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Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations

Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations

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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, Sebastian KRANZ, 2022. Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations. In: Journal of the European Economic Association. Oxford University Press. ISSN 1542-4766. eISSN 1542-4774. Available under: doi: 10.1093/jeea/jvac047

@article{Goldlucke2022Recon-59005, title={Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations}, year={2022}, doi={10.1093/jeea/jvac047}, issn={1542-4766}, journal={Journal of the European Economic Association}, author={Goldlücke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian} }

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