Strategic public policy around population thresholds

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DE WITTE, Kristof, Benny GEYS, Nanna Lauritz SCHÖNHAGE, 2018. Strategic public policy around population thresholds. In: Journal of Urban Economics. Elsevier. 106, pp. 46-58. ISSN 0094-1190. eISSN 1095-9068. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2018.06.001

@article{DeWitte2018Strat-55414, title={Strategic public policy around population thresholds}, year={2018}, doi={10.1016/j.jue.2018.06.001}, volume={106}, issn={0094-1190}, journal={Journal of Urban Economics}, pages={46--58}, author={De Witte, Kristof and Geys, Benny and Schönhage, Nanna Lauritz} }

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