummy variables, news factors were assessed by 4-point Likert scales recording their respective intensities ("no"- "low"- "medium"- "high") (Eilders, 2006; Maier & Ruhrmann, 2008).

i In order to measure the "causal attribution" frame element (Entman, 1993) the potential active role of people with migration background and the group categorization of persons involved in conflict were both coded using ordinal rating scales¹. Moreover, we assessed whether the events were reported in a personalized fashion, discovering individual responsibilities: The news factor personalization, measured by means of a 3-point Likert scale (see Maier & Ruhrmann, 2008) was used as operationalization. The structure of causality relations ranged from simple unilateral explanations to complex coverage of background and context information according to Iyengar's (1996) findings. In a sum index, all the components of causality relations mentioned in the report were added (possible components: 1) context information, 2) reasons, 3) causes, 4) effects and 5) consequences).

Moral evaluation. Operationalizing moral evaluation, variables such as journalistic style (Bell, 2007; Neuendorf, 2002) were coded by applying semantic differentials. The twelve single variables (each represented by an adjective-pair rated on a 5-point Likert scale) were then computed by a factor analysis resulting in two style factors representing 1) an informative-neutral (detailed, differentiating, boring) or 2) an emotional-negative tone (biased, metaphoric, one-sided) of coverage.

Treatment recommendation. Regarding the "treatment recommendation" frame element, the variable "demand for action" was coded, measuring whether and how the necessity of political problem solving is communicated by journalists (i.e. Who demands an action from whom? Which type of action is requested? How is the demand expressed: recommendation/advice, claim, threat?). These were measured by multiple categories each of which was dummy coded later on.

Minimal and maximal goals were measured on various levels. Coders first had to decide whether these goals were mentioned in the reports. Minimal goals were coded when proved criminal activities (no suspicions) were mentioned in the reports. Moreover, any universally valid and absolute claim or law forcing everyone to obey was interpreted as minimal goal. Maximal goals were coded when suggestions were made, when claims were gradual or when the reports mentioned compromises that had been made. If coders chose 'yes', they would also specify whose minimal and maximal goals had been mentioned – goals of the ingroup, outgroup or both. Furthermore, the coding scheme asked for the violation of minimal goals and maximal goals and for goal conflict (see appendix for detailed coder instructions).

Newsworthiness. In addition to the frame elements the newsworthiness of each report was determined. Two variables were included in an attention index (Maier & Ruhrmann, 2008) identical with the composite index of news item prominence (Shoemaker & Cohen, 2006): The index is composed from a measure for the length of the TV news report as well as a ranking of its position within the newscast.²

Reliability. Reports were coded by two independent student assistants who had been trained on the coding scheme beforehand. For each of the categories examples and indicators were listed to serve as anchors. Agreement between coders was calculated after a pretest with approximately 15 percent of the reports in the sample. Cohen's K ranged from .60 to .75 on the pragmatic level of coding (variables with an interpretive range: style, demand for action, causality index, minimal and maximal goals, news factor intensity). On the semantic level (names, labels and categorizations: perpetrator/victim role, nationality/religion/ethnicity, active or passive role of actors) as well as on the formal-syntactical level (identifiers like date, rank of the report in the show and formal variables like length, type of coverage) it reached values from .80 to .95, respectively.

Data Analysis. The news reports were initially explored by descriptive statistics to learn how the relevant variables were distributed. Typical formal and plot structures of TV news reports were selected on the basis of an explorative cluster anal-

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1. The *potential active role* of people with migration background was operationalized on 3 stages: 1) passive role (the report talks about them and their affairs in a general and impersonal fashion, without covering their respective actions or talking with/to them), 2) active role described (the report mentions actions by people with migration background but they do not speak out or are directly shown in the course of action) and 3) active expression of opinion or operation (people with migration background are interviewed and express their views or are filmed while clearly engaging in action).

The *categorization of people involved in conflict* was also assessed by 3 categories: 1) no explicit coverage of persons or parties involved in conflict, 2) presentation of single individuals as involved in the conflict, 3) presentation of specific groups (nationality, religion) involved in the conflict.

2. For the ranking of position within the newscast the first to third report are ascribed four points, reports ranking on fourth to sixth position are assigned three points, positions seven to nine are worth two points, and from position ten on one point is assigned. Regarding the length of the report an analogue technique is applied: Reports lasting 30 seconds or less are ascribed one point, reports of 31 to 60 seconds are worth two points, reports of 61 to 90 seconds get three points and to every report lasting more than 91 seconds four points are assigned. The index is built by adding up the scores for these two variables for each report and dividing them by two. Thus, the index can range between a maximum of four and a minimum of one (see Maier & Ruhrmann, 2008, pp. 203-204).

ysis using the CONCLUS-algorithm (Bardeleben, 1995).¹ The cluster analysis included all variables described in the context of frame-elements: topics, news factors, activity, categorization and personalization, the causality index, style, demand for action, minimal and maximal goals. Furthermore, the attention index as well as the TV stations (dummy coded) were included as these are usually related to news factors (Maier & Ruhrmann, 2008). Some further external variables served to characterize the cluster solution afterwards: these were formal variables like the journalistic type of coverage as well as qualifying variables like nationalities, religious categorizations and labels which had all been coded as nominal variables with multiple categories.

Additionally, one-way ANOVAs were conducted in order to investigate how reports with different qualities of goal formulation differed concerning other relevant variables like news factors.

5. Results

5.1 Descriptives

Preliminary data analyses show – as illustrated in Figure 1 – that more than 35 percent of all analyzed news reports deal with terrorism, which is the most frequent category – though closely followed by reports about crime (34.4 percent).




Figure 1: Distribution of topics in the analyzed reports

Most cases in the first topic category address terrorism or Islamic fundamentalism in describing trials or crackdowns and reporting on police investigations against presumable terrorists. This is especially evident by looking at the person and group categorizations, respectively: Nationalities of origin mentioned most frequently are Moroccan (31 entries, 22 percent) and Turkish (27 entries, 19 percent) indicating – together with the other nationality labels frequently used – that most people with migration background mentioned in German TV news are Muslims stemming from geographically and politically distant countries (see Figure 2). In particular, the group of people with Moroccan heritage is highly overestimated in the sample compared to the actual amount of people with Moroccan origin in Germany. Other relevant groups of people with immigration background, in contrast, are either not mentioned at all or not categorized specifically.

1. The software CONCLUS (Constrained Cluster Analysis), developed by Bardeleben, 1995 uses a hill-climbing technique which combines hierarchical and iterative clustering techniques on the basis of maximum-likelihood-estimations. Squared euclidian distances were used as distance measures, the optimal amount of clusters was determined with $\Delta\eta^2$, which describes the increase in explained variance from cluster-solution k to cluster-solution $k+1$.




Figure 2: Distribution of the most frequent nationalities mentioned in the analyzed reports

The results demonstrate that beside the amount of coverage about crime, which corresponds to prior findings, there is a new topic category related to crime but with the specific focus on terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism. Reports about classical integration topics like legislation issues are broadcasted in only 5.3 percent of the coverage which is especially remarkable as integration has been a highly relevant political issue in Germany.

5.2 Frames and contexts of coverage about migrants

In a second step we were interested in the complex structures of TV news on integration that can be detected beyond topics and group categories. The aforementioned variables representing the four frame elements were thus clustered in order to answer *RQ1*. As the structure and number of frames were not supposed to be predicted, an explorative cluster analysis was conducted. The goodness of fit index for a four-cluster-solution resulted in $\eta^2 = .30^1$ with satisfying cluster consistencies² between .20 and .37. Four consistent clusters representing distinct news frames of coverage about people with migration background were yielded. Their structure is displayed in Table 1.

In particular, the four clusters can be described as follows:

Crime. Cluster 1 ("Crime Frame") contains 87 cases (31 percent) which have mainly been broadcasted by commercial television stations. These reports deal with crime or (less frequently) with terrorism often presented as violations of minimal goals. They are covered in a sensational fashion. The problem definition of this frame is aggression, which is relevant for selecting and presenting the events as news. Referring to causal attribution, there are frequent group categorizations in terms of nationality, ethnicity and religion, labeling specific persons involved in the conflict. Many of the labels used are negatively connotated, like for example "islamic fundamentalist", "presumed terrorist" and so forth. However, not only Muslims are actors in these reports, we also find Eastern Europeans and Italians as protagonists. Concerning the treatment recommendation frame element, violation of minimal goals plays a significant role here compared to the other clusters. Typical reports in this cluster dealt with bus hijackings by young Muslim men in Bremen and Berlin. Another characteristic

1. η^2 describes the relation of the variance explained by a cluster solution (B) to the overall variance (T) of the model: $\eta^2 = B/T$. Consequently, η^2 indicates, how much variance is reduced by the cluster solution (Giegler, 1985, p. 341).
2. Cluster consistency is a measure of cluster homogeneity which is calculated as follows: $con(k) = 1 - W(k)$. $W(k)$ indicates the variance within a cluster: the lower $W(k)$, the more homogeneous the cluster (Bardeleben, 1995, p. 248).

example was a spectacular murder case in a town in Western Germany: A Turkish man was suspected to have hired a killer who had murdered the Turkish man's wife as well as two of her colleagues. Other reports dealt with crimes like burglary, extortion, homicide and rape.

