@article{elWakil2023-01-10Dutyo-59741,
  year={2023},
  doi={10.1017/S0034670522001061},
  title={The Duty-of-Office Accountability and Democratic Power},
  issn={0034-6705},
  journal={The Review of Politics},
  author={el-Wakil, Alice}
}

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    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Ceva and Ferretti provide rich, comprehensive, and thought-provoking answers to the question of what political corruption—understood as corruption that occurs in public institutions—is and when and why it is morally wrong. One aspect that greatly contributes to the book's originality and political relevance is its commitment to a “continuist” conception of (public) institutions (14), according to which institutions are nothing but the interrelated actions of their members—the officeholders entrusted, by virtue of their institutional role, with specific powers that they should always be able to use with a certain level of discretion. This conceptual starting point makes this book a compelling reminder that, even if designing and reforming formal institutions can be done effectively to shape the powers and incentives of institutional actors, we cannot focus only on formal institutional and procedural design to have functioning institutions. As Ceva and Ferretti argue, “no institution can be designed in such a way that makes it immune from political corruption, which may always sneak in per the officeholders’ work” (61)—namely, whenever public officeholders use their entrusted powers in a manner that is incompatible with the terms of their power mandate.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:contributor>el-Wakil, Alice</dc:contributor>
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    <dc:rights>Attribution 4.0 International</dc:rights>
    <dcterms:issued>2023-01-10</dcterms:issued>
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    <dcterms:title>The Duty-of-Office Accountability and Democratic Power</dcterms:title>
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