Undermining lobbying coalitions : the interest group politics of EU copyright reform

Abstract

Recent studies show that, when salience is high, ‘heterogeneous lobbying coalitions’ uniting business and civil society groups are more successful in achieving their lobbying objectives than homogeneous coalitions. It is therefore surprising that a coalition of tech firms and civil society activists failed to prevent the adoption of the EU’s contested 2019 Copyright Directive, which constitutes a significant shift in the Union’s approach to online content regulation. This article argues that proponents of the policy change successfully undermined the lobbying coalition by invoking notions of ‘digital sovereignty’ and by delegitimizing activists as Silicon Valley’s ‘useful idiots’. Combining process-tracing of the lobbying processes and content analysis of European Parliament debates, the article shows how legislators employed delegitimation and sovereignty claims to justify their non-responsiveness to public protests. The article contributes to the interest group literature and debates on ‘digital sovereignty’ by demonstrating its strategic use in the policy-making process.