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
Topic: Terrorism	-.734**	-.591**		1.358**
Topic: Crime	1.317**	-.669*	-.420**	-.717**
Topic: Migration	-.507**	1.493**		-.586**
Cultural proximity			.356*	-.592**
Aggression	.730**	-.403**	-.876**	.416**
Active role of person with migration background		.536*	-.683**	.349*
Group categorization of persons involved in conflict	.371*	-.553**	-.665**	.703**
Personalization			-.435**	.800**
Causality index		1.080**	-.509**	
Factor emotional-negative style			-.714**	.492**
Factor informative-neutral style		.535**	-.426**	
Minimal goal violation	.743**	-.620**	-.769**	.405**
Demand for action	-.362*			.351*
Attention index (news value)		.618**	-.696**	.492**
N	87	44	85	69
* $p < .01$, ** $p < .001$				

Table 1: Z-Means¹ of Variables in clusters

Migration policy. Cluster 2 ("Migration Policy Frame") consists of 44 cases (15 percent) that typically cover political and societal problems of integration and their political implications in the widest sense. Problem definitions of this news are structural in their nature, whereas causal attributions are quite complex and refer to political accounts. People with migration background mainly play active roles in the reports, which are characterized by an informative writing style with the implication of neutral or positive moral evaluation. This is also true for treatment recommendation: Violations of minimal goals are not considered. In contrast, this frame refers to the achievement of central political goals by politicians and people with migration background. The attention index of news in this cluster reaches a maximum, representing the great newsworthiness of this frame in Germany. Representative examples for this cluster are reports about an open day in German mosques or demonstrations against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan where people with and without migration background equally act as protagonists and express their opinions towards the issues covered.

Cultural proximity. Cluster 3 ("Cultural Proximity Frame") (85 reports, 30 percent) comprises short reports addressing either political issues or crime. These reports are presented without any background information. Cultural proximity of people with migration background is a strong feature in the problem definitions of this cluster. People with migration background do not play active roles in these reports; causal attributions are individual and vague. There are no significant neutral or negative moral evaluations and also no treatment recommendations. Moreover, the newsworthiness of reports in this cluster is very low. In this category, we find a broad mixture of topics ranging from reports about crime and terror investigations and suspicions over short statements on migration policy to news about education. They are usually quite condensed and generalizing.

1. Only deviations from the cluster centroid exceeding a total mean in z-scores of $<-.33$ or $>.33$ are reported. (The t-test indicates if a cluster mean differs significantly from the general mean.)

Terrorism risk. Cluster 4 (“Terrorism Risk Frame”) encompasses 69 reports, i.e. 24 percent. The majority of these news reports deals with terrorism. They describe the damage of prevented terrorist attacks and deal with the uncertainty of upcoming attacks as well as the lack of knowledge about the terrorist infrastructure. Cultural proximity is again an important characteristic of the problem definition, as well as aggression. Causal attributions are determined by a high degree of group categorization (as Muslim, Arabian) presented in a personalized and stereotypical fashion. People with migration background are shown in active roles. Thus, the conflicting groups become visible and are morally evaluated in a generalized and oversimplified way, which is constituted by an emotional-negative style. Regarding treatment recommendations we find many violations of minimal goals resulting in strict political demands that represent an essential debate about the limits of integration policy. In this cluster we find for instance reports about a Turkish leader of a forbidden fundamental Muslim organization and his followers as well as many news features covering either investigations or lawsuits against suspects of terroristic attempts. Interestingly, the reports in this cluster show a two-dimensional structure, well known in *risk perception*, dealing with the “dread risk” of attacks that happened, and with the dimension of “unknown risk” about potential terrorism (Lindell & Perry, 2004; Tuman, 2003).

5.3 Treatment recommendations

Focusing on *RQ 2*, the impact of oughts and ideals on the analyzed news coverage was inquired in particular. News frames seem to be sensitive to the gradual versus absolute expression of treatment recommendations, indeed. Specifically, the articulation of absolute treatment recommendations, represented by minimal goals, appeared quite often (60.4 percent) on TV news about people with migration background. Maximal goals, in contrast, do not play a major role in phrasing treatment recommendations (9.2 percent). Most reports mentioning minimal goals also address the *violation* of these oughts (85.0 percent) indicating that compliance with minimal goals might indeed be taken for granted and ignored by journalists who instead overrepresent the *missing* compliance with these goals. This could be explained by negativity bias and is plausible considering the amount of reports on crime which were mostly coded as minimal goal violations.

	minimal goals mentioned	N	Mean (SD)	F	p
personalization	No	113	1.05 (0.79)	7.79	0.006
	Yes	172	1.33 (0.85)		
damage	No	113	0.33 (0.62)	28.44	0.001
	Yes	172	0.84 (0.88)		
controversy	No	113	0.79 (0.81)	34.05	0.001
	Yes	172	1.35 (0.80)		
aggression	No	113	0.30 (0.68)	87.14	0.001
	Yes	172	1.34 (1.05)		
visualization	No	113	2.42 (1.04)	31.67	0.001
	Yes	172	3.00 (0.68)		

Table 2: One-way ANOVAs: compared means of news factors for minimal goals mentioned or not mentioned

However, apart from mere frequencies analyses revealed interesting relations between the expression of absolute goals and other news features. For instance, an ingroup-serving attribution bias can be presumed: People with migration background are more frequently held responsible for the negative events reported. Thus, the relation between violations of minimal goals and people with migration background appears especially strong. Interestingly, violations of minimal goals are reported in greater detail compared to events without minimal goal violation (see descriptions of clusters 1 and 4, respectively). Minimal goal violation is also mentioned more often in contexts of controversy and aggression and more frequently found in TV news with visualized stereotypes. Moral evaluations turn out to be more negative for people with

migration background than for those without and show an even stronger negativity if a minimal goal violation is mentioned. In addition, reports about minimal goal violations are often concerned with excluding people with migration background from German society. One-way ANOVAs show that reports with minimal goals yielded higher mean values for news factor intensity in personalization, damage and controversy as well as aggression and visualization compared to reports without minimal goals mentioned (see Table 2).

This leads to the conclusion that minimal goals are variables sensitive to news framing. They have a high statistical explanatory power for publicity, i.e. the newsworthiness of the report, measured by a multidimensional index of attention (Maier & Ruhrmann, 2008; Shoemaker & Cohen, 2006, see also fn 3 and 4) and are closely related to news factors and moral evaluations. In consequence, oughts and ideals need to be considered as elements of news frames in order to assess and explain the complex structure of news coverage on minority issues.

6. Discussion

Studies on news framing point out that frame shifts were caused by key events of xenophobic riots in Europe and Germany during the 1990s. As a result, the causes and responsibilities for xenophobia were newly interpreted, from a "vague idea of right-wing-gangs" towards "a sharp idea of right-wing-extremism" (Scheufele, 2006, p. 78).

Since 2001 terrorism and religious fundamentalism have changed global news discourse and created a completely new focus of coverage (Beck, 2009; Edy & Meirick, 2007; Norris et al., 2003; Nossek, 2008; Ross, 2003). The results of this study clearly support these findings showing that terrorism was one of the most relevant problem definitions in TV news coverage about people with migration background in Germany. Throughout 2003, reports on potential dangers of terrorism prevail in the sample constituting a stable cluster: the terrorism risk frame. Of course, it does not seem surprising that coverage about terrorism has increased since 11 September 2001. However, this effect is not trivial since it does not only show a thematic change in coverage but also a new type of news coverage dealing with diffuse threat or risk. It implies potential dangers hard to control and produces fear, both of which are eventually related to people with migration background in general, as they are the protagonists of the news reports. In particular, members of the Muslim community in Germany are affected by this coverage as they are most explicitly categorized in our sample. In addition, some other relevant groups of people with migration background in Germany are rarely mentioned. This leads to a biased impression concerning the actual amount and distribution of different minority groups in the German society.

