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Repeated Response versus Strategy Method : Experimental Evidence from an Oversight Game

Repeated Response versus Strategy Method : Experimental Evidence from an Oversight Game

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LUTZ, Maximilian, Susumu SHIKANO, Markus TEPE, 2022. Repeated Response versus Strategy Method : Experimental Evidence from an Oversight Game. In: SAUERMANN, Jan, ed., Markus TEPE, ed., Marc DEBUS, ed.. Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie, Band 12. Wiesbaden:Springer VS, pp. 163-179. ISBN 978-3-658-35877-8. Available under: doi: 10.1007/978-3-658-35878-5_7

@incollection{Lutz2022Repea-58082, title={Repeated Response versus Strategy Method : Experimental Evidence from an Oversight Game}, year={2022}, doi={10.1007/978-3-658-35878-5_7}, isbn={978-3-658-35877-8}, address={Wiesbaden}, publisher={Springer VS}, booktitle={Jahrbuch für Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie, Band 12}, pages={163--179}, editor={Sauermann, Jan and Tepe, Markus and Debus, Marc}, author={Lutz, Maximilian and Shikano, Susumu and Tepe, Markus} }

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