In cluster 1, the "Crime Frame", we find a strong relation between a very negative topic containing high levels of aggression and a special type of news coverage about people with migration background characterized by reports about the violation of absolute goals. This frequent expression of oughts but rare formulation of ideals indicates a way of presenting issues related to the integration of minorities mostly in the form of absolute standards and thus within a narrow interpretive range. This seems to be a subtle way of directing recipients' mental models (Kempf, 2006; 2008) to more absolute and less gradual judgments and attributions and raises the question whether such biased and one-sided coverage about minority groups may have indeed a negative and manipulative influence on their public image (Downing & Husband, 2005; Nerad, 2009; van Dijk, 2006).

The central insights concerning the integration of oughts and ideals into our content analysis can be summed up in four points:

1. We attempted to broaden the focus of news analysis by operationalizing and measuring new variables within the concept of media frames. Particularly, the motivational concept of minimal and maximal goals seemed to be interesting in exploring reasons for the specific structures of news frames in intergroup conflict.
2. Minimal and maximal goals have been proven to be fruitful in experimental and survey research for the explanation of negative behavior towards outgroups (Fritsche et al., 2009). However, they need to be investigated within a larger societal context. Thus, we focused on minimal and maximal goals in the public discourse on the integration of people with migration background in Germany. Applying the concept to the analysis of news frames actually proves to be promising. This is evident in the descriptive power of minimal goals for the differentiation between the clusters (frames) of different coverage types as well as in the relations to other important variables characterizing news coverage.
3. These relations between minimal and maximal goals and specific news factors as well as news frame elements can have different reasons, which from our point of view are interesting to explore in future research. Obviously, oughts and their violations may influence journalists' selection criteria and behavior in reporting about outgroups, thus shaping the political debate on integration in the media. For example, minimal goal expectations might support negative, risk-oriented journalistic selection decisions as well as attribution biases (Shoemaker, 2006).
4. Consequently, measuring these variables in content analyses opens new perspectives on a traditional field of research and helps to explore the backgrounds of discrimination of social groups by the media. Given the explorative character

of this study, it is still challenging to further operationalize and specify coding variables assessing minimal and maximal goals. Following strict decision rules and coding algorithms, the definitions of the variables used in this study seem to have worked for the assessment of minimal and maximal goals in general. However, more differentiated ways of coding as well as additional systematic qualitative analyses (Ogan, 2007; Moser et al., 2009) will be helpful to capture these goal concepts in greater detail.

Additionally, the concept should be applied to different forms of news genres and media texts with more (gradual) background information in order to gain further support for the results presented here.

Whereas minimal goals seemed to be mentioned very often in coverage about people with migration background, maximal goals were coded very rarely. This might be a systematic effect due to the particular type of discourse examined in this study and therefore needs to be tested further. From our perspective, an explanation for this effect lies in the nature of TV news: As it usually addresses more negative and absolute issues, our results seem quite reasonable. Despite these limitations, we still think that there is a strong and promising capability lying in this concept for the analysis of intergroup conflict in the public debate.

In his book on "Media and Morality" Silverstone (2007) states:

"... the world's media are an increasingly significant site for the construction of a moral order ... as they provide the symbolic connection and disconnection that we have to the other ... who is the distant other ... the media are becoming crucial environments in which morality appropriate to the increasingly interrelated but still horrendously divided and conflictful world might be found" (pp. 7-8)

Hence, as media and public discourses on the integration of minority groups are becoming more complex and differentiated, we need to carefully distinguish between different lines and levels of conflicts. In this realm, media frames as well as minimal and maximal goals are helpful for the analysis of media coverage about integration. The representation of social groups seems to be dependent on more than just negative versus positive evaluations. As our findings reveal, the question of gradual versus absolute expressions of goals and the combination of particular elements of coverage are crucial in developing and adhering public images of social groups represented in the mass media.

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On the author: Denise Sommer, Research Associate at the Department of Communication and Media Studies, University of Leipzig. Research Interests: interpersonal communication, attitudes and communication processes, media and migration and communication theories.

Address: Universität Leipzig, Institut für Kommunikations- und Medienwissenschaft, Lehrstuhl für Historische und Systematische Kommunikationswissenschaft, Burgstr. 21, 04109 Leipzig, Germany.

eMail: dsommer@uni-leipzig.de

URL: <http://www.kmw.uni-leipzig.de/bereiche/kommunikationswissenschaft/profil/>

Georg Ruhrmann, Chair of Mediated Communication and Media Effects, Institute for Communication Research at the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena. Research Interests: content analysis, crisis communication, media and migration.

Address: Friedrich Schiller Universität Jena, Institut für Kommunikationswissenschaft, Lehrstuhl für Grundlagen medialer Kommunikation und Medienwirkung, Ernst-Abbe-Platz 8, 07743 Jena, Germany.

eMail: Georg.Ruhrmann@uni-jena.de

URL: <http://www.ifkw.uni-jena.de>

Appendix

Coding instructions:

Variable	Explanation, Examples, Indicators	Categories
Minimal goal	<p>Minimal goals are <i>absolute</i> standards. Their violation is usually perceived as threatening and not tolerable at all, (i.e. laws, the constitution or essential societal and ethical rules like: you never laugh at death). A minimal goal separates two different regions of valence: By failing a minimal goal the region of valence is clearly negative whereas by compliance to minimal goals the region of valence is non-negative. Thus, compliance to minimal goals is taken for granted whereas sanctions for minimal goal violation are especially hard.</p> <p><i>Indicators:</i> Legal convictions and sanctions, deportation or eviction resolutions as well as other acts of exclusion (excluding members of associations or parties), any kind of obligatory rule, demands to obey a certain law, argumentation with interdiction.</p>	Yes = 1, No = 0
Maximal goal	<p>Maximal goals also separate two areas of valence. However, these areas are positive and gradually defined. Maximal goals are positively evaluated <i>gradual</i> goals, comparable to ideals which are good to achieve but whose fulfillment is not absolutely necessary (i.e.: everyone in the world promotes and supports integration and tolerance for everybody). Achievement of maximal goals is evaluated extremely positively whereas failure is evaluated non-positively but not necessarily negatively.</p> <p><i>Indicators:</i> general demands for the improvement of a certain situation (more and better promotion in the education of children with migration background, demonstrations against war or bad working conditions), unexpected success and achievement, future strategies and visions, affirmative action, campaigns, initiatives (open days, cultural events etc.).</p>	Yes = 1, No = 0
Goal conflict	<p>Goal conflicts evolve, for example, if one group takes a certain goal as a minimal goal whereas the other group interprets it as maximal goal. In Germany, school attendance is mandatory and as such a minimal goal whereas in other countries it is a maximal goal because it would be the ideal case that can just not be realized for administrative and financial reasons.</p> <p>Maximal goals defined by one group might also threaten minimal goal achievement of the other group: Some religious groups have the ideal and maximal goal to persuade as many people as possible of their religion. This might contradict constitutionally determined religious freedom of other groups.</p> <p>Conflicts may also arise if two different minimal goals are in dissent: If people are physically harmed because they have offended family honor which is a strong minimal goal violation in certain social groups the minimal goal of not exerting any kind of physical violence contradicts the minimal goal of preserving family honor under all circumstances.</p>	Yes = 1, No = 0
Minimal goal violation	<p>Violations of minimal goals include any verifiable action against important ethical and societal standards and every criminal act which has actually been conducted (<i>no suspicions!</i>).</p>	Yes = 1, No = 0
Maximal goal violation	<p>Violations of maximal goals encompass every action blocking or inhibiting the improvement of a situation or preventing to find an optimal solution or compromise.</p> <p><i>Indicators:</i> Laws and standards are introduced instead of projects or initiatives with 'open' objectives; financing of activities and initiatives is cut down.</p>	Yes = 1, No = 0

Steffen Hillebrecht (2009). Kommunikation und Medien. Ein Arbeitsbuch für Hochschule und Praxis. Gernsbach: Deutscher Betriebswirte-Verlag.

Man braucht keine Beweise vorzulegen, um argumentieren zu können, dass Kommunikation genau so alt wie die Menschheit ist. "Man kann nicht nicht kommunizieren" (Watzlawick et al. zitiert in Kempf 2009, 273). Obwohl Kommunikation als Wissenschaft eine relativ junge Disziplin ist, hat das letzte Jahrhundert zahlreiche Forschungen, Studien, Zeitschriften und Bücher hervorgebracht. Für Einsteiger oder Nichtwissenschaftler wird es immer schwieriger, sich in diesem Feld zu orientieren und sich über erfolgreiche Kommunikationsstrategien und Massenmediengesellschaft aus praktischer Sicht zu informieren.

Mit dem vorliegenden Arbeitsbuch Kommunikation und Medien stellt der Autor Steffen Hillebrecht, der über langjährige Erfahrungen in Medien und Presseberatung verfügt, eine ausführliche Einführung in Kommunikation und Medien für Hochschulen und Praxis zur Verfügung. Das Buch ist übersichtlich in fünf Kapitel "Die Grundlagen der Kommunikation", "Die Gestaltung von Kommunikation", "Die Gestaltung der Kommunikation in Gesellschaft und Unternehmen", "Medien und Massenkommunikation" und "Die Medienwissenschaft als Beschreibung organisierter Kommunikation" gegliedert. Die thematisch geteilten und kurz definierten Sub-Kapitel und umfangreichen Abbildungen sorgen für angenehme Lesbarkeit. Jedes Kapitel beginnt mit einer kurzen Einleitung und einer Auflistung der intendierten Lernaspekte. Jedes Unterkapitel wird mit wichtigen Schlussfolgerungen stichpunktartig zusammengefasst, was den Lernprozess anregt. Das Buch richtet sich an einen breitgefächerten Personkreis aus verschiedenen Disziplinen, die sich einen Überblick über Arten, Formen und Mittel der Kommunikation wie auch über Organisation, Gestaltung, Analyse und Ökonomie der Medien verschaffen wollen.

Um einen ersten Kontakt mit seinem Publikum herzustellen, definiert der Autor zuerst den Begriff Kommunikation als "in Gemeinschaft zu sein" und "etwas mit[zu]teilen" und zeigt dadurch, wie er mittels eingeführter Definition bereits erfolgreich Kommunikation zwischen Autor und uns Lesern betrieben hat. Durch die ersten drei Kapitel versucht Hillebrecht, diesen Kontakt mit Hilfe konkreter Situationen und direkt gestellter Fragen aufrechtzuerhalten. Es gelingt ihm auch, mit Hilfe lebendiger Beispiele aus Alltag, Geschichte, Kunst, Wirtschaft, Kinematographie, Sport, Psychologie, Konfliktlösung, Politik usw. den Leser dazu zu bringen, über eigene Kommunikationsformen und Verhaltensweisen und über die der Anderen nachzudenken und zu reflektieren. Unabhängig davon, ob man sich als Absender oder Empfänger positioniert: Man findet auf diesen Seiten wertvolle Ratschläge, wie man erfolgreich mit anderen kommuniziert, die Gründe gescheiterter Kommunikation erkennt und konstruktiv mit ihnen umgeht. Sei es als Verkäufer am Arbeitsplatz oder als Vorgesetzter im Büro, man wird die von Hillebrecht angeführten alltagsnahen Erklärungen und Kommunikationsstrategien bereichernd finden. Allerdings, wie der Autor auch selbst anerkennt, dienen die zitierten Werke von renommierten Wissenschaftlern wie Karl Bühler, Harold Laswell, Paul Lazarsfeld, Niklas Luhmann und Friedemann Schulz von Thun u. a. nicht so sehr der ausführlichen Auseinandersetzung mit verschiedenen Kommunikationsaspekten oder der Vertiefung des Wissens darüber, sondern lediglich dazu, Interesse und Neugier bei dem Leser zu wecken. Weil Hillebrecht auf spezifisch deutsche Beispiele zurückgreift und dabei das Wort "wir" benutzt, wird es für nichtdeutsche Leser zunächst schwer, sich als Zielgruppe des Buches zu verstehen. Das Gefühl verschwindet aber schnell, denn der Leser zieht Vorteile daraus und lernt Einiges über Kommunikationsaspekte in der deutschen Sprache und Kultur.

Das vierte Kapitel bietet einen umfangreichen Überblick über Elemente, Organisation, Gestaltung und Innovationen in Medien und Massenkommunikation. Wie werden Medien erstellt, aufbereitet und verteilt? Wie unterscheiden sich die Kernleistungen von deutschen Journalisten und Redakteuren und wo liegen die Abgrenzungen zu PR-Arbeit? Wie unterscheidet man objektive von neutraler Berichterstattung? Was ist Propaganda und warum hat das Wort eine negative Konnotation? Der Leser erhält Antworten auf diese Fragen und wird überdies über staatliches Handeln, Rechtsrahmen der gesellschaftlichen Kommunikation und Sozial- und Marktforschung als Kommunikationsinstrumente informiert.

Das fünfte Kapitel wird besonders bei jungen, empirisch ausgerichteten Wissenschaftlern gut ankommen, wobei es auch für Nichtwissenschaftler hoch interessant sein dürfte, einen Einblick in medienpsychologische und mediensoziologische Grundlagen zu bekommen. Wie wirken Medien auf die einzelnen Personen? Wie wird soziale Wirklichkeit durch die Medien überhaupt erst konstruiert? Wie wirken die dargestellten Inhalte auf Handlungsdispositionen des Konsumenten? Welche Medien werden in Deutschland von verschiedenen sozialen Gruppen benutzt und in welchem Umfang? Inwieweit sind medienpädagogische Maßnahmen umsetzbar? Obwohl der Autor sich mit diesen und anderen medienwissenschaftlichen Fragen intensiv auseinandersetzt und seine Analyse durch empirische Erkenntnisse stützt, mag mancher skrupulöse Leser fragen, warum der Autor die vielen gestellten Fragen unbeantwortet lässt. Dieses Kapitel bietet keine methodologischen Vorgehensweisen oder erschöpfenden theoretischen Grundlagen an, über die der Leser sich vertieft informieren könnte oder die dazu dienen könnten, wissenschaftliche empirische Forschung zu betreiben. Es vermittelt lediglich eine Übersicht und überlässt es dem Leser, darüber nachzudenken, welche

Medienaspekte untersucht werden könnten. Hillebrecht schließt sein Buch mit der entsprechenden Anmerkung, dass viele medienwissenschaftliche Ansätze unerwähnt blieben und es dem Wissenschaftler folglich überlassen sei, einen eigenen, aus seiner Sicht am besten geeigneten Weg zu wählen und diesen entsprechend der wissenschaftlichen Konventionen offenzulegen.

Auf jeden Fall gibt Hillebrecht wertvolle Hinweise aus praxisorientierter Sicht, wie die Medien im deutschsprachigen Raum organisiert sind und bietet eine interessante und anregende Lektüre für jeden, der in unterschiedlichen Kontexten erfolgreich kommunizieren will.

Literatur

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Irina Wolf

Über die Autorin: Irina Wolf arbeitet seit 2008 an ihrem Ph.D. über Presseberichterstattung über Hizb ut-Tahrir in deutschen, britischen und kirgisischen Zeitungen zwischen 2002 und 2007 und ist Mitarbeiterin in der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung an der Universität Konstanz. Sie erwarb ihren B.A. und M.A. in Politikwissenschaft an der Amerikanischen Universität in Zentralasien und an der OSZE Akademie in Bischkek. Ihre Arbeitsschwerpunkte beinhalten quantitative und qualitative Methoden der Medieninhaltsanalyse, Konfliktforschung und politischer Islam.

Adresse: Wolf.Irina@gmail.com



Forschungsmethoden der Psychologie. Zwischen naturwissenschaftlichem Experiment und sozialwissenschaftlicher Hermeneutik.

Band I: Wilhelm Kempf (2003), Theorie und Empirie. 3. Auflage (2009). Berlin: regener, 377 Seiten, ISBN 978-3-936014-21-1, EUR 42,90

Band. II: Wilhelm Kempf (2008), Quantität und Qualität. Berlin: regener, 396 Seiten, ISBN 978-3-936014-15-0, EUR 44,90

Band. III: Wilhelm Kempf & Markus Kiefer (Hg.) (2009). Natur und Kultur. Berlin: regener, 366 Seiten, ISBN 978-3-936014-17-4, EUR 44,50

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Über die Unhaltbarkeit des Pseudostreits zwischen Erklären und Verstehen in der Psychologie

In den Sozialwissenschaften kam qualitativen Forschungsmethoden durch die zunehmende Verbreitung der Umfrageforschung in den 1950er-Jahren eine eher untergeordnete, ja die quantitativen Untersuchungstechniken ergänzende Funktion zu. Ab den 1970er-Jahren zeigt sich insbesondere durch den Einfluss der Chicago-Schule und der Frankfurter Schule im deutschsprachigen Raum ein Trend zu qualitativen Methoden. Diese Entwicklung war jedoch für die Psychologie keineswegs neu. Qualitative Verfahren (z.B. bei Moreno und Lewin) galten bereits in den 1930er- und 1940er-Jahren als wissenschaftlich bewährte Vorgehensweisen bei der Untersuchung psychologischer Fragestellungen. Eine Kontroverse zwischen quantitativer und qualitativer empirischer Sozialforschung ist jedoch allein schon deshalb irreführend, weil mit einer pointierten Überbetonung dieses Streits entscheidende Aspekte der Methodenbegründung (wie etwa die Frage nach den jeweiligen, den konkurrierenden Methoden zugrundeliegenden *Erkenntnisinteressen*) und damit die verschiedenen Ziele, denen die Methoden dienen, in den Hintergrund geraten.

Jenseits des Streits um qualitative vs. quantitative Methoden wurden in den 1990er-Jahren in der Psychologie Integrationsversuche zur Überwindung der sog. Erklären-Verstehen-Kontroverse unternommen, die auf die analytische Philosophie und Handlungstheorie wie auch auf die Phänomenologie Bezug nahmen, weil in diesen Theorietraditionen die Kluft zwischen Erklären (als Aufgabe der Naturwissenschaften) und Verstehen (als Aufgabe der Sozialwissenschaften) bereits als überbrückt gilt: Verstehen wird als logisches Verständnis von Handlungen und Handlungsmotiven verstanden (von Wright 1984), und Erklärung – wie Graumann (1985, 54f.) es formulierte – wird insofern als Form der intentionalen Beschreibung aufgefasst, als man dem Verhalten den Sinn und damit seine prinzipielle Verstehbarkeit belässt und entsprechend "die Rekonstruktion der Sinnstruktur situativen Sich-Verhaltens als methodische Aufgabe auch der Psychologie" begreift, welche – mit Jüttemann (1991, 103) gesprochen – darin besteht, "subjektiv begründetes menschliches Handeln in einer wissenschaftlich adäquat erscheinenden Weise deskriptiv und – im Sinne eines relativ weit gefassten Erklärungsbegriffs – explikativ zu erfassen". Psychologie darf also nicht an einer die Erklärung von Handlungsintentionen ausblendenden Gleichsetzung von Erklären mit naturwissenschaftlichem Erklären festhalten, sondern muss sich eines Erklärungsbegriffs bedienen, welcher das Erklären von Handeln aus Gründen ermöglicht (Maiers 1994, 75).

In diesen übergeordneten Kontext der Problematik einer Integration von Quantität und Qualität lässt sich das aus drei Bänden bestehende Lehrbuchwerk von Wilhelm Kempf einordnen, welches das Ziel verfolgt, die Mannigfaltigkeit der Psychologie in systematischer Berücksichtigung des Zusammenspiels von Gegenstandsverständnis, Wissensideal und Aufgabenverständnis psychologischer Forschung deutlich werden zu lassen. Alle drei Bände, "Theorie und Empirie", "Quantität und Qualität", "Natur und Kultur", tragen den Untertitel "Zwischen naturwissenschaftlichem Experiment und sozialwissenschaftlicher Hermeneutik", was auf die integrative Absicht des Autors schließen lässt. Aber es handelt sich nicht – wie in anderen Methodenbüchern meist der Fall – um reine Vermittlung von Informationen über vorhandene Methoden, Verfahren und/oder Techniken, sondern um die Vorstellung und Begründung einer kompakten Systematik wissenschaftlichen Forschens. Psychologische Methodenlehre wird immer im Zusammenhang mit den je konkreten Inhalten der Psychologie thematisch. Der Heterogenität innerhalb der Psychologie wird mit einem konstruktiv-integrativen Blick begegnet, welcher es ermöglicht, die unterschiedlichen Wissensideale in ihrer Geltung anzuerkennen. Diese Wissensideale – so eine zentrale These des Werkes insgesamt – implizierten zwar jeweils unterschiedliche methodische Schritte zur Geltungsprüfung von Theorien, können einander jedoch fruchtbar ergänzen.

Theorie und Empirie

Der erste Band fokussiert die Grundbegriffe der Methodologie und Methodik und verfolgt dabei die Absicht, den Zusammenhang der verschiedenen Spezialgebiete der psychologischen Methodenlehre untereinander und deren Verknüpfung mit den substanzwissenschaftlichen Inhalten der Psychologie herzustellen.

Insgesamt besteht das Buch aus drei Kapiteln: Im ersten Kapitel wird der Begründungszusammenhang zwischen den Aufgaben der Wissensbildung, der logischen Struktur von Theorien und den Methoden ihrer Geltungsprüfung systematisch erörtert (S. 28f.). Von zentraler Bedeutung ist die These, zur psychologischen Methodenlehre gehörten nicht nur die wissenschaftlichen Erklärungsmodelle, derer sich die Psychologie bei ihrer Theorienbildung bediene, sondern auch die Methoden der Geltungsprüfung von Theorien sowie die Methoden des Aufbaus einer psychologischen Wissenschaftssprache.

Explikation von strukturellen und empirischen Theorieanteilen als Chance für empirische Forschung

Um die Unterscheidung zwischen strukturellen und implikativen Sätzen zu präzisieren, greift Kempf auf die Unterscheidung zwischen Vernunftwahrheiten und Tatsachenwahrheiten zurück (S. 57). Auf dieser Ebene wird eine Typologie des Wahrheitsbegriffs aufgestellt und zwischen strukturellen, also (sach)logisch begründbaren, und empirischen Theorieanteilen unterschieden. Eine eingehende Behandlung der Problematik struktureller und empirischer Theorieanteile in psychologischen Theorien erfolgt im Kapitel 3.7 am Beispiel der Frustrations-Aggressions-Hypothese. Kempfs Ausführungen bleiben nicht bei der Kritik einer lediglich auf Pseudoempirie gestützten psychologischen Forschung stehen. Der eigentliche Gewinn dieser differenzierten Analyse besteht darin, dass konkrete Möglichkeiten zur optimalen Nutzung der in den diskutierten Ansätzen enthaltenen empirischen Theorieanteile für die empirische Forschung aufgezeigt werden: Die Identifizierung der strukturellen Theorieanteile soll nämlich dazu beitragen, empirische Forschungsfragen präziser stellen zu können und entsprechend empirische Methoden zu entwickeln, die dem Forschungsgegenstand besser gerecht werden, als dies im Rahmen einer pseudoempiristischen Forschungslogik der Fall ist.

Von den die Psychologie interessierenden Fragen über angemessene Antworten zu angestrebten Praxen

Besondere Aufmerksamkeit verdient Kapitel 1.4., weil dort die grundlegende Frage nach dem Aufgabenverständnis, Gegenstandsverständnis und Wissensideal der Psychologie diskutiert wird. Bereits mit der Formulierung von eine Wissenschaft interessierenden Fragen sind Forscher(innen) bei dem ihr zugrunde liegenden Gegenstandsverständnis angelangt (S. 62ff.). Auf der Basis dieser Differenzierung gelingt es dem Autor, Kriterien einzuführen, mit deren Hilfe wissenschaftliche Theorien, Konzepte und Ansätze hinsichtlich ihres Gegenstandsverständnisses befragt werden können. Woran lässt sich z.B. die Orientierung des Erkenntnisinteresses an der technischen Verwertbarkeit von Wissen erkennen? Welchem Wissensideal folgen wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen, in denen die Kontrolle des Verhaltens der Individuen im Vordergrund steht? Auf welche Weise korrespondiert das jeweilige Gegenstandsverständnis mit dem Erkenntnisinteresse einer Wissenschaft? Auf dieser Grundlage kann ebenfalls – etwa im Sinne einer Interventionsforschung – beurteilt werden, *aufgrund welcher Erkenntnisse (Wissensideal)*, ursprünglich angestoßen *durch welche Forschungsfragen (Gegenstandsverständnis)* und anhand welcher Praxisvorstellung (*Aufgabenverständnis*) *welche* Interventionsvorschläge schließlich formuliert werden.

Den Einwand, dieses Kapitel hätte wegen seiner hohen Brisanz ruhig etwas ausführlicher ausfallen können, kann man leicht mit dem Argument zurückweisen, dass die in diesem Abschnitt nur grob umrissenen beiden Wissensideale in den unmittelbar darauffolgenden Kapiteln (2 & 3) systematisch, und zwar durchgängig im Zusammenhang mit den vier Formen der Erklärung (deduktiv-nomologisch, induktiv-statistisch, intentional und narrativ), erörtert werden. In diesen Kapiteln wird exemplarisch aufgezeigt, wie durch Explikation der wesentlichen Bestimmungs- und Strukturmerkmale eines Gegenstandsbereiches (z.B. Aggression und Gewalt) eine Präzisierung der Erklärungsaufgabe im Sinne des aristotelischen Wissensideals und wie durch das hieran anknüpfende galileische Wissensideal eine empirische Erklärung der betreffenden Phänomene erreicht werden können.

Zum Zusammenspiel der unterschiedlichen Erklärungsmodelle der Psychologie

Den Begriff "empirische Erklärung" reserviert der Autor sowohl für Analysen, die sich im Rahmen des Bedingungsdiskurses (deduktiv-nomologisches und induktiv-statistisches Erklärungsmodell) bewegen, als auch für solche, die dem Begründungsdiskurs (narratives und das intentionales Erklärungsmodell) verpflichtet sind. Nach einer ausführlichen Diskussion des deduktiv-nomologischen Erklärungsmodells geht es im Kapitel 2.5 um experimentelle Hypothesenprüfung. Dafür greift der Autor auf bekannte Experimente der Sozialpsychologie (Ferienlagerexperiment von Sherif und Milgram-Experiment) zurück (S. 152f.). Es wird anschaulich herausgearbeitet, dass Experimente, die traditionell im Rahmen des deduktiv-nomologischen und/oder des induktiv-statistischen Erklärungsmodells als Methoden zur Geltungsprüfung von Theorien eingesetzt werden, im Kontext der intentionalen und/oder der narrativen Erklärung einer anderen Funktion dienen (S. 156). Der Aufweis des besonderen Stellenwerts von Experimenten bei wissenschaftlichen Erklärungen jenseits des deduktiv-nomologischen Erklärungsmodells kann als Beleg dafür angesehen werden, dass das Experiment als Methode nicht per se nur für ein bestimmtes Erklärungsmodell reserviert ist, d.h. dass das jeweilige Gegenstandsverständnis in einer wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung die Auswahl der Methode bestimmt (*Primat des Gegenstandes vor der Methode*) und nicht umgekehrt.

Bereits an mehreren Stellen des ersten Bandes nähert sich der Autor der Frage, inwieweit die Deutung beobachtbaren Verhaltens als intentionale Handlung empirisch zugänglich sei. Die besonderen Überprüfungsprobleme bei intentionalen Erklärungen (Kap. 3.2) rührten zweifelsohne daher, dass Deutungsprädikatoren keine Beobachtungen, sondern theoretische Konstrukte beschreiben. Dabei sei es gewiss kein leichtes Unterfangen, Sinngehalte (Absichten, Situationseinschätzungen, Meinungen und Wissen,

Lösungsstrategien etc.) zum Handeln der Subjekte hinzuzukonstruieren. Kempf spricht im Falle des intentionalen Erklärungsmodells insofern von einer Erweiterung des Gegenstandsverständnisses und des Wissensideals der Psychologie, als nicht (nur) Fragen nach Bedingungen, sondern (auch) nach Gründen menschlichen Handelns im Mittelpunkt stehen (S. 239). Hervorzuheben sind in diesem Zusammenhang die Analysekatoren, die der Überprüfung von Hypothesen über Prämissen menschlichen Handelns dienen sollen. Es wird aufgezeigt, wie mittels genetischer Argumentation, empirischer Reduktion und pragmatischer Evaluation der Empiriebezug subjektwissenschaftlicher Erklärungen hergestellt werden kann. Diese methodologischen Ausführungen können richtungsweisend eingebracht werden in die aktuelle Diskussion darüber, auf welche Weise sich die subjektwissenschaftliche Psychologie als empirische Wissenschaft erweisen kann. Unmissverständlich wird davon ausgegangen, dass die Begründungen zu den Prämissen nicht im Verhältnis empirischer Kontingenz stehen, weil Prämissen-Gründe-Zusammenhänge immer erster Person sind, und Handlungsvorsätze nur vom Standpunkt des Subjekts als unmittelbare vernünftige Konsequenz unter bestimmten, subjektiv bedeutsamen Handlungsprämissen ableitbar sind. Gleichwohl bilden Aussagen über Handlungsprämissen keine implikativen Sätze, sondern können an der Empirie scheitern. Die Rede von pragmatischer Evaluation, wo Hypothesen über Handlungsprämissen aufgrund des Misslingens einer auf den angenommenen Handlungsgründen gestützten Praxis falsifiziert werden, impliziert im Umkehrschluss Kriterien (S. 245), anhand derer die Richtigkeit einer intentionalen Erklärung beurteilt werden kann. Somit kann Kempfs Ansatz weiterführende methodische Diskussionen über die Entwicklung von Evaluationskriterien sowohl für die psychologische Praxis als auch für Forschungsprogramme (Handlungsforschung) initiieren, die auf der Grundlage ihrer Ergebnisse auf eine Verbesserung der Lebenslage der Subjekte bzw. auf die Förderung angemessener Formen der individuellen Ausgestaltung sozialer Probleme durch die Betroffenen abzielen.

Plädoyer für einen methodologischen Paradigmenwechsel: Die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit als zentraler Forschungsgegenstand

Um einen empirischen Zugang zu Selbst- und Weltverständnissen von Menschen zu ermöglichen, plädiert Kempf für einen methodologischen Paradigmenwechsel, welcher die gesellschaftliche Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit zum zentralen Forschungsgegenstand macht und den Analysefokus auf die sozialen und kulturellen Regeln legt, denen die subjektiven Wirklichkeitskonstruktionen folgen (S. 335). Dieses Kapitel setzt innovative begriffliche Akzente in der Diskussion über die Objektivität von Forschungsergebnissen. Objektivität könne nicht durch Distanzierung des Forschers vom Forschungsgegenstand, sondern durch *Transzendierung seiner Subjektivität* gewährleistet werden (S. 258). Gefordert wird also eine qualitative Forschung, die die "Illusion der Voraussetzungslosigkeit" überwindet, eine internalisierte Intersubjektivität durchbricht und auf der Basis reflexiven Theoriewissens entlang der Analysekatoren genetische Rekonstruktion, empirische Reduktion und pragmatische Evaluation einen empirischen Beitrag leistet.

Quantität und Qualität

Textinterpretation und *Inhaltsanalyse*, die dem Wissensideal der qualitativen Forschung verpflichtet sind, sowie *Psychometrie* als die konsequenteste Umsetzung des quantifizierenden Wissensideals in der Psychologie stehen im Mittelpunkt des zweiten Bandes. Während im ersten Kapitel konkret aufgezeigt wird, wie durch textanalytische Verfahren eine methodisch fundierte Rekonstruktion von Bedeutungen (als Aufgabe der qualitativen Forschung) erreicht werden kann, werden im zweiten Kapitel psychometrische Methoden und Modelle dargestellt; wobei eine statistische Theorie psychologischer Daten präsentiert wird, deren forschungspraktische Bedeutung weit über die Textpsychologie hinausreicht. Der Schwerpunkt bei der anwendungsnahen Darstellung der psychometrischen Verfahren liegt auf den mathematischen Grundregeln und der Diskussion der klassischen sowie der probabilistischen Testtheorie in einem allgemeinen, beide Schulrichtungen integrierenden theoretischen Modell. Die beiden Wissensideale, die bereits im ersten Band in ihren methodologischen Besonderheiten und methodischen Implikationen vorgestellt wurden, werden hier eingehend verdeutlicht. Insgesamt liefert der zweite Band zahlreiche Praxisbeispiele, welche nicht allein Einblicke in Forschungsverläufe ermöglichen, sondern konkrete Arbeitsweisen am Material anbieten.

Methodentriangulation, Offenheitsprinzip, narratives Interview und kommunikative Validierung auf dem Prüfstand

Wird das Augenmerk auf eine Integration qualitativer und quantitativer Forschungsmethoden in der Psychologie gelegt, so wird dieses Postulat gewiss nicht durch eine Triangulation im Sinne eines auf Erhöhung der Validität der Ergebnisse abzielenden ‚MethodenMix‘ verstanden. Die vom Autor formulierte Integrationsforderung geht über den Triangulationsgedanken insofern hinaus, als hier – konsequent vom Primat des Gegenstandes vor der Methode ausgehend – versucht wird, durch den Einsatz verschiedener Methoden Antworten auf diverse Fragestellungen zu suchen. Diesem erweiterten Verständnis des Triangulationskonzepts liegt die Ausgangsposition zugrunde, quantitative und qualitative Sozialforschung unterschieden sich nicht erst in den von ihnen favorisierten Methoden, sondern bereits hinsichtlich des Gegenstandsverständnisses und des Wissensideals (S. 18).

Beim "Prinzip der Reflexion" des Forschers über seine oft impliziten Vorannahmen liegt der Ausgangspunkt der Kritik Kempfs auf jenen methodologischen Strömungen der qualitativen Forschung, die im Gewande des Offenheitsprinzips (Hoffmann-Riem 1980) im Grunde einer induktivistischen Forschungslogik das Wort reden.

Es werden Möglichkeiten aufgezeigt, wie durch die systematische Reflexion der Subjektivität des Forschers, seines Forschungsinteresses und seines Vorwissens Objektivität im Sinne eines methodisch kontrollierten Analyseprozesses erreicht werden kann (S. 32).

Im Unterschied zur Konzeption des narrativen Interviews (Schütze 1977), in der die Interviewten vorwiegend als Informanten betrachtet werden, arbeitet Kempf überzeugend heraus, warum es im psychologischen Interview notwendigerweise der Bereitschaft zur Preisgabe privater Realität auf Seiten des Interviewten bedürfe. Jenseits der Fiktion einer egalitären Kommunikation wird für eine Überwindung der Distanz zwischen Forscher und Forschungssubjekt plädiert und eine alltagsweltliche, vertrauliche Kommunikationsform favorisiert (S. 25).

Am Konzept der kommunikativen Validierung übt Kempf dahingehend Kritik, dass jeder Versuch, eine Konsensbildung anzustreben, problematisch sei, weil Interpretationen auch dann eine Gültigkeit besäßen, wenn die Betroffenen sie ablehnten. Auch könnten sie umgekehrt trotz Zustimmung ungültig sein, wenn diese etwa infolge sozialer Erwünschtheit zustande gekommen sei (S. 33). Eine mögliche theoretische und forschungsmethodische Alternative zu konsensorientierten Nachgesprächen könnten m. E. die im ersten Band (Band I, S. 231) formulierten begrifflichen Bestimmungen über Beschreibungsprädikatoren bieten: Da die subjektivistische Relativierung der eigenen Wahrnehmung der Wirklichkeit erst in Dissenssituationen erlernt wird, rücken individuell unterschiedliche Wahrnehmungen durch das "unvermeidliche Verfehlen einer Einigung" (ebd.) in Nachgesprächen ans Tageslicht. Diese terminologischen Abgrenzungen machen den theoretischen Ausgangspunkt des sog. Argumentativen Rückkoppelungsgesprächs (S. 72) aus, in dessen Konzeption es ja gerade darum geht, dass Interpret und Interpretierte zu den Interpretationen argumentativ Stellung nehmen, ihre eigenen Wahrnehmungen und subjektiven Wirklichkeiten kommunizieren, intersubjektiv geteilte Wirklichkeiten ‚aushandeln‘ und im gemeinsamen Dialog ggf. auch Kriterien für die Überprüfung der Angemessenheit ihrer Handlungsprämissen erarbeiten.

Sozialpsychologische Rekonstruktion

Sozialpsychologische Rekonstruktion (SPR) umfasst ein Spektrum von textanalytischen Methoden, das von der Textinterpretation über die qualitative bis hin zur quantitativen Inhaltsanalyse reicht und über den Einsatz psychometrischer Verfahren (Latent-Class-Analyse) eine Brücke zwischen den beiden Themen des Buches schlägt. Durch die systematische Darstellung dieses method(olog)ischen Ansatzes kann der Leser nachverfolgen, wie es im Forschungs-Analyseprozess gelingen kann, eine dem konkreten Forschungsgegenstand angemessene Integration quantitativer und qualitativer Methoden zu erreichen, und zwar auf allen der im Ansatz der SPR formulierten Ebenen der Verständnisbildung (logisches, psychologisches und sozio-logisches Verstehen). SPR als textinterpretatives Verfahren setzt gezielt an dem dialektischen Verhältnis zwischen Individuum und Gesellschaft an und bietet ein methodisches Instrumentarium zur empirischen Erforschung der Vermittlung der objektseitig definierten Randbedingungen in subjektive Prämissen menschlichen Handelns. Somit bildet sie eine Alternative zu textinterpretativen Methoden bzw. Auswertungstechniken (z.B. psychoanalytische Textinterpretation oder objektive Hermeneutik), die von einem mehr oder minder einseitigen Verhältnis zwischen Individuum und Gesellschaft ausgehen und durch ihre methodologischen Vorgaben Subjekten letztlich ihre prinzipielle Möglichkeit absprechen, sich zu den objektiven Bedingungen zu verhalten. Während bei Verfahren einer psychoanalytischen Textinterpretation die subjektiven Konstruktionen des Einzelnen im Mittelpunkt des wissenschaftlichen Interesses stehen und das Soziale bzw. die gesellschaftlichen Strukturen als allgemeine Bedingungen/Bedeutungen ausgeblendet werden, wird Subjektivität in anderen Ansätzen (etwa in der objektiven Hermeneutik) aus den vom Forscher wahrgenommenen objektiven Bedingungen abgeleitet. Wünschenswert wäre daher m. E. eine explizite Abgrenzung des Verfahrens der sozialpsychologischen Rekonstruktion nicht nur gegenüber psychoanalytisch angelegten hermeneutischen, sondern auch gegenüber anderen qualitativen textinterpretativen Verfahren, in denen dem Kontextwissen eine hohe Bedeutung für die Textinterpretation zukommt und die Erforschung von "Regeln der Lebenskonstruktion" im Vordergrund steht. Diese Aufgabe könnte für den Autor eine künftige Herausforderung sein, zumal eine ausführliche komparative Diskussion des SPR-Ansatzes die eigentliche Zielsetzung der Buchkonzeption sprengen würde.

Textinterpretation (Kap. 1.3) wird in drei unterschiedliche Varianten (Handlungsanalyse, Integrationsanalyse, Textanalyse i.e.S.) differenziert und mit Anwendungsbeispielen aus dem eigenen Datenmaterial von Forschungsprojekten der Projektgruppe Friedensforschung an der Universität Konstanz veranschaulicht (S. 44f.). Nachdem die Abhängigkeit zwischen Textart und Ziel der Textinterpretation in einer schematischen Darstellung verdeutlicht wurde, widmet der Autor mehrere Seiten der Präsentation der bei einer Textanalyse i.e.S. vorgesehenen Arbeitsschritte, um anschließend auf dieser empirischen Grundlage die gegenstandsbedingte Differenzierung der unterschiedlichen Varianten von Textinterpretation methodologisch zu begründen. Diesem Kapitel folgt die Darstellung des Ablaufs der quantitativen Inhaltsanalyse. Dort wird dem Leser der besondere Stellenwert der Latent-Class-Analyse für die Identifikation und Rekonstruktion von typischen Merkmalmustern deutlich, die als Indikatoren für die Argumentationsrichtung bei einer großen Stichprobe von Texten dienen. Kempf arbeitet überzeugend heraus, wie eine Integration quantitativer und qualitativer Inhaltsanalyse erreicht werden kann und wie durch die Verzahnung beider Arbeitsrichtungen methodisch kontrolliert eine optimale Kontextualisierung von Analyseergebnissen gelingen kann.

Der dritte Band sucht nach einer *Synthese von Objektivität und Subjektivität*. Es wird die Notwendigkeit betont, eine integrative Psychologie methodologisch zu begründen, welche gegenstandsbezogen verschiedene Forschungsmethoden einsetzt und die Dichotomie zwischen Natur- und Kulturwissenschaften überwindet. Das erste Kapitel, in dem Wilhelm Kempf eine Erweiterung des Gegenstandsverständnisses der Psychologie um das biologische Paradigma und um die Paradigmen der kognitiven Psychologie, der Neurowissenschaften, der Handlungstheorie und der kulturwissenschaftlichen Psychologie vornimmt, enthält die Vision einer auf transdisziplinäre Methodologie gestützten integrativen Psychologie und gibt die wesentliche Stoßrichtung der Argumentation vor, die sich wie ein roter Faden durch alle folgenden Beiträge zieht:

Gegenstandsangemessene Psychologie sei nur in der Einheit von Natur- und Kulturwissenschaft denkbar. Theoretisch wie auch empirisch untermauert und gegenstandsbezogen spezifiziert wird diese These aus mehreren Perspektiven, die in den einzelnen method(olog)ischen Beiträgen (Günter May & Katja Muck über Grounded Theory; Lynn Huestegge & Iring Koch über naturwissenschaftlich orientierte experimentelle Psychologie; Markus Kiefer über neurowissenschaftliche Methoden) erarbeitet werden. Den Beiträgen ist gemeinsam, dass sie die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der unterschiedlichen Methodentraditionen und Verfahren gezielt in den Kontext der psychologischen Methodendiskussion über die Bestimmung von Objektivitätskriterien in der Forschung stellen. Der Beitrag von Klaus Höning über die historische Verankerung des integrativen Gedankens in der Psychologie unterstreicht noch einmal die Forderung nach einer transdisziplinären Orientierung. Insgesamt überzeugt der dritte Band von der Notwendigkeit einer stärkeren Vernetzung der verschiedenen Richtungen im Sinne einer transdisziplinären Orientierung, weil sie differente Aspekte menschlichen Erlebens und Handelns abdecken und sich auf diese Weise optimal ergänzen können, ja sogar müssen, um der Vielfältigkeit und Komplexität menschlichen Daseins gerecht werden zu können.

Sozialer Konstruktivismus und methodologischer Konstruktivismus – Annäherungsversuche an die epistemologischen Grundlagen im Werk von Wilhelm Kempf

Die soziale Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit findet sich im Werk von Wilhelm Kempf als Forschungsgegenstand der Psychologie (sozialer Konstruktivismus) wie auch als wissenschaftstheoretische Position (methodologischer Konstruktivismus) wieder. Der soziale Konstruktivismus kommt genau beim Versuch der Explikation der Vermittlungsebene zwischen den objektiven Verhältnissen und den subjektiven Handlungsprämissen ins Spiel. So gesehen, kann diese theoretische Tradition einen wesentlichen Analysebeitrag leisten zu der Frage, welche Bedingungen/Bedeutungen zu subjektiven Prämissen für die Individuen werden; eine Frage die keineswegs beliebig, sondern immer unter Berücksichtigung der sozial ‚gefärbten‘ subjektiven Lebensinteressen des Einzelnen beantwortet werden kann. Für die empirische Erforschung dieser Lebensinteressen stellt der von Kempf weiterentwickelte und in die Methodendiskussion eingebrachte Terminus Lebensorientierungen einen Schlüsselbegriff dar: Lebensorientierungen seien insofern maßgeblich für die Konstitution der Situation und der handlungsauslösenden Konstellation, als die subjektseitig definierte Situation durch die Interpretation der objektseitig definierten Umweltbedingungen konstituiert werde. Die empirische Erfassung von Lebensorientierungen, welche die Interessen sowie das subjektive Erleben und Tun in einen sinnhaften Zusammenhang stellen, bedürfe der genetischen Rekonstruktion von Handlungen (vgl. Band I, S. 254f.). Durch Rekonstruktion von Lebensorientierungen wird methodisch ein empirischer Zugang zu den subjektiven Handlungsprämissen des Individuums eröffnet. Spätestens an diesem Punkt wird die Notwendigkeit des Einsatzes dialogischer Interviewtechniken deutlich, um durch Reflexion und Argumentation dem Sinnzusammenhang des Handelns und Erlebens von Individuen näherkommen zu können.

Vergegenwärtigt man sich den im Anschluss an Werbik & Appelsmeyer (1999) vorgeschlagenen dreidimensionalen Zugang zu Geschichten (Band I, S. 272 & Band III, S. 36), mittels derer Lebens- und Handlungsorientierungen expliziert werden können (*Perspektive des erzählenden Subjekts, des Interaktionspartners und des Beobachters*), so erkennt man unschwer die Analogie der Argumentationsstränge des Autors zu der im Band III (Kap. 2) vorgelegten Konzeption des methodologischen Konstruktivismus. Dort werden nämlich ebenfalls drei Ebenen und Formen sozialer Wirklichkeit unterschieden, deren gleichzeitige Berücksichtigung für einen gelingenden Prozess psychologischer Erklärung unerlässlich sei: *subjektive, intersubjektive* und *transsubjektive* Wirklichkeit.

Aufbauend auf die konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie, wie sie von Kamlah & Lorenzen (1967), Janich et al. (1974), Lorenzen & Schwemmer (1975) und Schwemmer (1976) erarbeitet wurde, grenzt sich Kempf gegenüber einem sozialen Konstruktivismus ab, der die Auffassung vertritt, jede Wirklichkeit sei immer nur relativ, jede Wirklichkeit stelle lediglich eine subjektive, bestenfalls intersubjektiv geteilte Wirklichkeit dar. Anhand des Konzepts der Fehlwahrnehmung bei Konflikteskalationen wird – entgegen der Auffassung von bestimmten Anhängern des sozialen Konstruktivismus – aufgezeigt, dass nicht alle subjektiven Wirklichkeiten gleichberechtigt nebeneinander stehen (dürfen). Zur Beurteilung von Bedeutungszuweisungen führt Kempf das *Kriterium der Angemessenheit* ein. Die Frage nach der Angemessenheit von Bedeutungszuweisungen lasse sich wiederum über die Orientierungsfunktion, welche die Bedeutungszuweisungen für das menschliche Handeln haben, entscheiden. Am Beispiel der Eskalation von Konflikten wird gezeigt, dass nicht die Regeln, denen die Konfliktwahrnehmung folge, als richtig oder falsch zu kritisieren seien. Sie könnten jedoch als unangemessen bzw. als angemessen beurteilt werden, je nachdem, ob sie für den weiteren Verlauf eskalations- oder deeskalationsträchtig fungierten. Konsequenterweise am Beispiel des menschlichen Handelns zu

Ende gedacht: Handlungen können an sich weder als richtig noch als falsch beurteilt werden. Ebenfalls kann nicht die Rede von unangemessenem, im Sinne von kontraproduktivem – weil eben problemreproduzierend wirkendem – Verhalten die Rede sein, sondern eher von einem Verhalten, welches – in Anbetracht handlungstheoretischen Wissens über intendierte und nicht intendierte Folgen menschlichen Handelns – kontraproduktive Folgen nach sich zieht. Analog dazu sind auch Begründungsmuster an sich nicht kritisierbar. Man kann lediglich dann an problematischen Handlungsprämissen, unter denen Subjekte Handlungsvorsätze als richtige, vernünftige Konsequenz ableiten, Kritik üben, wenn die Subjekte mit ihrem Verhalten mittel- oder langfristig Situationen und neue objektseitig definierte Randbedingungen schaffen, die eher zu einer Verschärfung und Reproduktion der Probleme als zu deren Lösung, führen.

Kempfs Ausführungen sind also in diesem Zusammenhang eine methodologische Innovation, weil durch die Bezugnahme auf die Ebene der transsubjektiven Wirklichkeit das Kriterium der Angemessenheit zur Überprüfung und Beurteilung von Prämissen menschlichen Handelns eingeführt und konkretisiert wird. Auf der Grundlage des methodologischen Konstruktivismus leistet Kempf nicht nur einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur Überwindung der dem sozialen Konstruktivismus innewohnenden Widersprüchlichkeit bei der Handhabung des Wirklichkeitsbegriffs, sondern schafft den erforderlichen methodologischen Überbau, durch welchen subjektwissenschaftliche Fragestellungen empirisch zugänglich gemacht und methodisch kontrolliert erforscht werden können.

Resümee

Mit dem Lehrbuchwerk Wilhelm Kempfs wird die Brücke zwischen Wissenschaftstheorie, Methodologie und Methode geschlagen, denn diese Ebenen des wissenschaftlichen Denkens und Handelns werden nicht separat voneinander beschrieben, sondern in ihrer Brisanz, Funktion und unmittelbaren Dienlichkeit zur Genese, Analyse und Beantwortung relevanter Fragestellungen erörtert. Die Integration quantitativer und qualitativer Forschungsmethoden wird nicht lediglich programmatisch gefordert, sondern anhand angemessener Veranschaulichungsbeispiele exemplarisch umgesetzt und begründet präsentiert. Durch fundierte method(olog)ische Reflexionen gelingt es dem Autor, Struktur, Verläufe und Funktion psychologischer Forschung verständlich zu vermitteln. Die Lektüre der drei Bände liefert zahlreiche Impulse sowohl für Anwendungsforschung als auch für weitere Methodenreflexionen und lädt die Lesenden gewissermaßen zu einer Reise ein, auf der unterschiedliche Perspektiven und Einsichten über die Vielfalt methodologischen Denkens angeboten werden. Das im Lehrbuchwerk abgedeckte breite Spektrum – von Wissenschaftstheorie über Methodologie und Theorie bis hin zu einzelnen Facetten der komplexen Forschungspraxis – macht dessen besondere Qualität aus, die Lesende in anderen Büchern über psychologische Methodenlehre mitunter schmerzlich vermissen mögen. Vor allem junge Wissenschaftler(innen) werden dazu angeregt, die in den drei Bänden präsentierten Grundideen und zentralen Argumentationsstränge in ihren eigenen Forschungen nachzuvollziehen und auch weiterzudenken. Anliegen des Autors war es zwar, "die behandelten Methodenprobleme nicht nur aus ihrer methodologischen Systematik, sondern auch aus der Psychologie selbst heraus" (Band I, S. 9) abzuleiten, doch gelang es diesem Entwurf einer Methodenlehre darüber hinaus in hervorragender Weise, grundsätzliche Positionen zu entwickeln, deren Relevanz und Geltung weit über die eigentliche einzelwissenschaftliche Herkunft (Psychologie) der erarbeiteten Positionen hinausreichen.

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Wassilios Baros

Über den Autor: Wassilios Baros, Dr. päd., Hochschullehrer für interkulturelle Bildung und Erziehung an der Democritus University of Thrace (Alexandroupolis).

Arbeitsschwerpunkte: Interkulturelle Bildung, interkulturelle Kommunikation und Konfliktforschung, qualitative Sozialforschung, Migration und Capability-Forschung..

eMail: vbaros@eled.duth.gr

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